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ABSTRACT 
The thesis aims to establish an interpretative model of, or mode of response to, 
postmodern and in particular, poststructuralist architecture. The existing lacuna of 
interpretation in this area is the result of the disfiguring, but ubiquitous, 'language of 
architecture' formulation which is formally challenged here as part of the construction of 
a model of interpretation. Interpretation as a key term is not only dealt with specifically in 
Chapter Five, but is also illuminated for example by the discussion in Chapter Two of 
signification and the complex relationship between visual image and language, since 
language has to emerge holistically as an aspect of architectural meaning. 
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part One comprises four theoretical chapters which 
are not necessarily 'about' architecture as such, but which provide the theoretical 
components of a model of interpretation. It needs to be clearly stated that this model is 
not epistemologically exclusive or absolute in any sense, but is only one among many 
other interpretative possibilities. The first chapter deals with methodology and a literature 
review. 
Chapter Two establishes the importance of signification and the sign and the semiotics 
of image and word. Chapter Three deals with ideas of what the postmodern might mean 
since the architecture principally dealt with is poststructuralist. The fulcrum moment of 
schism between Modernism and Postmodemism around 1960 is discussed, as is the 
vitally important allegorical nature of the postmodern. Chapter Four looks at the 
philosophy of language and meaning since language is indispensably a part of 
postmodern architectural meaning. Chapter Five discusses interpretation within the 
development of literary theory which must underpin the reading of buildings as the 
source of a coherent account of interpretation in general as well as particular architectural 
meaning. 
Part Two contains two chapters. Both are specifically about architecture and how it 
might be read in postmodern and poststructuralist context. The first, Chapter Six, deals 
with the trace of the deVelopment of postmodern architecture as both an aspect of 
Modernist architecture and a subversive imperative against it. Chapter Seven, the final 
chapter, puts into practice in an almost Leavisite way the interpretative stances 
established in Part One. Major works by poststructuralist architects are read in terms of 
metaphor, especially visual metaphor, rhetoric and allegory. From Part One to Part Two 
is from theory to practice. 
The thesis concludes by suggesting that architectural poststructuralist semantics and 
interpretation can only be deepened by dispensing with 'the language of architecture' in 
favour of language as emergent from architecture; the language of architecture does not 
exist. 
LANGUAGE AND METAPHOR IN POSTMODERN ARCHITECTURAL MEANING: 
AN INTERPRETATIVE MODEL 
CHAPTER ONE: METIIODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The title here, Language And Metaphor In Postmodern Architectural Meaning: An 
Interpretative Model, suggests that postmodern architecture, unlike the Modernism from 
which it evolved, implicates meaning within the relationship of architectural built form 
and the visual metaphors it contains which become linguistic. Such visual metaphors do 
necessarily become linguistic because if postmodern architecture is assumed to have 
referential meaning, then that meaning can only be inferred through the process of 
readership. Readership in its tum is essentially both interpretative and 'literary'. The 
interpretation of architectural built form becomes linguistic as meaning emerges from the 
visual metaphors embedded in the form of buildings considered as postmodern. 
Modernist architecture, say that before Corbusier's Ronchamp, was largely anti-
referential and predicated on the form follows function relation. Its episteme was anti-
metaphorical in favour of an architecture that emphatically subjected form and 
architectural style to the dominating priorities and demands of structure and function. In 
this sense, Modernist architectural functionalism was inherently disinterested in metaphor 
and unconcerned with semantic inflection. Postmodern architecture has substantially 
subverted and reversed this position. It displays reference, often by a stylistic recursion to 
Historicist signposting such as faux classicism. This element of display is, certainly in 
early architectural postmodernism, an example of contrivance and theatricality. In this 
sense it is an architecture of rhetorical allusion. That this rhetorical display is, or was, 
playfully ironic or sardonic and subversive of architectural Modernism is now an 
established and accepted position in relation to early Postmodernism. However, a 
distinction needs to be drawn between early and late-phase postmodernist architecture, 
and it is the later manifestation which is mainly treated here and is the principle concern, 
and which is designated as poststructuralist. This later architecture is poststructuralist in 
the sense that it is heavily influenced by 'Theory', especially so when informed by 
Derrida and Deleuze. One essential aspect of 'Theory' is that derived from Craig Owen's 
foundational paper The Allegorical Imperative which seeks to establish that the driving 
mechanism ofthe postmodern aesthetic is palimpsest-like in its recursion to earlier forms; 
that is that poststructuralist architecture is construed and interpreted here as profoundly 
allegorical in its concern with both presence and absence. The allegorical ghost which, as 
it were, haunts the poststructuralist architectural form, is Modernism itself from which 
the postmodern emerged and yet remains an aspect of it. 
In many ways, the central issue of architectural meaning as the interpretation of visual 
metaphor is the demand that interpretation itself, as an inevitable act of readership as a 
literary act in part at least, necessarily becomes linguistic. In that sense, meaning flows 
from embedded built metaphor to become language. This 'unconcealing', as Heidegger 
would have it, is the philosophical justification of interpretation as language from built 
form. The phenomenological hermeneutics of the visual as instanced by Ileidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty is perhaps the best fit between built visual metaphor and language. And it 
follows from the semiotics of the sign as Lessing, Saussure, Peirce and Barthes for 
example have speculated, that the sign in order to signify, including visual signs, 
oscillates between the visual and the linguistic. 
In what has become a hugely influential semiotics of architecture, 'the language of 
formulation is now a widely, if not universally, accepted paradigm. The most influential 
work in this field in a generation has been Charles Jencks's The Language of Postmodern 
Architecture. But we are also confronted in a wider context by 'the language of sculpture' 
or 'the language of landscape' and so on. In attempting to generate a model of 
interpretation of postmodern architecture, a central argument here, amongst others, is that 
language is a product of architectural interpretation and is not an essential inherent 
property of architecture in the sense that language is understood to be an inherent 
property of the human mind. Interpretation as language emerging from architectural form 
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is fundamentally phenomenological. Assuming that architecture has an inherent 
propensity for language is, in the opposite direction, a product of philosophical idealism 
and is a contradiction of the proposed and supposed semiotic nature of 'the language of 
architecture'. There is no language of architecture; there is only language from and 
generated by architecture. Only texts have language, and architectural meaning only 
becomes textual after interpretation. 
Interpretation itself requires a frame of reference in order to prevent it succumbing to 
personal opinion or ad hoc accounts and narratives. The frame of reference secures the 
constitutive elements that constitute an interpretative model. The constitutive model here 
consists in having four underlying themes or epistemes. The first is the metaphorical 
nature of the sign and its visual and linguistic journey from Modernism to Postmodernism 
since metaphor is the genesis of postmodern architectural meaning. The second involves 
the discussion of the complex existential nature of Postmodernism itself since it is 
postmodern architecture that is the interpretative focus. The third is a philosophical and 
hermeneutical justification of the proposal that architectural meaning as encoded in visual 
metaphor 'unconceals' linguistically in acts of readership. The fourth is based on the 
assumption that any interpretation of an aesthetic object or process is necessarily 
linguistic and has to be grounded in literary theory which naturally subsumes readership 
itself. The four themes constitute the four chapters of Part One and holistically represent 
the model of interpretation. The two further chapters of Part Two discuss both the trace 
and the particular interpretation of mainly public buildings by poststructuralist architects 
such as Frank Gehry, Daniel Libeskind, Rem Koolhaas and Zaha Hadid. Part One 
represents the theoretical model of interpretation and Part Two the practical criticism of 
actual buildings - theory into practice. 
Within the four theoretical chapters of the first part are themes which spiral forward, or 
indeed, refer back retrospectively. What follows immediately as comparatively short, 
concentrated sections are the basic assumptions which appear throughout the thesis and 
underpin the interpretation in the second part. As the passage on methodology insists, this 
does not in any respect amount to a causal argument, more the constitutive elements of an 
interpretative model. 
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1 Architectural meaning must ultimately be linguistic and be derived from architectural 
shape and form and detail. Shape and form configure architecturally and in the 
postmodern, signify metaphorically. Meaning is not wholly governed by authorial 
intention. What the sign means is tripartite and is constitutive firstly of the form itself as 
signifier, secondly as architectural or authorial intention and thirdly as an 'interpretant' 
which confers a reading of the other two in a manner redolent of the hermeneutical circle. 
The tripartite nature of the sign is derived from Peirce who himself pointed out that each 
'interpretant' as an act of interpretation inevitably requires a subsequent interpretation, 
thus invoking an inevitable infinite regress and so making each interpretation and making 
each reading dependent on prior interpretations. In this way, the sign as a signifying 
entity is destabilised. Meaning in this sense cannot be fixed and restricted to intention. 
2 Meaning inheres in the sign and the sign is fundamentally and necessarily metaphorical. 
This is so because one thing which suggests or points to something else as the sign does 
as part of its nature is acting metaphorically and so requires interpretation. Without 
interpretation there is no sign in a meaningful sense. The presence of the metaphorical 
reference in the sign makes interpreting that sign an imperative. 
3 In postmodern architecture, the sign will be metaphorical and its interpretants infinitely 
regressive. The regressive nature of the sign creates a meaning which is layered on a 
previous meaning and represents a palimpsest. Any palimpsest, as an overlaying of one 
meaning or text on a previous one, then creates two conditions. The first, as an 
overlayering involves time. In tum, and secondly, this creates an absence and a presence. 
The postmodern sign is then a temporal palimpsest. And as Craig Owens has shown, the 
recursive dimension of time in the palimpsest always instigates the presence of the 
allegorical. The underlying presence of the allegorical as an essential element involved in 
interpreting the postmodern will be a recurrent theme here. 
4 The allegorical sign is both visual and linguistic. The relation between the visual or 
iconic sign and language is rather like the 'duck-rabbit'. At any moment, what is seen is 
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either the duck or the rabbit but actually never as both at precisely the same time. In 
allegory, the sign works by implicating a 'figure' which carries a conventional or 
language-based meaning. Gotthold Lessing's discussion of Horace's ut pictura poesis 
('as in painting so in poetry') initiates in the Enlightenment the modem interest in the 
relation of language and visual form and remains an important source. 
5 In postmodern architecture the allegorical sign is necessarily an aspect of rhetoric. The 
use of irony to produce a particular mood or tone in which something which is 'said' is 
used to convey an opposite or deliberately dissimilar meaning conforms to the rule of 
allegory to say one thing but mean another. This is the classical orator's device to signal 
to a knowing cognoscenti while apparently saying something more banal to the multitude. 
Postmodern architecture is allegorically ironic and therefore self-consciously rhetorical in 
saying one thing but meaning another. In the same sense as the classical rhetorician, the 
device of irony represents a deliberately self-conscious 'display' as a rhetorical flourish. 
In postmodern architecture, both display and flourish are represented by visual metaphor. 
The notion of 'display' is treated elsewhere here as an instance of architectural 
theatricality. 
6 Postmodern architectural rhetoric, as a form of display and contrivance, is characterized 
by what Michael Fried has called 'theatricality'. Fried's version of theatricality is seen 
here as the primary marker of the shift from high Modernism to the postmodern during 
the nineteen sixties. Fried and Clement Greenberg's defence of Abstract Expressionism 
and Post Painterly Abstraction is the paradigmatic moment of discontinuity between 
Modernism and Postmodernism, hence the significance of Jackson Pollock as the 
emblematic practitioner of the Modernist avant-garde. Pollock also represents the final 
moment of retinal Significant Form which was anti-metaphorical and which was to be 
replaced increasingly by referential installation in the postmodern aesthetic. The 
continuing importance and relevance of Pollock is as the last of the Modernists. 
7 After Fried and the collapse of the idea of the Modernist Avant-Garde and the 
emergence of Robert Venturi, postmodern architecture looked backwards since, 
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following the demise of the avant-garde, there could be no further progressive march into 
the future. It became recursively Historicist and initially was characterized by 
conspicuous contrivance. This historicist contrivance was also insistently revivalist in 
sardonically revisiting past architectural styles. This in its tum implicates an almost 
Proustian return to lost time which as an absence assumes a presence and may be seen as 
an aspect of mourning and the elegiac. This allegorical concern with past or lost time is 
an essential component of absence in presence and is a constant in the recursive 
postmodern aesthetic. 
8 'The return' in later poststructuralist architecture dispenses with the wide historicist 
referencing of early postmodernism such as faux classicism. As a palimpsest, it folds 
back instead on to the architectural Modernism from which it emerged. 
9 Part of theatricality and rhetoric in postmodern architecture is embodied in gesture. An 
early recognition of the semantic importance of pose, posture and repose and what Susan 
Langer calls 'the gestic' is found in Lessing's treatment of the Laocoon sculpture. 
Architectural gesture and pose are significant indicators of mood. The influential 
'Bilbaoism' of Frank Gehry, for example, is heavily informed by the gestural rhetoric of 
curvature, bending and folding. 
10 Visual representations of meaning as metaphor only become available as language. 
Meaning as language emerges from form. Implied meaning from form such as mourning 
or the elegiac, represented by the absence implicit in voids for instance, becomes 
linguistic in ways suggested by Heideggeran phenomenological hermeneutics and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty's discussion of Cartesian ocularity and the hermeneutics of the 
visual. Meaning in postmodern architecture is language latent in the form and made and 
generated by visual metaphor. 
11 'Unconcealing' the language latent in the metaphors of built form represents an act of 
critical interpretation. The sense of 'critical' here suggests the theoretical rather than any 
normative or adversarial judgement. Any interpretation is an act of readership. 'Reading' 
6 
assumes that 'the building' is a form of concealed or potential text. Its reception by the 
reader is pivotal, hence the significance and fundamental importance of literary theory 
and criticism. Literary criticism has many variants. However, interpretation here is 
justified by recourse to Reception Theory, Gadamer's hermeneutics and Stanley Fish's 
'interpretive communities'. 
12 Interpreting potential meaning in built form is in part an act of language. It becomes 
essential to be absolutely clear that this does not represent 'the language of architecture' 
formulation favoured by architectural critics such as Charles Jencks. 'The language of 
architecture' confuses the idea of language as an inherent property of architecture with a 
far simpler aspect of the built environment which amounts to not much more than the 
familiar nostrums of architectural style and genre. In terms of the themes which spiral 
forward through the present work, a resistance to 'the language of architecture', 'the 
language of sculpture' or 'the language of painting' and so on is of primary significance 
and forms a notable component of architectural interpretation. 
13 The allegorical in aesthetic Postmodernism is intimately associated with language and 
time and is an indispensable element of architectural interpretation. Allegory dissembles 
between past and present. The absence imposed by time infers not only the sense of loss 
and mourning, but the presence of the tragic itself. Walter Benjamin's discussion of the 
ruin as the archetypal allegorical trope of 'present absence' is an important adjunct to the 
palimpsest as a temporal folding back or recursion and a key aspect of the architecturally 
postmodern. The ruin revisited allegorically in poststructuralism is of course Modernism 
itself, and in architectural terms, particularly the early Modernism emerging after The 
Bauhaus and during the emergence of ClAM. The very act in which Modernism is 
parodied and subverted by the postmodern has to be seen not only as restitutive but also 
as an institutional or commemorative process which installs Modernism as something 
close to a founding memory. 
14 The meaning of a building can, may, and probably will, change over time according to 
its social use. The redundant church is converted to apartments; the sacred becomes 
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secular and is then characterized by the quotidian and the banal. Meaning in architectural 
contexts across time is contingent and not singular or absolute. Any synchronic reading 
of a building will be modified in time by its diachronic history. Nor is meaning solely or 
even largely dependent on authorial architectural intention. In the diachronic context, and 
indeed even synchronically, architectural intention has to be supplemented by the 
spectator's own reading as 'interpretant'. 
METHODOLOGY 
Methodological considerations are clearly important in establishing a critical frame of 
reference. Constructing a theoretical model with which to interpret potential meanings 
latent in postmodern, and in particular poststructuralist, architecture obviously will 
ultimately demand that 'Theory' embraces the practical task of confronting and reading 
those meanings in actual buildings. A model is a means to an end. The end is the 
emergence of meaning. Theoretical models allow and facilitate interpretation by means of 
the imposition of frames of reference. The frame, in quite a real sense, governs the 
qualitative nature of the outcome. And the outcome is the interpretation of meaning in 
actual, real buildings by means of the kind of 'practical criticism' which is prompted by 
the model. 
Frames of reference determine the nature of the model, which in practical terms, means 
its constituent parts. It is legitimate to ask why this or that particular model or frame of 
reference is selected rather than another from what could clearly be a plethora of 
alternatives. In other words, the adoption of this model rather than that requires some 
principle of justification. In seeking meaning from or within postmodern buildings as 
visual metaphor, there is an inevitable focus on form. Other frames of reference reflect 
different concerns and priorities. A sociological model for instance might deal with issues 
of power, or a Feminist perspective might understand architectural design to be a 
gendered issue, and so on. What makes the present model what it is, is the fact that 
poststructuralist architecture is heavily informed by what is generally understood as 
Theory. 'Theory' tends to mean an approach to significance which is fundamentally 
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semiotic and which evolved from Structuralism and became the Poststructuralism of 
Barthes, Derrida and Deleuze. Poststructuralist architects such as Peter Eisenman, Rem 
Koolhaas, Zaha Hadid and Daniel Libeskind for example are cultural theorists as much as 
they are architects. What governs the frame of reference here, then, is the poststructural 
nature of the theory with which such architects inflect their buildings. As well as 
semiotics, this represents a particular kind of philosophical emphasis based on the 
Continental rather than the Analytical tradition and openness towards possible 
interpretation which is 'literary' because it is semiotic and implicates language. 
It will be noted that a theoretical model is of the essence constitutive. It has component 
parts which in practical criticism generate holistic meaning. The constitutive parts here 
are arranged in the four theoretical chapters which represent Part One. Each chapter has a 
broad theme. Firstly there is metaphorical nature of the sign and the implications of and 
for language. Secondly is the ontological or existential condition of the postmodern itself 
which inevitably instantiates the Modernism from which it comes and so represents a 
cultural shift involving both continuities and discontinuities. Thirdly are the philosophical 
implications of Continental Phenomenology. And fourthly, there is an exposition of the 
literary implications for interpretation which is derived from literary theory. 
These chapters naturally sub-divide into thematic sub-sections. Such themes spiral 
forward and recur because they interrelate. Examples of thematic imperatives are 
metaphor and allegory, gesture, rhetoric, theatricality, vision and ocularity and visual 
metaphor. Theatricality, for instance, is established in Chapter Two, reappears in relation 
to rhetoric in Chapter Five and becomes a major interpretative element in Part Two. 
It is of the greatest importance to distinguish between the constitutive status of the 
theoretical model against the familiar causal argument. What is proposed here does not 
represent such a causal argument. Theoretical models belong to theory and practice 
arrangements where the theory endows the practice of interpretation with a derived 
authenticity. Theoretical models are neither hierarchical nor causal. The ordering of the 
parts is an almost arbitrary process. In the present case, for example, it would hardly 
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matter if the entire order of Part One was to be reversed, or if, say, interpretation 
preceded, rather than followed the philosophically based contents of Chapter Four. 
To confuse the procedural requirements of the theoretical model with the consecutive 
steps of the causal argument would in effect be a category error. A causal argument is 
necessarily propositional. Its truth conditions need to be falsifiable and developed in a 
logical chain of argument. At the end of the proposal, the proposition is thought to have 
been 'verified' in the usual adversarial way. Theoretical models on the other hand are not 
formally verifiable. Their 'proposal' is one form of interpretation among many possible 
alternatives. It is only 'verified' in the sense that the kind of interpretation which its 
practice confers is subject to the normal constraints of discourse and what Stanley Fish 
cal1s 'interpretive communities'. Any kind of interpretation is always subject to being 
modified by competing alternative interpretations arising from other acts of readership. 
Part One here, as the foundation of the interpretative process as it were, is not actually 
mainly 'about' architecture but, rather, 'Theory'. In fact as a thorough-going theoretical 
model it would need not be about architecture at all. Furthermore, each chapter as based 
on a significant thematic element such as the semiotic or the philosophical or the literary 
represents a distinct and discrete subject matter. Not only are chapters easily subject to 
rearrangement because their elements are not hierarchical, it could be further argued that 
each, because of the distinctive nature of their thematic content, in some sense stands 
alone, and that they only function as a model holistically as the parts fashioning the 
whole. In practice, the formal content of chapters often do, but not necessarily so, relate 
to each other. Thus, for example, both the allegorical and rhetorical aspects of 
Postmodernism as an aesthetic movement do relate to the distinctively literary aspects of 
both allegory and rhetoric as instances of metaphor which is dealt with in a different 
chapter. Nevertheless, despite such cross-referencing, it remains the case that the content 
contained in any given theme or chapter is often inherently related intrinsically to that 
particular theme and not others. If this does not entirely represent stand-alone autonomy, 
then it comes quite close to it. 
The requirement of the theoretical model to have its internal frames of reference brings 
into focus the issue of the selection of buildings. On what basis is such a selection made 
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and why are some specific architects included and others not? The majority of the 
buildings discussed are in fact public commissions including museums and galleries. 
There is perhaps an important link here with the fact that such buildings are 
commemorative and this often invokes the temporal revisiting of the past with its 
connections with allegorical and nostalgic mourning. In practice here, for example, in 
terms of architectural practice, the familiar buildings of Foster and Rogers are not 
addressed. Neither falls within the present remit because neither has a practice which is 
informed by Theory and neither in any meaningful sense is a poststructuralist architect. 
The shortfall created by the absence of a theoretical model between inquiry and outcome 
would inevitably result in buildings and architects being selected piecemeal, then 
requiring some form of justification having to be bolted on subsequently. In this case. 
paradoxically, the building would determine the model. 
REVIEW OF TIlE LITERATURE 
A review of the literature which relates to architectural metaphor in the sense that the 
term is used here to identify visual metaphor which transmogrifies into language and 
meaning has produced limited results. Searches of databases accessed through an 
AthenslEdina account such as The British Journal Of Aesthetics produce much that is 
useful concerning the nature of metaphor itself, but very little that informs a context of 
architectural semantics. Equally other databases such as J-STOR (Open University) or 
Infotrak which obviously interrogate multiple sources through their key-word searches 
produce little of relevance to the present topic. A ZETOC search-alert at the British 
Library also only produced the usual set of references such Charles Jencks's The 
Language of Poslmodern Architecture. And it is also the case that where references do 
occur to architectural metaphor. they usually use the term 'metaphor' as a simile, so 
suggesting that metaphorical reference associates with the comparatively trivial idea that 
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buildings resemble something else so that, for example, 'shiny' equates with 'modem' or 
'new'. The simile approach to architectural metaphorical reference is not conducive to the 
central concern that architectural visual form generates linguistic meaning. The paucity of 
reference to what might broadly be described as phenomenological approaches to 
architectural meaning suggests that the influence of 'the language or formulation 
remains powerfully influential and hegemonic. Similar investigations of architectural 
sources such as RIBA, The Architect's Journal or Architectural Design for example does 
not appear to produce work which examines architecture in terms of literary theory and 
allegory or rhetoric and semiotics, which are very much the central concern here. Thus 
Franks (2000, 'Yes, we wear buildings') suggests that architecture may be understood to 
be 'clothed', and the metaphor of architecture as clothing suggests that buildings as 
'wearing clothes' relates more to fashion rather than allegorical or poststructuralist 
reference. McCormack (1996, 'Architecture, Memory and Metaphor') makes useful 
connections between forms of architecture and a sense of its past as 'trace' but does not 
elaborate the significance of emergent language in this process, or deal with the issue of 
rhetoric. 
Since this dissertation lends itself to a typological or taxonomic grouping of subject 
matter, it may be convenient to address the relevant literature within the following 
arrangement: semiotics, postmodemism, philosophy, literary sources, architectural theory 
and trace and the issue of language itself. Dates for the most part relate to publication 
date. 
SEMIOTICS 
Any discussion of semiotics begins with Ferdinand Saussure and Charles Sanders 
Peirce. Since the emergence of Structuralism and the Poststructuralism which emerged 
from it, is essentially French in character, 'Theory' has often been seen to originate with 
Saussure and his 'Course' (1916). However, it is Peirce (1968-Papers), writing at the 
same time as Saussure who extended Saussure's sign/signifier into 
sign/signifier/interpretant. Peirce's additional treatment of the variety within the sign as 
symbolic, iconic and indexical is indeed foundational. The later contribution of Roland 
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Barthes, particularly in his later poststructuralist writing such as Image, Music, Text 
(1977) is also highly significant in the area of form generating text. Jacques Derrida's 
contribution to this area is of course well known. In the present context, his treatment of 
Kant's parergon in The Truth In Painting (1987) has proved very fruitful in terms of the 
frame (of reference) and what may be 'in' it and 'out' of it. The most significant later 
semiotic contribution has come from the October collections (1997) involving Rosalind 
Krauss and Hal Foster among others. But in relation to the present work here, Craig 
Owens's Allegorical Imperative as part of the first October series has been of the very 
highest importance. Its relevance for an understanding of the metaphorical nature of 
Postmodernism cannot be over-estimated, and its significance for an understanding of 
postmodern metaphor as being allegorically inflected is unrivalled. 
POSTMODERNISM 
There are of course any number of works dealing with the ontological or existential 
character of the postmodern, a representative selection of which appears in Charles 
Jencks's A Postmodern Reader (1992). Lyotard's provocative account of post modernism 
The Postmodern Condition (1979) is justly celebrated as is Baudrillard's Simulacra And 
Simulation (1981). However, the two works which have been pivotal here have been 
Frederick Jameson's Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991) 
which sets postmodern aesthetic themes such as photography, architecture and 
installation in a socio-cultural context and David Harvey's The Condition of 
Postmodernity which both offers an account of postmodernism and a critique of it. Terry 
Eagleton's After Theory (2003) although contentious in suggesting a now existing state of 
the post-postmodem which may be capable of being theorized but is difficult to justify in 
practice, is nevertheless another provocatively useful text. 
PHILOSOPHY AND LANGUAGE 
The theoretical and philosophical underpinning here begins with Aristotle and the 
discussion of the nature of metaphor and the tragic. Kant's Critique Of Pure Reason has 
its inevitable relevance, but in fact, the justification of the argument for language from 
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fonn is based largely on Heidegger's Being And Time (1927). Time, it will be noted, is an 
aspect of allegory, and it is the allegorical which is a fundamental aspect of the 
postmodem, so reinforcing the recursively temporal disposition of Postmodemism. Of 
equal importance is Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology Of Perception and The Visible And 
The Invisible (1964) with its powerful endorsement of the importance of embodiment. 
Gadamer (1989) in Truth And Method is important with his dialectical treatment of 'the 
conversation' as an important version of meaning-exchange. Equally, Martin Jay in 
Downcast Eyes (1994) in his discussion of the influence of what might be called retinal 
Cartesianism remains a valuable indicator of that whole sub-genre of visual hermeneutics 
represented by books such as Interpreting Visual Culture: Explorations in the 
Hermeneutics of the Visual (1999) edited by Heywood and Sandwell or Modernity And 
The Hegemony Of Vision (1993) edited by David Levin. The decisive influence of the 
later Wittgenstein (1958) such as the Philosophical Investigations within the complex 
issue of language use is well known, and the later treatment of this work by Stanley 
Cavell (2002) is instructive. Susan Langer's suggestion in Feeling And Form (1967) that 
gesture is an important constituent feature of visual meaning has a direct relevance for 
postmodem architectural semantics. 
LITERARY SOURCES 
Literary theory is an indispensable tool of interpretation that needs to be appropriated 
as an interpretative imperative for the realisation of architectural meaning. Eagleton's 
account of modem literary theory (1983) remains indispensable in spite of some critical 
attempts to judge it as tendentiously Marxist. It includes a useful discussion of 
Baudelaire's discourse on irony in the nineteenth century. When coupled with the 
sardonic tone, both have subsequently been recognized as key postmodernist tropes. 
Christine Brooke-Rose's analysis of literary metaphor remains vital, among others such 
as I.A. Richards in the first part of the twentieth century, as does Angus Fletcher's re-
establishment of the importance of allegory in the later twentieth century (1965). In more 
modern discussions of metaphor, Paul Ricoeur's rejoinder to analytical language 
philosophy that metaphor is non-propositional still hits its mark. Ricoeur suggested that 
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the very language in which analytical truth propositions are presented cannot escape 
metaphor itself (1978). David Lodge's The Modes Of Modern Writing: Metaphor and 
Metonymy (1977) discusses Roman Jakobson's indispensable distinction between 
metonymy and metaphor and the key concept of contiguity. Paul de Man's two books, 
Blindness And Insight (1983) and Allegories Of Reading (1979) remain the most radically 
deconstructive versions of literary theory. One of the most recent manifestations of 
literary interpretative theory, which is of the utmost significance here for the proposed 
theoretical basis for the interpretation of architecture, is Reception Theory. Gadamer has 
pointed out that authorial intention does not exhaust the meaning of a text. It is Reception 
Theory, emphasizing as it does the role of readership in the realisation of holistic 
meaning and echoing Barthes's reader as the destination of the text, which revisits Peirce 
and installs the reader as the 'interpretant' constituent of the sign. Stanley Fish's 
'interpretive community' (1980) represents the final justification of interpretation here. 
Any reading, that is, remains subject to interrogation by other writers and readers in what 
constitutes the universe of discourse. 
ARCHITECfURALTHEORY 
The architectural theorizing of the postmodem emerged embryonically in Robert 
Venturi's Contradiction And Complexity (1967), followed by Learning From Las Vegas. 
Venturi's Las Vegas book comprehensively engaged with 'low' street architecture, 
something Reyner Banham did for Los Angeles a few years later (1971). Both books 
contained the anti-Modernist suggestion that architecture might just now subsume kitsch. 
This is perhaps one of the most radical resituating moments in architecture which 
subverted previous notions of 'high form' in Modernism and earlier historical styles. 
Charles Jencks, in the late nineteen seventies effectively initiated the theoretical semiotics 
of architecture virtually single-handed. In doing so he popularised 'the language of 
architecture', and incidentally numerous other pursuits, to the extent that the phrase 'the 
language of ... .' not only became overwhelmingly influential, but it also entered the 
lexicon itself. This dissertation opposes 'the language of architecture' formulation not as 
a causal central argument, but as a necessary excision in order to establish an authentic 
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phenomenological interpretative theory. Nevertheless Jencks's The Language of 
Postmodem Architecture (1981) and its subsequent six editions remains powerfully 
hegemonic. In a decisive move away from The Language of Postmodern Architecture, 
although still acknowledging it, Christian Norberg-Schulz's more phenomenological and 
Heideggeran approach (1984) proved constructive although he did not deal in a 
substantive way with the problem of language. Derrida's comments on architecture, such 
as his 'Letter to Peter Eisenman' or 'Why Peter Eisenman Writes Such Good Books' in 
connection with Villette, Paris, although relevant are tangential. Poststructuralists 
themselves, including Eisenman, have proved to be highly proficient theorists themselves 
such as Daniel Libeskind's Countersign (1991), Rem Koolhaas's multi-genre Delirious 
New York (1978) or Zaha Hadid's theoretical acknowledgement of early architectural 
Modernism (2003). Perhaps the most recent major theoretical influence has been Gilles 
Deleuze's treatment of the fold (1993) and the later explication of the rhizome metaphor. 
The rhizome is emblematic of the non-hierarchical nature of cross-genre theory as 
opposed to the more familiar vertically oriented roots analogy. 
LANGUAGE 
The language problem is enormously complex. But here it is largely confined to the 
relation between aesthetic form and meaning on the one hand and the implications of 
metaphor on the other. The notion that language is latent in aesthetic form and must 
somehow be 'released' may sound like a proposition that analytical philosophers would 
rather shred, much in the way that Roger Scruton regards Heidegger, who is the source in 
this respect, as either an unconfined genius or charlatan, and it is difficult to be sure of 
which (Kenny, 1994). Lessing's discussion of the relation between different kinds of 
aesthetic form such as sculpture and painting and language (1776) during the 
Enlightenment initiated the modem debate, and examples of more recent aspects of that 
debate such as Barthes's Mythologies (2000) emphasize the continuing relevance of the 
issue. Charles Jencks's The Language of Postmodern Architecture effortlessly assumes 
its enormously important position, and part of its significance is that it continues to 
grapple with precisely the relation initiated by Lessing pace Horace; language and the 
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aesthetic object. The position of metaphor is hardly less complicated. One by-product of 
Jencks's hegemonic language of architecture is that since he deals with architectural 
reference largely in the simpler terms of simile, the problem of architectural meaning is 
widely understood in terms of simile and empirical resemblance rather than the infinitely 
more complicated issues of metaphorical reference. In fact, one of the earliest uses in the 
dissemination of the phrase 'the language of architecture', although not in Jencks's 
semiotic terms, seems to have been by Max Reiser (1946) and then later by Sir John 
Summerson in The Classical Language Of Architecture (1964). Linguistic philosophy 
typically supposes that metaphor is not meaningful other than as a literal statement 
because it does not have the status of truth conditions generated by logical propositions. 
The most complete modem representation of this position is that of Donald Davidson 
(1984). However, if meaning is restricted to the truth conditions of propositions, then 
architecture cannot mean because it does not have propositions in that sense. This is a 
position to which this dissertation is fundamentally opposed. What is assumed here is that 
metaphor in architectural interpretation releases meaning. 
The dissertation is in two parts. Part One consists of four theoretical chapters which, 
when taken holistically, provide the theoretical frame of reference which constitutes the 
theoretical model on which the architectural interpretation in Part Two is based. Part Two 
has two longer chapters which deal specifically with the architectural trace of 
postmodernism and poststructuralism and architectural interpretation respectively. 
PART ONE 
Each of the four chapters subsequent to the first methodological chapter deals with a 
substantive area of knowledge. Each is a distinctively different frame of view. Although 
each chapter deals with a different epistemological area, the themes within each chapter 
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do spiral forward and engage with and touch on thematic lines developed in other 
chapters, as the previous example of theatricality demonstrated. 
Chapter Two 
This chapter, called Semiotics, Gesture and Embodiment, deals with the metaphorical 
nature of the sign, the semiotic relation between image and word and the significance of 
the sign as embodied gesture. It is divided into four sections. 
The first, Sign, Signifier and Signified, establishes the centrally important concept of 
the metaphorical aspect of the sign and the way in which this immediately implicates 
language. 
The second, called Word and Image, treats the semantics of gesture, image and word 
and examines Lessing's Laocoon as a foundational Enlightenment text dealing with the 
aesthetic object and language and the idea of meaning from shape or gesture, important 
subsequently for postmodern architecture. 
The third, called Embodiment and Gesture, examines the relation of parts and notions 
of mimesis and the copy. 
The fourth, called Theatricality and Gestural Rhetoric, gives an account of the 
Greenberg and Fried debates which signalled the end of Modernism and the opening of 
the postmodern. Fried's ascription of metaphorical theatricality to what is now 
recognized as the postmodern has enormous implications for the rhetorical nature of 
postmodern architecture. 
Chapter Three 
Called Modernity and Postmodernism, this chapter looks at the existential qualities of 
both Postmodernism and the Modernism from which it emerged and of which it remains 
a part. The continuities and discontinuities are discussed, and the formative property of 
early Modernism established which becomes a principal feature of poststructuralist 
architecture. The chapter has six sections. 
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Section one discusses the importance of the Modernist theories of Clement Greenberg 
for an understanding of what the postmodern imperative was subverting. It is called 
Modernity and its Definitions. 
Section two, Continuity and Discontinuity, looks at positions defending Modernism 
such as that of Habermas and counter-positions such as those of Lyotard and Baudrillard. 
The third section called Cultural and Socio-Economic Transition discusses the 
polemics of Frederick Jameson and the continuing ambivalence surrounding the base and 
superstructure formulation. 
Section four deals with the important issue of the distinctions between Modernist and 
Postmodern temporality and the significance of the installation as both an index of the 
postmodern and an instance of the architectural. This section is called Postmodern Space 
and Modernist Temporality. 
Section five, The Allegorical in the Postmodern, assumes a fundamental importance 
for the whole dissertation. It discusses Owens's Allegorical Impulse which establishes the 
recursively allegorical aspect of the postmodern. The nature of photography is discussed 
as an exemplar of the postmodern condition. 
Section six, Theory and Post-Theory, looks at Eagleton's theory that 'Theory' has 
passed into a state of post-theory and presumably, into the Post-Postmodern as well. The 
section nevertheless insists that the continuing focus of the present work involves 
essentially the discussion of the postmodern nature of the theory and practice of 
poststructural ist architecture. 
Chapter Four 
This chapter is called Language And The Philosophical Background. It is concerned 
with the relation between the aesthetic object and its potential or possible meaning and 
how that meaning must become linguistic. The considerable tension between the 
Analytical and Continental philosophical traditions is resolved in favour of 
Wittgenstein's later formulation of language use and the significance of 
phenomenological approaches to meaning is established. The chapter is in four sections. 
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The opening section called The Philosophy of Language is mainly concerned with the 
later Wittgenstein and his acknowledgement that if meaning inheres in language use, then 
it must in part be metaphorical. 
Section two deals directly with Heidegger's phenomenology, particularly in Being And 
Time and is called Phenomenology and Interpretation. 
The third section, From Icon to Text, looks at Barthes's later position on the textual in 
the visual and goes on to assess the importance of Gadamer. There is also an account of 
the hermeneutics of vision, particularly in regard to Martin Jay and Merleau-Ponty. 
Section four which is called The Felicitous and the Infelicitous examines the 
implications of Austin's language philosophy and establishes 'the infelicitous' as a basis 
for interpreting postmodern architecture later as having self-consciously infelicitous 
rhetorical tropes. 
Chapter Five 
This chapter is called Rhetoric, Visual Metaphor and Allegory And Interpretation. It is 
concerned with the necessarily literary nature of interpretation as linguistic meaning from 
form. It therefore deals with literary theory as providing a theoretical justification for 
interpretation. There are five sections. 
Section one looks at rhetoric and proposes that self-consciously rhetorical form is 
recurrently postmodernist, and especially so in architecture. Important contributions to 
the theory of rhetoric are examined, particularly Aristotle, I.A. Richards and Paul de 
Man. 
The second section called Visual Metaphor and Allegory looks at the implications for 
metonymy and metaphor in the work of Roman Jakobson, Wittgenstein and the duck-
rabbit and Mitchell's discussion picture theory and language. 
Section three which is called Visual Metaphor examines the metaphorical nature of 
visual form and the ways in which meaning may emerge from it. This is particularly 
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important for an architectural interpretation involving particular detailing such as 
fenestration. 
Section four examines the significance of allegory and its relevant history and 
treatment. Walter Benjamin's idea of the ruin as an archetypal trope is discussed and 
applied in a later chapter to Frank Gehry's Santa Monica House. The importance of 
Baudelaire's invocation of irony is also examined. 
The last section is concerned with the nature of interpretation itself. Its development in 
literary theory from F.R. Leavis's Practical Criticism to Reception Theory and Stanley 
Fish's 'interpretive communities' is traced. 
PART TWO 
Part Two moves from theory towards a more practical interpretation of poststructuralist 
architecture. It comprises two chapters, the first of which attempts to trace the trajectory 
of the architectural postmodern and the second which looks at particular buildings and 
architectural practice in interpretative terms. Much of the foundational underpinning 
derived from the theoretical positions of Part One are freely deployed without the need 
for constant definition or qualification because their theoretical provenance has already 
been secured in Part One. 
Chapter Six 
Chapter Six, called The Architectural Trace, has four sections. Broadly, the chapter 
assesses the movement away from the Modernist rational grid towards what Venturi 
called complexity and contradiction at the opening of architectural postmodernism. The 
significance of theatricality, which was introduced in Chapter One, is examined as an 
exemplar of architectural rhetoric. 
The first section, The Modernist Grid, looks at the rational planning inherent in 
architectural Modernism and what almost amounts to the sanctity ofthe right angle. 
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Section two is called The Trajectory From Modernism Into Postmodern Architecture. 
It looks in particular at the interventions of Jane Jacobs in objecting to Modernist urban 
zoning and gridding and arguing for historical differentiation and colour in locales which 
was in accord with Venturi's complaint that 'less is a bore'. 
The third section, From Postmodernism To Poststructuralism: From Simile To 
Metaphor, interprets Gehry's Santa Monica House as allegorical 'ruin' and examines the 
architectural theory of Peter Eisenman and Christian Norberg-Schulz. 
Section four is called Poststructural Architecture and The Neo-Theatrical. Corbusier's 
Ronchamp is signalled as the instigation of an after-Modernist theatricality. As an 
instance of the insistent recursion to the example of early Modernism in poststructuralist 
architecture, Tschumi's references to Russian Constructivism at Villette are assessed in 
their historicist perspective. 
Chapter Seven 
Chapter Seven called The Reading of Buildings has five sections. This chapter tries to 
put into effect the interpretation of specific architects, their practice and instances of their 
built commissions. It obviously depends heavily on earlier considerations of thematic 
lines such as allegory, rhetoric and readership. In the sense that Part One established the 
theoretical framework of interpretation, this chapter tries to interpret and read buildings in 
the light of that framework, and is in one sense a test case for the efficacy and 
authenticity of the theoretical model put into practice. 
Section one, Sculptural Gesture As Origin, looks at the profound importance and 
signifying power of the church building as an originating instance of allegorical 
commemoration. 
Section two which is called Frank Gehry And Remembrance assesses Gehry's unique 
position within the poststructuralist momentum. His later work from Vitra to Ginger and 
Fred is interpreted in the light of its allegorical richness of reference. 
The third section, called The Architectural Curve, looks at the bending and folding 
which characterizes late poststructuralist buildings and the influence of Gilles Deleuze 
and the implications of his Le Plio It is not the case that Derrida and Deconstruction have 
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been supplanted; rather folded In. The implication of the all-over nature of BLOB 
architecture is also examined. 
Section four looks at the significance of the fold in Eisenman, Hadid and Koolhaas and 
is called The Reinscription Of Modem ism In The Fold. 
The final section looks specifically at Daniel Libeskind both as theorist and practising 
architect. His work, especially the Jewish Museum, Berlin, is interpreted in terms of 
absence and presence, with one aspect of that 'presence' being the tragic. This section is 
called Daniel Libeskind And Building On The Past. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LANGUAGE AS EMBODIED METAPHOR 
This chapter attempts to establish embodied gesture and metaphorical significance 
within the characteristics of the objecthood of the art-work as sign. Additionally there is a 
preliminary discussion of how language might be implicated in the process of 
interpretation of the visual object. The intention is not to discuss the implications for 
architecture directly at this stage, but rather, to give an account of the way the sign and its 
signification are understood to operate as fundamentally important aspects of what might 
be called aesthetic meaning. The chapter is divided into four sections. 
The first, Sign, Signifier and Signified, deals with the treatment of the sign by Saussure 
and Peirce and their respective traditions and the necessity for an interpretative procedure 
which goes beyond iconography. The second, Word and Image: Gestural Semantics, 
deals with Lessing's Laocoon and the significance of gestural form as a semantic 
indicator and instantiates the critical debate concerning the relationship between image or 
form and word and its meaning. The third, Embodiment and Gesture, examines the 
relationship of parts and the implications of mimesis. The fourth, Theatricality and 
Gestural Rhetoric, discusses the importance of the defence of Modernism by Clement 
Greenberg and Michael Fried and invokes Frieds's notion of theatricality as an indicative 
postmodernist sign. Fried's version of theatricality assumes a large significance and is 
explored as a theme throughout, but particularly in relation to postmodernist architectural 
rhetoric. It needs emphasizing, although it may be self-evident, that the arts of painting, 
sculpture and architecture all embody 'attitude' in their gestural inflection and rhetorical 
stance, and all are discussed. The rhetoric of form in architecture is treated later. It will be 
noted that the themes which are explored and developed in this first chapter are not 
necessarily architectural at all, but are essential prerequisites for later discussions of 
architectural meaning and interpretation and are constitutive parts of a larger theoretical 
model of architectural interpretation which is the objective overall. It will be noted that 
the elements or parts of the model, although often correlated and thematically linked, are 
not in any necessarily causal or hierarchical arrangement. 
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Sign, Signifier and Signified 
This section establishes the metaphorical nature of the sign in contrasting the theories 
of Saussure and Peirce, and introduces the possibility that the metaphorical sign often 
implicates allegory. The later discussion of architectural meaning is predicated on the 
assumption that architectural meaning, especially in poststructuralist buildings, is the 
result of the metaphorical transfer of meaning from the physical, gestural and rhetorical 
form of the building to the linguistic and semantic interpretation of it under the auspices 
of language. The sign as a version of metaphor is therefore fundamental. In Saussure's 
version of the sign, it is represented as both 'arbitrary' and conventional in meaning. In 
architectural terms this arbitrary sense of the sign has an obvious application to Modernist 
architecture which was broadly based on the form and function relation and was often 
explicitly non-referential and anti-metaphorical. However, postmodern architecture is 
constituted by reference and metaphorical allusion, and in this sense has a greater 
approximation to Peirce's symbolic and indexical signs. The indexical sign implies 
'touch' and leads to Roman lakobson's treatment of metonymy as a version of contiguity 
and Paul de Man's discussion of Proust's use of metonymy prior to metaphor, both of 
which are discussed in Chapter Four here. The arbitrary conventional sign seems 
paradoxically a Modernist signifying within a paradigm that resisted signs (II. Foster, R. 
Krauss et al 2004, 119). 
Buildings mean. Semiotically, a meaning is invoked by the disposition of signs. 
Something is signified. But what needs selection from the corpus of semiotic discourse is 
that the fundamental relationship between the sign and its signified is metaphorical. That 
is, the sign indicates meaning as an image. This is palpably the case in visual art, but it is 
clearly also true that texts signify metaphorically with imagery; although poetic meaning 
inheres in the words, its metaphorical meaning frequently, but not exclusively, secures an 
equivalence or agreement between the symbol and that symbolized which as an image is 
visual. And that agreement or equivalence as imagery demands a visual comparison 
between two disparate elements whose very difference is unified in their similarity. The 
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Aristotelian prescription for metaphor is met; in difference, similarity. One thing means 
something else that is different from it, yet is, by indication, similar. And of course, 
underlying the metaphorical signifier to signified relation is the fact that the antinomic 
tension between them is in the form of an oxymoron. In one figure, both similarity and 
difference have to be present at the same time. And the emerging paradox, that, in the 
case of a text, that it can generate linguistically some form of visual equivalent, and that 
reciprocally, a visual form or context can induce, or come into language, is precisely the 
issue which underpins Lessing's Laocoon: Horace's ut pictura poesis (as in painting, so 
is poetry). 
The referential nature of the sign, in the sense that an interpreting subject construes a 
sensible, empirically verifiable objective thing in itself as something else, implicates the 
presence of the semantic analogue. This in turn suggests that an inherent attribute of the 
sign is a constant oscillation between the signifying object and what is signified or 
represented, and that this to and fro is not only palimpsest-like, but also transitive, in the 
sense of crossing over, whether the source of the signification is linguistic or visual. The 
transitive nature of the sign has implications for the figural metaphor, especially 
rhetorical tropes such as chiasmus and metonymy. The two defining approaches to the 
sign were established at the beginning of the twentieth century by Saussure and Peirce 
(Jonathon Culler, The Pursuit OJ Signs, 1981, 25). Saussure is acknowledged to have 
conferred on subsequent linguistics the foundation of semiotics, and the establishment of 
a line that runs through to Chomsky and Structuralism, to Barthes, Foucault and Derrida 
and Poststructuralism. Saussure's account of the sign as dualistic, containing object and 
referent, implies a third element, that of recognition and the required presence of the 
cognizant spectator. This would also be the case in Peirce's triadic version of the sign. It 
is perhaps the case that not every sensible object in the world actually is a sign, but rather 
that the object, even if constituted in the mind, is putative, and has the potential to 
become a sign only in a conscious act of association and cognition. The existential 
condition of the sign is such that it only ontologically 'becomes' after it is, as it were, 
'switched on' by some conscious act of interpretation or construal. Saussure, credited as a 
founding father of semiotics, suggested that the linguistic sign acts as a code. Thus the 
sign d-o-g, which denotes the class canine, cannot be confused with the linguistic sign c-
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o-g precisely because of its difference from it. The meaning of the words dog and cog are 
conferred by convention and are arbitrary. There is no relation between the sign d-o-g and 
spoken utterance. The word does not mean by its sound, but by an arbitrary and 
conventional rule of transference. In other words, the form of the word, its letters and 
their sounds which accord a fixed referent, is not metaphorical, but is conventionally 
coded. It is the content of the word d-o-g which affords connotative implicature as 
something other than the typological class of canines. The later work of Wittgenstein 
reminds us that meaning is ultimately derived from language use, and therefore a 
contextual phrase like 'dirty dog' in the case of d-o-g, can refer to other metaphorical, 
rather than simply generic, meanings. However, visual signs are not arbitrary and 
conventional. The depiction in a visual sign may indeed represent, and be an image of the 
thing it refers to, such as a bird, or dog or sun. But on an Egyptian frieze, all of these 
images might represent, not membership of the typological class of avians, canines and 
heavenly bodies, but nothing less than gods. As a sign, the word must always and only 
refer to the category which has been singly and conventionally conferred upon it. But as a 
sign, the image not only represents its referent, but at the same time, other potential 
references according to context. The linguistic sign as sign is uni-referential and 
essentially unambiguous; the visual sign as image is multi-referential, contextual and 
inherently invokes ambiguity. It is important to note that architectural meaning, as in 
other visual arts, dependent as it is on visually coded metaphor, will always tend to 
provoke the not inconsiderable problem of semantic ambivalence in any interpretation in 
built environments, and that therefore that the relation between visual metaphor and 
language will be of the highest conceptual significance. This separation of signification 
between clarity and ambiguity is further represented in Saussure's distinction between 
langue and parole, established in The Nature of the Linguistic Sign, 1916 (L. Burke et al 
2000,21-32.) Saussure characterized langue as the syntactically ideal state of a language 
and parole as its imperfect and idiosyncratic utterance. Wittgenstein's shift away from 
Bertrand Russel's Theory of Descriptions towards meaning as use further points up this 
distinction (W. Lycan 2000, 90-93). Saussure's characterization of the arbitrary, 
conventional linguistic sign in langue was proposed as a basic model for the development 
of semiotic theory and has provided an enormously powerful cultural heritage since, 
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which in semiotic analysis, has extended the idea of what a 'text' might represent far 
beyond the purely linguistic. (See, for example, Margaret Iversen, Saussure v Pierce: 
Models For A Semiotics Of Visual Art in Rees and Borzello Eds, 1986,85.) Yet however 
provocatively rewarding semiotic analysis has proved over time, Saussure's model of 
arbitrary and conventional meanings as the constituent features of the linguistic sign will 
not directly assist us with the interpretation of the visual sign. It is at this point that 
Peirce's triadic formulation of the sign can add a further dimension (H. Foster, R. Krauss 
et al 2004, 36-39). 
But what the application of Saussurean semantics has done is to extend the idea of a 
'text' beyond the purely linguistic, so that other cultural objects become signs and submit 
to interpretation as an analogous 'text' which can then be 'read'. Previously, from the 
Renaissance to Panofsky and Gombrich, the visual sign has been treated in two 
fundamental ways. First, the visual sign was accorded a direct, natural relation between 
the depiction and the depicted; it would be, in Plato's terms mimetic, second-hand and a 
copy. Any value it might have would be severely restricted to its formal qualities. It 
would not mean in the sense that a word does and would have no referential meaning; 
that is, as a signifier, it signifies itself. Secondly, when an image was understood to 
symbolize something other than itself, perhaps by gesture or accoutrements, then it was 
assumed that the image concerned referred to a pre-existing narrative. So the reclining 
figure holding the arrow would be Sebastian, and so on. The visual image, because it is 
instantaneous and outside the temporal process which narrative obviously incurs, like the 
photograph, was nevertheless assumed to refer to, and therefore implicate as its meaning, 
the narrative it depicted. The meaning migrated from text to image, to icon as the sign, 
from language as the underlying semantic. Iconography has traditionally been 
preoccupied with the interpretation of figurative imagery, particularly from the 
Renaissance period, and since this might involve allegories, its concern with narrative as 
a key feature of depiction in the visual arts clearly merits acknowledgement. (See, for 
example, Erwin Panofsky, Titian IS Allegory of Prudence: A Postscript, in E. Panofsky, 
1955, 181-206.) However, iconography in this sense is inevitably autonomous. It would 
not postulate that a visual representation would have referred to its own contemporary 
context as much as to a past narrative to which it might be semantically attached. Thus 
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the Michelangelo David would not be construed as Renaissance homoerotic gesture 
because of the implied narrative blasphemy, although that remains, potentially at least, an 
interpretative possibility. Nor would iconography appear to otTer much assistance in 
interpreting contemporary culture. If we seek to account for Daniel Libeskind's Jewish 
Museum, Berlin as in some sense embodying the tragic (see, for example, Richard 
Patterson, The Tragic In Architecture, 2001) then an iconographical referral to a narrative 
of Jewish history would not seem to further that account. 
Panofsky, though, recognized that pre-iconographical and iconographical levels of 
interpretation were insufficient to account synchronically for 'otherness' in a diachronic 
account of a previous culture. Decisively, the analytical mode has to shift from the 
denotative to the connotative; from the iconographical to what he calls the iconological 
(E. Panofsky 1955, 57-67). He makes clear that iconology is, unlike iconography, a 
synthetic, not an analytical procedure. Even so, iconology's concern continues to be with 
'intrinsic meanings', although interpretation of 'symbolical values' might include 
Weltanschauung through a process of 'synthetic intuition' involving an hermeneutically 
circular methodology which Panofsky calls a circulus methodic us. Symbolical values are 
'a symptom of something else which expresses itself in a countless variety of other 
symptoms' and must therefore be metaphorical and refer to an equivalence extrinsic to 
the work of art. Iconology, Panofsky asserts, is activated 'wherever iconography is taken 
out of its isolation and integrated with whichever other method, historical, psychological 
or critical we may attempt to use.' (For an extended treatment of Pan of sky's iconological 
account of Titian's Allegory of Prudence see R.S. Nelson and R. ShifT, Eds 1996; 
Stephen Bann, Meaning/Interpretation 128.) So that if there is no pre-iconic text or 
narrative which iconographically supports an authoritative interpretation of the meaning 
of an image, then it becomes necessary to intuitively accord a meaning iconologically, 
using whichever methodologies might generate a putative meaning. Two issues of real 
critical consequence emerge, in tum producing a third concomitant one. 
In the first case, it will be noted that in iconography, language, in the form of the 
originating text, moves to the art object in its visual form and empirically 'resolves' its 
meaning. The resolution of the text-image interface alleges a one-to-one meaning 
between the words which 'resolve' it and the image. The emergent meaning claims a final 
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semantic resolution, and in ejecting ambiguity, an arbitrary epistemological status; and an 
inherent meaning has, as it were, flowed from the intentionality of the art object to the 
interpretative spectator. In the second case, in what seems analogous almost to a 
deconstructionist procedure, the processes are reversed. Meaning is iconologically 
imputed to the art object, which suggests that, in part, what we think of as the meaning of 
the visual image is represented by the intention of the spectator or 'reader' guided by a 
hermeneutical best-fit procedure. This might seem like an act of inscription by the reader 
rather than, or as well as, the author. Crucially, meaning flows from the art object in the 
sense that, since its symbolical status is metaphorical, that is, something standing for 
something else, its potential visual meanings must linguistically 'come into language' in 
the interpretative act. One arbitrary meaning is replaced by a multiplicity of potential 
meanings. The language flows are reversed, and semantic resolution is replaced by 
ambiguity; the semantic flow from text to image is reversed to image to text. And thirdly, 
and obviously, the final iconographical resolution of the image assumes an empirically 
derived arbitrary and intrinsically autonomous meaning and interpretation. In fact, such 
fixed meanings require deep interrogation by theories of readership. Of course, Panofsky 
would have to acknowledge the semantic shift from denotative iconography to 
connotative iconology, but also that the theory of iconology is highly tentative and is 
perhaps best characterized as indicative. Many of the issues raised here are the result of 
critical inquiry since Meaning In The Visual Arts, 1955, first established iconology as the 
threshold of hermeneutical interpretation in modem art-historical criticism, and much has 
been founded upon it since. 
Panofsky, perhaps unknowingly, and perhaps as an example of Weltaschuaang in 
itself, seems to implicate an almost Structuralist concern for a deep structure of 
interpretation that is both linguistic and semiotic. Saussure's semiosis has clearly been of 
great influence right up to Barthes and beyond in Poststructuralism. But in itself, since it 
deals with the linguistic sign, it cannot, although it may be necessary, offer a sufficient 
account of the visual sign. 
Peirce's typology of signs include the elements of index, icon and symbol, and can be 
enormously complex in their interrelationships (C.S. Peirce 1931-58, 228.) This is so 
because not only do the indexical, the iconic and the symbolic relate to each other and yet 
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remain different from each other, they also have an extended agenda of attributes, so that 
immediately it can be seen, for example, that all three are indexical in some sense. All 
three may also be iconic, and similarly, all of them may act symbolically. And it is clearly 
the case that the Peircian sign may function in all three senses in the specific context of 
one particular art object. The principal attributes associated with indexicality are 
contiguity, metonymy (as in part to whole) and surface and touch. The indexical deals 
with relation. Thus a fingerprint as a surface mark or touch will represent the person who 
made it as a sign of that person. In an extended sense, the fingerprint will also signify as 
the part symbolizing the whole, rather like the crown signifying monarchy, and therefore 
becomes synechdochal. The iconic sign functions visually. It is pre-iconographical in 
recognizing the visual image, and in identifying the depicted subject and what it 
represents, it is located in the present of what the eye actually sees. When a sign works 
symbolically, it is both iconographical and iconological; iconographical in the sense of 
being metaphorically something other than itself and iconological in its demand to be 
interpreted connotatively. If a sign functions symbolically, it does so verbally rather than 
visually or as a relation. And just as it refers to a previously existing text and settles in 
language as in traditional iconography, so its temporality lies in the past. If metonymy 
characterizes the indexical sign in Peirce's terms, then the symbol is characterized by the 
metaphorical. And finally, in a highly elided treatment, response to the indexical sign will 
involve synthesis. Response to the iconic sign associates with and implies description. 
And in the case of the symbol, spectator response is characterized by some form of 
affectivity. It will be noted that in responding to architectural semantics in terms of 
Peirce's formulation of the sign, all three elements will necessarily be involved. Clearly, 
the tripartite nature of the Peircian sign facilitates access to the visuality and objecthood 
of the art object which Saussure's semiotics might not. Nevertheless, since architectural 
semantics is here treated at one level as visual metaphor which must 'come into 
language', Saussure's linguistic sign remains pertinent. (Margaret Iversen in Rees and 
Borzello Eds 1986, 86.) 
Peirce's iconic sign, which because of its visuality seems to assume an almost pre-
eminent status, associates with the Kantian analytic in the sense that it is a self-contained 
visual depiction in the same way that the analytic is a valid proposition by virtue of the 
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meaning of the words alone. Thus, 'all spinsters are unmarried' is necessarily true and 
independent of any justification outside of the proposition. An iconic depiction of trees, 
lake and fields in an eighteenth century painting would necessarily have 'landscape' as its 
subject, whereas the attribution of St Sebastian's martyrdom to the reclining man holding 
an arrow is only true by convention. The attribution of pastoral or picturesque landscape 
as the necessarily depicted subject inside the frame of reference is visually equivalent to 
the necessary meaning of the analytical proposition contained within its words. In 
Panofsky's typology, the iconic sign functions pre-iconographically or optically as open 
to a visually analytical interrogation of what is 'there', de facto, as subject. If the 
depiction were of, say, a farm rather than a landscape, then the landscape subject 
becomes troubling and may cease to be either a version of picturesque or landscape. In 
the case, for example, of Jackson Pollock's Lavender Mist as an iconic sign, it has no 
subject or depiction, but does have content, which is the embodied expression of 
Pollock's aesthetic, and is 'there' defacto, as iconic gesture. The analysis of the iconic, or 
pre-iconological painterly or gestural sign in Lavender Mist precludes the erroneous 
attribution of it as a depiction or as having a subject [Fig 1]. In the case of architecture, 
which is similarly abstract in form, it, too, will have no subject, but will have as its 
content the expression of its gestures. And it will have, further, its gestures perhaps as 
postmodernist emphasis, or as 
modernist reticence, but gesture 
nonetheless. It is essential to note that 
the architectural SIgn as gestural 
configuration and the bearer of 
meaning in the visual metaphors of its 
form, precisely precludes conventional 
narrative but becomes discourse when, 
and as, it means. In fact, Pollock was 
~ 1 . playin~ games with the critics in giving the painting a name at all. His normal practtce 
was to simply number his abstract pictures in sequence, sometimes confusingly it must be 
said. 'Lavender Mist' is certainly not a picture of a lavender mist. Nor is it by intention a 
simile of a mist, lavender or otherwise. Pollock had seen native north Americans pouring 
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coloured sands as part of their own rituals, and this gave him the idea of dripping and 
pouring paint. In the studio his technique was to pour paint and drip and flick it with a 
stick. With a certain amount of notoriety, this technique became known as 'action 
painting'. There is no literal content in Lavender Mist, only the record of Pollock's 
gestures. 
Although there might not necessarily be a subject, Peirce's symbolic sign does 
implicate content, albeit not as narrative. Artistic or architectural content will not 
conform to Kant's analytical procedure as necessarily logically enclosed and therefore 
outside of the need for interpretation. It is much more likely to approximate to the 
synthetic proposition which is coherently syntactical, but not necessarily true, as in 'all 
artists paint', and be subject to further interpretation. The art object as symbolic sign will 
by definition represent something else (or else it would not be symbolic). That is, it is 
necessarily metaphorical, and like the synthetic proposition, is subject to interpretation, 
and is not clearly 'there' when exposed to visual scrutiny. Lavender Mist dramatically 
demonstrates the tripartite nature of Peirce's account of the sign. Not only is Lavender 
Mist powerfully iconic, it is also self-evidently indexical in its address to the surface 
mark, but is also symbolic in its being an example of what Clement Greenberg called 
'American-type painting' (Clement Greenberg, After Abstract Expressionism, 1962, in 
Harrison et al Eds 1992, 766). Gombrich makes the significant point that visual 
metaphors signify the Aristotelian 'difference in similarity' just as effectively in the 
image as in the word. Gombrich further suggests that metaphors, both iconic and 
symbolic, do not only represent what the subject of the metaphor is by comparing it with, 
or substituting it for, something else which exemplifies it, but the metaphor also declares 
what the subject of the metaphor is not (E.H. Gombrich, Visual Metaphors of Value in 
Art 1963, 24). There is an existential absence as well as presence here. Lavender Mist 
might be understood to be a metonymical representation of' American-type painting' as 
part of its presence. What it emphatically did not represent in its 1950s context was 
European-type painting. The metaphorical absence was the tradition of European-
dominated art history and accounts of painting up to the 1950s, and as the assertion of the 
new relevance and domination of American painting, Abstract Expressionism 
subversively substituted New York for Paris as the locus for avant-garde Modernism. 
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Figuratively, presence and absence often implicate allegory, and it may be that the 
example of the supersedence of American Abstract Expressionism over European post-
war painting was achieved sardonically or ironically. Certainly it had 'attitude', which 
may be suggestive of the allegorical. Attitude as an aspect of meaning is also an aspect of 
expression or intention. It is meant to convince and persuade, and is, as it were, a gesture 
of assertion. That is, attitude is an act of persuasion. It is, in other words, a version of 
rhetoric. And it remains the case that this rhetorical implication of meaning is 
metaphorical. In the case of Abstract Expressionism, it might be that gesture was a key 
component of the implicit message. Not only was the large painted gesture a sign of 
expressive content, but also the exaggerated, almost overlarge canvas itself as a version 
of the painting's gesture, functioned as a rhetorical device; its very size was a declaration 
that it was essentially American. Size became emblematic of American painting, and a 
decisive element of its rhetoric. 
Thus we would expect the building to exhibit metaphorical signs coded as part of its 
gestural rhetoric. The central issue associated with visual rhetoric is the tendency for 
rhetoric to be linguistic, but this couples with the imperative of the visual sign to signify 
iconically. In terms of image and word, there appears to be a chiasmic contradiction. The 
word must seemingly paint the image and the image write the word; icon and text 
meeting reciprocally. 
It will be noted that metaphorical meanings are characterized by an absence as well as 
a presence. What is manifest or present is the signifying object, perhaps the large painted 
gesture which substitutes for 'American-type painting' in Abstract Expressionism. What 
is absent or latent in this example is something equivalent to a phrase like 'the 
conservative and old-fashioned European history of art'. This absent or implied meaning 
is nothing less than a 'commentary'; the visual as somehow a text. The same 'iconic text' 
refers by implication to a previous text; that is, European-type art criticism now seen as 
defunct. There is here a movement from present to past. For the commentary to be 
understood in the mind at all, the present or manifest text has to invoke a previous one, 
itself both past and latent. This oscillation across time involving both temporality and 
exegesis are the hallmarks of allegory. Absent or latent metaphors may be understood to 
be recessional, and manifest and present metaphors as emergent. Recessional and 
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emergent as descriptive of metaphorical attributes are useful terms and represent the 
latent and manifest respectively. In a further sense of absence and presence, recessional 
and emergent, or latent and manifest metaphors, might also be understood to represent the 
concealed and revealed. In an important way, this will involve links with Heidegger's 
phenomenological 'unconcealment' in Being And Time. The terms 'latent' and 'manifest' 
are often associated with Freudian or psychoanalytical procedures, but here are restricted 
to the respective meanings of 'concealed' and 'revealed'. 
The discussion of the inadequacies of iconography and Panofsky's shift to what he 
called 'the iconological' mirrors a move in poststructuralist criticism in the work of 
someone like Roland Barthes from the denotational to the connotational and the 
importance of theories of readership and the relevance of literary criticism for the 
interpretation of architecture. 
Word And Image: Gestural Semantics 
Lessing's groundbreaking work, the Laocoon, makes a sharp distinction between the 
metaphorical nature of 'painting', that is the image, and 'poetry', that is the word. The 
image inevitably contains an instantaneity depicted on a surface of some kind, whilst the 
poetic (or linguistic) equally inevitably incorporates the opposite in the temporal. This 
discussion of word and image which leans on the important contributions to this area by 
W.J. Mitchell, lays the foundation for the description at a later point of the nature of the 
relationship between word and image and the way in which architectural meaning 
emerges from architectural form as linguistic. 
Gotthold Lessing in his preface to Laocoon (1776) speaks of a man comparing poetry 
and painting. 'Both, he felt, represent absent things as being present and appearance as 
reality. Both create an illusion, and in both cases the illusion is pleasing.'(G.Lessing, 
Laocoon 1984, 3). Lessing anticipates much in later criticism concerned with language 
and image. His position was certainly radical, perhaps even iconoclastic. The prevailing 
assumption, which he challenged, and which had emerged from Renaissance positions on 
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classical art and poetry, supposed that art and poetry were actually aspects of each other. 
Horace's dictum ut pictura poesis (as in painting, so is poetry) was widely assumed by 
eighteenth century Enlightenment criticism to be self-evident. (Moshe Barasch 1990, 
149.) Lessing quotes the aphorism attributed to Simonides that poetry is blind painting 
and painting mute poetry. His impatience with the synoptic view of poetry and painting, 
language and image, as mutually reciprocating and dialectically fused, extends to his 
characterization of illusion as a form of present absence. Lessing wants nothing less than 
a separation of powers, a clear division between the poetic and the visual. The poetic is 
linear, and in the epic, touches narrative. It is, in its very linearity, inevitably an extended 
account of an event or condition. Poetry is ontologically temporal; it can only produce its 
illusion and its mimesis of reality through time. He makes it clear that he is not only 
referring to poetry as temporal, but implies that progression through time is an attribute of 
writing (Lessing 1984, 6). Poetry, like painting, indeed, is not a simple duplication of 
nature formed in the mind as pleasing or sublimely beautiful. Each acts differently as a 
sign. In chapter sixteen of Laocoon, Lessing speaks of painting making 'use of entirely 
different means and signs from those which poetry employs'. Signs are either coded in 
language or in visual configuration, not both. 
Painting, it is made clear, is characterized by simultaneity. It can only represent, on the 
whole, one thing at a time. A painting other than allegory necessarily depicts a frozen, 
singular image and is outside of time in the sense that its whole, or gestalt, is 
apprehended by the instantaneous glance. (There was much for Clement Greenberg to 
admire here, and his debt to Lessing is acknowledged in his own Towards A New 
Laocoon.) Although it would not have seriously compromised his argument, Lessing may 
not have been aware of the medieval convention of depicting different time-frames in 
one painting, such as Duccio's version of Christ healing the blind man at the National 
Gallery, London, and which shows before and after the healing on the same picture-
plane. Painting cannot give an account of a narrative precisely because of the essential 
aspect of the simultaneity of its frozen visual constituent feature. And language does what 
painting cannot do as an element of what Poststructuralist critics like Roland Barthes 
would call its syntagmatic nature. That is, the syntactic property of units of meaning like 
sentences when they close, presupposes the implied existence of the next unit which does 
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not yet exist (Roland Barthes 1977,50). However, we note that 'painting', Lessing's tenn 
for the visual arts in general, exists as physical object as well as depiction. In an actual 
painting, what is depicted in contour and gesture metaphorically alludes to something else 
as the subject, coded in its medium of pigment. This is the dominant or manifest 
metaphor which bears a direct relation to what it as an object refers to, and which 
signifies as a presence. Yet the recessive metaphor, or Gombrich' s area of absence which 
indicates what the latent metaphorical meaning might be, must be a quality or state rather 
than a depicted subject. By definition, it will not have objecthood. Objecthood associates 
with the dominant or manifest metaphor. But then how may the qualitative state be 
signified, since it is non-visual and has no objecthood, other than with language? Lessing 
in his radical attempt to disturb the prevailing aesthetic consensus that ut pictura poesis 
presided canonically over critical orthodoxy, wholly separates the semiotic or linguistic 
sign from the iconic sign as representative respectively of poetry and painting. And yet it 
would seem that recessive metaphorical meaning can only be construed by coming into 
language from the emergent or manifest visual meaning. And Lessing, in his 
detennination to disrupt ut pictura poesis and to demonstrate the essential separation of 
poetry and painting, cannot contemplate or 
acknowledge the possibility that the 
painterly sign demands language for its 
semantic resolution. In fact, Lessing 
devotes some time to recounting the 
narrative of Laocoon since this bears on 
the efficacy of the sculptural gesture. In 
doing so he of course establishes a 
relationship between the sculptural form 
and its preceding narrative, Virgil ' s The 
Aeneid. It might be argued that the 
sculpture was a consequence of the 
narrative text and presumably would not 
have come to exist without it, which at 
least indicates a relation between narrative and sculpture, although that relation is not 
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necessarily causal. In Peirce's tenns, it is interesting to note that the art object, the 
sculpted Laocoon, and Virgil's account of the Greek story as language are reciprocal. In 
this sense, language and image are 'touching' , and must represent a part-whole 
relationship indicative of Peirce's indexical sign. The 'touching' will be contiguous and 
therefore metonymic. And in the case of the metaphorical meaning, the relation between 
recessional and emergent metaphor will be similarly part-to-whole, contiguous and 
metonymical. The metonymical aspect of metaphor will need to be further considered in 
the light of Iakobson's theory of language arising from the studies of aphasia. 
Lessing, in his use of painting 
as a generic tenn, includes all 
the visual arts. In discussing the 
Laocoon sculpture, [Fig 3] he 
generalizes from sculpture as a 
paradigmatic case for the visual 
arts. (Lessing, Introduction, 
xxvii.) Thus painted gesture 
would partake of the sculptural. 
In an extension of Lessing' s 
argument, if architecture is to be 
included in the visual arts as it 
surely must, then its form must 
in some way be reconciled with 
the sculptural. Work by I ate-
phase Postmodernist architects such as Gehry and Libeskind would seem to fit this 
prescription, as would Vitruvius's account of the specific place of caryatids in classical 
architecture. 
Lessing's demarcation of the verbal and the visual creates binary opposition such as 
the temporal in language and the spatial in the visual arts. That painting and poetry, 
image and word, are contrary processes can hardly be disputed. But what has become 
increasingly accepted from Coleridge's treatment of the symbol onwards, is the 
conviction that imagery cannot signify independently of language. Despite Clement 
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Greenberg and Michael Fried's insistence on the optical pre-linguistic nature of painterly 
visuality, particularly in Fried's Art And Objecthood, the critical trend has been towards a 
semantic transference from the iconic image in the form of semiotic interpretation, 
succinctly summarized by W,J.T. Mitchell. 'In the modern era the main 
direction ..... would seem to be from the image, conceived as a manifest, surface content 
or 'material', to the word, conceived as the latent, hidden meaning lying behind the 
pictorial surface.' (W.J.T. Mitchell, Image And Word in Icon%gy, 1986 in Harrison et al 
1992, 11 06.) The use of the prepositional terms 'from' and 'to' here is apposite in the 
light of the earlier discussion. The limitations of painting, nevertheless, induce it to 
produce its own sense of what amounts to an aspiration towards visual discourse. 'Even 
the legendary founder of the ut pictura poesis tradition, Simonides of Ceos, 
acknowledges that at best, 'painting is mute poesy.' It may aspire to the eloquence of 
words, but it can only attain the kind of articulateness available to the deaf and the mute, 
the language gesture, of visible signs and expressions.' (W.J.T. Mitchell, 1986, Mute 
Poesy and Blind Painting, in Harrison et al 1992, 1109, emphasis original.) 
Although Lessing, to a modem ear, differentiates too sharply between word and image, 
he has important things to say about the significance of the imagination for meaning, and 
its embodiment in gesture. In agreeing with Winckelmann that the sculpted Laocoon is 
represented as not screaming but stoically sighing, Lessing argues that the gesture 
(gestus) cannot show, or embody states in extremis precisely because it denies the faculty 
of imagination its function of interpretation [1] and [Fig 2]. 'But only that which gives 
free rein to the imagination is effective. The more we see, the more we must be able to 
imagine. And the more we add in our imagination, the more we must think we see. In the 
full course of an emotion, no point is less suitable for this than its climax. There is 
nothing beyond this, and to present the utmost to the eye is to bind the wings of fancy and 
compel it, since it cannot soar above the impression made on the senses, to concern itself 
with weaker images shunning the visible fullness already represented as a limit beyond 
which it cannot go ..... One either hears him either merely moaning or else sees him dead.' 
(Lessing 1984,20.) The comparison between The Laocoon and Bacon's Pope [Figs 3 and 
2] represents a notable distinction between ancient and modem, between the treatment on 
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the one hand of classical ideal form and on the other the deliberate depiction of distressed 
and distorted anomie. 
There is a fascinating arc which jumps from Lessing's Laocoon to modem Continental 
philosophers of phenomenology and embodiment such as Merieau-Ponty and Heidegger 
who insist that meaning must be a product of the reader's intention as well as that ofthe 
author. The philosophical underpinning of the relation between language and form which 
is rehearsed in Chapter Three here or the literary basis of interpreted meaning established 
by Chapter Five are both indebted to Lessing's distinction between word and image in the 
Laocoon. 
Embodiment and Gesture 
In an empirical object such as the building, metaphorical meaning will be embodied in 
its structure. Embodiment implicates the recurrent idea of the copy. If one thing is a 
version of another thing, or contains the reference to another thing or is a simulacrum or 
mimesis of it, then it must of course be in some part metaphorical. Thus even 
emphatically poststructuralist architecture, say by Zaha Hadid, which 'acknowledges' its 
Modernist precursors, is metaphorical in this sense. This section examines the 
implications of mimesis and the way that gesture as meaningful is both mimetic and 
metaphorical and looks at the significance of Vitruvius and Emmanuel Kant within this 
complicated issue. 
Although Lessing does not refer to embodiment as a specific term, he clearly separates 
it from the imagination; ' ... signs existing in space can express only objects whose wholes 
or parts coexist, while signs that follow one another can express only objects whose 
wholes or parts are consecutive. Objects or parts of objects which exist in space are called 
bodies. Accordingly, bodies with their visible properties are the true subjects of painting. , 
(Lessing, Chapter Sixteen.) 'Painting', we remind ourselves is Lessing's term for the 
visual arts. He is once more establishing the difference between the function of the sign 
in visual form and in language, the one as relational and the other as consecutive. At the 
same time, he also clearly distinguishes between the construction of meaning in the 
imagination from the physicality and materiality of the art object which embodies, in its 
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attitude and gesture as visual metaphor, states of mind such as, in the case of Laocoon, 
stoicism and the tragic. Imagination, then, operates as an aspect of mind, and visual 
shape, gesture and posture as metaphorical embodiment represented by imitation or 
mimesis. Another temporal arc diachronically links past to present. The gestural resting 
place of the postmodern building, its postural repose, will embody its metaphorical 
meaning in the mind of the spectator as the embodiment of its figural tropes, and in its 
attitude, its rhetorical stance. Lessing's aesthetic theory of gestural restraint and decorum 
is evaluative and normative, whilst contemporary modem theory might well locate itself 
more in the discussion of difference. Nevertheless, such a contemporary theory must still, 
in its own synchronic moment, address the nature of postmodem visual metaphor, and in 
the case of the installation and architecture as spatial forms, the spatial resolution of its 
gestural inflection. Lessing's remarkably modem-sounding emphasis on the sign as an 
indicator of gestural metaphor again heavily involves the spectator in interpretation of 
both value and meaning. Kant's later formulation of ideal beauty intuited by the mind by 
a process of judgement which is other than pure reason would seem to implicate intuitive 
recognition rather than interpretation. Beauty is inherently there within the disposition of 
the form and intuited transcendentally, autonomously independent of the conditions of 
spectatorship. Ideal beauty, after all, must exist a priori, and the sensorium is only an 
empirical means to a much larger conceptual and moral end. Lessing, however, insists 
that the aesthetic status of the art object as an entity must allow the imagination of the 
spectator to enter the fullest potential meaning, rather than be confronted by an 
interpretative end-point. In this sense, the status of the work of art in the imagination or 
mind of the spectator is not a transcendental given. In marking out this ground, Lessing 
was prescient. Although firmly of his own Enlightenment period, he anticipates, as it 
were, the issues confronting Structuralist and Poststructuralist theories of readership, as 
may become clearer later. Lessing's suggestion of the need for a layer of interpretation by 
the spectator makes the sign a palimpsest. The original creative intention is overlaid by 
the observer's interpretative assumptions. And in the act of interpretation, the observer's 
need to revisit what might be the author's intention is an act of restitution and 
reinstatement. It also both instantiates original intention, and from the imagination, 
accommodates a flow of possible alternatives. In an important and additional sense, the 
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presence of the palimpsest also implies an act of appropriation by the reader, or a process 
of complicity which is ultimately allegorical. Lessing's demand for decorum and 
appropriate modesty in depiction allowing for interpretative completion, makes the status 
of the art object as sign inevitably ambiguous. 
Both Lessing and Kant would insist that the art object is imitative, a copy derived from 
the embodiment of natural form. Despite Plato's expulsion of the poets from the Republic 
for pedalling metaphor and rhetoric as a form of second-hand copy, or appearance over 
reality, mimesis has been in essence the legacy classical art has bequeathed on western 
culture. It is interesting to note that if interpretation is an act of restitution, of reinstating 
assumed authorial intention, then the act of interpretation is itself mimetic. Imagination as 
response, proceeds from an original intention to the spectator's second-hand 
reinstatement of artistic intention. Given that artistic intention is literally embodied in the 
art object itself, the spectator's response to the object flows to a perceived artistic 
intention. The two processes, imagination and embodiment, historically represent mind 
and body. The Cartesian dualism is less interesting here than the suggestion that 
temporally and procedurally, embodiment precedes imagination, as 'from' must be 
anterior to 'to'. In a further sense, the spectator's interpretative response to the art object, 
to its embodiment that is, is a form of 'touching' between interpretation and intention. It 
would seem, then, that since intention and interpretation are conceptually contiguous, the 
process of interpretation is indexical. Peirce's indexicality is expressive of relation, and 
both intention and interpretation are parts of the whole sign, and what emerges as 
meaning must oscillate between the parts. At a given moment, perception and 
embodiment dominate, and at another, concept and imagination. At all events, the 
indexical relation between them will be metonymic; part to whole and back again. In the 
later interpretation of architecture here, this metonymic transfer will assume a large 
significance. 
So, albeit simplistically, the classical idea of beauty inhered in mimesis as a copy of 
nature. Art turned nature, the natural and the real, into the artificial. When the question of 
what nature and the real provide for formal artistic beauty is pursued, the traditional 
response from Vitruvius and the Renaissance Neo-Platonists, for example, was in the 
virtues of proportion, balance, euphony, rhythm and so on; in short, the attributes of 
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disegna. Proportion was seen as the fundamental unifying process which related size and 
shape, and metonymically, part to whole. The proportion and balance in design referred 
to surface and not subject, form not content. Classical themes might well have been 
copied as subject in the classical period from the Renaissance up to the emergence of 
Romanticism in the early nineteenth century, such as Titian's Bachus And Ariadne 
(National Gallery, London). But what made the art object beautiful was the disposition of 
the parts, which in tum involved the physical materiality of the medium arranged for 
order and balance, and composition which worked, in the case of paintings, through the 
surface. In painting, this amounted to the arrangement of contour and shape in the painted 
medium, in sculpture the modelling of three-dimensional form and in architecture the 
ordered assembly of facades. 
Vitruvius makes it clear in The Ten Books Of Architecture that architecture depends on 
the imperatives of Order, Arrangement, Eurythmy, Symmetry Propriety and Economy 
(Vitruvius, 1960, Book One, Chapter Two, 13). Later on in Book Three, 'On Symmetry: 
In Temples And The Human Body', he elaborates symmetry as based on the human body 
[2]. It is the human body, formed by nature which accords to Order, Arrangement and 
Symmetry their underlying proportionality. Vitruvius's metonymical fractions of body 
parts to whole are highly specific; the head (crown to chin) is one eighth of the length of 
the body, for example (E. Panofsky 1955, 95). His citing of the human body as an 
originating source for proportion and propriety in the arrangement of buildings, expressed 
in part in the modular, and in part in the ornamental, grounds the equivalence between the 
human body and architectural design as metaphorical. When speaking of propriety in 
Book One, Chapter Two, Vitruvius insists that appropriateness of style is an important 
component of the building'S suitability to its site. He asserts: ' The temples of Minerva, 
Mars and Hercules will be Doric, since the virile strength of these gods makes daintiness 
entirely inappropriate to their houses'. Describing buildings as 'virile' or 'dainty' 
confirms both their historical embodiment and their capacity to substitute for human 
states. The implication is that Doric columns are metaphorically masculine, possibly even 
phallic, and that Corinthian or Composite columns might represent femininity. (1. Onions, 
1998, Chapter Two, The Orders.) It follows that since these distinctions rest on contour 
and gesture, that the greater the degree of expression, the greater degree of overt gesture. 
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In the case of buildings in this respect, Corbusier's trajectory went from impersonal, 
Purist and classical modernism to the highly expressive at Ronchamp. In this context, 
Ronchamp begins to look sculptural precisely because it is gestural. Whether architecture 
is not overtly gestural, like Vitruvius's classical temples, or highly gestural as in Saarinen 
or Nervi, the underlying template is embodied gesture. 
Of course there is possible an almost limitless typology of gestural sign, such as 
'resignation', 'aggression', 'supplication', 'celebration' and so on. The gesture signs as 
an iconic 'something', as it were, a 'visual noun' which in interpretation becomes, or 
represents, an abstract quality like an abstract noun. The shift from concrete to abstract 
'noun' is analogous with the movement in cognition from perception to interpretation, 
from embodiment to imagination. It may be that the interpretation of gesture is only 
possible because we have both a biological imperative and cultural experience. In the 
perception, as distinct from the conceptualisation of gesture and posture, it can be 
reasonably speculated that there are specific eye-to-brain linkages and responses which 
have evolved and have been selected for in a hunter-gathering past because they favoured 
survival. The instantaneous recognition of, and essential distinction between, hostile and 
social gesture, for example, might still be the biological basis of the perception of form in 
general, and aesthetic configuration in particular. Even the act of differential perception, 
it will be noted, requires an act of interpretation; early humans, like other animals, needed 
a typological inventory of gestural form in order to avoid predation CR. Gregory et al 
1995; R. Latto The Brain Of The Beholder, 86.) 
In the case of art, much of the meaning assigned to gestural attitude or posture is 
conventionally and culturally conferred. The total sign as gestalt will, in non-abstract art, 
require the context of the whole and its parts to be resolved into an interpretation. If we 
recognize the folded arms gesture, for example, only the larger synchronic context will 
determine whether it represents resolution or resignation or something else altogether 
such as petulance. In chapter seventeen of Laocoon, Lessing discourses on the 
implications of the parts and the whole in the case of poetry and painting. Painting, in as 
much as it depicts a single subject and not an implied narrative, assembles the parts as 
representative and constitutive of a whole depicted at once visually in what is a spatial 
relationship. Poetry, on the other hand, in 'painting' the same scene in language, must go 
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to extraordinary lengths to account for the parts and their connections, and such a 
description would be of inordinate length, and demand of the reader or hearer prodigious 
feats of recall and memory. 'To the eye, parts once seen remain continually present; it can 
run over them again and again. For the ear, however, the parts once heard are lost unless 
they remain in the memory. And even if they do remain there, what effort and trouble it 
costs to renew all their impressions in the same order and with the same vividness; to 
review them all in the mind at once with only moderate rapidity, to arrive at an 
approximate idea of the whole!' Lessing does not discuss ekphrasis, the rhetorical trope 
of representing poetically iconic imagery in language, such as Homer's lengthy account 
of the appearance of the shield of Achilles in The Iliad which Lessing does discuss at 
length. The advantage of a poetic account over a visual depiction is that it can set a 
context which enriches the understanding with a successive account where, say, a 
painting of the shield can only depict one image characterized by simultaneity and 
outside of any context. Alternatively, a visual allegory or visual symbol such as a 
medieval painted icon of the Mother and Child signified so powerfully in its frozen 
gesture between mother and child as parts constituting the whole, that the Reformation 
iconoclasts frequently destroyed such images. The fear was that the visual image so 
powerfully embodied the mystery of the Virgin that the icon, a visual sign, would signify 
more potently than preaching and biblical exegesis; in a manner of speaking, the visual 
icon would deafen the word. (Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff, Eds, 1996; Sign, Alec 
Potts, 26). [3] Of course, the sign has first to be recognized as generic. We can, for 
example, look at a building in terms of its engineering and structural functions. But we 
can also, with Vitruvius, appreciate the building as delight, in which case it signifies as 
art. But the art object as sign is itself by its nature, constitutive, and is formed by the 
relation of parts to whole. The sign, then, in general, is in Peirce's terms indexical since it 
has its parts in contiguity and is therefore metonymic. We seem to have a case here of a 
metonymic sign indicating that its parts signify metonymically. Peirce's sign, it would 
seem, must assume the status of a meta-sign; the sign of a sign. It is immediately 
noticeable that Saussure's sign is, in contrast, binary; the sign and its signified referent. 
The sign can only signify in some code, such as language or pictograms, and the semantic 
relation between signifier and signified may be one-to-one or not. If not, then the 
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meaning of the sign must be subject to interpretation. But it exists as an entity which is 
'there' as a potential meaning outside the context of its recognition. If no one perceived 
it, it would still be a sign, but putatively. It is langue, not parole. This is rather like the 
later distinction Noam Chomsky draws between 'competence' and 'performance.' 
Competence, like langue, refers to language as an ideal state, the ideal grammar, while 
performance represents the rather more idiosyncratic condition of language-use. 
Saussure's sign remains a sign autonomously, independently of social context, even if it 
is not perceived by anybody as a sign. Peirce's sign only signifies when it has been 
subject to an apprehending act. 
Peirce, in describing the sign as constituent, acknowledges that its very tripartite, part-
to-whole relationship invokes an infinite regress. The apprehending subject perceives the 
signified object as referent and as emerging from the metaphorical transfer of meaning 
between the material sign and its semantic analogue. However, the emergence of the new 
meaning itself constitutes a new sign subject to being apprehended. This new or 
secondary sign will in tum produce new possible meanings, and so on indefinitely in an 
infinite regress. It is important to note that the meaning of Peirce's originating sign is not 
a totality. Part of its meaning or sense is deferred into a proliferating series of new signs. 
In Poststructuralist or Derridean terms, the proliferated sign as an absence by deferral, or 
'differance', constantly deconstructs and subverts the dominant or manifest originating 
sign as presence. Peirce's infinite regress seems to be a passage from the presence of each 
new meaning to the absence of the interpretation behind it which in tum becomes the 
latest present meaning about to be subverted by the next absent interpretation, and so on 
indefinitely. In a similar syntagmatic way, language itself as the principal medium of 
meaning and communication, defers the totality of meaning in Derrida's system. The 
conflict between this and the traditions of western analytical philosophy is both obvious 
and familiar. In the case of Pollock's Lavender Mist, Pollock's gestures depict nothing, 
and so there is no traditional subject, but there is Pollock's expression and intentionality 
as content. Since Lavender Mist depicts nothing and refers to nothing 'outside' itself, it 
can only signify self-referentially as a sign which refers to itself as sign, and is, in this 
sense, an example of meta-signification. We perhaps recognize that Pollock's painted 
gesture echoes the brush strokes in his earlier surrealist painting. This work was 
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influenced by Ashile Gorky, who, as a refugee European working in New York after 
World War Two, in tum was heir to the traditions of European painting. And so Pollock's 
originality is indefinitely deferred. Other lines of signification may set up other chains of 
signification, domino-like, ad infinitum. Each new signification is metonymically 
dependent on the previous one. The proliferating sign is both new and old in a series of 
oscillating presences and absences. Each new sign is also necessarily a palimpsest of 
layered meaning. Each of Pollock's gesture-marks, which dramatically embody his 
physical actions, can only mean as ciphers of his affective response to the medium 
confronting him. 
Lavender Mist evidently defies ekphrasis. An account in language of the painting 
would not allow a copy or replica to be made of it. Contrariwise, Homer's 'painting in' of 
Achilles's shield in poetic imagery could generate a visually depicted copy as an example 
of iconic mimesis. Lavender Mist is a collocation in an empirical sense; the whole is 
represented by the collection and disposition of its marks and touches, which 
intentionally reveal embodied human agency as its source. Since it does not represent any 
subject, but instead indicates the physicality of its surface, what is denoted and revealed 
is something like 'painterliness' as its dominant meaning or metaphor. But the association 
of its concealed symbolism, its absence in other words, is with an affective state or 
condition. Which existential condition might be instantiated by Pollock's apparently 
compulsive strokes - 'neurosis', 'alienation', 'anomie' or whatever - is not of direct 
concern here. Because there is no subject, as in a building, whatever condition inheres in 
its visual form must be the result of metaphorical substitution. And that existential 
condition can only be explained by the use of abstract nouns which assist the 
understanding and imagination. In what seems a useful way, the implied existential 
condition, whatever that may be, seems most appropriately represented by the ascription 
of 'keywords' rather than through extended descriptive sentences (Raymond Williams, 
Keywords, 1988). This suggests that the status of visual, non-narrative art, including the 
building, is ontologically mediated, and not simply formalist or eidetic. The fact that the 
semantic significance of the visual art object cannot be fully explained by language 
implies that its meaning must be self-contained in some way, and that the object is an 
example of a thing-in-itself. This does not mean that language is not implicated in the 
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understanding of what might be called 'the existential status' of visual art. The art object 
may indeed not have its own self-contained 'language', as in 'the language of 
architecture' or 'the language of sculpture' and so on, an issue discussed at length later. 
Such rhetorical turns disguise the process whereby visual art, in revealing its meanings, 
necessarily comes into language. In visual art, the 'language of this' or 'the language of 
that' only acts to obfuscate that what this so-called 'language' actually represents are 
forms of metaphorical gesture, shape and pose. An essential aspect of the ontological 
condition of the visual art object will be a further sense of the palimpsest. What will also 
be layered in the visual sign will be the linguistic imperative somehow 'behind' or 
'below' the visual. What a building signifies oscillates between the two in particular 
ways. 
The implication of language within the visual sign as recessional or latent indicates that 
it is 'there' as an absence. Such oscillation between the tacit and implicit, particularly 
involving time, often appears to be what Auerbach in Mimesis calls 'Figura' (Erich 
Auerbach, Mimesis, 1957, 64).'Figural interpretation establishes a connection between 
two events or persons in such a way that the first signifies not only itself but also the 
second, while the second involves or fulfils the first.' Auerbach cites biblical exegesis in 
the figural account of Adam's sleep producing Eve, the original mother. In the New 
Testament, Adam's sleep is a figure of Christ's death-sleep, and from Christ's wound in 
the side flows a new mother, the church, just as Adam's wound produced Eve. For the 
moment, it is important to note that such figural oscillation suggests the presence of 
allegory as an implicit text which was previously 'absent'. Mimesis of course involves 
the copy. If there is a copy, then as Auerbach's figural analogues imply, there must be an 
original. However, Derrida, in discussing Rousseau, questions originality. Rousseau 
argues that originality arises from nature, and that art's quiddity lies in line and not 
colour. Mimesis inheres in shape, not tint. The copy is made essentially from outline 
hence establishing the engraving as the paradigmatic art form. (It would be suggested 
here, although neither Rousseau nor Derrida pursue it, that the paradigm of the outline 
leads inevitably to gesture, pose and visual rhetoric.) In a difficult, but ultimately 
rewarding way, Derrida denies the possibility of origin. If the 'original' beauty remains 
beautiful after the copy, then that very beauty contained that which could be reproduced 
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as part of its beauty. 'If the beautiful loses nothing by being reproduced, if one recognizes 
it in its sign, in the sign of the sign which a copy must be, then in the "first time" of its 
production there was already a reproductive essence. The engraving which copies the 
models of art, is nonetheless the model for art. If the origin of art is the possibility of the 
engraving, the death of art and art as death are prescribed from the very birth of the 
work.' The original has to be represented as a drawing from nature, drawing being the 
instrument of the outline. What appears to be original is dependent on a previous 
originality leading presumably to another regress in which originality is indefinitely 
deferred, as in the case of Peirce's triadic sign. The original is itself a copy possibly 
derived from nature, and its mimesis, Derrida reminds us in Of Grammat%gy, is a result 
of 're-production' and 're-presentation' (Jacques Derrida, 1998, 208/9). Auerbach's 
Mimesis invokes the idea of the copy as a metaphorical simile and is a provocative 
anticipation of the tropes of postmodem architecture (as against poststructural forms) 
which in its earlier manifestations was self-consciously mimetic in parodically reinstating 
earlier architectural styles such as classicism. The opening of postmodem architecture is 
conspicuously Historicist and mimetic and is heavily dependent on the function of the 
simile rather than fuJI-blooded metaphor. Mimesis is one of its highly significant 
constituent features, and is discussed at length in Chapter Six here. 
Theatricality and Gestural Rhetoric 
Michael Fried's foundationally important work, Art And Objecthood opposed the 
movement of art during the early nineteen sixties away from painting towards 
objecthood, and is now widely seen as the defining debate about the emergence of the 
postmodem art object becoming increasingly an architectural form of instaHation. Fried's 
characterization of the Minimalist, or postmodem work of art as an act of contrivance and 
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theatricality is often associated solely with the debate about the future of the plastic arts 
and not architecture. However, this section appropriates Fried's conception of 
theatricality, applies it to architecture and suggests that the very notion of theatricality is 
highly apposite as a way in to postmodern architectural rhetoric which is developed 
thematically later. 
The critical conflict between Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried and the 
Minimalists in the nineteen sixties is now seen retrospectively as a rearguard defence of 
Modernism itself (Charles Harrison et al Modernism In Dispute, 1993, 196). This is of 
some considerable consequence because Fried's impassioned defence of visual 
simultaneity in Art And Objecthood is representative of a fulminating line between the 
fracture of Modernism and the conceptualism of the postmodern. Although Fried resisted 
to some extent Greenberg's reductive and essentialist account of American modernist art 
as an evolutionary or dialectical apotheosis, both agreed about the definitive constituent 
feature of Modernism. Just as Lessing had initiated simultaneity as the defining feature of 
the image at the beginning of the modem in the Enlightenment, so Fried and Greenberg 
established the optical as the quintessential of spectator response at its end. For a 
discussion of simultaneity as paradigmatic of Modernism, a paradigm fundamentally 
opposed by Postmodernism, see Art Since 1900, H. Foster, R. Krauss et a12004, 122-124. 
A number of important consequences flow from Greenberg and Fried's position. Their 
characterization of the modernist art object acknowledges much that is found in the 
writings of Roger Fry and Clive Bell in the early twentieth century in the emergence of 
Significant Form. Since abstract art (and in particular Abstract Expressionist painting and 
sculpture) contained no subject, it dispensed with the depicted illusion and as a 
consequence emphasized surface and gesture. Despite Pollock's 'cutting the [picture] 
plane' as Greenberg had it, the Minimalists like Donald Judd and Robert Morris argued 
that any painting, including abstraction, would be inevitably illusionist because of the 
necessary consequence of the figure/ground spatial depth created by any mark on any 
surface. 'Specific Objects', as theoretically free of gesture and expression were to replace 
modernist painting and sculpture. Frederick Jameson has represented the postmodem as 
an emptying; of a flat, depth less and calculated superficiality in which the affective has 
50 
been excluded (Frederick Jameson, The Cultural Logic Of Late Capitalism 1991,6-10). 
The waning of affectivity is accompanied by the disappearance of expression. Fried's 
account of the Minimalist object as 'literalist' might be seen as characteristic of the 
objecthood of the postmodern art object itself. As postmodern art has become more 
objectified and has forsaken the wall for the floor, particularly in the installation, it has 
also become an occupant of space, and in that sense has moved towards the architectural. 
And in assuming objecthood it has dispensed with expression. The literalist object 
(Emin's bed, Hirst's shark and so on) in emphasizing its objecthood, has shed illusion, 
but not necessarily allusion, and at the same time has similarly discarded the possibility 
of its being 'artistic', let alone 'beautiful' precisely because of its literality. Duchamp's 
found object, the Fountain or pissotiere becomes paradigmatic. The literalist found object 
within the institution of art sardonically installs the possibility of art becoming non-art. In 
what at first seems a paradox, just as postmodern painting and sculpture has reified into 
objecthood and excised expression, postmodern architecture has palpably become 
sculptural, gestural and overtly expressionistic. It was architectural Modernism which 
expelled expression and gesture prior to Ronchamp. Mies's Seagram Tower, New York, 
was mute. In fact, of course, architecture always has embodied objecthood and literality 
by necessity in order to function as building; it always has been an object. So the 
postmodern building already finds itself as an object which cannot objectify or reify itself 
further, unlike the painting or sculpture. In order to resist Modernism and become 
Postmodern, it has, in other words to incorporate as a form of presence that which 
Modernism consigned to absence. Architectural Postmodernism has moved in the 
opposite direction to painting and sculpture. In order to become postmodern, architecture 
has had to reject Modernist versions of Purism and classicism and become through its 
gestural inflections, expressionistic. This expressionist flowering during the opening 
period of postmodern architecture, which is traced in Chapter Five here, is characterized, 
in its opposition to Modernism, by the extravagance of its visual and historicist rhetoric. 
As well as emphasizing the instantaneous optical nature of the spectator response to 
visual art, Fried and Greenberg were also insistent that such experience defeated time and 
what Fried called 'theatricality'. (Michael Fried, Art and Objecthood, 1967, in Harrison 
et al 1992, 822-834.) Fried's ascription of objecthood extended beyond the Minimalist 
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objects of Donald Judd, Robert Morris and Carl Andre to the ambiguity of the painting-
becoming-sculpture of Robert Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns. In a way, the climactic 
moment arrived with Fried's advocacy of Anthony Caro's sculpture, Early One Morning 
[Fig 4]. What matters about it is its contiguity and metonymy. Its relational parts amount 
to a version of Significant Form. The contrast with the Minimalist object of Judd or 
Morris is acute. The parts relate gesturally, and if the whole refers to or embodies the 
human form in an abstract way, it nonetheless remains abstract and non-mimetic. ('The 
Fig 4 
idea that Caro's sculpture can liberate 
gesture does not make it like a body 
in a mimetic sense, but the release of 
gesture does depend on the, relational 
character of the sculptures.' Anthony 
Causley, Sculpture Since 1945, 1998, 
112.) Relationship is crucial. Fried 
suggests that the authenticity of 
Modernist art resides in its interior, 
intrinsic and autonomous visual 
relation of parts. What makes the Minimalist object theatrical or 'a kind of stage 
presence' (original emphasis) is that the relation, in being extrinsic, is externally 
dramatised; ' .... the spectator perceives an object as that which it literally is, something 
existing in space and time. The experience is then of interest to the extent that the 
relationship between spectator and object can be invested with drama; that is to say, to 
the extent that the relationship can be made ' theatrical'.' (Charles Harrison, 1993, 191.) 
As art approaches the condition of theatre, so it degenerates, and value lies in the internal 
authenticity of any art-form. Extrinsic relations between arts, such as painting and 
sculpture, as in Rauschenberg's Combines for example, make the art 'theatrical'. It might 
actually be suggested that the condition of theatricality is broadly that of the postrnodem 
and not simply the Minimalist object. Theatricality might also be supposed to be an 
aspect of contrivance and hence of the rhetorical. If we suspend Fried's nonnative 
judgements, made at his synchronic and historical moment, and instead simply document 
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'theatricality' as an act of contrivance, it becomes a useful template for an account of 
first-phase architectural postmodernism, as may become clearer later. 
Fried's expostulation of theatricality in art after Modernism as an act of contrivance 
seems to suggest a tendency towards a certain version of taste that is Mannerist; a certain 
self-consciousness of affected and declared attitude, designed to persuade, or to be, in 
other words, rhetorical form. The rhetorical attitude, particularly in three-dimensional 
form, is of course a function of gesture. This will include the installation and the building 
as well as sculpture and painting. In architecture this has long been recognized. In the 
fifteenth century, Alberti was a principal source for classical forms in Renaissance Italy. 
His own originating source, Vitruvius, he considered unsatisfactory, and the Vitruvian 
scheme of Arrangement, Eurythmy, Symmetry, Propriety and Economy he judged to be 
tendentious. In De Re Aedificatoria, Alberti abandons the Vitruvian scheme which moved 
arbitrarily from one kind of paradigmatic building type to another. Alberti's system was 
instead based on principles of construction, function and design; jirmitas, utilitas and 
venustas. In this way, Alberti separates forms and structures from ornament. Obviously, 
the underlying distinction here is between function and form. In order to support analysis 
only, they are separated, and in order to give unity they are synthesized. What is wholly 
novel about Alberti's scheme is the fact that the unifying and synthesizing element in 
design is classical rhetoric. Alberti clearly argues that iconic visual form should be 
informed by the tropes of language, thus contradicting Lessing's insistence on the 
inherent separateness of language and visual form. Alberti's model is Quintillian whose 
subject was oration, and in particular, inventio or 'invention'. In Alberti this was 
translated into the manipulation of inventive forms but which nevertheless conformed to 
the strictures of decorum. Quintillian proposed that a speech, in order to be convincing 
and persuasive, had to have a quality of disposition or order, and equally Alberti seeks to 
impose order from dispositio on issues of planning and relating part to whole in the 
layout, particularly in the city. And Quintillian's elocutio, or adornment by tropes, Alberti 
adopts as the guiding taste for the suitability and appropriateness of embellishment and 
decoration (Anthony Grafton, Leon Battista Alberti, 2001, 274-5.) Alberti's 
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dissatisfaction with Vitruvius was based in part on his empirical studies of Roman and 
Greek building in the 1440s. The buildings themselves were said to be better models than 
Vitruvius's prescriptions, especially when realised in a corpus of drawings. Alberti 
effectively says that the propitious architectural form is an expression of its rhetorical 
tropes. This vital link will necessarily reappear in the later consideration here of the 
gesturally rhetorical form of the postmodernist building which seems to bloom after the 
formalities of architectural Modernism receded. 
In terms of visual culture, Fried's Modernist art object accedes to the glance as a 
condition of its immediacy and simultaneity. The gestalt is the means whereby its visual 
authenticity is authorised and time elided by contact with the moment. On the other hand, 
the postmodern literalist object demands that the spectator enters its space in the same 
way that the playgoer enters the fictive stage setting and mis-en-scene of the theatrical 
experience, and the glance is deferred by the intrigue of the gaze. And in entering that 
space and in following Coleridge's familiar 'suspension of disbelief, the spectator 
becomes in a sense complicit and even compromised by joining in the contrivance of the 
theatrical. At all events, however much Fried's disapproval of the postmodern art object 
may sound like a version of Puritanism, what it substantiates is that in the case of the 
postmodern art object, the critical relationship is not only within the object's parts and 
whole, but between spectator and object. And although he does not say so, Fried's 
disapproval of theatricality, his impatience with its very contrivance, represents a distaste 
of the rhetoric of display. What Fried also does not say is that in deferring the diminutive 
glance which potentially confers a kind of receptive epiphany, the postmodern work of 
art implicates language. 
Clement Greenberg's authority as the Fidei Defensor of late Modernism remains of the 
highest importance. For a generation from 1940 on, Greenberg's influence became 
hegemonic both in America and Europe. His position changed radically. Towards A 
Newer Laocoon wholly abandons the leftism of Avant-Garde And Kitsch of the previous 
year. Lessing becomes powerfully relevant in separating word and image and Greenberg 
invokes the Laocoon as a means of insisting on the optical nature of experiencing abstract 
painting which suspends not only the linguistic but also the temporal. In other words, 
Greenberg's procedure has become transcendental. It also suspends the significant 
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historical account in Avant-Garde And Kitsch and in denying time, suspends history 
itself, making the experience of art autonomous and a priori. Greenberg's Kantian 
position (Peter Osborne 2004, 651-2) remains of the greatest significance because it 
represents what Postmodernism is against. (The spatial and temporal aspects of 
Modernism and Postmodernism are discussed in the section 'Postmodern Space and 
Modernist Temporality' in Chapter Three here.) Rosalind Krauss writes: 
'In 1940 Clement Greenberg writes 'Towards a Newer Laocoon' in which he attacks 
Surrealism, among other things, for being narrative, and Lessing's Laocoon becomes 
a kind of master model (though it was published in 1766!) of how to separate the visual 
and spatial arts from the verbal and temporal arts in modernism. For Greenberg the 
literary is temporal, Surrealism is literary, and so it must be condemned as impure.' 
(H. Foster, R. Krauss et al 2004, 320) 
What Greenberg repressed, the experience of language and time in art in the name of an 
immediate, optical and pre-temporal response becomes the linguistic and temporal 
palimpsest which ushers in the allegorical in the postmodern. 
This chapter has sought to establish a number of fundamentally important and 
recurring themes. The metaphorical nature of the sign underpins everything and 
anticipates the more specific treatment of visual metaphor as the conduit of meaning into 
language to come as well as the associated metaphorical constituents such as contiguity, 
simile, synechdoche, catachresis and metonymy, which are the mechanisms of 
metaphorical reference, and which are intimately related in origin to classical rhetoric. It 
has also been important, following Lessing, to establish that physical gesture, whether in 
abstract painting, sculpture or architecture is an important part of how an empirical and 
non-linguistic object such as the building might indicate rhetorical attitude as part of its 
significance. Equally, the fact that gesture is an aspect of embodiment leads later to a 
developed position which is supported by the phenomenological approach of Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer, and which explicitly rejects transcendental views of the 
work of art as characterized by Kant's version of the Beautiful. And the notion of 
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mimesis is also later developed as the basis of the simulacrum and essential to the 
concept of allegory which illuminates the idea of the postmodem. Michael Fried's 
foundational work on what has become postmodem objecthood and installation runs as a 
theme throughout and his concept of theatricality represents a key link with the rhetorical 
nature of the postmodem and poststructuralist building. Finally, the profoundly complex 
and difficult nature of the relationship between visual form and linguistic meaning, 
Lessing's image and word initiated classically with ut pictura poesis, forms the basis of a 
continuing discussion of the language and form debate that leads to the rejection of the 
assumptions embedded in the modish characterization of architectural significance as 'the 
language of architecture'. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
MODERNITY AND POSTMODERNISM 
This chapter deals with the perceived transition from Modernism to Postmodernism, 
but assumes that the postmodern remains an aspect of both modernity and Modernism. 
There are then continuing issues which centre around the nature of transition and its 
continuities and discontinuities. As well as discussions of the characteristics of 
Modernism and Postmodernism, the possibility of the Post-Postmodern is also 
considered. The chapter is divided into six sections: Modernity and its Definitions, 
Continuity and Discontinuity, Cultural and Socio-Economic Transition, Postmodern 
Space and Modernist Temporality, an important section here called The Allegorical in the 
Postmodern and finally, Theory and Post-Theory. 
Modernity and its Definitions 
It will be extensively argued here in Chapters Six and Seven in Part Two that the 
postmodern imperatives embedded in poststructuralist architecture are, in a very real 
sense, the embodiment of a return to early Modernism in the sense that the Postmodern is 
a version of Modernism but one which parodies and subverts its 'origin' or 'source'. The 
comparison of the two, the modem and the postmodem, is then an obvious requirement 
for an understanding of architectural postmodernism. It then in tum becomes essential to 
have a clear understanding of the driving imperatives of Modernism itself. This section 
offers a brief historical account of the emergence of Modernism. It then considers the key 
ideas of Clement Greenberg, universally recognized as the most accomplished theorist of 
Modernism and looks at the villas of Cor busier as exemplifiers of the Modernist impulse. 
Fried and Clement Greenberg in their different but basically similar ways represent the 
fullest expression of Modernist theory. Much is previously anticipated in Roger Fry and 
57 
Clive Bell, but Clement Greenberg in particular is widely understood to explicate 
Modernism's ideology in its most accomplished and representative form. 
In Avant-Garde and Kitsch (1939) Greenberg identifies a 'Bohemian' tendency in 
avant-garde practice which emerged in the 1850s and 1860s to withdraw from what he 
then saw as the mass commodity of capitalist culture. Greenberg is speaking of the avant-
garde: 
Hence it developed that the true and most important function of the avant-garde was 
not to 'experiment', but to find a path along which it would be possible to keep culture 
moving in the midst of ideological confusion and violence. Retiring from public alto-
gether, the avant-garde poet or artist sought to maintain the high level of his art by both 
narrowing and raising it to the expression of an absolute in which all relativities and 
contradictions would be either resolved or be beside the point. 'Art for art's sake' and 
'pure poetry' appear, and subject matter or content becomes something to be avoided 
like a plague. (C. Harrison et a11992, 530-541 original emphasis) 
In fact, what is meant by familiar terms such as 'modem', 'modernity' and 'Modernism' 
is often unclear. The term 'modem' itself seems often associated with the Industrial 
Revolution and the emergence of the Romantic sensibility during the nineteenth century. 
It can be argued, however, that 'modem' is a relative term that could have been used by 
the Romans as well as the Victorians with equal legitimacy. 'Modernity', on the other 
hand has been convincingly linked to the post-Renaissance period which itself was 
founded on dynamic changes in capitalist organization. [4] In Britain, for example, during 
the reign of Elizabeth 1 there were two quite clear early revolutions in industrial output 
(J.U. Neff The Economic Review 1935) which helped to create a new land-owning and 
capitalist middle class which ultimately suppressed the monopolistic practices of the 
Crown in the English Civil War (Christopher Hill 1961, 145-61). 'Modernism' itself is 
now largely confined to the aesthetic developments which began with the Impressionist 
practices of Edouard Manet and continued through the emergence of Post-Impressionism 
and beyond into Cubism. The single definitive founding moment for architectural 
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modernism was the creation of The Bauhaus by Walter Gropius which later evolved into 
the International Style (C. Harrison 1997, 42). Greenberg saw the gradual historical 
development of the movements of modernity such as Realism or Romanticism for 
example, suddenly accelerate during the second half of the nineteenth century into the 
explosive change generated by Cubism. Art and cultural practice after Cubism was 
Modernism. And it was Modernism that both Greenberg and Fried defended in the 
nineteen sixties against what they increasingly perceived as the theatrical contrivance of 
objecthood and the installation. 
If Greenberg's primary terms such as 'avant-garde', 'moving', 'high' and 'absolute' 
were reversed, then almost immediately there would exist a preliminary of the 
postmodern in the sense that Postmodernism has reversed Modernism at almost every 
point. He goes on to invoke Enlightenment and in particular, Kantian self-criticism and 
scepticism and the necessity of progress to justify an avant-garde utopian aesthetic of 
forward movement. Greenberg is speaking of high art, of Joyce and T.S. Eliot and 
Matisse. Low art is essentially mimetic and copies or apes the great art of the past in a 
sentimental denigration of form. It is a popular, mass art, both commercial and kitsch. In 
the following year, Greenberg published Towards a Newer Laocoon, whose reference is 
principally to Lessing. Just as Lessing, in speaking of word and image, had queried the 
boundaries between and across art forms, Greenberg suggests that authenticity in the 
visual arts is a condition of its proper medium, or, in another sense, of its autonomy. And 
of course it is Michael Fried, Modernism's other great advocate, who argues in Art and 
Objecthood that painting which presumed to become sculptural, as in Rauschenberg's 
Combines, is a version of theatre. Towards a Newer Laocoon treats Greenberg's 
fundamentally important treatment of flatness. Avant-garde painting in particular, in 
emphasizing facture and therefore surface, destroyed the illusionist picture plane of 
academic art. All avant-garde visual art avoided illusion and subject and delighted in 
appearance in a denial of realist meaning and narrative. There is a trajectory here. 
Modernism proper begins with Manet's flatness [5]. (T.J. Clarke, 'Preliminaries to a 
possible treatment of Olympia in 1865'.) There is then a 'forward movement' which 
increasingly denies the picture plane and moves towards abstraction. Abstract 
Expressionism is then an historically advanced visual art-form which denies reference 
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and metaphor. In retrospect, we can reasonably associate the architectural Purism of 
Corbusier or the Functionalism of Gropius and Mies with the historical destiny of 
abstraction. All Modernist culture was seen to be moving away from narrative and 
ornamentation, and indeed, depiction itself. In Towards a Newer Laocoon Greenberg 
says: 
A vibrating tension is set up as the objects struggle to maintain their volume against 
the tendency of the real picture plane to reassert its material flatness and crush them 
to silhouettes. In a further stage, realistic space cracks and splinters into flat planes 
which come forward parallel to the plane surface .... (C. Harrison et al 1992, 554-560) 
The historical result is abstraction as a form Hegelian end-state, dialectically achieved 
through time. This seems necessarily teleological, although what it is in Modernist visual 
art that is temporally purposive is difficult to pin down. Greenberg's teleology may be 
critically inscribed within the project of Enlightenment, which Jean-Francois Lyotard in 
The Postmodern Condition (1984) describes as an example of 'Meta-Narratives' which 
invoke postmodernist scepticism and incredulity. The difficulty with end-states is that 
any further 'movement' can only be recursive, whilst Modernist 'movement' in order to 
remain avant-garde must be 'forward'. Once that Greenberg was obliged to concede that 
a bare tacked up canvas on a wall would still count as an abstract picture - although not 
necessarily, as Greenberg said, a successful one - then the wall metaphorically represents 
the Modernist cul-de-sac. Although Modernist theory required avant-gardist progression, 
the only possible 'direction' the practice of art could take was in reverse. That reversal 
becomes and initiates the postmodern. In going backwards, Postmodernism ushers in the 
very condition of temporality that the optical instantaneity of Greenberg and Fried 
denied. Often enough, this new concern with historical past time has been called New 
Historicism. How could anyone take art 'forward' after Jackson Pollock. The only 
remaining possibility for abstraction was to make the painting different by adding another 
dimension as Frank Stella did. But this in tum made what had to be two-dimensionally 
abstract and flat, despite Fried's support for Stella, into a three-dimensional object which 
it seemed would need to become sculptural and therefore submit to objecthood and, 
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presumably, theatricality. The very act oflooking backwards down the Modernist cul-de-
sac because there was no 'forwards' beckoned the postmodern. The GreenberglFried 
moment is singular. However much they might resist objecthood and the threat to the 
Modernist art object as pure optical form, the newer kind of art as produced by 
Rauschenberg and Johns in particular, mimicked Abstract Expressionism in retrospect, 
whilst simultaneously punning on its nature as object. The period from the late 1950s into 
the 1960s is the inception of the postmodern moment. In architecture, Robert Venturi's 
Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture achieved the same result. In sculpture 
Donald Judd and Richard Serra moved towards the contextualized literalist object and 
initiated ideas of installation. In painting, Rauschenberg and Johns re-accommodated the 
Dadaist found object and in making their 'painting' figural, announced the event of 
Conceptualism and the presence of allegory as an essential aspect of the emerging 
postmodern. 
Clement Greenberg'S trajectory of Modernist Kantian teleology is here taken as 
paradigmatic of Modernist theory. However much postmodernist theory might dissolve 
the dualist binaries of Modernism, such as that between high and low culture and in 
'deconstructing' them effectively reversing them, Modernism remains a retrospective part 
of the postmodern. Immediately, the palimpsest reappears in this temporal layering of the 
modem with the postmodern. And this oscillation between a postmodern present and a 
Modernist past represents, as it were, a search for lost authorship and instigates the 
auspices of allegory which is discussed in a later section in this chapter and more 
extensively in Chapter Four. 
Modernist art and architecture were understood to be different aspects of the same 
historical imperative towards abstraction as the apotheosis and end-point of Modernism. 
Modernist art belonged in Modernist buildings. It was no accident that the abstract 
paintings of Mark Rothko were originally destined for Mies's Seagram Tower, New 
York, perhaps the most powerful statement of architectural international Modernism. 
During the earlier phase of Modernism, which may be conveniently if artificially 
demarcated between 1900-1960, it was the abstract Purism of Corbusier, promulgated 
internationally by ClAM, which defined architectural Modernism. Corbusier's 
assumptions are concordant with Greenberg and Fried, and also the arguments in favour 
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of 'Significant Form' of Roger Fry and Clive Bell (C. Harrison et al 1992, 78-86). 
Abstraction and Significant Form were credos for the existence of a transcendental 
beauty, almost as a version of Platonism to which the architecture of Corbusier 
subscribed. 'Extending some of the ideas of Purist painting to architecture, and revealing 
the underlying Platonism of his outlook, Le Corbusier argued that there were basic and 
absolutely beautiful forms transcending the mere conventions of period and style.' (W.J. 
Curtis 1999, 169) 
Corbusier's early encounter with the Parthenon and Greek classical architecture was 
decisive. The Parthenon was seen as long and low, its laterality conferring classical order, 
proportion and arrangement. That laterality was of course the product of using stone as 
the pre-eminent building material which effectively constrained the height of the building 
for structural safety. That conflation of the classical with the lateral produced Corbusier's 
defining principle of the Five Points. At the Villa Stein, Garches, 1926, he designed a 
dwelling of formidable horizontals comprising decks and the jenetre en longueur, or strip 
window, liberated from structural compromise by the Domino-type frame on which hung 
the free fa~ade and its wall-wide fenestration. The lateral building, like Corbusier's other 
Villas, then assumed a classical repose of ordered arrangement (W.J. Curtis 1999, 181). 
Despite the classically ordered exteriors of his Villas, Corbusier's interiors do not 
reproduce the same interior format of the classical building with its structurally-imposed 
arrangement of the rational grid. (The grid as a recurrent imperative and sign of 
Modernism is examined in Chapter Six.) At the Villa Savoye, for instance, the 
processional demand of the inner arrangement is immediately signalled by replacing 
conventional stairs with a continuous up-slope ramp which conducts the visitor to the 
upper floors. And of course, just as the frame liberates the external wall into a free 
fa~ade, so the frame equally generates the inner arrangement into the free plan which can 
be altered at will because the internal walls are non-structural dividers. What in 
Greenberg'S terms is essentially Modernist about these buildings is not simply the 
industrialist frame as the structural device of mass-construction, but the aesthetics of the 
visual which approaches the abstract by deferring ornament and creating the instant 
visual epiphanies of Significant Form in whatever medium or genre. It remains 
extraordinary that Corbusier's archetypal Modernist structures, largely stripped of 
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metaphorical reference, transmogrified into the metaphor-saturated Ronchamp, the first 
architectural appearance of the postmodern at the end of his life. 
Continuity and Discontinuity 
There are a number of versions of the relationship between Modernism and 
Postmodernism. They might reasonably be placed typologically into five groups, 
although there could be more. The first position, occupied by Jurgen Habermas and Jean-
Francois Lyotard, although for different reasons, understands Modernism to be ,ongoing. 
The second, perhaps most powerfully elucidated by Frederick Jameson, sees 
postmodernist culture as historically discrete, but as existing in relation to late-phase 
capitalism,a position reinforced by Jean Baudrillard in a post-Marxist position which 
equates the postmodern phase of capital with the production of signs and images. A third 
grouping, as represented by David Harvey, for example, offers a critique of 
Postmodernism as indifferent to value. The fourth grouping, loosely held by Charles 
Jencks, is that initially at least, Postmodernism adopted the culturally low and populist 
position opposed to Greenbergian high Modernist culture, and the fifth, held by Terry 
Eagleton, speculates that we may already be in a new instability which is Post-
Poststructural, Post-Theory and Post-Postmodern. This section examines each of these 
with the intention of representing the postmodern not simply as opposed to anything 
Modernist, but as a complex and often indecisive thing in itself with its own 
philosophically derived precepts which are discussed further in Chapter Four. 
The intention here, especially in Chapter Six, is to give an account of postmodern 
architecture in particular, broadly from Robert Venturi to, say, Daniel Libeskind as part 
of postmodern culture. That is, that architecture de facto in the period under review, like 
other cultural forms, came to differ very significantly from Modernist preferences, 
whatever any interpretative grouping may make of it. Habermas, however, has suggested 
that that what has been characterized as postmodern, is in fact a reactionary and neo-
conservative tendency in the modem itself which the vanguard and avant-garde 
utopianism of Modernism has always resisted. In this sense, Modernism is an ongoing 
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project with its Enlightenment principles of rational self-interest and self-criticism within 
authentic social forms largely intact but under threat. The postmodern then becomes not 
simply different from Modernism, but a virulent form of anti-Modernism. Habermas 
mourns the loss of rationally planned Enlightenment collective space whilst 
acknowledging Theodore Adorno's trajectory, similar to that of Clement Greenberg, that 
Modernism was a principled space for high art. (Theodore Adorno, 1962 in Harrison et al 
1992, 761-764) Habermas's position, principally in Modernism -An Incomplete Project 
(C. Harrison 1992, 1000-1008) seems unable to concede that however much aspects of 
Modernism may be valued, the rational collective space of the modem has been dissolved 
by the global market and by, as it were, its mass economic individualism. Lyotard 
suggests that the modem must always contain the capacity to become postmodern, but at 
its opening, so that at the inception of Modernism the postmodern already implicitly 
'exists' in order for the modem to defeat ossification and renew itself in constant rebirth. 
'A work can become modem only if it is first postmodern. Postmodernism thus 
understood is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant.' 
(C. Harrison et al 1992, 1012) Lyotard suggests that the modernist aesthetic is a nostalgic 
aesthetic of the Kantian sublime and that presumably the transmogrification of the 
modern by the postmodern will help resist the authoritarian horrors of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries; 'Let us wage war on totality.' 
Habermas and Lyotard resist the nai"ve view that Postmodernism represents a complete 
break with Modernism. But both in their different ways, understand Modernism as 
forward movement, even Lyotard's, postmodernistically at least, more 'advanced' 
position. ('In an amazing acceleration, the generations precipitate themselves.') The 
Modernist metaphor of 'forward movement' of course implies temporality, and arguably 
stems from the imperative of Enlightenment Utopianism. The postmodern aesthetic 
prerogative over space on the other hand, with its artistic objecthood requiring installation 
and therefore contact with the architectural, would appear to be only able to treat time 
figuratively since it is necessarily intolerant of narratives. (See the later section in this 
chapter called 'Postmodernist Space and Modernist Temporality.') Although 
Postmodernism rejects the temporality of 'Grand Narratives' and is therefore placed in 
spatial rather than temporal attitudes, when it does deal with time as it must, it often does 
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so retrospectively, rather as an aspect of mourning or Lyotard's nostalgic sublime. The 
position taken here is that the nostalgia of mourning, that is of recursive temporality, is a 
necessary condition for the underlying imperative of the postmodern which is allegorical. 
This, it should be noted, is the opposite of Lyotard's 'amazing acceleration', although his 
notion of the postmodern aesthetic as a version of the Romantic sublime is taken up later 
here, as is Frederick Jameson's suggestion that both Modernism and Postmodernism are 
basically differently evolved aspects of Romanticism itself. (Frederick Jameson 1991, 
59.) 
Jameson suggests that Postmodernism is a cultural function of late-phase capitalism. 
This third phase of capitalist development is derived from Mandel. (See the next section, 
'Cultural and Socio-Economic Transition'.) Postmodernism on this argument is the 
cultural and social arrangement of global, 'post-industrial' capitalism. If economic 
organisation such as capitalism is staged, so far into early, middle and late, then perhaps 
we can all see another infinite regress appearing when the late becomes the late-late or 
post-late, and so on. At any rate, modernity is defined by and characterized by the 
emergence and development of capital. Jameson sees late capitalism as increasingly 
integrating the production of new culture into the production of commodities which 
favour the individual expression of choice. Product placement accompanies commodity 
production. In order to keep pace with competition, there is a constant demand for 
innovative technologies which, like computers, develop in generational waves. The 
discard is the obsolescent not the dysfunctional. The constituent features of the 
postmodern become: 
.... a new depthlessness, which finds its prolongation both in contemporary 'theory' 
and in a whole new culture of the image or simulacrum; a consequent weakening of 
historicity, both in our relation to History and in the forms of our private temporality 
whose 'schizophrenic' structure (following Lacan) will determine new types of syntax 
or syntagmatic relations in the more temporal arts; a whole new type of emotional 
ground tone - what I will call 'intensities' - which can best be grasped by a return to 
older themes of the sublime; the deep constitutive relationships of all this to a whole 
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new technology, which is itself a figure for a whole new economic world system .... 
in the bewildering new world oflate multinational capital. (Jameson, 1991, 6) 
It becomes possible, even necessary to refer back to McLuhan's Gutenberg Galaxy which 
now seems extraordinarily prescient in its depiction of the (then) coming electric global 
village with its cascading streams of electronic information simulating and representing 
the external appearance of an increasingly tenuous reality. This presentation of the real as 
copy, as simulacrum, becomes in the form, say, of the Internet what Jean Baudrillard 
calls in The Hyper-realism of Simulation, the hyperreal (C. Harrison et al 1992, 1049-
1051). McLuhan's electric tides of information and Baudrillard's media saturation of the 
apparently real may seem to represent a fairyland apostasy of lit-up communication, a 
twinkling version of the postmodern sublime. The real, Baudrillard says 'is volatised, 
becoming an allegory of death.' As an example of precession, he invokes a Borges fable 
in which cartographers produce such a perfect map of a territory that it actually comes to 
cover quite literally the territory exactly, like a vast palimpsest. However, in the 
postmodern, it is the territory, not the map which decays, because the 'map' precedes the 
real. The 'real' becomes engendered by the simulation of it as the precession of simulacra 
(1. Baudrillard 1994, 1-3). In the movie The Matrix, reality is a digital construction of 
simulacra as science fiction, but it becomes postmodernistically allegorical when it is 
realized that the film can also be read as a commentary on the contemporary political and 
corporate manipulation of media as 'presentation'. 
David Harvey understands the emergence of the postmodern as 'the shift that everyone 
agrees has occurred'. (David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodemity, 1990, 42.) Despite 
the continuities of the postmodern as part of the modem (such as the representation here 
of postmodern temporality as being recursive in revisiting Modernism in the form of 
parody or pastiche), Harvey cites Hassan's schematic differences between Modernism 
and Postmodernism. (Ihab Hassan, 1985, and in Charles Jencks, Ed, 1992.) Although the 
oppositional pairs in Hassan's scheme are only schematic, it is worth noting that what 
was oppositional to Modernism is now propositional in Postmodernism. In other words, 
Derrida's process of binary reversal as an act of deconstruction has apparently become 
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institutionally postmodern. This would seem to further suggest that the postmodern 
ideaturn, or the equivalence between the real and its representation, is largely embodied 
in poststructuralist theory. Derrida would of course have only accepted binary opposition 
as a means to the larger end of deferring 'presence', such as reversing the conventional 
primacy of speech over writing. What is 'present' (speech) is deferred and what was 
antinomically 'absent' (writing) itself assumes the ontological status of the present. 
Necessarily, each new present is subject to its own deferral. Each moment of deferral 
when an antinomy is becoming 'reversed' is synchronic. Once deferred, and a present has 
become a past, the 'reversal' becomes diachronic. The relation between oppositional 
forms is complex. In the case of the dialectic, the opposition between the thesis and its 
antithesis is resolved, not deferred by the synthesis of the two terms into a Hegelian 
'higher form', which is obviously hierarchical. But however opposed, each oppositional 
form necessarily implies the presence of the other, so that each is contained in the 
presence of the other (Derrida 1976, 165-268). 
The oppositions between the modern and the postmodern are normally understood as 
being non-dialectical because Poststructuralism would treat the Hegelian dialectic as a 
totalising 'Grand Narrative'. One oppositional pair in Hassan's scheme is reading and 
interpretation versus against interpretation and misreading. The first is deemed modern 
and the second postmodern. An elaboration of this apparently simplistic opposition 
suggests that the postmodern distrust of interpretation is itself an interpretation of 
interpretation. There are different versions of reading implicated here. The postmodernist 
objection is not to reading/interpretation as such, but to a version of them which produces 
a definitive and absolute resolution, rather like Frank Kermode's 'sense of an ending'. 
Poststructuralism distrusts both source and origins and destination and absolute end-point 
(Shiff 1996, 105). There is neither origin nor destination. Barthes's 'death of the author' 
is rhetorically the death of textual destination and the birth of the text as a product of 
readership (Barthes 1977, 142-148). Syntagmatically, there can be no resolution only an 
apparently infinite process of deferral by acts of readership against authorial or narrative 
intention. The text becomes a palimpsest of readership overlaying authorial authority. 
The 'reading' is in part a reproduction or reconstitution of the text, and as such is 
mimetically a copy of it. All copies are required metaphor; something as something else 
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both similar and dissimilar (Aristotle, Poetics, XX I). Interpretation then assumes the 
attribute of the simulacrum, but does not 'vanish' or become dissolved by the 
postmodern. The simulacrum itself is a mimetic creation; a copied version of the real as 
appearance, the real in this instance being authorial intention. In another fundamentally 
important antinomy, Hassan characterizes metaphor as a feature of modernism and 
oppositional to postmodernistic metonymy, which has come to displace it. In Peirce's 
terms, metonymy is connected with coterminous or contiguous relations which are often 
associated with the flatness and depthlessness of collage as a figure for postmodern 
conceptual randomness against the teleological 'project' of Modernism (Harvey 1990, 
302-3). But it needs emphasizing here that such large-scale generalizations, although 
perhaps usefully indicative, often conceal as well as reveal important attributes. This 
means, for example, that metaphor was not within the exclusive provenance of 
Modernism. In fact, in the case of architecture, it could be suggested that it was 
Modernism rather than the postmodern, perhaps in the case of Corbusier's Purism as a 
Modernist paradigm, which eschewed metaphor as potentially ornamental non-functional 
reference. It then transmogrifies into postmodernist architecture in the process of 
becoming expressive and in so doing acquires the attributes of the theatrical metaphor. 
And it is also the case that if postmodern temporality is recursively nuanced with ironic 
parody, then the postmodern imperative towards allegory is deeply metaphorical as Craig 
Owens proposes (Preziosi 1998, 315-328). 
Harvey appears to speak from a largely Modernist perspective. 'I also conclude that 
there is much more continuity than difference between the broad history of modernism 
and the movement called postmodernism. It seems more sensible to me to see the latter as 
a particular kind of crisis within the former, one that emphasizes the fragmentary, the 
ephemeral and the chaotic .. .' (D. Harvey 1990, 116). Everyone seems to agree that 
Postmodernism exists as a kind of cultural theory commensurate with globalism. In one 
sense, then, theories of continuity and discontinuity are of marginal significance. All 
equally seem to agree that the postmodern is implicated in the modem and that notions of 
a 'break' are simplistic and untenable. So we have, de facto, postmodern culture in, say, 
architectural forms which instantiate postmodern mores such as figural and metaphorical 
tropes together with ironic parody which would never have appeared under Modernism. 
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Nor do we need necessarily to evaluate such culture normatively. The documentation and 
description of the empirical forms of the postmodern as an account needs to distinguish 
between fact and value and avoid value-judgement. Harvey, as Modernist sympathiser, 
on the other hand, does offer a critique of post modernism as 'deconstruction bordering on 
nihilism' and for its 'preference for aesthetics over ethics' or its accommodation of the 
market as both 'shameless' and as a mark of 'reactionary neo-conservatism' (Harvey 
1990, 116). Harvey's rather larger point that the ceaseless deconstruction of all forms of 
theory, including itself, leading to constant instability and relativism, echoes Eagleton's 
later position which characterizes the situation as 'after theory' and as post-Postructuralist 
(Eagleton 2003, 23-40). For all that, the later works of Frank Gehry, for example, remain 
securely postmodernist. Regardless of disputes surrounding possible breaks, or 
continuities and discontinuities, Postmodernism is empirically quantifiable and 
qualitatively discrete. It exists as a characteristic taste and tendency, producing aesthetic 
culture and art objects as descriptively different from those of Modernism. 
Cultural and Socio-Economic Transition 
This section, which relies on Frederick Jameson's discussion of the condition of 
postmodernity in economic and cultural terms and their relation, suggests that basically 
postmodern culture acts, as it were, as a semantic analogue of the globalism of which it is 
part. Jameson is clearly correct in insisting that what we perceive as 'Postmodernism' is 
not a purely cultural process. The old deterministic case, however, that the economic base 
in the long term generates the cultural superstructure, has long since been abandoned in 
favour of a model that includes human agency and reciprocity. At all events, an 
understanding of the dynamics of postmodern culture is a clear prerequisite for any 
understanding of the cultural products of Postmodernism such as postructuralist 
architecture, for example, the focus of attention here in Chapter Seven. 
Frederick Jameson's use of the term 'late' ('The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism') is 
derived from Ernst Mandel (Mandel 1978). Mandel has identified three phases in the 
development of machine and technological innovation which has underwritten capitalism 
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since the eighteenth century Industrial Revolution (Jameson 1991, 35). This involved a 
series of transitions in the underlying mode of production. Steam-driven engines which 
appeared from about 1848 were superseded by the electric and combustion motor at the 
end of the nineteenth century. The third transition towards nuclear and electronic 
technology appeared after World War Two. These production technologies typify and 
characterize their stage of development. The equivalent stages are described as the market 
economy, monopoly capitalism and the post-industrial or global multinational society. 
The following general statements appear to be stable. 
The first phase, in the Victorian market economy, produced free trade after the repeal 
of the Com Laws. The art of this period was predominantly Realist. Clement Greenberg 
in 'Towards a Newer Laocoon' describes the art of the first half of the nineteenth century 
as Romantic and 'exhausted' by 1848 (Harrison and Wood 1992, 556). Interestingly, if 
Constable and Turner are included in this Romantic rubric, their treatment of the sublime 
in landscape not only encapsulates realist rather than symbolic or allegorical treatment of 
art-subjects that were typical of much previous art, but also makes Realism in the form of 
the sublime what Baudrillard would call an instance of the hyper-real. The art of the 
second phase, that is monopoly capitalism, corresponds to Modernism up to about 1960. 
Third-phase capitalism, or post-industrialism, has Postmodernism as its constituent art 
form. 
Jameson has represented these historical changes as transitions within capitalism itself. 
Although he wishes to retain notions of agency in the culture/society relation, and indeed, 
reciprocity, he still addresses the nature of the relation in the familiar causal terms of 
economic base and cultural superstructure (Jameson 1991, xxi). 'To say that my two 
terms, the cultural and the economic, thereby collapse back into one another and say the 
same thing, in an eclipse of the distinction between base and superstructure that has itself 
often struck people as significantly characteristic of postmodernism in the first place, is 
also to suggest that the base, in the third stage of capitalism, generates its superstructures 
with a new kind of dynamic.' The philosopher David Hume long ago distinguished 
between apparent causality and correlation in his Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding, 1748, (A. Kenny 1994, 162-5). So it might be possible to assert that 
something called the Big Bang for example, caused the expansion of the universe, the 
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expansion being both a necessary and sufficient consequence of the original Big Bang. 
But then, of course, there would have to have been a previous cause which entailed the 
Big Bang as its consequence into an infinite regress of causes of causes. Hume has a 
further point of relevance here. If a cause produces an effect, it is reasonable to expect 
that in order for it to be a cause, its effect should follow it in time and to be separate from 
it. In fact, the Big Bang and the expansion are instantaneous and not only inseparable, but 
the existence of each is a precondition of the existence of the other. 
If we substitute 'economic base' for Big Bang as cause and 'culture' as its effect, the 
two should be inseparable, each as a condition for the existence of the other. But it would 
seem premature to assume that something called 'market capitalism' caused the 
appearance of Modernist art which is meant to correlate with it and at the particular 
historical moment of the opening of the twentieth century for example. Clement 
Greenberg's account of the origins of Modernism as a kind of bohemian retraction in 
'Avant-Garde and Kitsch' (C. Harrison and Wood 1992,531) involved a response which 
Raymond Williams called a 'structure of feeling' incorporating a rejection of modem 
mass civilization (R. Williams 1961, 64-88). The modernist impulse was then a response 
to the culture as experience, so that we seem to end up with the effect that is the culture, 
as part of the cause of which it is supposed to be the effect. This familiar dispute about 
the relative importance of base and superstructure is seen here as best treated as a 
'collocation' rather than a causal sequence. Culture is then understood to be part the 
experience of the quotidian rather than the result of whichever form of economic 
determinism the 'base' historically produces. Culture, then, as response, is something 
closer to an appropriate 'structure of feeling'. Postmodernism as quotidian experience is a 
response to, not an effect of, the set of economic and social constraints labelled as 'post-
industrialism or 'globalism', but as a constituent part and not simply a product. A further 
difficulty with economic base as cause is that it is inevitably entailed like any other 
'source' in some prior cause - the regression in this case into the causes of causes (R. 
Krauss 1997, 170). Thus post-industrialism regresses into monopoly capital which 
regresses into market capitalism, into mercantilism into the domestic system and so on 
back to slave labour in the classical Greek and Roman society. Even if the argument is 
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pushed back to an assumed origin when the first hominid fashioned the first tool, there 
must have always be an anterior causality entailing it, reductio ad absurdum. 
Based on these approximations, it naturally follows that aesthetic Postmodernism is 
homologous with post-industrialism and that the constituent parts of the post-industrial 
are aspects of the postmodern. Mandel's monopoly capitalism has been otherwise 
characterized as 'Fordism' (D. Harvey 1990, 125-140). Fordism is characterized by 
national mass-production commodity capitalism and was the basis of post World War 
Two expansion and consumption. It began in 1920s America and spread in the West after 
the 1930s Great Depression. Its period of greatest production and boom coincided with 
the influential period of high Modernism in the 1950s, the classical period of the nuclear 
family and welfare state capitalism which have both been in substantial reverse under 
post-Ford ism and post-industrialism. 
Fordism encountered increasingly severe difficulties during the 1960s and 1970s. The 
entrenched positions of labour and capital in financing an increasingly expensive welfare 
state produced rising inflation and the beginnings of western de-industrialization in the 
face of Japanese competition and Third World production costs. The oil shock of 1973 
and after produced hyper-inflation and the wider acceptance of the need for flexible 
adjustment rather than Fordist fixed regimes of production. During the 1970s, Fordism 
was modified by greater technological innovation in information technologies and the 
emergence of a ' service-sector' economy which replaced the traditional heavy industries 
as production was exported to the Third World. 
If there has been a cultural and aesthetic transition from Modernism to Postmodernism, 
then in regard to base and superstructure ideology, we could expect to find an 
homologous transition in economic organization. The evidence is complex (D. Harvey 
1990, 189-197). But however complicated the data, there does appear to be consensus 
around fundamental socio-economic shifts, beginning in the 1960s and accelerating 
during and after the 1970s. So family structure and home ownership, the decline in the 
influence of organized labour, the flight of manufacturing, the growth of the service 
economy, the decline in traditional 'authority', the electronic transformation of 
information and technology, the rise in embourgeoisment and the creation of sub-working 
class and underclass dependency culture, privatisation, market competition within 
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welfarism, the rise of economic individualism, consumer indebtedness, the rise of 
differentiated pay over pay scales and the rise of inventoried just-in-time production aJl 
represent change and transition towards postmodernity. This instant index of transition 
and change could of course be almost exponentiaJly expanded. 
Postmodernism as an instance of aesthetic, cultural, social and economic change in 
which the cultural superstructure and economic base reciprocate equivalently seems 
empiricaJly justified. That postmodernistic socio-economic change remains a conspicuous 
aspect of capitalism reinforces the view that Postmodernism is also an aspect of 
modernity. Just as post-industrialism does not represent a 'break' with Fordism but 
continues to exhibit some of its constituent features such as supply and demand, so 
equally Postmodernism emerges reflexively from Modernism. 
Postmodernist Space and Modernist Temporality 
In the discussion which follows there is a further attempt to distinguish between two of 
the primary imperatives of time and space driving the modem and the postmodern. This 
is another highly abstract and conceptual area, but one which marks a fundamental 
difference between them and has important implications for the way that the modem has 
mutated into Postmodernism. There is an admittedly ambitious account of the way that 
the Renaissance initiated a retinal and optical art based on perspective which allowed the 
visual depiction of narrative and the way that this was subsequently 'aesthetically 
institutionalised' by Descartes during the Seventeenth century scientific revolution. There 
is also an exploration of the implications of Bergson's theory of personal time coupled 
with Bachelard's treatment of what might be called personal space. The object overall is 
to characterize Modernism as inherently concerned with time where Postmodernism and 
its objecthood is an appropriation of space. 
Modernity has been defined here as the emergence of capitalist accumulation in the 
fifteenth (Italy and its Renaissance) and sixteenth centuries (Northern Europe and its 
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Refonnation) and with the cultural fonns which were its semantic analogue (Lisa Jardine 
1996, 93-132). What emerged from the Refonnation is not only the Protestant Ethic, but 
also the modern centralist nation state. The other great expression and fonn of newness 
and modernity, the Italian Renaissance, was of course many things, not least in its 
philosophical Neo-Platonism and classical referencing and its proto-capitalist socio-
economic dynamism (Hooker, Ed, 1989, 132-4). But its revolutionary aesthetic was in the 
depiction of space. (That the revolutionary utopian forward dynamism of the Renaissance 
can be seen as a 'product' of emergent capitalism is a familiar commonplace which 
simplistically re-invokes the base/superstructure causal dichotomy.) The rediscovery of 
realistic depiction of space in perspective was largely theorized by Brunelleschi and 
Alberti and mathematically described by Piero della Francesca and depicted in painting 
by Duccio and Giotto (J. White 1966, 287-334). It is inaccurate to suggest that there was 
no perspective in medieval depiction, but alternatively, it was the case that it was 
stylistically symbolic, as in icon painting [6]. But the visual capture of deep space on a 
flat two-dimensional surface was the achievement of Italian theoretical painting and 
architectural practice during the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. In general tenns, 
the acquisition of realist perspective in the Renaissance replaces religious dogma with the 
central principle of rationality and the explanatory power of the auratic individual such as 
Michelangelo in the sixteenth century (Bram Kempers 1992, 241-243). This literally 
visionary epiphany is later theorized by Descartes in Cartesian optical dualism and is 
incorporated into Enlightenment philosophical Rationalism. (This topic is further 
discussed with reference to Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Jay in the later chapter 
here, 'The Philosophical Background'.) It may not be too far-fetched to suppose that this 
optically rationalist tendency of modernity on reaching the Enlightenment becomes 
codified into modernist visual theory such as nineteenth century Pointillist colour-theory 
(Griselda Pollock in Hooker 1989, 339). Greenberg and Fried's insistence on the visual 
and optical nature of the modernist aesthetic experience then retrospectively becomes 
grounded in Cartesian dualism and is an end-point of the process of the optical and retinal 
aesthetics of Descartes as Martin Jay, for example, has shown. This is obviously a highly 
encapsulated discussion of a lengthy and complex historical and cultural process which 
needs further examination in the next chapter. 
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It is clearly quite impossible to separate the spatial and temporal since neither can be 
thought of without the other. Least of all are they in binary opposition. However, that 
does not preclude different synchronic forms of emphasis. The underlying subtext of 
visual modernity from Renaissance ocularity within perspective onwards is Realism. The 
essential attribute of Realism is the representation of forms of action in space but which 
inevitably occur in linear time. Even mythical or allegorical subjects are treated 
realistically, quite unlike the frozen temporality of the medieval icon. Renaissance 
depiction becomes increasingly realistic both in painting and sculpture within the frame 
of the ultra-realism of the portrait, especially in northern Europe, as the celebration of 
economic individualism and which in tum becomes synchronically a version of the 
'hyper-real' (Craig Harbison 1991, 13-18). Realism of course undergoes its historical 
nuances. Mannerist exaggeration of the real is succeeded by the dramatic movement of 
the Baroque only to be followed by Rococo whimsy. And in the opening drama of 
modernism, romantic nineteenth century gesture in the form of the sublime remains a 
contest between the artificial and the real in which nature as the touchstone of the real 
wins. Once the perception of Renaissance perspective emancipates realism, then the 
substantiating account of action in space, but through time, becomes possible in the pre-
eminence of the narrative. Lessing was quick to assert in the Laocoon that the 
simultaneity of the visual image always requires a pre-text in the form of a written story 
or account before it can represent narrative. Lessing's insistence on the image becoming 
word before it can assume the status of the depicted or implied narrative will be important 
in the case of the postmodernist installation (G. Lessing 1962, 88). In the case of 
Botticelli's Primavera, for instance, we need to know about the Three Graces, Ceres, 
Zephyr and other allegorical figuration in order to decipher the iconography of the 
subject. But also we have to 'read' the painting from left to right, as in an actual act of 
textual reading. The conceit is to make the visual, iconic painting simulate indexically its 
concealed metaphor - the myth of spring as narrative language. The depicted sign as 
painting then becomes, dramatically, a simulacrum for its underlying visual meaning. 
It should be said that modernist art after the 1860s increasingly avoids academic 
illusionism in realist depiction following its collision with photography. The art object 
had to distinguish itself from the contemporary 'hyper-realism' of the photograph and its 
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perfect surface by creating aesthetically interesting perturbation on the painted surface, as 
in the case of the Impressionists and Post Impressionists. Despite this, Picasso's Cubism, 
for all its phenomenological multiplicity of viewpoint, remains an account of the real as 
subject, albeit non-realistically. Jackson Pollock's Lavender Mist, although it may not 
have a subject as such, nevertheless is precisely real in being the result of Pollock's 
actions in the disposition of its pigments, really there on the surface (Rosalind Krauss 
1997, 221-242). Postmodern Conceptualism, in opposition to Modernist realism still 
deals with the real but as objecthood, as installed objects, and not as depiction. The real 
and literalist objects (shark, bed and so on) are literally real as objects but become 
figuratively conceptualised as declared works of art. Although an aspect of the real, and 
thus of modernity, Conceptualism as installation only functions conceptually in space, 
even architecturally, and as a paradigm of Postmodernist aesthetic is relatively 
unconcerned with showing or representing time in any association with narrative. It may 
however conceptualise time, perhaps as autobiography or perhaps as sardonic stylistic 
recursion. 
The implications of narrative as an essential aspect of realism demand the sequential 
arrangement of events in time which typically travel from an introduction, through a 
development to some end-point or conclusion. Language structure is hierarchical. Noam 
Chomsky in Language and Mind proposes that the language is stratified between a deep 
and a surface structure in which the grammar or syntax serves a semantic function. The 
hierarchy is essentially in ascending order, phonemic, morphological and syntactic. The 
model for the ideally correct set of phonemic and morphological inflections - 'correct 
words' that is - is the paradigm. (P. Adams 1972,330-331) Correct words in the correct 
order are represented by the syntactic model of the paradigm. And the sequential 
movement through the proper words arranged properly syntactically from beginning to 
end is through the sentence which then indicates a finite meaning. Expanded, this is how 
narrative itself works from beginning to denouement. However, the implied fixed 
temporality of moving sequentially from a beginning and reaching an end or denouement 
is symptomatic of realism and start-stop temporality. Postmodernistically this sequential 
paradigm is opposed in, for example, Hassan's schematic, by the syntagm. 
Syntagmatically, meaning is deferred since each causal step is preceded by previous 
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causal steps and indefinitely succeeded by effects as each succeeding clause or sentence 
demands another successively, so defeating the fictive end-point. (Time can only 'stop' 
fictively.) The apparent disruption of time in early Modernist fiction such as James 
Joyce's Ullyses is, in fact, a disruption more of narrative and the arrangement of sequence 
than the fundamental notion of causal sequence itself. In Mrs Dal/oway, Virginia Woolf 
has Mrs Dalloway walking to the flower shop as Big Ben strikes the hour. She, and the 
other characters who are simultaneously touched by the sound of the bell are the 
protagonists in a common moment, one of Woolfs pre-eminent leitmotifs, and their 
geographical arrangement in space is of subsidiary importance as the spreading 
concentric rings of sound 'touch' the characters [7]. The striking of the hours then 
becomes a metonym of time, not space, encapsulating the brevity of time as a kind of 
temporal memento mori . 
Modernism, then, can be characterized as being concerned with perspectively depicted 
space through the passage of time in narrative and within the parameters of realism. 
Postmodernism occupies real, not depicted space in its forms of art; it defers both 
temporal and narrative termini and engages with the real in literalist objects which it 
ironically conceptualises as figuratively unreal. Installed, the Postmodernist art object 
becomes part of the architectural. So time seems to be a Modernist, and space a 
Postmodernist imperative. 'A certain spatial tum has often seemed to offer one of the 
more productive ways of distinguishing postmodernism from modernism proper, whose 
experience of temporality - existential time, along with deep memory - it is henceforth 
conventional to see as a dominant of the high modem.' (F. Jameson 1991, 156) 
Jameson's association of deep memory with Modernism and subsequently the 
Postmodernist memory of modernism as nostalgia, highlights the significance of temporal 
absence as loss. Proust's A fa Recherche du temps Perdu with Joyce's Ulysses as the 
definitive Modernist novel, introduces poetic diction into the realist novel (D. Lodge 
1977, 79-80). It is the deployment of poetic discourse within realism which enables 
nostalgia to become Walter Benjamin's allegorical ruin of time creatively expressed as a 
version of Henri Bergson's fa duree in Proust's Recherche, particularly in the episode of 
the madeleine (Proust, [Penguin Books] Swann's Way, 48). What definitively emerges 
from this very complex issue is that Modernism and its implicit narratives has been 
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concerned primarily with time, whereas Postmodernism in its trajectory towards 
objecthood, installation and the architectural centres on the idea of the spatial. 
Bergson has two versions of time. In 'An Introduction to Metaphysics', he gives an 
account of time as the measurement of movement across the divisions or intervals 
between two points in space. This approximates to the fixed, universal time of Newton's 
physics which time was to be reconstructed by Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity in 
1905. In 1889, Bergson had published Time and Freewill in which he distinguished 
between Newtonian time (Ie temps) and time as duration (fa duree). Duration is the 
reconstituted events available to memory but reconstituted subjectively. The process of 
objectively ordered time may difTer from the objective order of occurrence in Ie temps 
(McNeil and Feldman, Eds 1998, 89-96). 'Duration' as memory and subjective 
recollection (with the implications for mourning and the sense of loss of irrecoverable 
past time, especially for childhood in Proust and Bachelard) then becomes the defining 
aspect of both of meaning and consciousness, although Bergson is insistent that 
'duration' is an aspect of mind. The theoretical division between Modernist temporality 
and the postmodern episteme of spatiality is never absolute. Modernist time needs space 
just as postmodern space needs temporality. Thus the recursive nature of Postmodernism 
depicted here as allegorical is dependent on retrospective nostalgia and time which is 
usefully characterized by Bergson's 'duration'. In a further instance of the 
ModernistIPostmodemist antithesis, it will be noted that Bergson belongs to the 
Continental Philosophical tendency associated with the postmodern, while the dominant 
philosophical outlook of modernity is normally lodged in the Anglo-Saxon analytical 
tradition. The fact that Bergson's 'duration' inhabits the fringes of allegory by oscillating 
in the presence and absences of memory and remembrance makes it an important element 
in postmodern 'historicism' and the nature of the allegorical itself. 
The Postmodemist imperative away from temporality lies in its distrust of the narrative 
sequences of both aesthetic Realism and philosophical Idealism and their proclivity for 
the 'totality' of 'Grand Narratives' and 'forward-movement' through time in the form of 
avant-gardism. The Postmodemist shift away from depiction and Realism and the 
narrative progressions which they suggest, and instead towards objecthood and literalism, 
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puts the postmodern art object in an immediate spatial context. One paradigmatic case of 
the metamorphosis from temporality to spatiality is the movement in sculpture from the 
statue on the plinth to the architectural context of the installation. The plinth and its statue 
have been characterized as commemorative (R. Krauss in D. Preziosi, Ed 1998, 281-298). 
And of course, any commemorative act is an act of memory and time, even if the work is 
abstractionist like Henry Moore's eponymous King and Queen. In the case of 
architecture, it has always been necessarily spatial anyway, and Postmodernistic 
architectural space is configured into 'bad space' in the sense of opposing modernist 
rational space, and is an adversarial anti-modernism. It deliberately invokes time as an 
aspect of its figurative and metaphorical referencing. In familiar ways, Modernist 
architecture rejected reference, temporal or otherwise, in favour of rationalist space and 
purity of form. Once architectural space becomes commemorative, then its deep semantic 
structure allegorically implicates a structure of feeling, almost as belief when an 
architectural site such as Libeskind's Jewish Museum, Berlin, almost becomes a shrine. 
(See the chapter The Architectural Trace here.) 
What might be called Postmodernistic 'commemorative space' (because it is 
architectural) is described in The Poetics o/Space (Gaston Bachelard, 1964). Bachelard's 
account of space is closely linked with the Imagination, which makes it 'poetic'. Just as 
Bergson has two radically diITercnt versions of time as Newtonian and personal, so 
Bachclard speaks of what might be called 'Newtonian space' and 'personal space'; that 
is, one that is both real and contingent as well as subjectively represented and 
'constructed'. Representation as a kind of construction of spatial reality and memory is 
founded on the one hand by rationalism which allows intcrpretation, and on the other by 
realism as the very material required for interpretation to occur at all. The realist aspect of 
Bachclard's formulation has a tendency towards the scientific and empirical, given that 
space is geometrically dimensional. The antithesis here between rationalism and realism, 
betwccn appcarance and reality, is dialectical (1. Lechte 1994, 3-6). Bachelard also 
characterizes space as an imaginative dimcnsion. It has the psychological and spiritual 
qualities of the refuge, in which the imagination acquires a certain tranquillity which 
derives from reverie rather than the Freudian dream-state of displacement, or as 
Bachelard has it, rather I ike the condition of the nest (Bachelard 1964, Chapter 6). In one 
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sense, the certainties of the refuge permit the imaginative reverie. There are two basic 
elements running in opposed but complementary directions. The one is primitive and 
visceral, the physical embodiment of the reassurance of survival and continued well-
being, whilst the other leads to the contemplative rationality of the imagination. The 
refuge is then constituted as the house in human habitation which becomes a vast 
reservoir of spatial metaphor for memory and security in which the room signifies the 
inner within the outer. The Proustian inflection here is immediate, but where Proust 
mourns the lost time of Bergson's 'duration' and childhood, Bachelard asserts that it is 
the space which conditions memory as experience in the phenomenal world. Bachelard 
also speaks of space as potentially felicitous (G. Bachelard 1964, ix) . 
... the images I want to examine are quite simple images of felicitous space. 
In this orientation, these investigations would deserve to be called topophilia. 
They seek to determine the human value of the sorts of space that may be grasped, that 
may be defended against adverse forces, the space we love. For diverse reasons, and 
with the differences entailed by poetic shadings, this is eulogized space. Attached to its 
protective value, which can be a positive one, are also imagined values, which soon 
become dominant. Space that has been seized upon by the imagination cannot remain 
indifferent space subject to the measures and estimates of the surveyor. (Original em-
phasis) 
In the case of architecture, the idea of the felicitous space is later deconstructed here as 
the 'bad space' of Post modernist architecture which then becomes subject to J.L. Austin's 
account of the infelicitous performative. In another sense of the infelicitous which 
Bachelard seems to ignore, it can also be the case that nests, the inner sanctum protected 
by the outside, can also become areas of threat [8]. Bachelard's apparent avoidance of the 
possibility of threat and dysfunction within the domestic interior has become subject to 
feminist critique (P. King 2004). Shortly after The Poetics of Space, Robert Venturi 
began to dismantle or at least loosen the interface between inside and outside in 
Contradiction and Complexity in Architecture (1967) as did Derrida in Of 
Grammatology. Although one of Bachelard's principal distinctions between the inside 
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and the outside was later deconstructed, particularly by Derrida, nevertheless The Poetics 
0/ Space in its preoccupation with space over time remains a key indicator of the 
postmodern. 
Bachelard also maintains that the effectiveness of the inside as refuge is in part a 
function of the outside as setting, context and site. Postmodernistically, the concept of 
site has become problematical. After Modernism, sculpture not only abandoned the plinth 
for the installation, but also deserted the gallery and the museum (D. Crimp in H. Foster, 
Ed, 1983, 43-56). In the process, the idea of site became de-monumentalized, de-
commemorated and desacralized (R. Krauss 1997, 276-290). The site and setting of 
display made the entire inner space of a gallery or non-gallery room a part of the aesthetic 
object as the defining space of its installation. Once the art object had been installed 
outside the gallery and the non-monumental environment became the site or setting, the 
art object became part of the landscape, part landscape itself and part architecture, each 
neither wholly 'in' the frame of reference of the other. Intriguingly, the exteriorised art 
work then began to ape Enlightenment conceits of Nature and the artificial and the 
Picturesque and the Postmodern deployment of space summoned up the recursive 
memory of the figural meanings it was intent on confronting and violating. The 
disruption of the traditional site of display in galleries and museums was conspicuously 
adopted by Land Artists such as Richard Long or installationists such as Daniel Burren, 
Hans Hacke and particularly by Marcel Broodthaer's series Museum: en/ants non admis 
(1968). The spatialized art object then became existentially public rather than private, and 
in the process became decommodified and literally ruinous as it became subject to 
weathering and erosion, like Robert Smithson's Spiral Jetty (1970). However, it needs 
noting carefully that the tendency of the installation to be subject to decay or removal, 
although it might also code for the denial of originality, implicates decay and ruin as 
Benjamin's temporal allegory and memento mori, and therefore time [9]. The allegorical 
function of the photograph as approximating to almost an act of preservation of that 
which cannot be preserved then collects an added significance as image demanding text 
in a reversal of Lessing's pre-iconic narrative. The larger distinction between Modernist 
temporality and Postmodcrnist space also has implications for the consideration of genre. 
The installation as an aesthetic hybrid also destabilizes the Modernist imperative towards 
81 
the autonomy of genre as an enclosed narrative end-point. The modernist preoccupation 
with the specificity and uniqueness of the individual medium resulted in a fairly sharp 
demarcation between apparently discrete disciplines such as literary studies and 
architecture, for example. This hegemonic separation of genre, which demands a clear 
sense of what is 'inside' and 'outside' the generic frame of reference, has been 
increasingly subverted by the ambivalence and conscious ambiguity of the installed art 
work. It was as if the Modernist membrane was not punctured exactly, but rather became 
osmotic. In a way, the ultimate violation of the idea of the room institutionally 'inside' 
the house, gallery or museum as a defined architectural space was committed by Gordon 
Matta Clark who destructively deconstructed it with the chain saw, and in the process 
equally 'massacred' Bachelard's felicitous space. 
The Allegorical in the Postmodern 
The point to make here is that the postmodern is allegorical because it is inevitably 
recursive in its processes and addresses past and irretrievable time. In being recursive, or 
going back in time after Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried, Postmodernism becomes 
characterized by layers. That is, a present superimposed upon a past; a present inscribed 
on an absent past where that past nonetheless is constantly reiterated into an absent 
presence. In Chapter Four, the nature and evolution of allegory as a rhetorical trope is 
discussed in greater detail, but the immediate point is that it was Craig Owens's 
enormously important and influential work, The Allegorical Impulse: Towards a Theory 
of Postmodernism (In D. Prezioni Ed 1998, 315), which defined the postmodern as 
palimpsest-like and therefore always subject to the inflection of mourning which is a key 
characteristic of allegory and as a consequence, of Postmodernism itself. The allegorical 
then is necessarily a constituent of all postmodern culture, including postmodern 
architecture. It is the task of Chapters Six and Seven to trace the embodiment of the 
allegorical in poststructuralist buildings and reveal the possibilities of meaning which this 
extends. This section also deals with photography which is recognized by both Owens 
and Jameson as a primary indicator of the postmodern and therefore important for an 
understanding of the nature of Post modernism which this chapter attempts to describe. 
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It has already been noted that painting in the second half of the nineteenth century 
progressively declined to compete with photography and increasingly emphasizes the 
presence of the surface of the painting. The illusionist picture-plane came closer to the 
surface as depiction became flatter. In one way, then, photography transformed realism 
into a commodity, even as Modernist painting practice as evidenced, say by Cezanne, 
became less real. The great nineteenth century photographic images from Fox-Talbot to 
Roger Fenton through the Julia Cameron portraits to the moving film of the Lumieres 
were the iconic narrative parallel to the narrative realism of Dickens, Zola or Dostoevsky. 
What of course is striking about the nineteenth century photographic image is how it is 
posed and lit to resemble painting, particularly history painting. Painting itself in order to 
become modern, was at the same time moving away from realistic depiction, although not 
from Realism itself. The realist tradition in photography continued in the first half of the 
twentieth century in the definitive black and white images of Henri Cartier-Bresson, Bill 
Brandt or Robert Capa. (N. Rosenblum 1989, 461-513). However, after the 1960s, 
photography was increasingly appropriated into the area that had been Modernist 
painting. Thus Rauschcnberg's Combines and Allegory and Rebus series frequently 
carried the photographic image as part of spatial collage in doing so. But the most 
conspicuous use of the photographic image in the early 1960s was in Warhol's 
screenprints where the random, commonplace image served as a Duchampian found 
object as an exemplum of Jameson's characterization of flat depthlessness as 
paradigmatic of the postmodern art object (Jameson 1991,6-11). Warhol's appropriation 
of the photograph into the painterly device of the screenprint comprehensively 
demolished the screenprint and its image as realist, so that the printed image became the 
simulacrum. In a further sense, Warhol's layering of the printed onto the photographic 
image introduces a hybrid condition, part painting and part photograph, which then 
assumes the characteristics of the palimpsest and as such also undermines the traditional 
genre-distinctions bctwcen painting and photography. Immediately any 'text' is doubled, 
then allegory becomes implicated (Craig Owens in D. Preziosi, Ed, 1998, 316). Owens 
suggests that that reading one text through another is not only the potential invocation of 
allegory, it always implies the presence of the palimpsest as both exemplifying allegory 
83 
and the postmodem. The photographic image is indissolubly a part of postmodem global 
infonnation culture. 
Cindy Shennan's self-portraits as photographic versions of Monroe or ' character' 
from paintings of iconic stature not only defy the possibility of originality, but also 
become simulacra which, in a further turn, are then representative of Shennan's practice 
as autobiographical (R. Krauss in D. Hooker, Ed, 1989, 436). The autobiographical is 
inevitably Proustian. It is always an attempt to retrieve that which is constantly deferring 
retrieval: the past. The fact that the characteristic episteme of Postmodemism is spatial 
rather than temporal and that the temporal nevertheless paradoxically insinuates itself as a 
presence in postmodem allegory is dealt with here in the later section on allegory itself. 
In speaking of Smithson's 
work, [Fig 5] Owens argues 
that since it is site-specific 
and in and part of the 
landscape and therefore 
subject to inevitable ruin, it 
can only be 'preserved' by 
the photograph. 'In this the 
site specific work becomes 
FigS 
an emblem of transience, the ephemerality of all phenomena; it is the memento mori of 
the twentieth century. Because of its impennanence, moreover, the work is frequently 
preserved only in photographs. The fact is crucial, for it suggests the allegorical potency 
of photography .... As an allegorical art, then, photography would represent our desire to 
fix the transitory, the ephemeral, in a stable and stabilizing image.' (C. Owens in D. 
Preziosi Ed 1998, 319) The 'reality' of real objects which postmodemistically become 
metaphorical is also eroded by performance art such as the early 'living sculpture' of 
Gilbert and George whose real corporal appearance signifies the conceptually unreal. 
The importance of the photograph in postmodernist culture is hugely amplified by its 
other media. The vast proliferation of infonnation culture in computers and their games 
and the use of video and digital imagery may indeed be in the sardonic awe which they 
induce, examples of BaudrjJlard' s ironical postmodem electronic sublime. And in the 
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case of digital photography, it will be noted that the creation of apparently real imagery is 
obtained by layering successive individual image into the 'real' totality of what appears 
to be a photograph of what Cartier-Bresson called 'the decisive moment' (N. Rosenblum 
1984, 483) [10]. This digital palimpsest in its apparent capture of a uniquely 
instantaneous moment is indeed cynical in its manipulation of the real, and renders as 
'authentic' photography's claim to 'fix the transitory, the ephemeral, in a stable and 
stabilizing image' in Owens's formulation. This is a version of the really unreal. The 
attempt to stave off the inevitable ruin of time by eternal ising the now in the painted or 
photographic image is fatally compromised, because the 'now' is in fact an act of 
contrivance and another aspect of Michael Fried's theatricality as characteristic of the 
postmodern. The layering of the digital image as a series of composites which de-
authenticate its apparent depiction of the real at a given, precise moment, would seem to 
be another basic example of the postmodernistic impulse towards collage. 'The decisive 
moment' belongs to the modernist authenticity of Cartier-Bresson and Fried because the 
authenticity would lie precisely in the truth of the moment. The postmodern digitally 
manipulated image is profoundly and self-consciously inauthentic and its very 
manipulation an act of contrived theatre. This collagist practice, to reinforce the point, 
operates in a spatial context in which images attach and become contiguous rather than 
paratactically generating narration in a temporal context. It is the spatial assembly of the 
digital image which defeats the representation of the decisive moment in time. That said, 
Owens reminds us that the photographic or multi-media image still manages to 
reconstitute a moment of past stasis, or at least represent it as such, which in tum 
implicates empathic mourning, and therefore the allegorical, and then, therefore, 
recursive temporality. Jameson, who believes that' ... photography, whose extraordinary 
reinvention of today (in theory as well as practice) is a fundamental fact and symptom of 
the postmodern period ... ' is surely justified in codifying the essential postmodern 
aesthetic in terms of the photograph and the installation, and indeed of the installation of 
the photograph and the (reminiscent) photograph of the installation (F. Jameson 1991, 
173). For Walter Benjamin, the ruin was the archetypal symbol of the allegorical, 
particularly in The Origins of German Tragic Drama which is discussed here later. For 
Postmodernism, the allegorical ruin has become transmogrified technologically into the 
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rum of temporality as the collaged photo-image. In many ways Jeff Wall's 'The 
Storyteller', 1987, remains postmodernistically iconic and paradigmatic. The photograph, 
displayed in a life-size light box, is a carefully arranged version of Manet's Le dejeuner 
sur I'herbe but set under a modem freeway. In ironically revisiting the origins of 
Modernism, Wall inevitably invokes the temporal palimpsest, and at the same time, the 
almost sacred photographic realism of Modernism is subverted into the 'really unreal'. 
The theatricality of this postmodern 'staging' of Manet as apparently real but in fact 
deeply historically double-coded is self-evident, and it is this contrived artificiality which 
confers the work's continuing paradigmatic status (J. Wall, 'Marks ofIndifference' 1995 
in 1. Gaiger and P. Wood, Eds, 2003, 151.) 
If the palimpsest is the paramount and recurrent constitutive feature of Post modernism, 
evidenced across many contexts as col/agist, then it is Peirce's indexical sign which 
becomes privileged. Peircian indexicality consists in metonymically and contiguously 
relating part to whole. Synechdochal imagery, for example, as part for whole then 
becomes indexically linked as if by touch. Often the touch is understood in collagist 
procedures as operating between, across, sideways and adjacently, because collage, in 
order simply to be seen, juxtaposes images. However, in the in the original sense of the 
palimpsest as one text superimposed on another, the relation, although remaining spatial, 
was expressed not 'horizontally' but 'vertically' in an act of layering as in digitally 
produced images. (The important implications for this discussion in lakobson's treatment 
of metaphor are addressed later.) The photograph is the pre-eminent Postmodernist sign 
because it deals with trace and imprint. Scott Lash suggests an historical hierarchy for 
Peirces system of signs. The first, the symbolic, relates to the cognitive dimension of 
writing and the printed word such as McLuhan's 'Gutenberg Galaxy'. The second, the 
iconic, came to replace symbolic printed representation during the modem period. And 
the new dominant which has superseded the iconic as paradigmatic, is indexicality. Of 
Peirce's three modes, indexicality is the least mediated and most immediate as 'touch' 
because then the phenomenological immediacy of the body and embodied experience 
become paramount in a clear opposition to the Platonist tradition of sceptical suspicion of 
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direct empirical experience. Then, the embodied indexical sign can be seen as opposed to 
the traditional western apriorism of the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tendency. 
Derrida's version of Peirce's three modes of signification as difference are the phonic, 
visual and tactile respectively (Scott Lash 2004, Chap 7). In a familiar procedure, Derrida 
transcribes the notion of 'difference', which arises from 'difference' in Saussure, into 
'differance'. Lash supposes that Derrida's separation of the tactile, or Peirce's indexical 
sign, from the anteriority of symbolic and iconic signification is the difference between 
the constant deferral of the immediacy of the tactile as presence into absence. It has 
already been noted that Lessing in the Laocoon in the eighteenth century understood well 
the distinction between absent and present in the relation between language and the visual 
sign. For Lessing, the difference represented the absence of one in the presence of the 
other, and, rather like the celebrated 'duck-rabbit', never both at the same time. Derrida's 
treatment of this kind of difference as the deferral of presence into absence in 'differance' 
involves time. What becomes absent or deferred becomes mourned, again in a Proustian 
or Bergsonian tum, and mourning and time (effectively recherche) indefatigably usher in 
the allegorical. Derrida's own temporal palimpsest, where the textual present is 
syntagmatically deferred into absence, itself remains a characteristicaIly poststructural 
version of allegory. 
Theory and Post-Theory 
The problem of participant observation remains. The difficulty is that once an observer 
enters the arena they wish to observe as a distanced spectator, they immediately and 
inevitably also become participants. And in becoming participant they become part of and 
therefore change the very situation they wish to observe. There seems no way out of this 
dilemma of the spectator becoming a participant. It therefore becomes extremely difficult 
to claim any objective knowledge of any given cultural situation. Hence there is a serious 
difficulty in being able to 'know' about any culture by its internal spectators who are part 
and parcel of the very thing they seek objectively to observe. Virginia Woolf famously 
observed that 'In or about December 1910, human character changed.' (P. Rogers, Ed 
1987, 407) She was of course referring to the first Post-Impressionist exhibition in 
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London curated by Roger Fry who saw it as the total embodiment of Significant Form. 
Perhaps part of the resolution of the spectator/participant paradox is that it might be less 
difficult to discern the beginning of change much as Virginia Woolf did (retrospectively 
it should be said). Detecting the end or transition of a cultural imperative seems much 
less secure. Thus there needs to be a consistent scepticism about whether we are 'in' or 
'out' this or that cultural mainstream such as Postmodernism - whether or not we are in a 
state of Post-Postmodernism and that in some curious way, the postmodern is 'finished' 
and that we have all moved on from the Theory which defines the cultural appearance of 
postmodernism, and in particular, Poststructuralism in its various forms including 
architecture. The following discussion looks at this issue and assesses the contribution of 
Frederick Nietzsche and the origins of 'theory' in Structuralism. 
In many ways Frederick Nietzche's description of the tragic in Greek drama and poetry 
as a dialectical process which oscillates between the Dionysian and the Apollonian has 
been seen almost as a fable of modernity. In The Birth o/Tragedy, the Dionysian impulse 
towards ecstatic disgust is modified by Apollonian culture and restraint. Writing in 1870 
at the time of the Franco-Prussian War, Nietzsche understood what Baudelaire called 'the 
heroism of modem life' as the unbridled Dionysian. 'Our entire threadbare culture is 
plunging at the breast of the horrible demon' (R. Safranski 2002, 67). The Nietzschean 
account of experience as the death of God and the status of art as beyond good and evil in 
the face of the flux and transience of the phenomenological sounds now as insistently 
postmodern. Only the exercise of will in the presence of the death of God, allegorized in 
Thus Spake Zarathustra as the Ubermensch, could prevail when confronted by time as 
'eternal recurrence' (F. Nietzsche 1961, 136-139). The prospect of the inevitability ofre-
encountered time on an eternal scale, and which might involve the reoccurrence of 
unleashed Dionysian dystopia, has been understood as disturbingly ironic. (The notion of 
recurrence is of course dramatized and theatricalized in the ironic, and recursive parody 
of earlier aesthetic forms in Ncw Ilistoricism within the postmodern.) Meaning is 
replaced by interpretation and the normative distinction bctween the good and the bad 
transcended in Good and Evil (1886). And Nietzsche's disruption of linear time in the 
doctrine of eternal recurrence echoes a familiar disruption of narrative realism in the 
postmodern and which subverts the Modernist account of time as 'Hegelian'. This view 
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of time as almost as transcendentally ascendant has already been encountered in Clement 
Greenberg's teleological account of the destination of Modernist painting. In one respect, 
Nietzsche's suggestion that it is art which transcends distinctions between fact and value, 
is presciently postmodem. Nietzsche disposes of metaphysics in favour of culture, which 
then resembles poststructuralist deconstruction (D. Harvey 1990, 18-19). In a further 
'ironically postmodernistic' dissolution of binary opposition, Nietzsche not only sees 
Dionysian culture as potentially monstrous or terrible, but as actually welcome. His 
confrontation with his own experience of contemporary modernity makes him sound as if 
he anticipates the postmodern with his own cynically ironic critique of modernism's 
potential for nihilism. Although he remains self-triumphantly sui generis in his 'pre-
postmodernistic' confrontation with modernism, Nietzsche nevertheless instigates an 
anti-modernist distrust of fixed moral or truth-like propositions. Despite not being 
specifically relativist, this position, which like Kierkegaard's, was contemporaneously 
shocking, was certainly seditious of any form of cognitive absolutes and little short of 
breathtaking in the elevation of aesthetic over philosophical understanding. 
Being without, in both the sense of absence and as outside of the reassurance of fixed 
moral understanding or trajectories, was indeed a leap in the dark since the commentator 
is already a member of the class or set being commented on. This in turn is rather like 
committing the medieval heresy of fideism that the (religious) truth can only be 
established by acts of faith and not by Aristotelian or other forms of reason, as in Aquinas 
for example. Postmodernistically this translates into refusing to judge normatively 
between different cultural norms as high or low. Postmodern culture can only ever 
indicate the experience of 'structures of feeling' and is therefore suspicious of normative 
canons of prescribed cultural products (T. Eagleton 2003, 55). Cultural observers can at 
best exercise choice. Across the spectrum of the culture in which they exist, such 
observers reserve the right to prefer to choose one end of that spectrum from the other 
whilst acknowledging that what separates the choices is their difference rather than their 
value. This 'leap of faith' into choice is what Soren Kierkegaard also pre-figures 
postmodernistically in the necessarily relative and subjective position of the choosing 
subject among the objects of choice (R. Scruton in A. Kenny 1994, 221). 
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The wave of theory which is inseparable from the postmodern really began with the 
dissatisfaction of Structuralist critics with the premises of literary New Criticism. 
Significantly, Structuralist criticism identified a semantic deep structure independent of 
authorial intention. Secondly, it identified cultural objects as surrendering to textuality as 
part of their immanence. (The development of literary criticism is more fully discussed in 
a later section here.) In the first instance, all texts, 'high' or 'low', became subject to deep 
structural analysis. Fairy tales, fables and myths and legends became doubled with a 
surface and a deep structure. Although Chomsky'S linguistic account of surface and deep 
structure would not countenance it, this might well be an early indicator of the 
prominence of the palimpsest as an embedded postmodern figure in textual contexts. 
Thus the Three Bears become the ogre-like guardians of the threshold between private 
desire and the property rights of others; Little Red Riding Hood represents the transition 
from the grace of sexual innocence to the fall of corrupt experience. And presumably, 
The Very Hungry Caterpillar might very well be an emblem of Nietzschean will. 
Properly speaking these fable-like narratives are examples of fabula and carry an explicit 
didactic function as in Aesop or in Ovid [II]. At the high end of the cultural spectrum, 
the Structuralist critic Tzvetan Todorov, for example, in examining the doubling in 
Boccacio's Decameron, linguistically demarcates 'character' as nominal (nouns), 
attribute as adjectival and the narratology as functioning as verb (T. Todorov 1969, Chap 
2). Almost as a consequence of this kind of textual activity, 'Theory' became semiotically 
attached to the linguistic interrogation of texts as exemplars of surface form as telling and 
semantic depth as meaning. The problem for Structuralism, as its internal critics such as 
Derrida and Foucault pointed out, was that the very idea of some disembodied 'structure' 
which in some way inhered in cultural objects as 'text' was itself prone to philosophically 
ideal accounts as something to which Structuralism was supposed to be opposed. The fact 
that a deeper structure than simply authorial intention was an inherent aspect of a text 
raised the not insignificant question of where it came from if it was not to be an Idealist 
or transcendental account. The second Poststructuralist wave of French theory (Kristeva, 
Foucault, Dcrrida) is often regarded as the most accomplished and complete 
representation of Postmodemism, although perhaps modified now by the writing of Gilles 
Deleuze. Despite the reservations of its trenchant critics as being asocial, apolitical, 
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formalist and unstable, Poststructuralism has succeeded in theorizing a cultural condition 
which is sufficiently and distinctively different from Modernism to be able to make its 
own existential claim to exist as state. 
More conservative criticism, such as Daniel Bell's, continues to seek to relate texts to 
autonomous 'close reading' within the liberal perspectives of 'Criticism' as it existed 
prior to Structuralism. The more recent and radical attacks on 'Theory' have come from 
anti-theorists such as Richard Rorty or post-theorists such as Stanley Fish [12]. The 
obvious problem with anti-theory is that you require a theory of not needing a theory. 
However, post-theorists like Rorty and Fish insist that being of and in a culture, we can 
never step outside it in order to be able to account for or describe it objectively. In other 
words, in being a part of the object as subject, it becomes impossible to adopt a position 
other than Kant's in the Critique of sensible intuition. This then becomes rather like 
another version of fideism - another subjective 'leap of faith'. 'Theory' is then seen as a 
form of justification, almost legitimatization. It is contingent and mediated by the cultural 
presence or 'noise' of the observer's own experience of it which should be bracketed in 
order to be explained but which never can be (R. Rorty 1989,46). 
For this reason and because of new directions thought to be emerging in discourse 
towards embodiment, gender and sexuality, for example, Eagleton considers 
Postmodernism to be moribund and the era of Theory to be over (T. Eagleton 2003, 23-
40). For the present at least, this kind of speculation is bound to be inconclusive. In 
architectural terms, which is the immediate focus here, no recognisably post-
postmodernistically distinctive form appears to have emerged. What, however, is certain 
is that Postmodernist architecture de facto as formally different and otherwise theorized 
from Modernist forms, can be both explained and understood. In order to better explain 
and to understand the phenomenon of postmodern architecture, the prevailing assumption 
here is that the underlying postmodernist cultural imperative is allegorical. In that sense, 
discussion concerning the 'beginning' or the 'ending' of the postmodern is of marginal 
significance. Since Postmodernism has staked out its own existential claim to exist as 
state, its cultural forms such as architecture can be seen as being emblematic of that state 
and therefore metaphors of the allegorical. 
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This chapter has argued that since the nature of Postmodemism is allegorically 
recursive and that the postmodem is a version of the modem which evolved from it and 
against it at the same time, it becomes essential to have a qualitative description of what 
Modernism involved. It is precisely to the origins of architectural Modernism that 
poststructuralist architects have returned, particularly to the founding movements such as 
Constructivism, the Bauhaus and Corbusian Purism. The subversive quality of that return 
is traced in chapters Five and Six. The continuing presence of the Modem in the 
Postmodern was examined in terms of continuities and discontinuities, a theme further 
pursued in the discussion of cultural and economic transition. The treatment of 
postmodern space and modernist time often seems relentlessly abstract, but is of real 
importance and significance and leads into that pre-eminently postmodem condition of 
Duchampian or conceptual objecthood, resisted so long by Michael Fried, and 
characterized by the architectural implications of the installation. 
The section on the allegorical nature of Postmodernism is fundamentally important and 
runs throughout as a recurrent theme. Craig Owens's piece, The Allegorical Imperative, 
remains a foundational text and lays the basis here for the later discussion of postmodern 
architecture as being constituted by the allegorical palimpsest of the postmodern re-
inscribed on the modern. In terms of architecture, this does not seem to appear elsewhere 
in the literature and is an important aspect of what Postmodernism is, and in particular 
how it illuminates the nature of postmodern architecture itself. The application of 
allegory to poststructuralist architecture, especially as rhetoric and visual metaphor, 
rather like appropriating Michael Fried's notion of theatricality, is considered to be 
distinctively novel and not found within the appropriate literature surrounding the 
significance of post modem architecture. 
The final section of this chapter has dealt with the distinction between the 
spectator/participant roles and its implications for the 'in or out' debate and concludes 
that since there seems no prima facia evidence for the emergence of a distinctly 
recognizable and quantifiable post-poststructuralist architectural form, that it is the 
architecture of the poststructuralists that should occupy critical attention and that is dealt 
with specifically in Chapter Seven. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LANGUAGE AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND 
Since the spread of structuralism and its emphasis on text, and the subsequent 
Poststructuralist imperative to consider cultural objects as imminent text, it has become a 
commonplace to ascribe to aesthetic objects the properties of language. Hence we have, 
for example, William Tucker's 'The Language of Sculpture' (1964) and the highly 
influential 'The Language of Postmodern Architecture' (1989) by Charles Jencks. And it 
was Michael Fried who described the internal relationships of Anthony Caro's sculpture 
as 'syntax'. The implication is that in itself, and according to its arrangement, the 
aesthetic visual object conforms to linguistic rules, otherwise it would be impossible to 
try to speak ofthe 'language' of art, sculpture, architecture or whatever. The position here 
is that this position of regarding artistic form as language is highly confused. Significant 
theorists such as Roland Barthes in particular have established that cultural objects such 
as a Citroen car function not only as an empirical and visual thing, but also as a semiotic 
signifier which demands to come into language as part of its existential aesthetic (R. 
Barthes 2000, 88-90). The key link here is not the 'grammar' or 'syntax' of form, but 
immanence. And immanence is found in the philosophical line linking Husserl, 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer. There is no language of sculpture and no 
language of architecture and indeed, no language of any art form. In constructing a model 
of the interpretation of postmodern and poststructuralist architecture which is a primary 
purpose here, the idea of immanence, rather than architecture actually having or 
containing language in some way, assumes a critical importance. The 'source' of that 
immanent meaning as embedded in actual form resides not in the anti-metaphor ideology 
of the Analytical Tradition in philosophy, but in the philosophers of embodiment within 
the Continental Tradition, and specifically in the hermeneutical phenomenology of 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer. 
This chapter is divided into four sections: The Philosophy of Language, 
Phenomenology and Interpretation, From Icon to Text and The Felicitous and the 
Infelicitous in Form. 
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The Philosophy of Laoz:uage 
Ludwig Wittgenstein's position in his early Tractatus might typically be that what can 
be thought can be expressed and what can be expressed can be expressed clearly (RJ. 
Fogelin 1995, 3-17). The Tractatus is an example of the Anglo-Saxon tradition in 
philosophy and its treatment of meaning as analytic. Wittgenstein's teachers were Russell 
and G.E. Moore. Russell's 'Theory of Descriptions' was probably the most influential 
version of the analytical approach and was a major influence on the Tractatus. 
Wittgenstein was later in the Philosophical Investigations and the Blue and Red Books to 
almost wholly retract from his early commitment to the analytical or 'atomistic' view of 
linguistic meaning (S. Cavell 2002, 44-72). The analytical tradition has been broadly 
represented by a line from Frege, Russell, early Wittgenstein, Ayer and the Logical 
Positivists up to Donald Davidson (W. Lycan 2000, Chaps 2,3,8 and 9). The position of 
this tradition in regard to meaning is of fundamental importance in that it restricts 
meaning to logical propositions expressed in sentences. The core assumptions require 
brief explication. In Metaphors We Live By, LakofT and Johnson set out the analytical or 
objectivist programme succinctly if only in order to subsequently subvert it. 
Meaning is characterized purely in terms of conditions of objective truth or falsity. 
The conventions of language confer on sentences an objective meaning which 
determines objective truth conditions. Elements of context which are indexically 
(in its linguistic, deictic, not Peircian sense) clear do not infringe objective meaning. 
A sentence is understood if the conditions under which it would be true or false are 
understood. The condition of objective falsity or truth exist and are accessible. Under-
standing the meaning of a sentence involves understanding what makes the sentence 
true or false. Meaning is independent of understanding and remains available by 
producing logical propositions. (G. LakofT and M. Johnson 1980, Chap 26) 
The writ of Kant's analytic as true by virtue of the meaning of the words alone without 
reference to indexicality or entailment or other forms of context runs here (A.R. Lacey 
1996, 9-12). If the proposition does not infringe the ostensible truth of the premise, then it 
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is analytical. (,Spinsters are female' is analytic because it is necessarily true.) The 
analytical tradition almost regards language as subject to suspicion because in usage it 
potentially prevaricates about the absolutely clear expression of transcendentally 
universal truth propositions; that language, unless it clarifies the logic of propositions, 
does some job other than stating meaning. However, what is important here is that the 
Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations rejected the apriorism of the Tractatus 
and the analytical tradition in favour of language use. When Wittgenstein famously said 
in (116) of the Philosophical Investigations, 'What we do is to bring back words from the 
metaphysical to their everyday use', he came close to suggesting that meaning can only 
be understood as the product of some context and that therefore what a sentence finally 
means is what the speaker intended by those words [13]. The 'context' is then made 
necessarily into the social and psychological and Wittgenstein ' ... comes close to saying 
that knowing how to use an expression constitutes both a necessary and sufficient 
condition for knowing its meaning.' (RJ. Fogelin 1995, 121, original emphasis) Part of 
the context oflanguage use is the application and recognition of rules, and ifmeaning is a 
product of use, then the rules must be social as well as cognitive. Wittgenstein says that 
the rules are like language games. The relevance of games is, of course, that they are 
highly structured entities governed by the conventions of rules in any particular context 
of use (W. Lycan 2000, 90-93). Wittgenstcin's account of meaning in the Philosophical 
Investigations is a direct rebuttal not only of his own earlier Tractatus, but also Russell's 
Theory of Descriptions and the analytical procedures of Anglo-American philosophy. 
When Wittgenstein said, in (116) that, 'What we do is to bring words back ... to their 
everyday use', he was proposing not that language use contains no logical or truth 
conditions, but only that sentences exclusively and only of the analytical type might 
exclude the very kind of usage required for understanding meaning experientially rather 
than as a closed, self-contained philosophical procedure. Wittgenstein's treatment of 
meaning as socially inflected by the conventions of rules of address in usage has 
increasingly positioned the later work on the margins of the Anglo-Saxon tradition, and 
by virtue of his insistence on experience, has aligned him with modem phenomenologists 
such as Heidegger and Gadamer or Merteau-Ponty. 
96 
If only analytical sentences are directed towards the meaning of the art object under the 
auspices of the analytical tradition as summarized above, that must suppose that either 
visual works of art contain objective truth conditions, or that alternatively that as objects, 
they cannot. Either version is unhelpful in interpreting art objects. It might reasonably be 
asked how a piece of sculpture, an installation or a piece of architecture, for example, can 
'contain' logical propositions or truth conditions as, necessarily, an essential aspect of its 
meaning. And if it supposed on the other hand that the aesthetic object cannot contain 
logical propositions precisely because of its objecthood, then under analytical procedures, 
it has no meaning and therefore no possible interpretation. In fact, although the art object 
may not proffer logical propositions of the universal truth type, and its meaning may be 
immanent in its form, and in that sense be obscure, or even hidden, it demands 
interpretation as a condition of its existential or ontological state. Its potential meanings 
will be metaphorical, not literal or analytical. And it is metaphor that the analytical 
tradition excludes from its account of meaning. Wittgenstein's rejection of analytical 
truth conditions as the exclusive basis of understanding meaning in favour of language 
usage in its full social and psychological setting meant that everyday language use would 
constitute entailment of metaphorical meaning, and the wide use of figurative language. 
Architecture, like other forms of aesthetic objecthood can only connote its meanings as 
visual metaphorical tropes and not as purely logical propositions. The central issue is not 
truth conditions, but how visual metaphor transmogrifies and transmutes into Iinguistic-
type meaning from form. 
Phenomenology and Interpretation 
Heidegger in Being and Time identifies 'Being' as an aspect of time. And that time is 
located in the real time of history, unlike the transcendentally ideal universals of the 
Platonic tradition which are understood as timeless, or even 'outside' time itself (H.G. 
Gadamer 1989, 254-264). Heidegger understands meaning as locked up, concealed and 
immanent. It is 'Being' through historical, not ideal, time which reveals or 'unconceals' 
meaning. The concealed, then, or the absent becomes presence; the process is one from 
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latency to manifestation. Heidegger is clear that the process of 'becoming', as opposed to 
idealist hypostacized time, is, because historical, experiential and phenomenal, and what 
in Merleau-Ponty will be deeply embodied. In other words, Heidegger maintains that 
'Ontology is only possible as phenomenology.' (M. Heidegger in W. McNeil and K. 
Feldman, Eds, 1998, 119; the sentence emphasis is original.) 'Phenomenology' is 
constituted by phenomenon + logos. 'Phenomenon' derives from Greek phainomenon, 
meaning 'to show itseIr, or as Heidegger has it, ' ... that within which something can 
become manifest, visible in itself.' (117) What can become 'manifest, visible in itself in 
the art object can only do so metaphorically, that is as aspects of the form serving as 
tropes for something else, the latent meaning understood metaphorically as allegory or 
some other rhetorical figure. The meaning will of necessity 'come into language' as 
logos, that is, phenomena become word. In a decisively important section of Being and 
Time which Heidegger calls 'The Concept of Logos', he says: 
Logos lets something be seen (phainesthai), namely what is being talked about, 
and indeed/or the speaker (who serves as the medium) or for those who speak 
with each other. Speech "lets us see" from itself ... what is being talked about ... 
When fully concrete, speech (letting something be seen) has the character of 
speaking or vocalization in words. Logos is phone, indeed phone metaphantasias 
- vocalization in which something is always sighted. (M. Heidegger, 118) 
In the aesthetic object what is signified becomes a form of inscription; from the visual to 
the linguistic. In a sense, then, from/orm to text. The building, in a case of Architectural 
ParI ante, 'speaks'. The act of interpretation which follows the realization of meaning as 
form transcribed into language is hermeneutical. 'Phenomenology of Dasein [Being] is 
hermeneutics in the original signification of the word, which designates the work of 
interpretation' (M. Ileidegger 120, original emphasis). Phenomenological concepts 
themselves must be distinguished from 'ordinary' conceptualisation. 
Now what must be taken into account if the formal concept of the phenomenon 
is to be deformalized to the phenomenological one, and how does this differ from 
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the common concept? What is it that phenomenology is to "let be seen"? What is 
it that is to be called "phenomenon" in a distinctive sense? What is it by its very 
essence that becomes the necessary theme when we indicate something explicitly? 
Manifestly, it is something that does not show itself at first and for the most part, 
something that is concealed, in contrast to what at first and for the most part does 
show itself. But at the same time it is something that essentially belongs to what at 
first and for the most part shows itself, and indeed in such a way that it constitutes 
its meaning and ground. (M. Heidegger 119 emphasis original) 
This Heideggeran account of the phenomenological sign as unrevealed, echoes the 
distinction made here earlier in Chapter One between latent and emergent [14]. Lessing's 
sharp distinction between image and word in the Laocoon is eroded by the transitive 
movement of meaning from the Peircian icon to the symbol, from visual form into 
allegory as language. 
Under Heideggeran phenomenology, the act of interpretation is necessarily 
hermeneutical. Schleiermacher's original separation in formulating the Hermeneutical 
Circle between scientific or rationally causal explanation and interpretative 
understanding in human action remains important (R. Scruton in A. Kenny, Ed, 1994, 
230). The hermeneutical process as circular and ceaselessly interrogating the relation of 
parts to whole and whole to parts in a procedure of both imagination and the 
reconciliation of part to whole is further discussed in Chapter Five here. 
Heidegger's proposal that 'Dasein' has to be understood within, as it were, historical 
non-transcendental real time contrasts strongly with the position of his teacher, Edmund 
Busserl. With Brentano, Husserl is understood to be the progenitor of the modem 
phenomenological tradition (R. Scruton 1994, 227-230). Husserl's phenomenological 
method required the radical separation of the perception of empirical phenomena from 
mental phenomena. Husserl's project was a study of mind, but based on the embodied 
experience of external phenomena, which have to be 'bracketed' or subtracted in an act of 
'epoche' (H.G. Gadamer 1993, 246). What becomes important for interpretation is 
Husserl's suggestion that the menIal understanding of real phenomena in the mind is in 
part a product of mental direction 'towards' objects which are in a sense reconstituted as 
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a result of intentionality (E. Husserl in McNeil and Feldman, Eds, 1998, 102-103). In the 
theory of interpretation, especially literary interpretation, Husserl's intentionality as 
authorship becomes apodictic, or what Husserl calls 'eidetic', (R.Scruton 1994,228) and 
what is bracketed, parenthesised or marginalized such as extrinsic biography or acts of 
readership is the result of favouring authorial intention as having directional force (T. 
Eagleton 1997, 51-52). The primacy of authorial intention as it has come down from 
Husserl's 'epoche' is challenged by Reception theory, not least in Gadamer's 
interpretative acts between subject and object, between reader and text and between 
spectator and art object in Truth and Method and is also discussed in Chapter Five. 
From Icon to Text 
The 'from-to' here is important. In the case of architecture as a field of empirical 
objects - buildings and the genius loci of their contexts - if there is to be a transmission 
of meaning or significance, then that 'message' must flow from the visual attributes of 
the building towards language. This suggests that the art object immanently 'contains' 
meaning in visual form. There may be difficulties implicit in moving from visual form to 
meaning, both as explanation and understanding. Conventionally, meaning is conveyed 
by syntax in some kind ofphatic code as in lakobson's model ofsender/mediumlreceiver 
(Roman lakobson in T. Sebeok, Ed, 1960, 353). The medium or code might be words, 
digital programs, morse-code or even ships' flags. But in the case of the building, abstract 
paintings and sculpture and installations for example, where there is neither overt subject 
or narrative content, it is indeed difficult to see what the medium of the message could 
be, even though we may be quite convinced that the particular art object under view does 
in fact signify and mean. Since there is no 'language of architecture' or 'language of 
sculpture' and so on, because neither buildings or sculpture have phonemes arranged in 
morphemes arranged in words which have some semantic reference and which are 
arranged grammatically in syntax, then in the case of the building, there can be no 
intercessional semantic code or medium. Meaning must inhere in the moment of vision 
when the visible of the object transmogrifies into the linguistic sense of the 
receiver/spectator. This section addresses this fundamentally important transition. 
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Roland Barthes in The Photographic Message suggests that certain kinds of aesthetic 
genre such as photography have no medium but represent a message without a code. In 
the sense that the photographic image is an analogy of the reality originally caught in that 
image, then the reality of the image is denotative of that reality. 'Certainly the image is 
not the reality but at least it is its perfect ana/ogon and it is exactly this analogical 
perfection which, to common sense, defines the photograph. Thus can be seen the special 
status of the photographic image : it is a message without a code '. (R. Barthes 1977, 17 
original emphasis) As an empirical object, 'the building' has no sender or medium of 
transmission, which is what Barthes and Jakobson mean by 'code'. The building will 
have no obvious denotative code such as the depicted in a painting and therefore no 
conspicuous code. But what it will have, as suggested in Chapter One, will be the 
expression of its gesture which substitutes semantically for 'code'. So that like the 
photograph, in this instance, although it has no code, we nevertheless remain certain that 
the mediaeval cathedral, for instance, as a building and a structure (not, that is, its internal 
iconographic accoutrements and symbolic elements such as statues and stained glass and 
so on) is powerfully semantic. (See 'The Architectural Trace' here in Part Two.) Barthes 
goes on to contend that the denotative level of the message or meaning, carries 
palimpsest-like, a secondary or connotative layer of meaning. The denotative is the form 
(building, photograph and so on) and the suggestion of meaning arising from the form is 
the connotation. 
In the case of the building (like the photograph) the point of reception of its visual 
meaning, and as Jakobson has it, its 'contact', must be retinal. The difficult issue of how 
an optical experience, the embodied experience of visual form, becomes semantic and 
interpretative, persists. Speaking of the photograph, Barthes says: 
... the photograph is verbalized in the very moment it is perceived; better, it is only 
perceived verbalized ... From this point of view, the image - grasped immediately by 
an inner metalanguage, language itself-in actual fact has no denoted state, is 
immersed for its very social existence in at least an initial layer of connotation, that 
of the categories of language. We know that every language takes up a position with 
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regard to things, that it connotes reality, if only in dividing it up; the connotations of 
the photograph would thus coincide, grosse mondo, with the overall planes of lan-
guage. (R. Barthes 1979, 28-29) 
In the same way, the building'S connoted visual meanings must come into language 
rather than be constitutive of meaning, as the hypostasis of 'the language of architecture 
would suggest. In The Rhetoric of the Image, Barthes speaks of 'rhetoric thus appearing 
as the signifying aspect of ideology'. By 'ideology' he means the connoted cultural 
meanings available socially and historically in any given society. The way in which such 
cultural connotation is signified is characterized as an aspect of rhetoric. In an image such 
as an advertisement for Italian food, pasta connotes metonymically not only as attractive 
food, but persuasively as what Barthes calls 'Italianicity' (R. Barthes 1977, 50). What is 
suggested here is that the formal items of the advertisement, that is the arrangement of the 
food, represents a visual trope or what Barthes calls 'figures'. 
Thus the rhetoric of the image (that is to say, the classification of its connotators) 
is specific to the extent that it is subject to the physical constraints of vision 
(different, for example, from phonatory constraints) but general to the extent 
that the 'figures' are never more than formal relations of elements.(R. Barthes 1979, 
49) 
'Figures' which emerge from the constraints of vision, in other words, signify 
metaphorically as, in so far as they are 'of the image (or building here), metonymically, 
part to whole. The visual connotation which signifies as 'figure' or trope is the act of 
rhetoric. In the same way, Postmodem architecture is highly tropic in its visual form, and 
part of its 'display' as theatricality may similarly be seen as rhetorical. In exploring the 
transition from the visual to the linguistic meaning, Barthes further says ' .. .language 
clearly has a function of elucidation, but this elucidation is selective, a metalanguage 
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applied not only to the totality of the iconic message but only to certain of its signs.' (R. 
Barthes 1979, 40) and notes that visual form understood as analogous linguistic meaning 
seems necessarily expressed as abstract nouns. 'To express these semes of connotation, 
would therefore require a special metalanguage and we are left with barbarisms of the 
Italianicity kind as best being able to account for the signifieds of connotation, the suffix-
icity deriving an abstract noun from an adjective ... ' (Barthes, 48). 
SemioticaIly, the image and the building as visible to the viewer and subject to both the 
denotative and connotative signification of vision, become analogous of its implicitly 
textual characteristic; the visible becomes the textual. Lessing's arbitrary dichotomy 
between image and word unravels and reassembles as the dialectical relation between the 
visible and the linguistic. A number of important consequences emerge. From Plato 
onwards, of course, the underlying notion of dialectic has been dialogue, which in tum 
implicates conversation. And no conversation can proceed without the imbrication of 
hearing. And so we proceed to the proposition that that the spectator/interpreter enters 
into a conversation with the visible art object by listening to its visual tropes or 
metaphors. In the case of the building, the issue of Postmodemist or New Historicism 
metaphorical referencing, for example, is discussed in 'The Architectural Trace' here in 
Part Two [15]. 
In Truth and Method, Gadamer, in speaking of texts, nevertheless underlines the 
presence of language in all interpretation. 
All understanding is interpretation, and all interpretation takes place in the medium 
of a language that allows the object to come into words and yet is at the same time 
the interpreter's own language. (H.G. Gadamer 1993,389) 
Gadamer proposes that it is the dialectics of the conversation which 'brings to mind' (and 
which, as he says, 'allows the object to come into words') the previously unforeseen 
cognition of newly emerging dialogical propositions (N. Davey in I Heywood and B. 
Sandywell, Eds, 1999, 9). In the antiphonal responses between argument and counter-
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argument, thesis and antithesis, a new and entirely unexpected, even disquieting 
possibility may emerge as the synthesis. And even in a multi-participative conversation, 
the process retains an objective and potentially analytical character, but which 
nevertheless results in the possibility of revelation and epiphany as understanding. A 
similar 'conversation' might take place between the interpreter and the text as written; the 
task then becomes hermeneutically interrogative in assessing the fit of the hermeneutical 
circle. 'Hence it is more than a metaphor; it is a memory of what originally was the case, 
to describe the task of hermeneutics as entering into dialogue with the text.' (H.G. 
Gadamer 1993, 368) 
The 'text', we remind ourselves, is embodied in the visual art object as Barthes 
proposed as a form of immanent inscription as well as in the actuality of writing. 
In addressing the significance of the art object we have to interrogate its visual form 
not simply as some thing in itself, some potentially attractive or beautiful object, but as 
the interface between form and meaning. And if visually configured meaning is to 
undergo Heideggeran 'self-unconcealing', the dialogue with the object demands that it be 
'listened to' or 'heard' (I. I Jeywood and B. Sandywell, Eds, 1999,238). Gadamer says: 
... we must take account of the particular dialectic implied in hearing. It is not just 
that he who hears is also addressed, but also that he who is addressed must hear 
whether he wants to or not. When you look at something you can also look away 
from it by looking in a different direction, but you cannot "hear away". This 
difference between seeing and hearing is important for us because the primacy 
of hearing is the basis of the hermeneutical phenomenon, as Aristotle saw. There 
is nothing that is not available through the medium of language. (lI.G. Gadamer 
1993,462 original emphasis) 
The process of hearing within dialogue is aletheic in the sense that the building reveals its 
metaphorical meanings in a condition of disclosure (H.G. Gadamer 1993,482-4) [16]. 
The disclosure is fundamentally an act of language. Despite the dominance of the visual 
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in the western tradition since the Renaissance (M. Jay in N. Mirzoeff, Ed, 1998,66-69), it 
is language which is the carrier of meaning. 'In the light of our hermeneutical inquiry this 
ancient insight into the priority of hearing over sight acquires a new emphasis ... in 
contrast to all other experience of the world, language opens up a completely new 
dimension, the profound dimension from which tradition comes down to those now 
living.' (B.G. Gadamer 1993, 462-3) The fact that the disclosure 'brings to mind' 
understanding through the dialogical means that our appreciation of the aesthetic will 
always be an acknowledgement that 'allows the object to come into words' (N. Davey in 
I.Heywood and B. Sandywell, Eds, 1999, 10). The dominance of the ocularcentric in the 
west as a form of embodied hegemony is testified by the intense saturation of the 
language with metaphors of vision and light. 
In many ways, the familiar debate about the 'inside' and the 'outside' of sensory 
information and consciousness and how the outside becomes internalised in the mind has 
been dominated by the Cartesian scopic regime of perspectivalism (Christopher Jencks 
1995, 1-5). Descartes's Cogito created the modem dualism between body and mind, and 
in association with the rise of scientific explanation in the seventeenth century, 
emphasized the visual as the principal source of sensible information for the mind, or in 
Descartes's location, the soul (M. Jay 1993,21-82). Maurice Merleau-Ponty, both in The 
Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and the Invisible, contested the dominance 
of Cartesian ocularcentrism, although not the remaining importance of acts of visual 
perception in themselves. Merleau-Ponty's programme incorporated not a rejection of the 
idea of an internal construction of real external, material phenomena, but rather the 
prevailing assumptions of Rationalism (G.B. Madison 1988, 57-81). In as much as 
rationalism followed the Platonic tradition of marginalizing sensory data as unreliable in 
the face of universal essences, so Merleau-Ponty subverted it. He also disrupted the truth 
propositions in the treatment of language by the analytical tradition by not only proposing 
that the visible must come into language, but also by maintaining that the language 
involved must inevitably be metaphorical. Merleau-Ponty's challenge to ocular scientific 
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Rationalism, his insistence on the importance of embodied perception and his acceptance 
of metaphorical as well as analytical meaning, has led to some considering him as a 
postmodern philosopher prior to the fact, if not a fully fledged postmodernist as such 
(G.B. Madison 1988, 60). The two traditions, the analytical Anglo-Saxon and Continental 
Phenomenology, divide fundamentally about linguistic and other forms of meaning. Each 
regards the area of concern of the other as outside its terms of reference. Unless we are to 
address the aesthetic condition of the postmodern building in terms of essence and its 
ascription to the norms of universal forms of the beautiful, which would seem bizarre, the 
analytical tradition offers no entry to the ironic and parodic metaphorical meanings of the 
postmodern which inevitably defer the absolute aesthetic condition which the analytical 
tradition would demand. Interpretation, as Gadamer insisted, is necessarily 
phenomenological. 
Merleau-Ponty's argument with what Martin Jay calls 'the scopic regime' of 
ocularcentrism (M. Jay in N.MirzoefT, 66), involved in essence a disagreement with the 
cognitive frame imposed by (Cartesian) perspectivalism (M. Jay 1994, 298). Visual 
perception, particularly after Alberti, involved scopic interrogation of external form. The 
perspectival frame of reference was analytically mathematical and geometrical. This not 
only excluded other forms of sensory information such as the idea of touch as metaphor 
which fascinated Merleau-Ponty, but never asked about the possibility of meaning and 
significance in the object as a result of the subject's acts of perception. Rationalist 
dualism demoted embodied sense experience as potentially dystopian only to be 
reconfigured within the mental framework provided by the mind and its ideal ideas. In 
fact, Merleau-Ponty distrusted both empiricist and transcendental a priori accounts which 
he saw as respectively 'perceptualist' and' intellectualist'. 
The empiricist solution - that each sense was utterly distinct - and the intellectualist 
alternative - that a transcendental knowledge of space exists prior to sense experience-
were both inadequate, because they failed to register the primary layer of intersensory 
experience in the body anterior to the differentiation of the senses and their resynthesis 
on the level of reflected thought. Instead, MerJeau-Ponty claimed, the unification 
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was like the merging of monocular and binocular vision, produced by a kind of bodily 
intentionality before mind distinguished itself from matter. "The senses", he contended 
"translate each other without any need of an interpreter, and are mutually comprehen-
sible without the intervention of any idea." (M. Jay 1994, 310) 
Philosophically, this position in The Phenomenology of Perception is very radical 
because although not dismantling the importance of ideas, it does accord to sensory 
experience something approaching autonomy. Merleau-Ponty begins with Husserl's 
intentionality and 'epoche' and builds on Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutics 
(M. Jay 194, 269-275). In The Visible and the Invisible, he develops the argument for the 
senses to be able to 'translate' each other by speaking of what amounts to the contiguity 
of the look. 'Hence without even entering into the implications proper to the seer and the 
visible, w know that, since vision is a palpation with the look, it must also be inscribed in 
the order of being that it discloses to us .. .' (M. Merleau-Ponty in W. McNeil and K 
Feldman, Eds, 1998, 170). lie says that we could not dream of seeing things 'naked' 
because' ... the gaze itself envelops them, clothes them with its own flesh.' (168) 
This section of The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty calls 'The Intertwining -
The Chiasm'. The trope or figure of chiasmus (R. Latham 1991, 33) is a fundamentally 
important metaphor because the intertwining of the senses such as touch and vision then 
in tum intertwines with the reflection of ideas. But it is more than simply 'intertwining'. 
Chiasmus not only links, but also reverses and establishes polarity. Thus 'S/he entered in 
triumph and departed in defeat' links 'entering' and 'departing' by reversing 'triumph' 
into 'defeat'. In similar fashion the two underlying senses in Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology, sense and idea, become antiphonal, although remaining differentially 
mediated; the monocular (sense alone) oscillates with and forms the binocular (idea). The 
understanding of meaning can only emerge when binocular 'vision' combines the 
experiential and the ideated. What might be considered as valid as an idea, he contends, 
will always be mediated by, and embodied in, experience [17]. 
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Merleau-Ponty has a similarly radical vIew of language. It is language which 
commands sense and meaning from the sensible objects of perception in the 
consciousness of the subject. 'And henceforth movement, touch, vision, applying 
themselves to the other and to themselves, return towards their source and, in the patient 
and silent labour of desire, begin the paradox of expression.' (M. Merleau-Ponty 1998, 
174) In the Tractatus Wittgenstein had suggested that anything that could be thought 
analytically could be expressed and expressed clearly. Otherwise there is silence. In 6.37 
he says, 'The only necessity is logical necessity. What we cannot speak about, we must 
pass over in silence.' (J.A. Smith in C. Jencks, Ed, 1995, 240) Merleau-Ponty's 
contention that the concealed 'invisible' can only come into meaning and 'be visible' in 
metaphorical language through the touch of the visible is in extreme opposition to the 
truth propositions of the Tractatus and the analytical 'Theory of Descriptions' of 
Bertrand Russell to which it subscribed. But in terms of the interpretation of the aesthetic 
object, the semantic trajectory of hermeneutical phenomenology from Husserl and 
Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer, although analytically unverifiable, offers 
much to signal the latent as well as the manifest rather than the analytical sterility of 'The 
only necessity is logical necessity', a position Wittgenstein later wholly rejected. 
Provocatively, Merleau-Ponty spoke of language as being experience in what he called 
'the occult traffic in metaphor', and actually, that experience without speech is 
impossible; ' ... there is no expcrience without speech, as the purely lived-through has no 
part in the discursive life of man.' (G.B. Madisonl988, 75) In effect, consciousness is 
language. But the fact that the art object can only come into meaning through metaphor 
and language (because there is no language afthe object) does not mean that the spectator 
cannot receive what Barthes calls the building's (or whatever art form) rhetorical 
'enonciation' or 'utterance' in its capacity to become textual (R. Barthes 2000, 3) [18]. It 
is not a finite, final or absolute meaning, but one possibility amongst others, scrutinized 
and 'verified' by a clerisy of fellow observers and commentators in what Stanley Fish 
designates as a community of Reception Discourse. (See Chapter Four here.) In quoting 
Merleau-Ponty from The Invisible and the Invisible, Martin Jay sums up the chiasmic 
intertwining betwecn perception and language by quoting from Merleau-Ponty. 
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, "Meaning is invisible, but the invisible is not the contradictory of the visible: the 
visible itself has an invisible framework (membrure), and the in-visible is the secret 
counterpart of the visible." Ifperception is a mute version ofJanguage, needing it to 
come into full speech, so too language bears within it the residue of its silent 
predecessor which inaugurated the drama of meaningfulness ... ' (M. Jay 1994, 324-5 
Merleau-Ponty's original emphasis). 
The movement from the visual aesthetic object to language or text as meaning does not 
implicate the paraphrase (see Chapter Five). In the first instance, the primary linguistic 
response to, say, the building as form will be in terms of Barthes's abstract noun 
formulation; that this building, as Libeskind's 'Freedom Tower' in New York might, as 
part of its annunciation, deal with mourning and the commemoration of the tragic. Such a 
shift from visual form to meaning is, and it can be argued, should be, full of 'dis-
quietude' (dis: reversal; quietude: silence, calm, repose; from silence to sound, from 
repose to perturbation). The prospect of the building, even metaphorically, as 'speaking' 
(parlante) and its meaning as silently invisible then becoming unconcealed in acts of 
rhetorical annunciation - indeed that it be 'heard' - and that the beholder be 'touched' by 
its visibleness is certainly disconcerting, but equally certainly, not paraphrastic. Its 
meaning in visual metaphor will as language be i//ocutionary or, in other words, be a 
form of language use which as a 'speech act' hereby promises a certain kind of meaning. 
The Felicitous and the Infelicitous in Form 
J.L. Austin belongs to the Oxford school of Ordinary Language Philosophy which is 
clearly in concordance with Wittgenstein's 'use' theories of language. Austin himself 
described his method as 'linguistic phenomenology' (S. Cavell 2002, 98). Austin's 
procedure is non-analytical. (,But even the bare title [linguistic philosophy] is suggestive: 
it suggests that the clarity Austin seeks in philosophy is to be achieved by mapping the 
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fields of consciousness lit by the occasions of a word, not through analysing or replacing 
a given word by others. In this sense, philosophy like his is not analytical.' Cavell, 100) 
Austin proposes that utterance, as will become clearer, may be well-rounded and 
felicitous when obeying regulative rules, and infelicitous when violating the same 
regulative rules (M. Black 1972, 152-3). Clearly, art objects such as buildings have 
analogous regulative rules that typologically characterize them as 'Baroque', 'Modernist' 
and so on. The rules, within artistic form, represent 'structures of feeling' expressed in 
form as the repetition of motifs of design, and for the building or work of art to be 
'Baroque' or 'Modernist', it must conform to the appropriate regulative rules of design in 
order to remain 'felicitous'. If the regulative rules are violated, the object either becomes 
something else altogether, or more likely, a hybrid or stylistic chimaera, so that in the 
present example, Baroque becomes Rococo and Modernist becomes Postmodernist. The 
felicitous would have become the infelicitous in terms of its origins among the regulative 
rules. There is even a sense that in the case of Postmodernist New Historicism, 
architecture that became self-consciously infelicitous as faux classicism in the 1980s 
assumed such a degree of deliberate stylistic inappropriateness that it approached the 
condition of the mythic. The source of the felicity/infelicity inheres in visual appearance 
in the case of the building; in its rhetorical enunciation. And although Austin deals only 
with linguistic utterance, our own aesthetic sense of the meaning of the building as 
onlookers must become linguistic, and so must encounter the linguistically concealed, as 
it were, within the visual; in Merleau-Ponty's terms, the invisible. The implications of 
Austin's felicitous/infelicitous distinction as a vehicle of visual interpretation, then 
becomes fecund. 
Austin begins by addressing the 'performative' utterance in declarative sentences 
['declare', from Latin declarare, to make clear, from clarus, bright, clear]. The building 
may be said to figuratively 'make itself clear' in annunciation as declaration, its 
'declared' then being the 'persuasive' of its rhetoric. Speech acts, or 'performatives' are 
governed by two kinds of rules, constitutive and regulative (W. Lycan 2000, 180). 
Constitutive rules assert that the utterance is performative (or in its declaration, the 
building is Modernist or is Postmodernist, and so on). The infringement of regulative 
rules results not in the utterance ceasing to be performative in the sense of doing 
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something, but merely in becoming declaratively defective or infelicitous. Being 
infelicitous will mean that the utterance (or building in this case) is still perforrnative in 
being declarative, but ambiguously so (W. Lycan, 174). In the present analogy from 
architecture, the Postmodernist building as a self-conscious acknowledgement of the 
constituent rules of Modernism, but still nevertheless representing a violation of them, 
becomes knowingly infelicitous, while still perforrnative or declarative, perhaps even 
'loudly' so. Austin distinguishes perforrnatives such as 'I support the motion' from 
constatives which represent philosophical-type propositional meaning [19]. However, 
performatives are necessarily propositional of something or other because they are 
declarative (in the present example, 'The motion is sufficiently worthy to merit support'). 
Austin determined the force and authenticity of performatives by the introduction of 
the 'hereby' criterion. Declarations such as 'I support the motion' immediately accept 
'hereby' as in 'I hereby support the motion.' Alternatively, if an ordinary member of the 
public says 'I declare that the state of the drains is unacceptable', then the 'hereby' 
criterion makes the assertion infelicitous, although still performative. However, if the 
Leader of the Council does so, the utterance becomes felicitous indexically, or according 
to its context of use. The 'hereby' confers authority and authenticity to the performative. 
If 'hereby' is added to constatives such as 'The cat sat on the mat', the result is either 
nonsensical or false (W. Lycan 178). The authority conferred by 'hereby' as a form of 
proclamation meaning adverbially 'as a result of this' is not within the constitutive rules 
of utterance, which remain unwritten (W. Lycan 176), but in institutional cultural custom 
and practice. 
Within the institutional frame and cultural custom of architecture what becomes 
provocative or interesting about Postmodemistic architectural style is its temporally 
recursive nature, becoming two things in one, both Modernist (past) and Postmodernist 
(present) at the same time. This invites conscious ambiguity and dissembling, plays on 
appearance and reality and the doubling of the metaphorical (allegorical) palimpsest. A 
building like St Pauls by Wren is stylistically mellifluous and felicitous, being, in this 
case, baroque through and through; it is characterized by the strong 'hereby' of its 
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unambiguous stylistic constitutive rule. The authenticity, force and authority of its 
'proclaimed' are precisely its synchronic stylistic unity. But in the case of the postmodern 
building, what is found is the weak signal of the inauthentic; its proclaimed are ciphers of 
differentiation and infelicity. 
A building like Corbusier's 
Ronchamp [Fig 6], 
apparently authentically 
Modernist In its white 
would-be Purism, suddenly 
reverses, becoming hugely 
gestural and expressive and 
metaphorical when, as of the 
modern, it should not be and 
becomes two ambivalently antinomic things in one. The felicity of its 'hereby' becomes 
more apparent than real as its chimerical quality reveals itself to the beholder. Ronchamp 
is discussed at further length in 'The Architectural Trace' in Part Two. Its doubling 
makes it arguably postmodernistically prescient; the first of the architectural authentically 
inauthentic and the first of the felicitously infelicitous. The infelicity of postmodemist 
architectural utterance will playa significant part in the interpretation of key Postmodern 
buildings such as Frank Gehry's Nederlanden building, Prague, and Daniel Libeskind's 
Jewish Museum, Berlin in Part Two. 
This chapter has had to deal with both with genuinely complex issues surrounding the 
issue of language and form and the rather technical terms in which it is often expressed. 
Tracing the possible route of the translation of the art object's physical form into 
linguistic meaning via Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, although of the greatest 
significance, can also sound rather mysterious, as in Heidegger's 'unconcealing'. Because 
of the inherent difficulties of the subject, perhaps this is both inevitable and as it should 
be. What needs to be absolutely clear at this point is that the coming into language of the 
building'S meaning is wholly trivialised by the ubiquitous 'language of formulation, an 
1L2 
issue discussed at some greater length in Chapter Six. The route of the translation of 
meaning involves implicating Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological and 
hermeneutical approach in the change of the physical work of art into a form of linguistic 
significance. Addressing such a change or transmogrification inevitably involves a 
process of interpretation which is a major concern of the next chapter. Austin's weII-
known distinction between felicitous and infelicitous speech acts, appropriated here as a 
means of interpreting buildings, helps later to construe the rhetorical self-announcement 
of an important poststructuralist building such as Daniel Libeskind's Berlin Jewish 
Museum for example as infelicitously contrived. The principle established in this chapter 
that visual forms such as visual metaphor or gesture acquire meaning by coming into 
language from what Heidegger might have called a condition of immanence is of the 
greatest significance. How a building is 'read', interpreted or 'received' - its reception 
indeed - is in large part dependent on how its visual rhetoric translates into linguistic 
possibilities. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RHETORIC, VISUAL METAPHOR AND ALLEGORY AND 
INTERPRETATION 
This chapter deals with the metaphorical aspects of interpretation and the necessity for 
the presence of literary theory in any version of interpretation itself, architectural or 
otherwise. The chapter comprises five sections: Rhetoric, Visual Metaphor and Allegory, 
Visual Metaphor, Allegory and finally, Interpretation. Rhetoric and allegory are seen as 
essential components of the 'self-announcement' of postmodern architecture and their 
history and development are briefly traced. The relevance of these tropes for an 
understanding of postmodern and particularly poststructuralist architecture is highly 
significant. The section on visual metaphor, which is how the rhetorical tropes of 
postmodernist building are actually signified, sets out the nature of visual metaphor with 
particular regard for the metonymy/metaphor relation and the importance of Roman 
Jakobson's work arising from the study of aphasia. The final section deals with 
interpretation. Since there is no language of architecture itself, but equally since meaning 
must be ultimately linguistic, the resolution, or not, of architectural form as emergent 
language and meaning needs some form of justification, best found in literary theory. The 
shape of that justifying theory of interpretation is located in Stanley Fish's 'interpretive 
community' . 
RHETORIC 
Since Plato, rhetoric has often been spoken of disparagingly as simply a device of 
display. That view was modified substantially by Aristotle who suggested that persuasion 
is a legitimate way of making a case or argument. Nevertheless, the idea that rhetoric is 
often a form of adornment or ornamentation persists. Alfred Loos's dictum, 'Ornament is 
crime' is of course famous as a Modernist creed. Corbusier's early Purism, discussed in 
Chapter Two, in its spare articulation contrasts vividly with the metaphorical gesture and 
114 
shape of his Ronchamp which is arguably, in its assumption of visual rhetoric, the 
announcement of the architecturally postmodern. After the historical decline of rhetoric, 
its own revival in twentieth century literary theory is traced, especially in the writings of 
LA. Richards and Paul de Man. The account of postmodern architecture in Part Two 
relies on and is dependent on being construed as highly rhetorically infonned. 
One conspicuous aspect of the recent rise in the importance of what might be called 
'the hermeneutics of visual culture' has been its incorporation of rhetorical tenns (for, 
example 'The Aporia of the Sensible', J.M. Bernstein in L Heywood and B. Sandywell, 
Eds, 1990). This might be conceivably little more than verbal flourish, a rhetoric of 
rhetoric, serving only to create particular or impressive effects, and thus confinning 
Plato's original objection to it. Alternatively, the growth in interest in rhetoric might have 
a deep-structural connection with the postmodern itself. As part of the central argument 
here, the very theatricality of postmodern culture, especially in its visual forms, 
announces itself rhetorically in its visual tropes. Thus the Modernist decorum of Mies's 
Barcelona Pavilion, for example, contrasts strongly with the augendi causa (raising the 
voice) of Corbusier's gestural exclamation at Ronchamp. In other words, the current 
invocation of rhetoric is not rhetorical simply in its persuasive sense. It would indeed 
seem that rhetoric is an insistent presence as part of the postmodern condition. In 
opposing Modernist architectural decorum, postmodern architecture as part of its 
deliberately contrived self-announcement, often Historicist in nature, clothes itself as it 
were, in the rhetorical pose. The nature of rhetoric then clearly needs clarification before 
it can be applied to the interpretation of postmodern architecture, given that visual 
rhetoric is an important constituent feature of its appearance. 
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle resists Plato's disapproval of rhetoric as a fonn of persuasion 
which is superficially mimetic and metaphorical and which is applied as ornamentation 
and affectation (H.C. Lawson-Tancredi 1991, 15). In order to correct the dominant 
impression of rhetoric as ornamentation, Aristotle insists that rhetoric is fundamentally 
syllogistic and concerned with proof. 'Just as in logic we have induction and the real and 
the apparent syllogism, so it is with rhetoric, where example is induction and enthymeme 
syllogism, apparent enthymeme being apparent syllogism. Thus I call enthymeme the 
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syllogism, and example the induction of rhetoric. ' (Aristotle 1991, Part I, 75, emphasis 
original) Aristotle speaks of 'proof, that is, the making of a case. The hermeneutical 
interpretation of a building as ontologically 'tragic' or 'hortatory', for example, is 
assisted by the use of rhetorical tropes as part of 'making the case', of suggesting what is 
present as concealed and immanent. Rhetoric, Aristotle insists, is art as well as the 
politically and judicially forensic. In this sense, his treatment of style as simile and 
metaphor used for propriety and suitability is clearly valuable (Aristotle 1991, Part 2, ix, 
215-242). 
Clearly, rhetoric has its own interior and complex history of development extending 
across millennia, representing periods of emergence, latency and recession. In its earlier 
Graeco-Roman classical phase, rhetoric was a public act involving the marshalling and 
ordering of rational argument (P. Dixon 1971, Introduction). But taking Aristotle's point 
about rhetoric being an art (Ars Rhetorica), under the typological heading of 'Style' [that 
is Elocutio one of the five organizing Faculties, the others being Inventio or Invention, 
Memoria or Memory, Dispositio or Arrangement and Actio or Delivery], emerge the 
'Figures' and 'Schemes'. Figures of words such as tropes and metaphor were 
distinguished from figures of thought such as allegory or irony. The influence of 
Ornament, originally only one of four further components of style, was so pervasive that 
ornament and rhetoric became virtually synonymous (P. Dixon 1971,38). The distinction 
between Schemes and Tropes was maintained into the mediaeval period and adhered to 
by Bede (De Schematis et Tropis) and rhetoric continued to be taught as part of the 
Trivium. Despite the enormous revival of interest in rhetoric during the Renaissance, 
during the following period of seventeenth century Empiricism, language was 
promulgated, almost in anticipation of the Analytical Tradition it would seem, as the 
means of clarifying objective ideas. John Locke wrote: 
, ... and we must allow that all the Art of Rhetoric besides Order and Clearness, all the 
artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing 
else but to insinuate wrong Ideas; move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judge-
ment; and so indeed are perfect cheat.' (An Essay In Human Understanding, Book 3, x 
in P. Dixon 1971, 67, emphasis original) 
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The increased marginalization of rhetoric was also confirmed by the rise of the novel 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, because of course the novel dealt with 
realism in opposition to rhetoric (I. Watt 1957, 13). 
There is a further distancing of rhetoric in taste, sensibility and fancy at the opening of 
the Romantic Movement. It is intimately associated with a parallel rejection of allegory in 
favour of the symbol (see the following section here, 'Visual Metaphor and Allegory'). 
The nature of rhetoric as a public art infringed the emerging aesthetic individualism of 
the sublime and private concept of the artist as genius, or as Gadamer puts it, ' ... the 
devaluation of rhetoric in the nineteenth century follows necessarily from the doctrine 
that genius creates unconsciously.' (H.G. Gadamer 1993, 72) The intimate association of 
rhetoric with allegory and irony as a means of publicly 'other-speaking' in which the 
intended meaning is ironically opposite to the stated meaning, pointed up the value of 
tropes and figures and confirmed a relationship which was sustained right up to the 
Romantic period from its classical origins. 
Although radically transformed, rhetoric was redeemed in the twentieth century after 
largely being ignored from Coleridge on. The first moment of redemption was LA. 
Richard's Philosophy of Rhetoric. Although embracing the classical tradition, Richards 
also qualified it. Quintillian, for example, in Institutio Oratoria argued that res, the 
subject matter of speech or thinking, is inseparable from verba, the words uttered to 
express the thought. Quintillian's famous aphorism, that language is the dress or clothing 
of thought, depends on the unity of thought and language. However, that unity can only 
occur when the speech is meet and fit for the decorum of the thought. The figures of 
speech and thought, although different, must remain congruent. ' For the same things are 
often put in different ways and the sense remains unaltered though the words are 
changed.' (QuintiIlian, Institutio Oratoria IX I 16) Richards rejected the necessary unity 
of language and thought posited by both QuintiJlian and Cicero in favour of the 
essentially ambivalent nature of expressive and poetic language. Richards's 'New 
Rhetoric' in the Philosophy of Rhetoric will be nothing less than 'the study of verbal 
understanding and misunderstanding.' (I.A. Richards 1956, 23) All fictive writing is an 
act of persuasion in which the writer seeks to 'convince' the reader and therefore this 
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collision of interest, rather than authorial hegemony, necessarily introduces ambiguity, a 
position far removed from Aristotle's syllogisms and enthymemes. William Empson's 
Seven Types of Ambiguity found similar rhetorical ambivalence in Shakespeare's diction. 
Richards's situating rhetorical and poetic meaning within an aporia between authorial 
intention and textual interpretation anticipates later semiotics and Reception Theory. His 
cleavage between res and verba is to some extent supported experimentally by Lev 
Vigotsky's finding (1934) that language and thought have a common root but diverge at 
maturation into separate faculties; hence the infant can think but not necessarily be able 
to say it (L. Vigotsky 1962, 33-51). Rhetoric was accorded much attention in literary New 
Criticism, notably in The Rhetoric Of Fiction by Wayne Booth, which argued that any act 
of authorial intention is inevitably the imposition of the author's meaning on the reader as 
another version of persuasion. But the decisive tum came in Structuralist and 
Poststructuralist treatment of the text as narratological deep structure. 
This is of course an inevitably compressed and selective account. However, its 
importance for the building'S 'enonciation' remains undiminished and indispensable. The 
revival of interest in rhetoric and allegory in Structuralism and Poststructuralism has been 
highly influential, although seldom applied to architecture as a key element in 
interpreting potential architectural meaning, a lacuna the present work here attempts to 
address. The association between rhetoric and allegory and Poststructuralist theory is of 
fundamental importance. Following the collapse of the Modernist avant-garde, the 
reinscriplion of the postmodcm, perhaps as 'New Historicism', often achieved 
architecturally as parody or irony, involved 'other-speaking' in a rhetoric of display. That 
rhetoric of display is characterized here in terms of Michael Fried's notion of theatricality 
in Art and Objeclhood. Clearly, there is a cultural need for an imperative of display. What 
then becomes important phenomenologically, is that display is not understood to be only 
visual (J. Birksted, Ed 2000, 2). Not only buildings, but also their setting -landscape that 
is - 'declares' itself in more than one cultural dimension. Time and memory, which 
ultimately invoke allegory, and which are embedded in landscape, are part of its 
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rhetorical unfolding, and bring a corrective influence on Cartesian perspective and optical 
hegemony (Martin Jay 1994, 69-82). 
'As for notions of memory, the landscape perspective would bring an increased 
awareness of how memory is 'seen'. Landscape is of course historically linked to 
the' arts of memory'. Since vision appears to be natural it transforms memory into 
a seemingly natural experience, an experience present in the here-and-now. The 
interaction between vision and memory in the landscape is thus capable of generating 
narrative vision that cuts across the very basic distinction between the textual and 
the visual - a distinction which tends fundamentally to oppose, in art and architectural 
history, the iconographical approach to the approach of visual cultural studies. Hence, 
also a temporal dimension: transporting the past into the present, blurring past and 
present, recreating the present as past. Vision of landscape has a temporal dimension 
and thus brings the temporal dimension into the spatial dimension. The landscape 
perspective foregrounds time.' (J. Birksted 2000, 3) 
Another highly significant landscape element which emerged from the eighteenth century 
preoccupation with the Picturesque (Caroline van Eck in J. Birksted 2000, 243) and 
which is represented by Walter Benjamin's iconic allegorical sign, the ruin, is further 
discussed here under 'Visual Metaphor and Allegory' [20]. 
ft has already been suggested that I. A. Richards's 'New Rhetoric' in The Philosophy 
of Rhetoric to some extent anticipates poststructuralist readings of texts in rhetorical 
terms as necessarily operating inside an ambiguity. In discussing semiology and rhetoric 
in Allegories of Reading (1979), Paul de Man senses a similar aporia between rhetorical 
figures and the grammar or syntax of a text. In assuming that semiology asks not of the 
meaning of words, but rather how they mean structurally, it has been assumed that 
rhetorically figural tropes are an aspect of syntax or structure (Paul de Man 1979, 5). He 
suggests that rhetoric associates with paradigmatic aspects of language, which of course 
is substitutive or metaphorical, but that this has paid insufficient attention to tropes and 
figures in a syntagmatic context. Paradigmatic approaches to language are metaphorical 
and substitutive, syntagmatic approaches contiguous and metonymic (Paul de Man 1979, 
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6). So it is the metonymic rather than the familiar metaphorical aspects of rhetoric which 
might repay exploration, a distinction made here in the later discussion of the metonymic 
and metaphorical implications in Libeskind's fenestration. 
This aporia between rhetoric and grammar, which demands some resolution, is 
echoed, de Man shows, in the inner characteristic of allegory and irony. Allegory and 
irony are major tropes within rhetoric and important, and indeed essential, elements of its 
typology. In 'The Rhetoric of Temporality' in Blindness and Insight (1971), de Man 
shows the gap between anteriority and some present as a form of hesitation between a 
past and a present, Janus-like on a temporal threshold, as the distinctive feature of both 
allegory and irony (paul de Man 1971, 222). Although for purposes of analysis it is useful 
to distinguish between the categories of rhetoric and that of allegory and irony, they are 
in effect, inseparable; allegory and irony relate to rhetoric by synecdoche. The 
postmodern building's announcement of itself as rhetorical speaking will be allegorical 
and ironic because of course the postmodern itself is recursive in time and acts 
indexically in Peirce's terms by the temporal 'touching' between past and present. 
Peirce's version of the sign as part symbol and part referent requiring the third element of 
interpretation as meaning must always get caught up in a temporal progression. As has 
already been pointed out, each new interpretation of the sign as 'meaning' then in turn 
demands its own interpretation and so on indefinitely into the infinite regress. This 
sequence of interpretations has to move 'forward' each time and therefore is bound to 
leave a 'trace' which is temporal. It is the gesture of that procession of signs across time 
which implicates the rhetorical in the sign, but not necessarily as allegory or irony. 
'The interpretation of the sign is not, for Peirce, a meaning but another sign; it is a 
reading, not a decodage, and this reading has, in its turn, to be interpreted by another 
sign, and so on ad infinitum. Peirce calls this process by means of which 'one sign 
gives birth to another' pure rhetoric, as distinguished from pure grammar, which 
postulates the possibility of unproblematic, dyadic meaning, and pure logic, which 
postulates the possibility of the universal truth of meanings.' (Paul de Man 1979,9) 
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The course of grammar, as distinct from rhetoric, is towards the syntagmatic, towards the 
metonymic and, indexically, towards narrative. Currently fashionable phrases such as 'the 
language of architecture' or 'the grammar of form' or Michael Fried's 'syntax of form' in 
relation to Anthony Caro's early sculpture are obfuscatory and remain unhelpful. Such 
phrases are of course themselves rhetorically inflected and are designed to persuade or 
convince. But they do not make the necessary distinctions between the paradigmatic and 
the syntagmatic in the opening of language emerging from the rhetorical self-
annunciation in the interpretation of the aesthetic object. Intriguingly, rhetorical turns 
such as 'the language of architecture' or 'the grammar of form' seem to be examples of 
the imposition of the poetic on the discursive, typical, as lakobson has suggested, of 
literary Modernism - the metaphoric overlaid on the metonymic. 
In citing Austin's perlocutionary language as the language of effect, de Man is 
suggestive of significant rhetorical consequences (paul de Man 1979, 8). What might 
emerge here is the conflation of Austin's 'felicitous' and 'infelicitous' with the 
allegorical and ironic presentation of aesthetic form as allegorically felicitous or 
ironically infelicitous. Gehry's own House, discussed in Chapter Seven, as a self-
conscious postmodern 'ruin' would be ironically infelicitous. 
The irresolution which hangs between metaphorical (rhetorical) and grammatical (or 
discursive) meaning that the beholder must be aware of, between connotation and 
denotation without which interpretation is 'blind', is the defining feature of the rhetorical 
moment. 
'Nor is this intervention part of the mini-text constituted by the figure which holds our 
attention only as long as it remains suspended and unresolved. I follow the usage of 
common speech in calling this semiological enigma 'rhetorical'. The grammatical 
model of the question becomes rhetorical not when we have, on the one hand, a literal 
meaning and on the other hand a figural meaning, but when it is possible to decide by 
grammatical or other linguistic devices which of the two meanings (that can be entirely 
incompatible) prevails. Rhetoric radically suspends logic and opens up vertiginous 
possibilities of referential aberration.' (Paul de Man 1979, 10) 
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This rejection of Aristotelian logic endorses the radical edge of Richard's 'New 
Rhetoric'. The rhetorical oscillation resides in de Man's verb 'prevails'. Either the 
building is rhetorically metaphorical, in which case it is showing, or it is, as it were, 
grammatically discursive and invites a narrative account of itself [21]. In actual fact and 
in practice of course, interpretation oscillates between a 'grammatical' or empirical 
account and description of the building and the figural interpretation which emanates 
from it. 
If the building can be read as a rhetorical 'text', displaying its figural tropes as 
'showing', then it immediately speaks in one way, in the light of its form but in another in 
its figuration which makes it rhetorical. This is a recurrent feature of postmodem 
architecture. The presence of rhetoric generates a problem of belief, given that the 
beholder is confronted by two discourses or 'codes'. The rhetorical code is doubly 
difficult because it is necessarily from behind the fan, despite its need for a public face 
for its 'showing'. 
'A rhetorical figure is a situation in which language means something other than 
what it says, a violation of the code. But lest that violation introduce a radical 
undecidability to linguistic situations, leading us to wonder how we could ever 
know whether language means what it appears to be saying, these violations are 
codified, as a repertoire of highly artificial and conventional devices .... The very 
notion of rhetorical effects - the possibility of metaphorical signification, for 
example - requires there to be a distinction between literal meaning and metaphorical 
meaning and hence the beginnings of a rhetorical code.' (1 Culler 1981, 46) 
The poststructural surge of interest in rhetoric as other-speaking has led to an even 
greater concern for the significance of metaphor as a fundamental attribute of the sign (1. 
Culler 1981, 209-100). Traditionally, metaphor was understood as part of rhetoric, one of 
its tropes, along with allegory, metonymy, synechdoche and so on. But metaphor has 
become the figure of figures, and in the form of allegory, a key postmodernistic trope. 
In the context here, postmodern architectural rhetoric has been characterized by the 
notion of theatricality, derived from Michael Fried's theory of objecthood. And that 
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theatricality has been powerfully expressed in the sculptural and gestural attributes of 
postmodern architecture, linking it with meaning which in turn implicates the constant 
dialogue between form and language. Lessing's conversation between image and text and 
then gesture as meaning in the eighteenth century, reverberates still into the postmodern. 
In Part Two, in the discussion of the manner in which the postmodern building signifies, 
poststructuraJist architecture is seen as a theatrical violation of the rational grid, 
especially in the form of the bend and the fold. The Modernist sanctity of the straight line 
and the right angle arranged in the contrasting masses of the horizontal and the vertical -
Corbusier's machine ethic - is traduced by the return of swing and movement, so that the 
Baroque becomes a significant postmodernjst precursor, and which locus classicus finds 
a notable theoretical exposition in Robert Venturi's Contradiction and Complexity in 
Architecture (1966). 
VISUAL METAPHOR AND ALLEGORY 
Fig7 
Metaphor has already been extensively 
dealt with in Chapter Two which 
established the metaphorical nature of the 
sign arising from the discussion of the 
semiotic significance of the work of 
Saussure and Peirce. Metaphor was also 
dealt with in Chapter Four in relation to the 
position of the analytical tradition in 
philosophy In regarding metaphor as 
cognitively non-propositional and therefore 
discursively and semantically unreliable. As 
a response it was proposed that since there 
is no 'language of architecture' (or of any of the other plastic arts) which might otherwise 
encapsulate architectural meaning, but only immanent and emergent language from 
architectural form, then that architectural meaning must reside in visual metaphor which 
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becomes linguistic when 'read' rhetorically by a beholder [Fig 7]. Charles Moore's 
Piazza d'Italia, New Orleans, is a conspicuous example of the tendency in early 
architectural postmodernism towards what is normally designated as New Historicism. 
The architectural conceit here is in an almost ludicrously exaggerated version of classical 
Romanesque complete with metal orders containing hidden lights and strident colour 
effects. The faces on the wall are of Moore himself. Perhaps no other early postmodern 
building exemplifies better with its faux historical references the capacity to become a 
version of Fried's theatricality and contrivance as architectural rhetoric. 
The insistence of poststructural ist theory in breaking out of this kind of iconographical 
autonomy has resulted in a resurgent interest in metaphor as the paradigmatic postmodern 
trope located within the rhetorical stance (J. Culler 1981, 210). In architectural terms, the 
rise of metaphor in postmodern architectural rhetoric against the dominance of metonymy 
in Modernist building design is very clear (C. Jencks 1981, 40-52). The basis of Charles 
Jencks's now famous 'double-coding' in The Language of Postmodern Architecture is of 
course the 'other-speaking' of ironic metaphor. Equally clearly, the essentially referential 
nature of metaphor is always suggestive of meaning. In Postmodernism, reference is 
through the semantic analogue as another version of 'other-speaking', whilst in 
Modernism, Louis Sullivan's dictum that form follows function (W. Curtis 1999, 47-49) 
resisted the possibility that building shape could or should produce meaning. In 
architecture, since there is no 'language of architecture', its metaphors must signify 
visually. It is therefore essential to establish which salient features unite linguistic and 
visual metaphor. 
It is hardly possible to give a full, comprehensive and historical account of metaphor 
since the field, which includes philosophical, literary and cultural theory, is so large. The 
present overview, apart from Aristotle, confines itself to the modem discussion of 
metaphor, particularly in the twentieth century revival of interest in rhetoric and metaphor 
generally. Equally, the discussion of allegory is largely modem. 
In Aristotle's scheme, metaphor is placed firmly within the rubric of rhetoric. Within 
the five main divisions of rhetoric, metaphor is placed under Elocutio with its 
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overarching sense of style (/exis; R. Latham 1990, 165). Metaphor falls under the figures 
and is further classified as trope in which words can mean other than their literal 
meaning. Figures are sub-divided into figures of thought as well as tropes. Figures of 
thought are large-scale tropes or schemes. Significantly, Aristotle characterizes allegory 
as a figure of thought (R. Latham ] 990, 178). In the Rhetoric during the discussion of 
metaphor under ' Style' (3.10), Aristotle identifies four kinds of metaphor, but 
concentrates mainly on the analogical form, which implies identity, where simile involves 
simply likeness (Aristotle 1991 , 236). His definition of metaphor as principally analogical 
is further defined in the Poetics. 'Metaphor is the application of an alien name by 
transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or by analogy, that is 
proportion.' (Aristotle 1997, XXI , 41) The mechanism of transference (the Greek root of 
the word 'metaphor') is juxtaposition (Northrop Frye 1957, 124), when likeness of image 
or sense migrates to an adjacent term showing difference, but at the same time, similarity. 
Instantly, as may become clearer, the duck-rabbit appears. 
Aristotle's account of analogical metaphor as being In proportion is clearly 
fundamentally important. It leads to the formulation that as A:B, so C:D and that also 
B:D and D:B. His example makes the point. 'Or again, as old age is to life, so is evening 
to day. Evening may therefore be called 'the old age of the day' , and old age, 'the 
evening of life', or in the phrase of Empedocles, ' life's setting sun.' (Aristotle 1997, 
XX 1, 41-2) Since metaphor was seen as an aspect of rhetoric and rhetoric involved the 
prosecution of a logical argument or case, the proportionality in metaphor was understood 
to be logical and helped to indicate the case. An abstraction is made concrete. Aristotle 
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says of metaphor in the Rhetoric ' . .. .it 
puts the subject before our eyes; for we 
should see things being done rather than 
imminent.' (Aristotle 1991, 236) 
Aristotle's appliance of proportion to 
metaphor represents an emphasis on its 
logical formulation, constrained by the 
demands of decorum and propriety. 
However much Aristotle invites the 
prudent use of metaphor in order to illustrate the nature of the argument during the 
adversarial use of the enthymeme as the basic confrontational weapon of rhetoric as 
logically forensic (R. Latham 1990, 65), metaphor insists on dissembling. Despite 
Aristotle's proportionality, metaphor, unconfined to rhetoric, remains a figure of 
ambivalence. Owen Barfield in Poetic Diction, suggested that the equivalence in 
metaphor may well be implicit within the context rather than being specified, and made 
all the more powerful for that (T. Hawkes 1972, Chap 5). In the sentence, 'The keel 
ploughed the deep', 'keel' is synechdochicaIIy attached as part of the implied ship whose 
progress is plough-like across the ocean, which in tum is metonymically linked to the 
earth of the field (D. Lodge 1977, 75-77). Within a context, this kind of implicature can 
be very powerful indeed. In Macbeth 111, 2, Macbeth says to his wife, 'Light thickens; 
and the crowl Makes wing to the rooky wood'. We know that the extraordinary metaphor 
'light thickens' refers to the darkening at the end of the day because that is when crows 
fly home. But we also know that what is implied beyond the equivalence of light fading 
and becoming opaque at dusk is that blood also thickens. So the metaphor 'light thickens' 
refers to in the context ofthe play the murder of Malcolm, and the further implication that 
the darkness falling as light thickens is a metaphorical presentiment of evil. In a similar 
visual metaphor, the sticking-plaster imagery of Libeskind's Jewish Museum [Fig 8] 
suggests that the body of the building, 'body' being metaphorical, has in some sense 
'suffered'. Beyond that, like 'light thickens', is the metaphorical suggestion of wounding 
and the metonymic association of the Museum's 'body' with the inherently tragic 
element of Jewish history. The elusive 'presence' of 'the tragic' in the Jewish Museum is 
discussed in Part Two. It is important to note here the relation between metaphorical and 
metonymic meaning. Paul de Man's submission cited earlier that in fact Marcel Proust's 
figural imagery in the Recherche is metonymic first and metaphorical in terms of identity 
second, also applies to the architectural example of 'sticking-plaster' fenestration. The 
connection of the fenestration with the whole building as 'body' is part-to-whole, 
'touching' and therefore contiguous and consequently metonymic. The metaphorical 
connotation of 'wounding', which is one clue to the condition of allegorical loss and 
mourning, comes second and reverberates as the tragic presence within the context of the 
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whole building, much as Owen Barfield had suggested about the larger significance of 
the context in linguistic metaphor. 
The most comprehensive account of the relation between metaphor and metonymy is 
by Roman Jakobson in 'Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic 
Disturbance'. lakobson establishes the bipolar opposition between the metaphorical and 
metonymic poles of language from the study of aphasic loss of function in stroke patients. 
The resulting dysfunction is bipolar in the sense that the loss of function either affects 
metonymic and metaphorical language use but not both and that the loss of one is 
compensated for by the dominance of the other. From Saussure, lakobson suggests that 
metaphor is a version of langue (discussed in Chapter Two) and involves selection or 
substitution, whilst metonymy relates to parole and the process of combination (D. Lodge 
1977, 74). This bipolarity can be further overlaid by the antiphonal nature, respectively, 
of the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic previously discussed here under 'Continuity and 
Discontinuity' in Chapter Two. In aphasia, the loss of one faculty typically produces the 
dominance of the other. Paradigmatic language use involves the code rather than the 
message itself and vice-versa for syntagmatic language use. 'Paradigmatic' is not used by 
Jakobson to mean 'model' in any sense (D. Lodge 1977, 74-77). So 'code' is the 
equivalent of grammatical and syntactic selection, whilst 'message' involves the 
arrangement and relation of words and terms appropriate for the meaning, the one dealing 
in similarity or equivalence and the other in contiguity (R. lakobson 1956, 76). Thus 
poetic language as 'selection' is opposed to discursive language as 'arrangement'. In the 
plastic arts, Surrealism is opposed to Cubism and so on. Always the bipolarity is between 
metaphorical meaning and metonymic association. In a later version, lakobson opposes 
'referential' language use to 'metalinguistic' language use which relate to metonymy and 
metaphor respectively, or discursive and realist versus poetic and figural. Famously, 
Jakobson says, 'The poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of 
selection into the axis of combination. ' (R. Jakobson in T. Sebeok Ed 1960, 358, original 
emphasis) In other words, creative language use imposes the poetic on the realistic, as in 
lames Joyce. However, Paul de Man, in speaking of Proust, shows that what was 
previously thought to be exclusively metaphorical, is in fact preceded by metonymy. This 
is precisely what is found here in the discussion of Libeskind's fenestration; it is the 
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metonymic association which leads to the larger metaphorical meaning behind it. As 
insightful and influential as Jakobson's model remains, its principal drawback is that the 
underlying oppositional model has been largely superseded by the procedures of 
Poststructuralism. For example, Jacques Derrida in 'The Outside and the Inside' in Of 
Grammatology, suggests that a frame of reference, that is, being a 'frame' by its very 
outsideness, moves forward ,in time at moments of supersedure and becomes the 'inside' 
of the new episteme (J. Derrida 1998,30-44). Derrida's sustained critique of Saussure is 
based on the limitations which Saussure's langue I parole polarity has produced, notably 
in Jakobson. Derrida's own model of external I internal framing is not bipolar because it 
implicates time, and does emphasize the intimate relationship and co-dependence of 
apparently opposed imperatives. 
Paul de Man's reversal of the primacy of metaphor in Proust in favour of that selfsame 
metaphorical attribute as being dependent on metonymy also emphasizes the inevitable 
reciprocity rather than polarity between the two (1. Culler 1981, 222). In terms of visual 
metaphor, the primacy of metonymy contiguously associates two or more elements which 
can secondarily produce ontological or existential metaphorical significance - Aristotle's 
'identity'. Ernst Gombrich's piece 'Visual Metaphor', works essentially by deriving 
narrative pre-texts from visual simile. Or in the case of architecture, Gombrich suggests 
that classical columns were visual metaphors for the human body or trees and that the 
representation of the tree trunk in the form of a column was essentially a simile (E. 
Gombrich 'The Language of Architecture' in E. Gombrich 1996, 228-234). Images are 
deciphered according to the supporting classical narrative source such as Ovid in 
Renaissance iconography, much as Lessing intimated in the Laocoon. However, it is 
visual metaphor rather than simile which draws in the other-speaking of allegory and 
which is required for the interpretation of postmodem, and particularly poststructuralist 
architecture. And in architectural semantics, visual metaphor entails the palimpsest-like 
relation of metaphor inscribed on metonymy as another version of the palimpsest, 
established by Craig Owens as the fundamental mechanism and imperative of 
Postmodemism. 
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It was Gombrich who established 
the canonical status of the duck-
rabbit [Fig 9] in Art and Illusion by 
saying of it that we cannot experience 
alternative readings at the same time. 
The impossibility Gombrich refers to 
is the inability to address singularly a 
visual oxymoron like the duck-rabbit; two things in one thing at the same time. The 
ambiguity in metaphors involves, similarly, dealing with two things in one in which 
meaning oscillates back and forth like the rabbit and the duck. In a metaphor, if this 
oscillation ' inside' the fi gure or conceit becomes temporal , then potentially, the fi gure 
addresses the allegorical. W.J. Mitchell in writing about meta-pictures, pictures about 
pictures, of which the duck-rabbit is an example, maintains that meta-pictures are' ... a 
kind of summary image ... that encapsulates an entire episteme, a theory of knowledge.' 
(W.J. Mitchell 1994,49) Speaking further of meta-pictures, Mitchell says: 
They are not merely epistemological models, but ethical, political, and aesthetic 
'assemblages' that allow us to observe observers. In their strongest forms, they 
don't merely serve as illustrations to theory ; they picture theory. 
In an important sense here, if 'three-dimensional' meta-pictures like the architectural 
'ruin', say, of Frank Gehry's original House made by the new postmodern addition which 
then becomes inevitably a duck-rabbit in metaphor, really 'pictures theory' , then the 
theory it pictures must be ' inside' it as a form of immanence; as the emergence of 
language. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 's interest in metaphor as an aspect of ordinary language use has 
already been noted. He 
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was also fascinated by 
the duck-rabbit in the 
Philosophical 
Investigations and drew 
his own schematic of it [Fig 10] in order to avoid making either duck or rabbit life-like 
(W.l. Mitchell 1994, 50). Wittgenstein's schematic representation of the image served to 
unsettle psychological accounts of it, and render it philosophically speculative. It 
produces speculation on the relation between 'inner' language games deployed to deal 
with the problem of interpreting external visual phenomena. Wittgenstein seems to say 
that it is not a case of external visual phenomena being represented by 'inner speech', but 
rather that aspects of interpretation of images as a mental operation can only be 
conducted under the auspices of language, in which case they can be made sense of (W.J. 
Mitchell 1994, 52-3). Even so, Wittgenstein's schematic is in one sense designed to test 
the anomaly that although the image is composed oxymoronically as two things in one, 
we see them sequentially one at a time. Although visually we see one, either duck or 
rabbit, mentally we know of the attached existence of the other. The metaphorical relation 
is then once more metonymic. In the absence of one 'pole', as lakobson would represent 
the metaphor I metonymy aspect of the duck-rabbit, although absent as part, it is present 
in the whole. Equally in verbal metaphor, the ship I plough is the equivalent of the visual 
duck-rabbit. What the metaphorical nature of the metonymic parts of both verbal and 
visual metaphor achieves is to allow the reader or beholder to maintain contact between 
the 'presence' pole and the 'absent-yet-present' pole. This may be relatively trivial in the 
case of a duck-rabbit, but when metaphorical absence behind, say, architectural form is 
for example, 'the tragic', then it assumes a considerable existential significance. The 
duck/rabbit is in itself is a powerful indicator of the allegorical figure of absence and 
presence. 
The ambiguity at the centre of metaphor caused by the existence of two terms which 
imply each other in their difference, I.A. Richards called vehicle and tenor in The 
Philosophy of Rhetoric (A. Ortony Ed 1988, 3). Richards is clear that meaning can only 
emerge from a context: 
, .... any part of a discourse, in the last resort, does equally what it does only because 
the other parts of the surrounding, uttered or unuttered, discourse, and its conditions, 
are what they are.' (LA. Richards 1936, 10) 
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The insistence on context is highly relevant as it also is in the case of visual metaphor as 
the example of Libeskind's fenestration shows. Richards characterized the 'poles' of 
metaphor as tenor and vehicle where 'tenor' is taken to be the underlying idea to be 
transferred and the vehicle is the analogical equivalent or ground. (So as darkness 
approaches as tenor, so light thickens as vehicle.) Richards indicates clearly that the 
metaphorical meaning involves the interaction of both. 
' .... the co-presence of the vehicle and tenor results in a meaning (to be clearly 
distinguished from the tenor) which is not attainable without their interaction.' 
(LA. Richards 1936, 100 original emphasis) 
Without the simultaneous presence of both at the same time, like the duck-rabbit, the 
third implied meaning from the interaction of the two cannot emerge (P. Ricoeur 1978, 
81). And it is the context which allows the interpreted meaning to be propitious as 
Aristotle intended (C. Brooke-Rose 1958, 208). Thus in the present example, light 
thickening and suggesting blood cannot emerge without the context of the play Macbeth. 
Architecturally, the visual metaphors that function within the building'S context means 
that the architectural context, which will be much greater than simply visual, needs 
further explication and is dealt with in Part Two. The basic significance of the vehicle 
and tenor formulation applies both linguistically and visually. In the fenestration 
example, the building as 'body' acts as the equivalent to the linguistic tenor and the 
transference to windows as sticking plaster is the equivalent vehicle. The interaction 
metaphorically generates 'wounding' or 'the tragic'. 
The issue of order is important. Under Richard's scheme, the tenor precedes the 
vehicle. However, Owen Barfield in Poetic Diction suggested that the vehicle might be 
stated and the tenor, as the originating idea, might be only implied. ('Light thickens' 
implies the dusk which is only hinted at by the flight of the crow.) The possibility of 
ambiguity is at the heart of the metaphorical process, almost so that when it ceases to 
dissemble, then it loses what Aristotle called 'vividness' and thence our attention (T. 
Hawkes, 1972, Chap 5). 
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'Instead of saying that A is like B or that A is B, the poet simply talks about B, 
without inaking any overt reference to A at all. You know, however, that he intends 
A all the time, or, better say that he intends an A; for you may not have a very clear 
idea of what A is and even if you have got an idea, somebody else may have a 
different one. This is generally called symbolism.' (0. Barfield 1962, 107) 
The further symbolism of the Jewish Museum's fenestration is expressed in long, 
extremely narrow windows which from the outside resemble slashes. By symbolic 
implication, then, as Barfield intimates about linguistic metaphor, the external metal 
cladding of the building becomes, metaphorically, skin. 
VISUAL METAPHOR 
Barfield's subjunctive 'may', hovering between vehicle and tenor, makes metaphor, 
philosophically at least, non-propositional. However, it is inescapable and has to be re-
emphasized that in the present example of Daniel Libeskind's fenestration in the Jewish 
Museum, the symbolic connotation of 'wounding' can only be derived from the reading 
of visual metaphor, and a discursively analytical approach would fail to distinguish 
between what Paul de Man characterizes as 'Blindness and Insight' (P. de Man 1983, 
102-141) [22]. The characteristic and salient features of visual metaphor are therefore 
the metaphorical foundations of postmodern architectural meaning. 
It has already been suggested that a traditional iconographical approach which 
typically deals with the visual image as simile, leading to a narrative account of content 
and not immanence, will be of limited value in figuring postmodern architecture. 
However, it should be noted that since postmodem architecture is recursive, ironically or 
parodically revisiting earlier forms in time, an element of iconography is actually 
essential. Thus Zaha lIadid's typical use, for example, of steel and glass, both mimics and 
acknowledges the foundational importance of the Bauhaus. Or Peter Eisenman's House 
I-X sequence both acknowledges and subverts with what might be called 'structural 
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Cubism', the Purism of Corbusier's early villas. A recurrent feature of postmodem 
architectural semantics is its recursion to prior historical form. 
What are the salient features of visual metaphor as might apply to postmodem 
architecture? The following sections are suggestive of those key characteristics. 
Salient Features of Visual Metaphor 
1. Linguistic metaphors can be literally falsified. Juliet is not the sun (W. Lycan 
2000, 210). Visual metaphor cannot be falsified because it has no literal content or 
narrative. The metaphorical relation between visual elements is arbitrary and 
'visually subjunctive'; arbitrary because the link between the window and the 
sticking plaster either convinces the audience of Fish's 'interpretive community' 
or it doesn't. Visual metaphors as well as being literally beyond falsification are 
also incapable of verification in its analytical sense precisely because of their 
metaphorically subjunctive nature. 
2. Visual metaphor involves the association of at least two, and probably more, 
things which because associated visually, are necessarily contiguous because a 
comparison based on similarity or substitution is, especially in imagery, bound to 
involve juxtaposition or 'touch'. This makes the initial yoking of the two different 
but similar elements metonymic. In visual metaphor, the elements literally touch, 
like 'sticking-plaster' and 'skin'. Juxtaposition reinforces similarity as contiguity. 
'Descriptively, all metaphors are similes.' (Northrop Frye 1957, 123-4) Even 
highly abstract linguistic substitution such as Keats's 'Beauty is truth, truth 
beauty' (Ode To A Grecian Urn), like visual substitution, depends on metonymic 
'touch' in the juxtaposition (C. Jencks 1969, 13). 
3. The visual sign is, in lakobson's terms and in origin, syntagmatic (metonymic) 
and not paradigmatic (metaphorical) because it requires the juxtaposition of 
'touch'. To be associated, visual elements, in order to become metaphorical, must 
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be in the same context and be contiguous (D. Lodge 1977, 80-81). The 
syntagmatic is non-substitutive and associative; that is, metonymic. 
4. The visual sign may be initially based on the simile, and the vehicle, say the 
window, may be a sticking-plaster by resemblance, and would remain simile-like 
if there were no further or larger context to make the simile become fully 
metaphorical, as in 'wounding'. Many examples of the architectural simile exist in 
Late-Modernist architectural style (C. Jencks 1981, 74-5) such as the Foster 
'Gherkin'. The simile in Late-Modernism is discussed here in 'The Architectural 
Trace' in Part Two. 
5. Visual architectural metaphor will tend to be based on simile and metonym when 
first encountered. Aristotle's metaphors of proportion, immediately perceived as 
such, will apply largely to linguistic and analogical similarity (A. Ortony 1988, 
188-200). The shift in visual metaphor from part to whole is in proportion to the 
shift from metonym to metaphor; from A as 8 to A is B. 
6. Architectural metaphor as visual form will have neither narrative nor subject as 
referential meaning. 'Meaning' in an architectural context must reside in the 
public functioning of the building (R. Patterson Ed 2000, 66-75). The cultural 
function (belief, commemoration and so on) determines how the building signifies 
and indeed may change through time. Sacred buildings, for example, such as 
churches may become redundant and be converted to secular use as apartments. 
The building's use provides the context for its symbolic significance. 
Significantly, the redundant church becomes 'de-allegorized'. An apartment at its 
east end would no longer allegorise on light, hope, birth and rebirth, nor the west 
end represent any longer death, resignation and darkness. This social and cultural 
context is discussed further in Part Two. The large, holistic allegorical 
significance is inflected by the building'S metonymic and metaphorical tropes. 
Part to whole, the visual metaphors as 'significant form' suggest and associate 
with holistic meaning which in the example of commemorative architecture may 
be allegorical. Metonymic and metaphorical visual tropes as parts oscillate with 
and between holistic meaning. Within rhetoric, this oscillation, which drives 
meaning and significance, is between the tropic and the figural; between specific 
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'empirical' detailing suggestive of metaphor and the larger figural meaning of the 
whole building as an abstract idea like allegory. 
7. As' allegorical, the building will 'contain' commentary and other-speaking or 
par/ante which is an aspect of rhetorical enunciation or 'showing', and which is 
'instigated' by visual metaphor. The allegorical itself is not necessarily visual, but 
rather, as temporal, conducts a figural conversation between past and present. 
8. Visual metaphor is characterized by what in conversation would be called 
implicature. That is, something is said 'as if it meant something else (W. Lycan 
2000, 190). H.P. Grice's theory of implicature has a series of rules designed to 
avoid the ambiguity of implied meaning such as 'Do not say what you believe to 
be false'. Nevertheless, says Grice, there are grammatically acceptable sentences 
which insist on defying the rules. 'There's the door' literally indicates the door, 
but in speaking 'as if, it implies the imperative 'You should leave' without 
actually saying so, and despite the fact that 'There's the door' is not 
conventionally metaphorical (H.P. Grice 1989,50). Metonymic visual detailing in 
buildings such as sticking-plaster fenestration is rather like 'There's the door'. It 
implicates a secondary meaning without actually stating it. The equivalent of the 
conversation in which 'There's the door' occurs in the architectural context is the 
conversation between building and beholder. Sticking-plasters and gashes as 
windows are also clear examples of Austin's 'infelicitous', discussed earlier, and 
in wh ich the announcement of the 'hereby' by the architect is almost tangible. 
9. If metaphorical or metonymic 
transfer is to be effective when 
A:B, then some of the salient 
features of B must be in A. 
Following Barfield and Grice, 
the analogical salient features 
of B in A may be implied, or A 
itself may be implied by the 
salient features of B, as ' keel ' 
implies the unstated 'ship' . 
Libeskind's metallic exterior to the Jewish Museum as 'skin' has consistently 
exposed riveting around the windows where the main panels as cladding are 
'invisibly' attached. The immediate effect is one of 'suturing'. Then, if you see 
'stitches', you also see 'skin', in tum allowing the wounding connotation. The 
attributes of one are associated with the other, again initially, as a metonymic 
transfer. 
These 'mechanics' of the metaphorical transference from visual form to meaning, which 
is linguistically resolved, are of fundamental significance for the semantics of non-
representative form and configuration. In the case of Michael Graves Portland Oregon 
Building [Fig 11], the spectator needs to pick up on the classical referencing. The front of 
the building presents two 'fluted' columns which might or might not be ionic. Along both 
sides is a heavily contrived frieze confirming the classical inference. However, the 
structure itself is a perfect geometrical cube, referring to the function and form imperative 
of Modernism. In other words, it refers to its own source in the Modernist movement as 
much to deliberately phoney classicism. In this way, it folds back in time towards its own 
origin and towards the allegorical. 
Allegory 
The relation between metonymy and metaphor in allegory itself, that is, allegory as the 
fundamental postmodernist impulse, is obviously crucial (C. Owens in D. Prezioni Ed 
1998,317-20). [Fig 11] The allegorical nature of the postmodern was discussed here in 
Chapter Two. Jakobson proposed that poetic Romanticism correlates with metaphor and 
that it is metonymy which engages with the more modernist prosodic possibilities of 
Realism in the novel. When metaphor is imposed on metonymy, what results is the 
'poetic function'. There is of course a further palimpsest here, two things in one like the 
duck-rabbit, but in this instance separated by time with metonymy as prior. There is also 
an implicit notion of writing, particularly as 'writing over', not as the physical act of 
reworking a text, but as the imposition of one sense of a text on another. The 
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superimposition of one text on another as a concept rather than a physical process, is the 
imposition of a secondary meaning on a primary one; almost an act of theft. certainly one 
of appropriation (C. Owens 1998, 317). The contiguity between the two as 'touching' 
suggests· metonymy, and the substitution of one meaning for another, implicates 
metaphor. It has already been established that the nature of postmodern culture is 
recursive; that after Greenberg and Fried and the end of the Avant-Garde, the only way 
forward was backwards towards an ironic and subversive revisiting of Modernism, seen 
powerfully in the appropriation of early Modernist forms by the architectural 
poststructuralism, for example, of Rem Koolhaas and Zaha Hadid. This constant seeking 
after contact with the Modem by the postmodern is part of the contiguity or 'touch' 
between an irretrievable past sought by a retrospective postmodern present constantly 
searching for its source, origin and beginning in its progenitor, Modernism itself. The 
sense of the elegiac emerging from this reach back into past time is an absolutely 
essential aspect of the allegorical which is foundational to Postmodernism. As well as 
tracing the rise of allegory as a pre-eminent postmodern trope, this section also considers 
allegory as 'other speaking' and assesses the implications of Charles Baudelaire's 
sardonic treatment of the nature of irony and Walter Benjamin's important work on the 
significance of the ruin and its implications for postmodern allegory, architectural and 
otherwise. 
However, the normal contact between the two, one being metonymic (Modernist) and 
the other being metaphorical (Postmodernism), is immediate and simultaneous, as in the 
case of the oxymoron and duck-rabbit. But in allegory, the contact between the two is 
distanced and separated by time because the allegorical constantly seeks the temporal. 
Allegory must oscillate ceaselessly between a present now and an absent past; ' .... 
throughout its history it has functioned in the gap between a present and a past which, 
without allegorical reinterpretation, might have remained foreclosed. A conviction of the 
remoteness of the past, and a desire to redeem it for the present - these are its two most 
fundamental impulses.' (c. Owens 1998, 325) The very impossibility of redeeming the 
past whilst it remains its presiding impulse and 'desire' makes allegory elegiac and 
always within the vicinity of the tragic. The impossibility of the redemption of a lost past 
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also accounts for the hortatory and didactic nature of the allegorical. We should also add 
that as an act of reinterpretation and appropriation, allegory also reinvents what it 
purloins, and in that sense is always some kind of commentary. Often that commentary, 
which approximates to a kind of historical attitude, is ironic or parodic as in postmodem 
architecture. Baudelaire, in 'On the Essence of Laughter' (C. Baudelaire 1964, 147-165) 
discusses the satirical nature of irony and Paul de Man links it indissolubly to allegory (P. 
de Man 1996, 208-228). Allegory does not simply proffer some pre-text as narrative 
which lies behind the image and gesture as Lessing assumed, but is disposed towards an 
anxiety of discourse, because of its imperative to convince the beholder, almost as a 
series of sententious moral observations. There is no doubt that this has been a principal 
cause of the critical disapproval of allegory at the opening of Romanticism until its 
revival in the twentieth century CW. Benjamin 1977, 160-163). 
Allegory as a trope, maintaining the distinction between it and Craig Owens's version 
of 'the allegorical' as an impulse or imperative, fell into disrepute and disapprobation 
largely at the hands of Coleridge in England. In effect, the primacy of allegory through 
the Middle Ages, into the Renaissance and Baroque periods and on into eighteenth 
century Enlightenment was overthrown both in German criticism and in Britain by the 
Romantic sensibility. What came to replace allegory was the symbol. This revolution in 
taste has been exhaustively documented (R. Welleck and A. Warren 1973, 186-191). 
Nevertheless, the nature of that debate remains essential for an appreciation of the 
characteristics of the allegorical. It was Coleridge who produced the fullest theory of the 
symbol in the Biographia Literaria and The Statesman's Manual, both issued within the 
context of the influence of Goethe and Schelling (I.A. Richards 1960, 242). Goethe had 
written: 
'There is a great difference between a poet's seeking the particular from the general 
and his seeing the general in the particular. The former gives rise to allegory, where 
the particular serves only as an instance or example of the general; the latter, however, 
is the true nature of poetry: the expression of the particular without any thought of, 
or reference to, the general. Whoever grasps the particular in all its vitality also grasps 
the general, without being aware of it, or only becoming aware of it a later stage.' 
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(Quoted in W. Benjamin 1977. 161) 
The effectiveness of Goethe's proposition here is in the chiasmic opposition ('seeking the 
particular from the general and his seeing the general in the particular'). In Coleridge this 
becomes a characterization of the symbol which is ' .... characterized by a translucence of 
the special [the species] in the individual. and of the general [genus] in the 
special. ... above all. by the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal.' 
(Welleck and Warren 1973, 189) The use of the term 'translucence' inferring 
transparency and the passage of light and illumination, is in stark contrast to Spenser's 
famous description of allegory as 'darke conceit' (Spenser's Preface to The Fairie 
Queene J.C. Smith and E. de Selincourt, Eds 1983) [23]. Goethe's representation of 
allegory as the specific being part of the general, of course makes the relation 
synechdochal, and makes the particular an instance of the general. The symbol will fire 
instantaneously where allegory always has a temporal gap between the allegorical figure 
and its prior reference in which there is an implied commentary. thus requiring some 
element of either implicit or explicit exegesis. Edward Honig, whose own book Dark 
Conceit (1959) was an important milestone in the restoration of allegory and titled from 
Spenser's Preface, characterizes allegory thus: ' .... allegory. a more extensive figure that 
lends itself to narrative. comes to be known for its hortatory and prosaic qualities.' (E. 
Honig 1959. 4) The Romantic Imagination becomes intolerant of allegory's moral 
exegesis in favour of the instant substitution found in the symbol and which resulted from 
Coleridge's own theory of the Imagination as distinct from the Fancy (I.A. Richards 
1960, 242). But the Romantic insistence on instantaneity. met again later in Greenberg 
and Fried's Modernism, fails to acknowledge the constant search in the allegory for a past 
which remains elusively irrecoverable. and the source of its indelible sadness (W. 
Benjamin 1977. 66). It might then speculatively be said that the allegorical imperative of 
Postmodernism is itself an attempt at the resurrection of the irredeemable. albeit 
parodically and ironically [24]. Then the gaudy quality of early postmodern historicist 
architecture takes on the figural sadness of the clown. In the revolutionary fervour of the 
Romantic Imagination. the symbol. with its instantaneous metonymic contact between 
image and concept. embraced the possibility of the sublime in nature. while allegory 
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metaphorically dallied in a past landscape in which the artificial in the form of the ruin 
postured in the presentness of the Picturesque (Caroline van Eck in J. Birksted Ed, 2000, 
247). 
Although Craig Owens in his foundational text is justified in selecting allegory's 
temporality and the forlorn imperative towards the redemption of the past as nostalgic 
empathy as two of its principal characteristics, it also always also demonstrates the 
attribute of 'other-speaking'. In another key work in the twentieth century reinstatement 
of allegory, Angus Fletcher in Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode (1964) 
represents allegory thus: 'In the simplest terms, allegory says one thing and means 
another.' (A. Fletcher 1964, 2) In many ways, this remains allegory's supreme quality 
and one to which the instantaneity of the symbol cannot aspire. It demands some 
discussion. Other-speaking is most obviously represented by irony. But allegory is not 
necessarily ironic as speaking otherwise, whereas irony implies not only something 
different or 'other' within the metaphor, but a directly opposite meaning from that 
depicted or spoken. What is said or depicted and what equally is implied as a form of 
'doubling', rather like Charles Jencks's architectural 'double-code' (C. Jencks 1981, 6-8), 
comes from the traditions of classical rhetoric. The Greek origin of the word 'allegory' is 
in two parts; allos meaning 'other' and agoreuein or 'speaking in public'. Producing a 
coded message where a speech said one thing and meant another for those in a position to 
recognize and receive the double meaning as literally 'speaking other', was an instance of 
metaphorical rhetoric. This form of discourse, which as an oxymoron is both 
conspicuously public and deliberately misleading, and is at the same time dramatically 
private is known as allegoria (F. Orton 1994, 157). Allegory's capacity to dissemble 
about an existing and therefore by definition, prior, text by a coded disguise is allegoresis 
(M. Quilligan 1979, 97). The process of allegoresis is clearly in part exegetical, and in 
that sense has an imperative towards text as writing (W. Benjamin 1977, 175-6). 'Text' 
may of course include visual forms such as architecture or painting where visual 
configuration confers meaning as immanent language from the form. The notion of 
allegory as an extended series of metaphors, which then represent a 'figure' as part of a 
'scheme', is Quintillian's (Oratoria VIII vi, in 1. McQueen 1970,48-9). The very notion 
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of linked or extended metaphors implies the linguistic in allegory, even in visual form as 
previously suggested here. It is the recognition of the figure in visual metaphorical form 
which brings a change of meaning. And the 'figure' arises from the reference to the 
originating source or pre-text. The 'figure' in an architectural context is the accumulation 
of visual metaphor, both external and internal which as synechdochal tropes relate the 
parts to a consistent aesthetic whole. Naturally, in allegory as language, the originating 
text is revealed, and the subtext or allegorical 'other meaning', concealed. So the 
Paradise Lost of John Milton's poem is not only a biblical paradise in its source, but it 
also 'comments' as a subtext on the loss of the Republican ideal in the face of the 
Restoration of the Monarchy (Tom Paulin, The Guardian, November 19th, 2005). And 
Frank Gehry's own Santa Monica House, for example, comments on the 'ruin' of the 
original shingle house by the impositions of modernity and is discussed at greater length 
in Part Two. 
The sense of a figural unfolding in which the beholder becomes increasingly open to 
and aware of the concatenation offigural parts within a larger metaphorical whole, brings 
the spectator to the threshold of the allegorical. But whereas Milton's subtext of 
mourning among the perceived follies of a restored monarchy is carefully concealed, in 
an architectural context, the 'clues' must be empirically there as part of the physical 
structure in the case of the building. The concealment here is in the relation between the 
parts which doubles up the meaning. The architectural threshold referred to here is 
plainly not the literal entrance to the building, although that in itself has fascinating 
Janus-like possibilities. The threshold to the architectural meaning is a figural doubling. 
That doubling (Jencks's 'double-code', Baudelaire's 'dedoublement') is part of the 
palimpsest-like nature of postmodernist reference. The frame of that reference governs 
what is 'inside' the allegorical. Inside the allegorical frame will be those elements 
inimitable to allegorical experience. The essence of allegory lies in memory and 
remembrance and mourning for, and loss of, some valued aspect of past time constantly 
sought in the tragic frame of redemption. The photograph, as both Barthes and Frederick 
Jameson have pointed out is, in being just a banal memento, the gatekeeper between past 
and present and as such the perfect cipher of the postmodern. Its very banality in 
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capturing some ordinary moment of a treasured past gives it the intense nostalgia of the 
aHegorical. 
Equa))y, a condition of the aHegorical is that its figural imagery becomes language in a 
didactic commentary on its origin. The beholder's response to the building has to be one 
of perception and recognition of the doubling [14]. The initial confrontation obviously 
involves the appearance of the exterior of the building. It may hold important prompts as 
Libeskind's Berlin Museum demonstrates and as is also the case with the church and 
cathedral. (The symbolic significance of the church is discussed in Part Two.) The 
exterior may indeed be criticaHy important and sufficient in itself to invoke the 
allegorical which is the case in Gehry's Nederlanden Building in Prague. 
In his section 'Allegory and Trauerspiel' in The Origins of German Tragic Drama, 
Walter Benjamin cites the ruin as the archetypal signifier of the allegorical. The ruin 
'naturally' symbolizes the temporal oxymoron of the past as an actual physical presence, 
although its existential condition is one of absence. The ruin, as either authentic or folly, 
becomes, as it were, the paradigm of decay. 
'The word 'history' stands written on the countenance of nature in the character of 
transience. The allegorical physiognomy of the nature-history, which was put on stage 
in the Trauerspie/, is present in reality in the form of the ruin. In the ruin history has 
physically merged into the setting. And in this guise history does not assume the 
process of an eternal life so much as that of irresistible decay. Allegory therefore 
declares itself to be beyond beauty. Allegories are, in the realm ofthoughts, what ruins 
are in the realm ofthings.' (W. Benjamin 1977, 177-8) 
In architectural terms, Frank Gehry's House immediately assumes a prominent theoretical 
position as a manifestation of 'ruin' and is given added poignancy by the fact that ruins 
are usually architectural. In a wider sense, the recursive nature of Postmodernism, which 
reveals itself as historicist revisiting, makes what it visits and historically emerges from, 
in this case, a site of conceptual ruin. The postmodern haunts the ruins of Modernism 
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both as source and continuum; both part of the Modernism of modernity and a subversion 
of it. 
Of course, what is ruined by the literal decay of the ruin as a remnant is an ideal beauty 
compromised by time, so that ruins become memento mori. In a sense, the ideal becomes 
ruined by the reality of decay. Kant's account of the beautiful in The Critique of Pure 
Reason is dependent on judgements of taste arising from the understanding united with 
the imagination (1. Derrida 1987, 70-71). However, Kant also addresses the problem of 
the parergon in relation to the beautiful. The parergon is a form of supplement or addition 
and raises the difficulty of whether it is then extrinsic rather than intrinsic to the beautiful 
object. As an example, Kant speaks of the drapery of a classical statue as a parergon. Is 
the drapery an essential quality of the piece or rather a kind of external adornment? The 
drapery then might supplement the statue but as an hors d'oeuvre (1. Derrida, 57). 
What we might expect from this in respect of postmodern architecture is the addition 
of historicist traces, particularly on the outside, which act as rhetorical adornment, self-
consciously and parodically applied, as in Michael Graves's Portland, Oregon building 
with its 'stick-on' pseudo-classical ornamentation signifying as a supplementary and very 
knowing parergon. And of course, what the 'ergon' or essence is, stripped of its 
postmodernist accoutrements, is nothing less than a version of Modernism. The historicist 
nature of the parergon, or supplementary adornment, relates the postmodern building to a 
Modernist past 'ruined' by time. The building then becomes vibrantly ironic in 'saying' 
one thing whilst implying its opposite, that is, its residual Modernism in the sense of the 
postmodern as being part of the modem. 
From the moment that the ironic appears, it becomes difficult to separate it from the 
sardonic. It is a recurrent feature of postmodern architecture that its palimpsest between 
itself and its historicist past is in some sense a form almost of mockery, and that 
somewhere in the postmodernist historicist detail there is an echo of laughter. Although 
allegory and irony share the same structure of saying one thing, but meaning another (P. 
de Man 1996, 209), their respective imperatives towards the tragic and laughter require 
some reconciliation. 
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De Man acknowledges Baudelaire as the innovator of modernist irony (P. de Man, 
174). Baudelaire's essay in The Painter of Modem Life about irony - 'On the Essence of 
Laughter' deals with the disconcerting circumstance of the man who trips and falls. What 
the spectator should feel, which is a concern for the plight of the man who stumbled and 
fell, is overwhelmed by the irresistible impulse to laugh. In this moment of 
Schadenfreude, the potentially tragic invokes the opposite condition of the sardonic 
(Charles Baudelaire 1964, 149). The implication is that the fallen condition as a result of 
the biblical Fall is what Baudelaire might want to call 'the heroism of modem life'. The 
sardonic observer must himself fall. It is only in metaphorically 'falling' that the modem 
man recognizes his in authenticity and comes to laugh at it, and in doing so, laughs at 
himself. The man who has stumbled and fallen then becomes doubled ('dedoublement') 
into the authentic and the inauthentic (C. Baudelaire 154, de Man 1996, 214). As well as 
the allegorical, there is a key sense of chiasmus here. What enters as the comic in a 
figural sense exits as the tragic. In chiasmus, the relationship ABBA runs (R. Latham 
1990, 33). Thus the comic [laughter] in reality is tragic [fall] and the tragic as fall is 
comic and produces laughter. This kind of metamorphosis applies to postmodem 
architecture. What, for example, may appear in Libeskind's Jewish Museum as an oddly 
comic 'sticking-plaster' window, ironically implicates the tragic sense of 'wounding' and 
allegorizes between the dialectical opposition of the two. In much of early postmodem 
architecture, the theatricality of its punning and doubling takes the form of 'loud' 
historical referencing. This is the element of 'clowning' concealing the elegiac, but 
behind the rhetoric of self-annunciation is the also concealed ruin of history; a shift from 
major to minor (S. Langer 1953, 27); the sardonic laughter at the deceived spectator; the 
gaudy ironic parergon of architectural form dressing and covering the allegorical. 
INTERPRETATION 
The way in which any cultural object might be interpreted requires a distinction to be 
drawn between a literal text and a signifying object. A text, that is the writing of words, 
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can be thought legitimately as subject to interpretation because as a form of words or 
discourse, it can be thought to normally have a meaning. On the other hand, a cultural 
object such as a sculpture or building cannot be subject to interpretation in the same way 
because its objecthood precludes words and therefore direct textual meaning. However, 
such an object clearly signifies as Roland Barthes demonstrates in Mythologies, ranging 
from a Citroen car, the face of Greta Garbo or the Eiffel Tower. So it might be suggested 
that Daniel Libeskind's Berlin Jewish Museum confronts the tragic, and that this is a 
major part of its act of signifying. The case then that has to be made, and is made here, is 
that the tragic impulse conveyed by the museum is a product of the metonymic and 
metaphorical relation which represents its visual metaphor. This significance is 'read' 
hermeneutical1y and phenomenological1y as latent language from the philosophical 
underpinning developed in Chapter Four. However, the spectator who stands addressing 
the building cannot be al10wed simply his own reading of it since that reading may be 
altogether too solipsistic. Some further kind of justification is required which has to be in 
the form of some theory of interpretation. That theoretical justification is best found in 
the interpretative practices of literary theory. This section traces the important 
movements in literary theory, principally from Practical Criticism to Reception Theory. 
This produces the justifying procedure of Stanley Fish's' interpretive community' . 
Works of art associated with the tropes of visual form identified here such as 
metaphor, al1egory or irony and so on, are often spoken of as 'having' ironic or 
al1egorical undertones - the litotes of ironic understatement. They do not. Allegory, for 
example, is not 'in' the building. 'Where' allegory 'is' remains deeply problematical. The 
vast literature concerned with how, say, a metaphor is not read simply as a literal 
meaning but is read as meaning otherwise continues to grow (W. Lycan 2000, 208). The 
questions associated with the nature of allegory in particular might be seen as category 
errors. Allegory does not have an existential 'is' or a locative 'where'. In fact, the 
philosophical, cognitive or linguistic implications of what al1egory might or might not 
'be' are not of direct concern here. What is clear, however, is that metaphorical meaning 
does not inhere in an object but is a form of response which emerges from the matrix of 
authorial intention, readership and text. In the case of visual form, 'text' might be taken 
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as the equivalent of, or to subsume, visual form. The art object could be understood 
semiotically to be textual in some way since it yields meaning. But it has to be insisted 
that it does not 'contain' language inherently as the language 'or architecture or 
whatever, because then we might just as well start talking about 'the language of cars' or 
'the language of toys'. Toys and cars may well signify in culturally important ways, but 
they do not have a language of their own. What they have is style and style is not a 
language. The textual nature of the art object, as Heidegger and Gadamer have proposed, 
can only be received hermeneutically and phenomenologically as immanence. Thus we 
have language from, but not the language of, architecture. And the source and origin of 
the reception of meaning of an art object is in visual metaphor and not in the so-called 
language 'or that object. In the introduction to The Language of Images, W.J.T. Mitchell 
reminds us of the 'enduring formulation' of ut pictura poesis, and that despite the radical 
category error of conflating and mixing the visual and the verbal, critical discourse 
continues to insist on doing so (W.J.T. Mitchell 1980,3). The tripartite nature of the sign, 
including the special sense of 'text', means that meaning is a relation and is not 
hypostacized into objectivity. And the tripartite sign, rather than Saussure's binary sign, 
re-emphasizes the fundamental importance of Peirce's triadic signifier discussed in 
Chapter One here. 
The primary task is to introduce a proper scepticism about the term and the process of 
interpretation itself which might lead eventually to a statement about its nature and status. 
In Michael Fried's criticism of Minimalism, the work became theatrical because it 
became an object, and because as such its space of address was a point of contact with 
spectatorship and its duration rather than the autonomous immediacy of the Kantian thing 
in itself (Yve-Alain Bois 1983 in R. Krauss et aI, Eds, 1987, 369). This kind of 
autonomous criticism associates strongly with not only Modernism (as opposed to the 
essential referential nature of Postmodernism) but in the critical traditions of the 
twentieth century and earlier. It is striking how Fried's identification with the 
simultaneity of the moment (,Presentness is grace.' The closing sentence of 'Art and 
Objecthood') allies his position with the symbol rather than allegory in the light of the 
earlier discussion. And it is the allegorical, not the symbol, which comes to typify the 
postmodern in what Craig Owens calls 'the allegorical imperative'. Fried's insistence that 
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the beholder respond to form and surface rather than subject almost mitigates the need for 
interpretation at all in the presence and experience of the work in and as itself. 
Interpretation on the other hand always implies the paraphrase or a new version of what 
was originally there in the work. And the paraphrase as what the work is about is of 
course a palimpsest as a discourse on an earlier text which gives it an allegorical 
resonance. Indeed, Northrop Frye contends that the logical resting place of criticism is 
precisely the allegorical itself (Northrop Frye 1957, 89). That allegory and what we are 
calling interpretation are sisters is clear. 'It is as though allegory is precisely that mode 
which makes up for the distance, or heals the gap, between the present and a disappearing 
past, which without interpretation, would otherwise be irretrievable and foreclosed .. .' 
Joel Fineman in R. Krauss et a11987, 375) 
If we compare the postmodern critical imperative as a concern with the metaphorical, 
temporal and referential, condensing into the allegorical, with the Modernist 
preoccupation with significant form marginalizing content and at least resisting 
interpretation, then what is meant by 'interpretation' becomes highly ambiguous. 
Interpretation is evidently a fundamental human impulse which is unavoidable. The 
difficulty with it as a concept is that it comprises a centre of literary tradition which 
assumes that meaning is always interior to the text, somehow as a residue of authorial 
intention. Susan Sontag's attempt in 'Against Interpretation' to cut through the accretions 
of interpretation in order that criticism of the art work, especially the literary, should 
, .... show how it is what it is, even that it is what it is, rather than to show what it means.' 
(S. Sontag in E. Fernie, Ed, 1996, 222 original emphasis) returns us promptly to the 
problem of Kant's parergon, and what the 'is' of the work really is. It seems though that 
interpretation in some fashion is inevitable. The source for a model of interpretation must 
lie in the familiar contours of literary criticism. 
Modern criticism begins with T.S. Eliot, I.A. Richards, William Empson and F.R. 
Leavis (G. Watson 1973, 168-207). The indelible imprint of Richards (The Meaning of 
Meaning 1923, The Principles of Literary Criticism 1924 and Practical Criticism 1924) 
created the ground on which Leavis later established the modus operandi of modernist 
criticism as 'close reading'. Known universally as Practical Criticism, close reading was 
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empirically technical and exegetical. The journal of Practical Criticism had the forensic 
title of Scrutiny. In many ways, Leavis's single most influential book remains The Great 
Tradition. It is unapologetically judgemental in establishing the canon of English 
novelists from Jane Austen to D.H. Lawrence. Apart from the canonical ex cathedra 
judgements about the moral seriousness of the authors included (F.R. Leavis 1962, 10), 
the book establishes the interiority and autonomy of the text. Leavis's successors in close 
reading, the New Critics, disparaged 'the intentional fallacy' (varieties of possible 
authorial intention) and 'readership' (varieties of possible readings) in favour of what is 
incontrovertibly present in the text as objective meaning. So supreme was the autonomy 
and hegemony of the text that both writer and reader were marginalized by the authority 
ofthe words as written. 
The great change came with Structuralism in the 1950s and 1960s which dislodged the 
autonomy of the text as the keystone of criticism (D. Lodge 1979, 57-65). Structuralism, 
previously referred to here, established a second order of interpretation, another doubling, 
in which the presence of a cultural subtext subverted traditional views of autonomy by 
positing a semantic deep structure. Fried's defence of autonomy in painting, in particular 
as the apotheosis of surface over object, chimes historically as a parallel defence of 
interiority. The Structuralist practice of almost archaeologically exposing layers of 
subtext amounts to a kind of rein scription, another palimpsest, reinforcing Frye's position 
that the critical act as commentary is inevitably of the allegorical. 
Poststructuralist criticism, such as Barthes's has already been considered here and will 
not be rehearsed again. However, the impetus of what has become known as Reception 
Theory as an account of criticism as readership (T. Eagleton 1997, 64) is considered to 
be highly significant for the kind of allegorical reading of postmodem architecture 
proposed here. Reception Theory as an account of readership not only destabilizes the 
central tenet of traditional criticism - that of the autonomous interiority of the text - but 
also renders meaning as subject to historical contingency. What Reception Theory 
emphatically does not dispense with, however, is a close attention to textual evidence, but 
hermeneutically derived as in the hermeneutical circle. 
E.D. Hirsch's work Validity In Interpretation (1967) makes a distinction between 
'meaning' and 'significance'. Following Husserl's phenomenological intentionality, 
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Hirsch proposes that meaning is synonymous with intentionality which then becomes 
transcendentally objective as the author's 'ideal' position. However, that does not prevent 
a plurality of interpretations which may indeed cascade through time. What is current 
interpretation at different given points in time represents only that particular significance; 
the objectively original source, that of intention from the author, remains a constant 
through time and is the meaning (T. Eagleton 1997, 58). On the other hand, Gadamer, 
following Heidegger rather than Husserl, suggests that authorial intention does not 
exhaust the possibilities of meaning [25]. Gadamer, unlike Hirsch, insists that 
interpretation as conversation between reader and author is not only historically specific, 
but valid for and in its time as meaning, not simply significance. The line drawn in the 
sand here between interpretation prior to and subsequent to Gadamer is highly significant. 
The distinction is between an objective reading of the words as written and the alternative 
that meaning may indeed be subject to historical change. 
Gadamer's Heideggeran concern with historical interpretation, however powerful and 
inspirational, restricts his attention to works of the past, whereas a fully-fledged 
interpretative model needs to be able to deal with contemporary new work. Reception 
Theory moves modern theory and criticism to the reader where the previous focus had 
been, as in Practical and new Criticism, exclusively on the text. Reception theory 
incorporates Gadamer's phenomenological hermeneutics. Barthes's rhetorical Death of 
the Author has the destination of the text as the reader, and Wolfgang Iser's The Act of 
Reading (1978) has the text as multi-layered codes, which in deciphering, readers 
effectively 'read' themselves (T. Eagleton 1997, 67-71). This underlying notion that 
'critical understanding proceeds through the ways of self-consciousness' (1. Culler 2001, 
132) is arguably adopted most radically by Stanley Fish. 
Fish is not the only radical voice of poststructuralist criticism. Others, such as Stephen 
Greenblatt in The Forms of Power and the Power of Forms (1982) introduced the notion 
of 'New Historicism' in criticism, and specifically reinvented the place of biography as 
emblematic of the cultural milieu in which the work was produced, it seems almost in 
defiance of his teacher, the New Critic W.J.K. Wimsatt, creator of the Intentional Fallacy. 
Critics such as Fish and Greenblatt may represent an eclectic critical moment after the 
impact of French Poststructuralism and which Eagleton characterizes as 'After Theory' 
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(T. Eag]eton 2003, 23-41). Fish asserts that readership is interpretation. He denies the 
possibility of a fixed, timeless meaning of the work derived from authorial intention. 
Instead, what a work means is nothing more than the cumulative discourse of previous, 
present and future accounts of the work. The meaning then becomes historical and 
diachronic rather than paradigmatic and synchronic. In a sense, the meaning, as an 
accumulation of readings, evolves (T. Eag]eton 1997, 74). There is another fascinating 
sense of chiasmus here. Barthes's 'Death of the Author' implies not only the resurrection 
of the reader, but also that authors, in being 'written' by their accumulated cultural 
baggage, are in fact, 'readers' in that sense and that readers of texts, in 'inscribing' their 
interpretative strategies on to the text, become 'writers'. In accordance with what has 
already been said here in relation to Heideggeran immanence, Fish proposes that a text in 
itself has no determinate meaning and only becomes meaningful on being read through 
the strategies of the reader. This meaning is phenomenologically in potentia (J.A. Cud don 
1999, 726). Fish's objections to the Omniscient Author, the deus ex machina, echoes 
Michel Foucault's representation of the author in 'What Is An Author?' as an ideological 
construct which reverses the historic role of the author as 'discourse' into an individual 
rather than part of an available collective meaning, as in a writer called 'Homer' for 
example. 'We are used to thinking that the author is so different from other men, and so 
transcendent with regard to all languages that, as soon as he speaks, meaning begins to 
proliferate, to proliferate indefinitely. The truth is quite the contrary: the author is not an 
indefinite source of significations which fill a work; the author does not precede the 
works .... One can say that the author is an ideological product, since we represent him as 
the opposite of his historically real function'. (C. Harrison and P. Woods, Eds, 1995, 927) 
The sense of cultural meaning being the product of a public rather than a private 
process is reinforced by Stanley Fish's concept of 'interpretive communities'. In order to 
meet the charge against Reception Theory of critical solipsism - that any interpretation is 
as valid as any other by any reader - Fish's interpretive communities allow readers to 
align themselves into appropriate reading strategies prior to any act of interpretation. 
Naturally, there are other competing reading strategies, schools and communities with 
rival accounts. What a work means is the accumulated discourse of informed readership 
rather than a single oracular origin from the Omniscient Author. Far from meaning 
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remammg a private product, it becomes instead publicly accountable and open to 
sustained revision (T. Eagleton 1997, 74). 
'Reader' here means beholder, and 'text' architectural form, or other forms of the 
plastic arts, and not simply the reader of a literal text. In an important way, this correlates 
with the distinction between 'the allegorical' and specific allegories in either images or 
words. The photograph, for example, is an immediate temporal palimpsest inviting the 
nostalgic presence of a vanished past and as such doubles and other-speaks as allegoria 
and as an aspect of the allegorical. 'The allegorical' is a version of allegoria as lost time 
and is non-exegetical and only 'becomes' allegorical in the presence of empathic and 
complicit readership. It will be noted that reading the allegorical begins with close 
attention to detailing - in architecture as in any other context. Such close attention to 
detailing is analogous with the 'close reading' of New Criticism or Leavis's Practical 
Criticism, and reading within an 'interpretive community' certainly does not preclude the 
need to establish careful empirical evidence on which acts of readership can be based. 
What an appreciation of the presence of the allegorical avoids is in fact the belief that 
intentional input from an author requires an equal and opposite extraction of something 
called 'the meaning' by a reader. Texts signify differently at different historical periods, 
and the collection of those significations as historical layering is what the meaning can be 
developmentally thought to be. A final and objectively ideal meaning from intention as 
what the work ontologically represents, is deferred by meaning as being understood as 
process rather than end-point. Explanation, (as one more kind of interpretation of course), 
is marginalized by understanding (J. Culler 1981, 6). Understanding rather than 
explaining is the empathic response to the immanence of the work of art as part of its 
metaphorical 'other-speaking' nature which is realised in its incipient language. This 
might represent an available as against a definitive meaning. 
Meaning as developed here, especially in an architectural context is part linguistic, part 
meaningful pattern (S. Fish in J. Culler 1981, 134), part rhetorical and self-annunciation, 
part metaphorical and figural, part semiotic signifier and part gestural and allegorical. It is 
also an act of reading. Meaning, as will be argued in Part Two, is also powerfully cultural 
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and social, and dependent on the context of use. Meaning as a single representation of an 
authorial intention within the interiority and autonomy of the text is neither necessary nor 
sufficient. The scepticism about interpretation which introduced this section nevertheless 
has to acknowledge that as an act of reading, interpretation is inevitable; but 
interpretation as objective meaning is by no means inevitable, and certainly in response to 
architectural form, would deny the essential ambivalence with which the allegorical 
dissembles. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS FOR PART ONE 
It needs to be re-emphasized that the chapters of Part One do not prosecute an 
unfolding causal argument. One central unifying strand, the relation between the aesthetic 
object and language and the meanings that makes available is developed throughout and 
is concluded in Chapter Six in Part Two with an extended discussion of 'The Language of 
Architecture' question. In producing a theoretical model of the interpretation of 
poststructuralist architecture, the constituent features of that model have to be sufficiently 
developed to become a basis of justification for the process of reading and interpreting 
specific poststructuralist buildings, particularly in Chapter Seven, which then necessarily 
becomes subject to the strictures of the interpretative community. Part One therefore 
represents in total not only a theoretical model of interpretation of architectural 
Postmodernism, but also a theory of justification in itself, much as its final section, 
Interpretation, suggested. Although there are important linking themes which spiral 
forwards such as theatricality or the word and image relation, each chapter of Part One as 
an examination of a constituent component is theoretically stand-alone. Chapter Two 
deals with the linguistic and metaphorical nature of the sign, Chapter Three examines the 
shape of Postmodernism and its crucial relationship with its own antecedent Modernism, 
Chapter Four assesses the philosophical justification underpinning the model and Chapter 
Five looks at the qualitative nature of Rhetoric and its tropes such as allegory and the 
available scope ofliterary theory. Another enormously important strand crossing chapters 
and which is established in Chapter One, and which reappears extensively in Chapter 
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Five and forms a continuous basis for interpretation in Part Two, is the formative 
allegorical imperative at the very centre of the postmodem. It is also important to 
reassert, particularly in the early chapters, that in order for the model to represent a viable 
form of theoretical justification, architecture itself is not necessarily directly implicated 
initially as such. Thus the establishment of the metaphorical nature of the sign, for 
example, which is a powerful requisite for later metaphorical interpretation of 
postmodemist buildings, is in itself not an aspect of architecture at all, but nevertheless is 
essential for its interpretation. It is only by establishing principles of interpretation, which 
are necessarily abstract and non-subject specific in Part One, that the architectural 
interpretation of Part Two in practice can take place. A naive question such as 'What has 
the metaphorical nature of the sign actually got to do with architecture?' would then be 
revealed as simplistic. 
These first four chapters have not offered an accumulative argument which causally 
reach a conclusive end-point. The characteristics of an argument are substantively 
different from that of the constituent theoretical model. 'An argument involves putting 
forward reasons to influence someone's belief that what you are proposing is the case 
(Hinderer, 1992). Whichever way someone makes an argument they are attempting to 
convince others of the validity (or logic) of how they see the world and convince us that 
we should see it the way they do.' This quotation from Doing A Literature Review (C. 
Hart 2000, 79-80) makes clear that the constitutive process of the theoretical model, 
which comprises its constituent parts, is substantively different from the argument which 
in an adversarial manner constructs a new position which contests the ground of previous 
arguments. The theoretical model on the other hand establishes one set of interpretative 
criteria among many other sets of possibilities. In this sense, unless the selection criteria 
are erroneously based, the theoretical model presents one means of interpretation which is 
as viable as any other. It is not necessarily so. The same subject area could generate other 
and different models of interpretation. What the present model offers is distinctively 
different from other models of architectural interpretation found in the literature because 
it establishes allegory as a basic category of postmodemistic architectural meaning with 
all its concomitant attributes of metaphor, rhetoric and literary association. The fact that 
the allegorical as well as being always temporally recursive says one thing but means 
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another implicates architectural 'parlante', or speaking. And this language which emerges 
from allegory as architectural speaking, concealed, hidden and latent as it is, is a very 
different kind of architectural discourse from the modish chic of 'the language of 
architecture' and its absurd assumptions about the relation between architecture and 
language. Poststructuralist architecture is full of tropes, figures and references which 
constitute an essential element of its significance and meaning, and which is the principal 
concern here. Its meanings, which emerge from architectural visual metaphor, must 
become linguistic, but it should be clearly understood that this emergent language is only 
'manifest' at the behest of the beholder. It is only within the accordance between 
architectural intention, built form and spectator response that architectural meaning can 
appear. And the fact that this represents another Peircean triangulation of the sign and as 
Peirce himself suggested, means that each interpretation is itself subject to interpretation 
ad infinitum as infinite regress, then suggests that this process of scrutiny involved in the 
interpretation of interpretation is precisely Stanley Fish's 'interpretive community' in 
action. 
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PART TWO 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE ARCHITECTURAL TRACE 
This chapter discusses the key developments in architecture which resulted in the 
dominance of theory in poststructuralist practice in particular, and what distinguishes it 
from earlier postmodern building. The shift is one from simile to metaphor, from flagrant 
historicism to poststructuralist modified Modernism and from the inherent rationalist 
classicism of the modernists to the chiaroscuro-like influence of the baroque. The 
historical importance of the grid is traced to its postmodem violation and also how 
Modernist architecture became postmodern, and in tum how architectural postmodernism 
evolved into the architecturally poststructural. And what might be called 'The 
Poststructuralist Neo-Theatrical' is examined for the trace of early Modernist architecture 
which informs it. The chapter is in four sections: The Modernist Grid, The Trajectory 
From Modernism Into Postmodern Architecture, From Postmodernism To 
Poststructuralism: From Simile To Metaphor and Poststructural Architecture And The 
Nco-Theatrical. 
THE MODERNIST GRID 
'Surfacing in pre-War cubist painting and subsequently becoming ever more stringent 
and manifest, the grid announces among other things, modem art's will to silence, its 
hostility to literature, to narrative, to discourse. As such, the grid has done its job with 
striking efficiency. The barrier it has lowered between the arts of vision and those of 
language has been almost totally successful in walling the visual arts into a realm of 
exclusive visuality and defending them against the intrusion of speech.' 
(Rosalind Krauss 1997, 9) 
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Rosalind Krauss in The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, 
above, discusses the imposition of the grid as a key feature of modernism. The founding 
movements of twentieth century Modernist aesthetics - Cubism, de Stijl, Bauhaus - all 
arranged form around the grid, none more so in architecture than Rietveldt's Schroeder 
House. It is again striking how modernism deferred meaning and discourse from form 
and elevated the moment of visual perception as the characteristic instantaneous response 
at the expense of language. In the light of the earlier discussion, the 'silence' of 
modernism contrasts conspicuously with the 'noise' of earlier postmodern architecture as 
self-consciously rhetorical. In contrast with Charles Moore's postmodernist Piazza 
d'Italia for example, Mies's pared down rational grids in, say, The Barcelona Pavilion or 
The Seagram Tower, seem positively self-effacing, examples of mute decorum in the 
denial of reference or meaning, and a kind of refusal to be manifest but also avoiding the 
suggestion of latent meaning. Architecturally, the grid as three-dimensional, becomes the 
lattice (R. Krauss 1997, 210). The grid in modernist and earlier architecture as the lattice 
imposes its rigid and logical rationality on the arrangements of the building and thus 
makes the spectator's traversing of it essentially a tour, with the grid or lattice as 
'conductor', an important feature of Le Corbusier's Villa Savoye, noted in Chapter Three 
here. The visitor is chaperoned by the building's function. Contrariwise, the postmodern 
violation of the rationalist grid is forecast in Gehry's use of the free-flowing ground plan 
of Frank Lloyd Wright's prairie houses in his own Wright-inflected early California 
houses, discussed further in Chapter Seven [26]. It is interesting to note that the idea of 
the right-angled lattice is conspicuously de-formed by several prominent postmodern 
buildings such as Foster's 'gherkin' at St Mary Axe, London, (2000-4) Rem Koolhaas's 
CCTV building, Beijing (2003 and after) and Herzog and de Meuron's Olympic Stadium, 
also Beijing (2004-8). All these buildings curve and bend the lattice almost beyond 
recognition, and Herzog and de Meuron's Olympic Stadium has defaced the conventional 
logic of the lattice into structurally complex basketwork (C. Jencks 2005, 112-3). 
Chapter Three also discussed the important continuities and discontinuities between 
Modernism and Postmodernism. In architectural terms, this section tries to identify the 
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fracturing of the modernist rational grid and the appearance in its place of postmodern 
deconstruction, and more recently, especially at Bilbao, the radical implications of 
folding and bending for the displacement of the grid; what Gilles Deleuze calls Le Pli 
(the fold). This discontinuity is the reversal of the grid and results in the implicit 'chaos' 
of in-folding. Much of that trace begins with Robert Venturi's ground-breaking book, 
Contradiction and Complexity in Architecture. The word 'complexity' itself (Latin 
'entwine', 'braid') is one of Deleuze's pli words such as 'complicate' (from plicare, to 
fold). The collocation of terms associated with bending or folding is directly linked to 
radical poststructuralist architectural practice such as Gehry's at the Bilbao Guggenheim 
(1. Rajchman in G. Lynn, Ed, 1993,61-3). 
What is being violated here is the logic of the grid and plan, foundational to the very 
idea of the development of western civilization and its built environment, centred as it is 
on the primacy of the right angle and its geometry. In Building, Dwelling, Thinking, 
Martin Heidegger proposes that the existence of 'building' presupposes clearance and the 
creation of 'place' as a prerequisite for dwelling. In Heidegger's celebrated example, a 
cleared space by a river is characteristically a location. However, once the river is 
bridged, the location becomes a place (with its own genius lOCI) in which 'dwelling' can 
'become'. The bridge 'gathers together' the banks and a place emerges (M. Heidegger in 
N. Leach, Ed, 1997, 100-9). The dwelling in a place is always predicated on the two 
experiences, however simple or complex, of first entrance, and the subsequent experience 
of organized space within and beyond. The one is encounter and the other exploration. 
The dovetailing of entrance and the developed space behind which together constitute the 
building as design and arrangement supposes that the organization of that space will be 
logico-rational. The prototype of rational entrance, and inward progression with rooms 
and functions off is the Graeco-Roman domus or villa. Arranged as portico, vestibule, the 
(open) space of the atrium and empluvium leading to the aedicule and peristyle with its 
loggia linking the rear garden, it represents a progression from front to back, from public 
to private (J. Curl 1999, 42). Its sense of conduct from front to back is essentially through 
logically arranged division and space. Arguably, this prototypical form of rational 
division has prevailed since, and right into modernism itself, only to be defiled by the 
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postmodernist spatial revolution. Apparent exceptions such as amphitheatres or the Albert 
Hall with multiple entrances remain geometrically coherent from outside to inside. 
Significantly, both Venturi and Deleuze identify the Baroque as a perturbation of logical 
arrangement and view that period as analogical to the change in architecture after 
modernism (R. Venturi 1966, 58-63). In the classical period, the geometry of 
arrangement of course extended from the house to town and city with its walls pierced by 
four gates and producing the cruciform arrangement with right-angled streets and ways 
off (N. Pevsner 1958, 30). The cruciform shape continued through the mediaeval period 
but it is precisely the ad hoc, idiosyncratic nature of development off which Jane Jacobs 
identified as the combination of old and new, producing 'place' and 'dwelling' as against 
the almost ideologically zealous grid-arrangement of, say, Corbusier's Ville Radieuse, 
engendered as it was on the inexorable progress of the planned right-angled zone and 
vertical lattice (D. Harvey 1990, 180). 
The persistence of classicism from its renewal during the Renaissance right up to the 
deformations of the postmodern is singular. Indeed, it is argued here below that in terms 
of both building form and town planning, that the underlying imperatives of Modernist 
architectural practice could be categorized broadly as classically derived (R. Scruton 
1979, 226-7). The persistence of the grid and row is of course easily understandable, both 
in locations such as the mediaeval linear village (M. Aston 1985, 75) to Chicago in the 
nineteenth century and in the post war British New Towns and in individual buildings 
themselves. Classicism subsumes the grid and despite variations in historical style, layout 
remains a powerfully linear version of its arrangements with dominant axes and right-
angled extensions. The assertively dominant axis, as in the Champs Elysees, Paris, 
running from The Louvre, is not simply a line of communication, more an intimated axis 
of power. The dominant axes of the grid in planning produced public buildings seen 
largely as facades as the public face of the building. The portico, vestibule and aedicule 
'progress' of the Roman triumphal building is often replicated in public buildings with a 
dominant corridor with corridors off, the whole simulating the axis of power of the main 
street which the building fronts. Thus the fa~ade and the inner grid both mimetically 
signify in terms of grandeur and authority. 
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However, Roger Scruton, as a classical revivalist, proposes in The Aesthetics of 
Architecture that buildings as public things which beholders cannot choose to ignore as 
they 'can with a poem or a painting, potentially act as moral signs. 
'The architect must be constrained by a rule of obedience. He must translate his 
intuition into terms that are publicly intelligible, unite his building with an order 
that is recognizable not only to the expert but also the ordinary uneducated man.' 
(R. Scruton 1979,250-256) 
Buildings thus bestow order and continuity, and the architect has a responsibility to 
forego individualistic expressionism and unite his building into the tradition and 
repertoire of style as a continuum; a linking thread through the vicissitudes and 
idiosyncrasies of genre in history. In fact, a kind of ideal. Style, especially classicism, is 
embodied in the fa/yade (R.Scruton 1979, 253-6). Although Scruton does not say so, the 
fa/yade has traditionally articulated style as an indicator not simply as ornament, but also 
function. So that fenestration, sections, projections, bays and string courses reveal 
resonance and rhythm; an architectural version of harmonious euphony and the 
mellifluous. The idea of the beautiful as proportion and arrangement inevitably hovers 
nearby although compromised as adornment by Kant's parergon. The harmonious and the 
beautiful confer an aesthetic morality on to the street, and the public appreciation of the 
aesthetic sensibility becomes not only possible, but a duty of architectural composition. 
In order to promote what might be called 'the moral ontology' of the building, the 
architect submits to style and in so doing, rejects any conspicuous personal expression. 
The fact that many previously industrial buildings are now converted into highly 
desirable apartments and lofts amplifies the view that public buildings on the public street 
had a responsibility to create a context of built refinement. Although far outside the 
present remit, these are powerful arguments for a perceived need for an architecture 
which respects place, materials and human scale for an informed version of the public 
good. As may become clearer, it is a version of the kind of revivalism promulgated by the 
Prince of Wales at Poundbury and other contemporary revivalists of traditional facadism 
such as Quinlan Terry or Rob Krier. Despite Scruton's rejection of Modernism (and 
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Postmodernism), it can of course be argued that Modernist architecture such as that of 
Mies is precisely a version of order and arrangement that can be broadly described as 
'classicist'. Mies's Seagram Tower is rejected by Scruton as a minimalist object 
conspicuous in its avoidance of ornament and moulding. Its fa~ade is unarticulated, and 
therefore cannot be beautiful (R. Scruton 1979,226-7). Alternatively, this is by no means 
a universally accepted view, and the Seagram Tower is now regarded as internationally 
iconic (J Glancey 1998, 203 and C. Jencks 2005, 192). 
The self-conscious 'Stuckism' and almost militant revivalism of commentators such as 
HRH or Roger Scruton is inevitably another kind of mourning for traditional form in the 
face of what is understood to be the anarchy of architectural innovation. It is change itself 
which represents the threat of the new. What is mourned and lost here is nothing less than 
the pre-industrial landscape of English pastoral [27]. The Stuckists who also favour the 
presence of figurative painting over Conceptualist or Installationist art are representative 
of an anxiety and unease about the genius loci of public spaces. The point here is of 
course documental, not judgemental. But the contrast between contemporary revivalism 
and Postmodernism, let least Modernism, is extraordinarily vivid. The rhetorical 
expressionism, deconstructed 'beauty' and parodic and ironic violation of historical genre 
of poststructuralist architectural theory demonstrates the fundamentally radical and 
'schizophrenic' embrace of 'catastrophe' and deferred meaning in its practice. The 
rational organization of space from the classical period, through the various forms of 
entry during the mediaeval period (J. Brunskill 1978,98-119), and on past Renaissance 
and Enlightenment into nineteenth century eclecticism and arguably reaching its post-
Renaissance apogee in Modernism, suddenly undergoes deformation with the inception 
of the postmodern. Not only is shape and arrangement deformed, the ancient sanctity of 
the dispositio of classical rhetoric profaned, but also the shape of space itself. Daniel 
Libeskind's proposed cubist Spiral extension to the Natural history Museum, London, if 
ever built, is the acme of the poststructuralist deformed versus the ideal. The deformed as 
a 'monstrous' (monstrum, portent and monere, to warn) intrusion into the harmony and 
order of the built environment would only seem able to increase the apprehensions of the 
Stuckists. The dislocation of the grid was hugely affected by the bending and folding 
which emerged during the nineteen nineties and the emergence of curvilinear structures 
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which had appeared conspicuously, for example, in the undulating fa~ade of James 
Stirling's Neue Staatsgalerie, Stuttgart (1984). The curvilinear building almost by 
necessity must disrupt the quasi-triumphal floor plan of the gridded building with its 
signifying entry point and directed flow within. Approached from across the Manchester 
Ship Canal, Libeskind's Imperial War Museum of the North appears to be entry-less. In 
fact, the entrance must be sought, and it turns up opposite the car park, modestly 
inconspicuous, and giving access to multiple choice flows within rather than the assumed 
authoritarian 'rightness' of the directed flows of the traditional grid. 
Rosalind Krauss in the earlier quotation refers to the incompatibility of Modernist form 
with discourse and 'the intrusions of speech' as a result of the exclusive visuality and 
silence of the grid. The refusal of high Modernism of any overt kind of allusion within 
visual form and the consequent quietude and denial of referential meaning has already 
been discussed here in the first two chapters. What replaces 'language' in Modernist 
practice is instantaneity such as Michael Fried's 'presentness', or Clement Greenberg's 
'flatness' . 
Charles Jencks's two early and highly influential books, Meaning In Architecture 
(1969) and The Language of Postmodern Architecture (1981), represented a radical 
disjuncture with the precepts of architectural Modernism by insisting that architectural 
form and meaning mutated after Venturi's Complexity and Contradiction and with the 
symbolic end of Modernist architecture in the demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe apartment 
block in 1972 (C. Jencks 1981, 9). The explosive end of the Pruitt-Igoe block is 
suggested by Jencks to demonstrate not only the demolition of Modernist mass-housing, 
but the demise also of centralist planning and zoning as an aspect of the Enlightenment 
tradition. Jencks's achievement in identifying what came to be known as Postmodernist 
Architecture was an outstanding contribution to the theoretical and typological debate. At 
the centre of Jencks's position are the twin characteristics of code (1969, 20) and 
language (1981, 40-64). Both concepts are developed further in the later The Language of 
Postmodern Architecture, but already in Meaning In Architecture there is a reductionist 
account of architectural meaning as linguistic. 
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'Now if the linguist tries to discover what basic units communicate verbal meaning 
and finds such things as phonemes and morphemes, then it would be highly appropr-
iate if the architectural explorer found 'formenes', 'funcemes' and 'techemes' - those 
fundamental units of architectural meaning .... The new field, naturally following lin-
guistics, would be called 'architistics". (C. Jencks 1969, 17) 
Drawing as it does on Saussure rather than Peirce, this may in retrospect sound 
semiotically modish and rather far fetched. But the underlying notion, elaborated much 
further in The Language of Postmodem Architecture, that architectural meaning emerges, 
albeit as metaphor, as a consequence of architectural form having a direct linguistic form 
and equivalence, has largely gone unchallenged. This position of course prompts a causal 
debate: does architecture prompt its 'language' or be prompted by it? The second option, 
that language instantiates ideas and therefore form is positively Whorfian [28], and one 
which is endorsed in Meaning in Architecture (1969, 18), but which disappears from The 
Language of Architecture. The fraught causal relation between architectural form and 
'the language of architecture' is produced by the use of the preposition 'of, causing 
architecture to 'have' language as a constituent feature, or even ontologically to be a form 
of language. The distress created by this formulation disappears if what is proposed is, 
say, 'the language of Shakespeare' because the sonnets and plays are already language. 
The difficulty arises when something which is demonstrably non-linguistic such as 
architecture or sculpture is treated as language. It has been consistently argued here that 
any theoretical model of architectural meaning has to dispense with 'the language of 
architecture' as a serious category error. Chapter Four in Part One in particular tries to 
formulate a coherent account of a particular model of language as inherently latent in 
architectural form and which becomes manifest through a process of phenomenological 
ascription by the beholder-corne-reader; language 'from' rather than 'of. The 
authenticity of that reading is then subject to justification by Stanley Fish's 'interpretive 
community' in much the same way that the present text is itself subject to scrutiny as part 
of discourse. The fact that the interpretation by an interpretative community is itself 
subject to interpretation in a Peircean infinite regress is precisely the kind of 'trace' that 
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the present chapter is seeking and does not represent an unwelcome paradox. Chapter 
Two establishes the building as semiotic and as essentially a metaphorical sign, and 
Chapter Two diagnoses its particular postmodern characteristic. Chapter Four dispenses 
with 'the language of architecture' in favour of language from form, and Chapter Five 
identifies the signifying aspect of visual metaphor as initially metonymic rather than 
linguistic. All of this represents an explicit rejection of Jencks's formulation. 
It may be that Charles Jencks's greatest contribution has been to equate postmodernist 
architecture with metaphor rather than more famously proposing that buildings have or 
are language (C.Jencks 1981, 40-52). Nevertheless, as an extension of that position, 
Jencks goes on to three linked sections called 'Words', 'Syntax' and 'Semantics' (52-64). 
Unfortunately, this approach represents a kind of literalism; that postmodern buildings 
signify as metaphor because they, as it were, as tenor literally resemble the metaphorical 
vehicle. Put simply, this is metaphor as simile. In his section on 'Metaphor and 
Metaphysics' (1981, 112-118) Jencks says: 
'The most renowned metaphorical buildings - Ronchamp, the Sydney Opera House, 
TWA [Kennedy Airport] - vary in their coding from implicit to explicit, from mixed 
metaphor to congruent simile. An architectural 'simile' is, as in writing or speech, the 
formal and explicit statement of a metaphor - the hot dog stand that has so many other 
cues such as mustard and bun that one can say that it is explicitly intended.' 
In the light of Chapter Five here and the nature of visual metaphor as potentially 
post structurally allegorical, this insistence on the physical resemblance of the whole 
rather than the metaphorically symbiotic relation between metonymy and metaphor, part 
and whole, seems rather limiting. Jencks's term 'code' has no sustained definition and 
appears to mean 'dual-coding' (1981, Introduction) which in turn implicates metaphor 
and hence the assumption that in Postmodernism, architecture is actually language. ('So 
the term 'Post-Modern' has to be clarified and used more precisely to cover, in general, 
only those designers who are aware of architecture as a language - hence one part of my 
title.' (C. Jencks 1981,6, original emphasis) In many ways, the great accomplishment of 
The Language of Postmodern Architecture lies not in conflating postmodernist 
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architecture with language but in recognizing that its 'double-code' is a version of what is 
called here rhetorical metaphor where meaning oscillates between the actual physical 
present of the building in its empirical form and some stylistically implied historicist past. 
However, it is Jencks's literalist and reductionist tendentiousness which leaves him 
dwelling simplistically on metaphorical simile. Thus in Late Modem Architecture (C. 
Jencks 1980,) Roger's Pompidou Centre, Paris, and Foster's Willis-Faber Building, 
Ipswich, are designated respectively as simply 'exoskeleton' and 'amoeba' rather than 
generating an after-Modernism ambience which helped to make problematic not only the 
conventional use of space in the grid, but the relation between inside and outside itself. 
Equally, the slight treatment of Ronchamp as merely a simile for a peasant hat or ship's 
prow and so on ignores the much deeper sense of nostalgia for Modernist rationalism 
shown in the still Purist walls amongst the almost revolutionary metaphorical referencing 
emerging within the larger context. Ronchamp as the defining precursory postmodern 
sign is discussed further below. 
Despite these important caveats, Charles Jencks succeeded in not only defining the 
initial postmodern architectural field, but also in introducing a semiotic procedure which 
in tum generated the concern for meaning and language and its embeddedness in 'code'. 
Although he does not specifically say so, Jencks's use of the term 'code' is in fact a 
version of the metaphorical palimpsest producing meaning as a form of doubling. The 
new is made 'old' by the recursive act of collage and mixing current and previous forms 
such as Tschumi's play on Russian Constructivism at Parc de la Villette, Paris. The link 
is of course time. It has to be emphasized that 'code' is necessarily a system which has its 
own syntactic or regulative rules ('code' from Latin codex, book). So there is again an 
unstated underlying assumption that architecture as 'coded' must be a linguistic type of 
regulated system. (Roman Jakobson's development of the term 'code' is in an exclusively 
poetic context, or possibly in the sense of genre. The later examples of substitutive and 
contiguous relation [metaphor and metonymy] such as Cubism as metonymic and 
Surrealism as metaphorical (D. Lodge 1971, 81) do not signify as 'code'). In what has 
been an influential work, Function and Sign: The Semiotics of Architecture, Umberto Eco 
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attempts to characterize primary and secondary functions respectively as denotative and 
connotative. He suggests that there are varieties of architectural code such as technical, 
syntactic and semantic (Umberto Eco in N. Leach, Ed, 1997, 193-5). But this again 
assumes that an architectural code is linguistically formulated. Roger Scruton, from a 
sceptical viewpoint in 'Language and Architecture' in The Aesthetics of Architecture (R. 
Scruton 1979, 164-5) effectively breaks the architecture/language link, although from an 
anti-semiotic position. 'Acceptability in language is connected to the possibility of truth, 
and there can be no explanation of linguistic meaning which does not show its relation to 
truth.' From the position of Analytical Philosophy, language comprises sentences that 
contain propositions which can be falsified and therefore bear a relation to ideas about 
truth. 'Yet it is precisely that relation which semiology ignores, and must ignore ifit is to 
generalize the concept of 'meaning' from language to art and architecture.' Scruton's 
position is ultimately transcendental in suggesting that truth rather than language inheres 
in classical architecture as harmonious beauty, a view far outside the present argument, 
but one which effectively marginalizes the 'language of architecture' formula. Despite 
post structuralist scepticism about architecture as language, Adrian Forty in Words and 
Buildings (2000) maintains that the linguistic metaphor remains a viable and useful 
descriptive tool (A. Forty 2000,84). 
Once the hegemony and prerogative of the grid has been suspended on the one hand, 
and its modernist silence on the other, then it becomes possible to identify the 
postmodemist trace. However, it should be clear by now that the imperative of meaning 
in postmodem and particularly poststructuralist architecture is not a product of the 
language of architecture, but rather the semantic significance of Heideggeran 
'unconcealing' , or language emerging from architecture as part of its allegorical 
symbolizing. 
THE TRAJECTORY FROM MODERNISM INTO POSTMODERN 
ARCHITECTURE 
This section, relying on the treatment of mimesis in the first chapter, distinguishes 
between the notion of copy implicit in Eclecticism or Revivalism and common in 
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architecture before the twentieth century and the rise of Modernism and the parody which 
is characteristic of Postmodernism. Thus there would be an enormous difference between 
the' parodic neo-c1assicism of Charles Moore, for example, and the veneration Lord 
Burlington showed for Palladio and the Villa Rotonda. The trajectory of the development 
of Modernism is briefly traced from Arts And Crafts to archetypal Modernists such as 
Corbusier. As a turning moment towards the postmodern, the work of Jane Jacobs and 
Robert Venturi is discussed, the one in regard to the landscape and the zone-planning of 
cities and the other as the instigator of the opposition to Modernism in Contradiction And 
Complexity as the celebrant of American vernacular as a potential paradigm in Learning 
From Las Vegas. 
The transition of Modernism to Postmodernism and the continuities and disjunctions 
involved as movements has already been established by Chapter Three. The relationship 
is deeply complex with Postmodernism being part of Modernism and yet outside it, and at 
the same time collaged or layered back over it in a temporal fold. The nature of this 
temporal recursion is characterized by both nostalgia and mourning, the result of the 
touch of the ruin of the past and which makes the absent presence of the past elegiacally 
allegorical. However, the recursive momentum is by no means an exclusive attribute of 
the postmodern. The postmodern, certainly in its deconstructive aspect, always seeks to 
defer origin and cause as Barthes showed in Myth Today (R. Barthes 1997, 98-9). The 
postmodern reference to earlier historicist styles is a form of mimesis. All movements are 
to some extent regressive in the sense that whatever is 'new' emerges or even evolves 
from some stylistic past. 'Origin' is always deferred. The trabeated post and lintel 
architecture of the Paeleolithic such as Stonehenge as well as beam-loading in Egyptian 
and Greek structures aped and mimicked examples of load and support in natural rock 
formation (V. Gibberd 1990, 11-13). Roman architecture although archeated and vaulted 
rather than trabeated, retained the Greek Orders and the use of post and lintel construction 
in porticoes and facades. It would obviously be possible to go on. The Romanesque 
which followed the Roman was similarly derivatively archeated, and the expressive 
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innovations of Gothic conceal the fact that its central structural feature remained the arch, 
albeit pointed and externally supported by the buttress. 
Deliberate revivalism is deliberately mimetic. The Renaissance revives and reinvents 
the classical. In England at the opening of the eighteenth century Lord Burlington 
reinvoked Palladianism at Chiswick with the reinstallation of Palladio's Villa Rotonda, 
Vicenza, in a revivalist classical wave that spread across and through the century, 
reaching as far as Thomas Jefferson's version of Palladian Rotonda at Monticello, 
Virginia. At the end of the same century, Gothic was being revived at Fonthill and at 
Hugh Walpole's Strawberry Hill, London. 
What distinguishes Revivalism from Postmodernism is that the revival is an act of 
veneration, the reassuring presence of a past authenticity. The postmodern of course 
prevaricates and parodies and in that sense denies the very idea of the authentic and 
celebrates its own in authenticity. The paradigm of Revivalism as the reinstatement of the 
authentic is eclecticism. In Britain, once the conflict of styles between Classicism and 
Gothic subsided in the second half of the nineteenth century, many different architectural 
forms which deformed the original, such as debased Egyptian, became respectable (N. 
Pevsner 1958, 272-77). In appearance, the very inauthenticity of the supposedly authentic 
revival is a vivid precursor of the postmodern itself. What separates them is a pre-
Modernist failed attempt at revivalist authenticity preceding the deliberate postmodern 
mockery of historicism as a denial of originality. The overwhelming ubiquity of 
eclecticism led to a vital historical moment. William Morris, initially as a follower of 
Pugin and Ruskin, accepted the authenticity of Gothic as in Ruskin's The Stones of 
Venice and the need for truth and simplicity, argued in Ruskin's The Seven Lamps of 
Architecture (1849). The twin principles of truth and the simplicity of craft led Morris to 
reject mass-production, but in 'Truth To Materials' to have 'laid the foundations of the 
Modern Movement' (N. Pevsner 1958, 277). Morris's own revivalism was of the 
perceived simplicity which in a Pre-Raphaelite way preceded the Renaissance. The 
enormous influence of the Arts And Craft movement as a kind of up-to-date 
Mediaevalism produced, in the British Vernacular Revival from Norman Shaw to 
Lutyens, an informed eclectic revivalism from Shaw's 'Queen Anne' to Lutyen's version 
of sixteenth century houses, an achievement perhaps unprecedented in its 
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accomplishment. Although historically referenced, the houses built by the Vernacular 
Revival seemed of their time and convincingly 'modem', especially Voysey's pared-
down. elevations at Bedford Park (J.M. Richards 1981, 231-43). It was from the 
heightened design quality of Arts And Crafts and English vernacular houses that Herman 
Muthesius produced Das englische Haus (The English House). Muthesius's transfer of 
the principles of simplicity and truth to materials to the German context of the Deutscher 
Werkbund in 1907, but to include concrete, steel and glass and mass-production rather 
than stone and red brick, has been well documented (W.J. Curtis 1999, 99-100). From 
Werkbund to Bauhaus is a very short and a very German step. So it was out of the furore 
of eclecticism that Modernism emerged. However, it cannot be emphasized too strongly 
that it is the example of eclectic revivalism, rejected by the Modem Movement, which 
has been an inspirational source and is an important trace in postmodern architectural 
sensibility, and particularly in its New Historicist dimension. What also bears repetition is 
that although pre-Modernist 'eclecticism' is in some ways equivalent to postmodernist 
'pluralism', it is to the structural and stylistic motifs of Modernism itself that 
poststructuralist architecture returns in its parodic way. 
The key developmental moments in the dissemination of the Modernist ideology from 
the Bauhaus to ClAM and the influence of Cor busier and Mies and the International Style 
up to 1960 as an arbitrary end-point are a Modernist narrative which has been extensively 
rehearsed (W.J. Curtis 1999, 257-73). Corbusier's use of his Dom-ino structural grid 
allowed the emancipation of form in the five principles of Five Points of a New 
Architecture (1925). The use of the grid facilitated the development of pi/otis, the free 
plan and the flat roof for example. Immediately the pitched roof is dispensed with, the 
previous vertical emphasis becomes lateral, and the use of strip windows, allowed by the 
hung glass curtain walls of the Dom-ino, creates the effect of lateral striation which was 
an effect copied and parodied by James Stirling at the Neustaat Galerie, Stuttgart and in 
countless 'developments' during the 1980s as a chic postmodernist sign. Walter Gropius, 
Corbusier and Mies may all be understood to be residual classicists in laying down the 
epistemes of architectural modernism in the presence of the rational grid, avant-garde 
social planning and the restriction of ornament in favour of function. As form, the 
representative Modernist building is a version of the ideal (W.J. Curtis 1999, 169), 
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especially in Corbusier's Purism, which in some respects may be seen as analogous to 
Platonism. Following Krauss's argument, Gropius's Bauhaus, Corbusier's Villa Savoye 
and'Mies's Seagram Tower all shed reference and allusion and in their mute silence, 
resonate essentially visually as ideal geometrical forms. The implacable geometry and 
shape of the modernist ideal is caught by Corbusier in Vers Une Architecture. 
'Reinforced concrete has brought a revolution in the aesthetics of construction .... with 
the accent running not from top to bottom, but horizontally, from left to right.' (Le 
Corbusier 1923, 61) It was the striated fenestration of Modernist construction that Robert 
Venturi parodied in his mother's Vanna Venturi House by exposing a floor showing 
through a window, and thus introducing the complexity and contradiction he writes of, 
and contradicting specifically Corbusier's dictum in Vers Une Architecture; 'The Plan is 
the generator .... The house is a machine for living in.' (Corbusier 1923, 43-108) 
Robert Venturi's Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture, 1966 and Jane Jacob's 
The Death And Life Of Great American Cities 1961, are both foundational texts in the 
transitional trace from International Modernism to postmodernist architecture. Jane 
Jacobs wrote mainly about Modernist cities, districts and planning, whereas Robert 
Venturi's direct concern was with the architectural provenance of actual building rather 
than the built environment itself. Both books had revolutionary implications, and in 
retrospect may be seen to be risk-taking and daring in the face of the then dominant 
International Style. 
Jane Jacobs wrote about American cities because, like Chicago, they are planned grids, 
which despite the logical advantages, impose uniformity above all and which a European 
sensibility might find endlessly monotonous (J. Jacobs 1994, 393). European cities 
because of their greater age and diversity are frequently characterized by the ad hoc of 
bricolage. Instead of the relentless uniformity of the grid, representative of rational 
modem planning and zoning, Jacobs argues for 'subsidiary irregularity' (1994, 394) 
which would introduce the complexity of the local with parks and additional routing, so 
introducing the possibility of frequent turning rather than the endless vistas of the grid. 
Diversity, not uniformity, would be created by irregularities and visual interruptions 
(1994, 395). Within the city, Jacobs suggests that two principles vie with each other for 
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dominance. The arrangement of the city declares itself as 'a visual announcement' and 
either recedes into the vista of repetition and infinity or is fore-grounded into local close-
ups characterized by diversity. Modernist planners favour the first option of clearance and 
uniformity and are suspicious of 'city diversity, freedom and life' (1994, 392-3). Jacobs 
suggests that there are four 'generators of diversity' (1994 162-3). These are variety and 
mixing in primary functions such as work and leisure, blocks must be short and streets 
and turns frequent, districts must retain old buildings rather than resort to clearance and 
redevelopment and there must be concentrations of people, including residence rather 
than sterile business zones which exclude residential and mixed use. 
Robert Venturi's Vanna Venturi House, Philadelphia 1962, predates Complexity and 
Contradiction. On the main falYade is a loggia-type entrance which has an artificial 
trabeated lintel over, which in tum is transected by an equally artificially non-functional 
'arch' (,archeated' being the opposite of 'trabeated') which in turn is bisected by a large 
aperture as the 'break' in the false 'broken pediment' which is the whole main fac;ade. To 
the right of the main entrance is an essentially Corbusian strip-window. In architectural 
parlante, the fa~ade acknowledges, even salutes, Corbusier but with such declared 
Fig 12 Historicist allusion traduces the 
tradition of Modemist Purism [Fig 12]. 
This is what Charles Jencks has called 
the 'radical eclecticism' of the double 
code (C. Jencks 1981, 127-32) which 
has metamorphosed into what Jencks 
In describing conspicuously 
postmodem public building caIls the iconic building (C. Jencks 2005, 20) and which here 
is accounted for in Chapter Seven as a version of the theatricality established in Chapter 
Two. The wholly artificial mouldings and columns (faux Greek classical) in the Vanna 
Venturi House, representing as it inevitably and self-consciously does a resolute 
inauthenticity, become a first sounding, an 'enonciation' in which the rhetoric of play and 
parody establishes a dangerous proximity to kitsch. 
Venturi later wished that the title of Complexity and Contradiction had been 
Complexity and Contradiction in Architectural Form (R. Venturi 1966, 14). But the term 
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Form was omitted because at the time of writing, 'form' was a Modernist episteme which 
had been resonating since Roger Fry and Clive Bell but one to which Venturi was 
opposed. 'Significant Form' had been first formulated by Clive Bell in Art, 1914 
(Harrison and Wood Eds, 1995, 113-116). 'Form' in its Modernist incarnation was an 
ontologically complete, but equally instantaneous, visual experience which suspended 
meaning and reference and deferred what Venturi calls 'symbolism'. To have used 'form' 
as a term at the height of international modernism would have been to declare himself a 
Modernist, the very process with which he was in dispute. It reinforces the point that 
where Jacobs's critique centred on place, Venturi's focused on the significance of built 
forms, and that they independently launched a twin attack on both Modernist building-
type and its social context. The Vanna Venturi House introduces notions of complexity 
which contradict themselves by, for example, including on the outside a dado rail which 
clearly belongs conventionally inside (R. Venturi, 1966, 119) thus anticipating Derrida's 
later epigram that the outside is the inside (see Chapter Four here). Mies's earlier 
Farnsworth House is often cited as a glass cuboid which relates the outside to the inside 
by virtue of the transparency of its glass walls. This may be so, but it certainly does not 
represent an inversion or doubling in meaning which would make it postmodernistic; that 
it is not referential but formal makes it essentially Modernist. In fact, the external 
structural expression of the inside on the outside represents a dual point of view rather 
like Picasso's inclusion of both full face and profile at the same time, thus making this 
not only Modernist, but Cubist. Venturi's 'Gentle Manifesto' (1966, 16) does indeed 
sound revolutionary. 
Having dismissed incompetence, the picturesque and expressionism, he says: 
'Architects can no longer be intimidated by the puritanically moral language of 
orthodox Modem architecture ... .1 am for messy vitality over obvious unity. I 
include the non-sequitor and proclaim the duality .... But an architecture of com-
plexity and contradiction has a special obligation toward the whole: its truth must 
be in its totality or its implications of totality. It must embody the difficult unity 
of inclusion rather than the easy unity of exclusion. More is not less.' 
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In the light of the earlier discussion of visual meaning as constituted by the relation of the 
metonymic to the metaphorical as constitutive of holistic meaning, Venturi's formulation 
of truth in totality may seem rather innocent now. Nevertheless, the famous riposte to 
Mies's 'Less is more' as 'Less is a bore' exactly parallels the Greenberg/Fried debate 
discussed in Chapter One here as the crucial moment of defeat for formalist Modernism. 
As was suggested, the attack from Clement Greenberg and particularly Michael Fried's 
Art And Objecthood against the Minimalists in the nineteen sixties was in reality the 
defence of Modernism against the nascent postmodern. The equivalent of Jackson 
Pollock's Lavender Mist as a total holistic experience in the visual instantaneity of form 
is Mies's Seagram Tower, New York. This was initially a very American conceptual 
contest in which Venturi rivalled Mies just as Rauschenberg and Johns subverted the 
Abstract Expressionists and in which Installation and Performance violated the sculptural 
purity of David Smith and Anthony Caro. At the very centre of the debate was the 
Modernist critique from Greenberg of what was clearly becoming an 'after-Modernist' 
state as a version of kitsch and which Fried characterized as a form of theatricality. It is 
Venturi who answers in the midst of this secessionist crisis by asking at the end of 
Complexity and Contradiction ' ... .is not Main Street almost all right?' (1966, 104) The 
Strip, Main Street and the commonplace Pop icons of Andy Warhol and Richard 
Hamilton celebrated precisely banality and low ordinariness against the high sublime of 
Modernism. The Strip and Main Street carry semiotic language at the gaudy sharp-end of 
transaction of the front whilst it is the unseen back which actually functions with 
deliveries and waste-disposal and so on. In Learning From Las Vegas (1972), Venturi 
celebrates American low-life frontage architecture as a kind of legitimate American 
vernacular (W.J. Curtis 1996, 562) in the shape of the 'decorated shed' which is used in 
contrast with, and to disparage the expressive Modernist concrete form such as Saarinen's 
TWA Airport as a giant bird which is dismissed as a 'duck', or Utzon's Sydney Opera 
House which expresses structure and function as decoration (C. Jencks 1981, 45). 
Venturi now seems the architect who pushed at the Modernist dam to release the 
developing flow of architectural and other forms of Postmodernism. The Vanna Venturi 
House stands equal in importance with Charles Moore's Burns House, Santa Monica, 
1974. Moore's own House, Orinda, California, (1962) is wildly eclectic and swings from 
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Regionalist painted exterior to absurdist classical moulding and a shower which is 
mimetic ofthe impluvium of the Roman Villa (G. Allen 1980,24). This is the ruination of 
the grid. Roman grid-logic is traduced by the collage of different architectural effects 
imploding contiguously. The regional ad hoc and collaged bricolage of the Bums House 
and the Moore House announce the death of the rational organizing grid-form as 
decisively as Pruitt-Igoe or Ronan Point declared the decease of Modernism as a principle 
in its own terms. 
FROM POSTMODERNISM TO POSTRUCTURALISM: FROM SIMILE TO 
METAPHOR 
As a means of pointing up the transition from first-phase Postmodernism into 
architectural Poststructuralism, this section compares the showy historicism of 
postmodem architecture from the nineteen sixties to the nineteen eighties and its 'noise' 
with the more restrained neo-modernism of the poststructuralists. The transition is 
characterized by the move to an engagement with 'Theory' and the discussion of the 
nature of that change depends heavily on the account of the phenomenology of Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty in Chapter Four. The suggestion is that architectural form 
transmogrified from a physical resemblance to the metaphor it referred to, such as 
Roger's Pompidou Centre actually resembling an exoskeleton, and is therefore 
metaphorically a simile, to buildings which implicated meaning by the means of visual 
metaphor inside allegory's 'other-speaking' such as Frank Gehry's suggestions of 'ruin' 
at his Santa Monica House. Architects whose work is deeply influenced by theory such as 
Peter Eisenman or critics and theorists like Christian Norberg-Schulz within the 
phenomenological tradition are discussed. 
By the nineteen seventies the architectural context wao; characterized by a spreading 
eclectic revivalism. On the one hand there were straightforward traditional revivals of 
post-Renaissance classicism such as Quinlan Terry's Richmond-Upon Thames, begun at 
the end of the decade and which contrasted with the deliberate Historicism of Venturi and 
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Moore or the more observed continuities of modernist refinement among the New York 
Five, especially in Eisenman and Meier. Almost immediately the historicists became 
knoWn as 'the greys' because they dallied with Pop, low life and kitsch. Their sources 
were Mannerist, Baroque and Rococo, just as Paulo Portoghesi had revivified Borromini. 
The Five, in contrast, became known as 'the whites' because of attachment to the 
intellectual economy of Corbusian Purism (W.J. Curtis 1996, 565). Meier's houses were 
essays in the white antiphonal exchange between verticality and horizontality. 
Eisenman's Houses 1-10, equally white, were intensely theoretical deconstruct ions in 
concrete of both the grid house and conventional domestic space. The rejection by the 
Five of mannered revivalism eventually led, particularly in Eisenman, to an architectural 
poststructuralism. What characterized this moment was the appearance of theory quite 
separately from ideas specifically about architecture, but which nevertheless powerfully 
influenced its subsequent practice. 
The confusion which surrounded new forms of eclecticism and 'revival' represented 
the appearance of the postmodern as an imperative. The importance of the 
GreenberglFried debate discussed in Chapter One underpins the present discussion as the 
account in Chapter Two similarly treats the transition from Modernism to 
Postmodernism. Underlying notions of 'revival' and 'eclecticism' is the temporal 
recursion of Postmodernism away from Modernist ideological dogma whilst yet 
remaining part of it as architectural practice as 'The Five' demonstrate. The shift to the 
postmodern is a movement away from Modernist progressive leftism and its social 
ideology to an architecture of theoretical formalism (W.J. Curtis 1996, 565). Where the 
modern had breathed the air of utopian progress and improvement and the powerful 
planning achievements of World War Two, the postmodern embraced linguistic 
semiotics, Chomskyan deep structure and the metaphorical significance of gesture. The 
legacy of conjecture about the relation between gesture and meaning and between the 
visual and the linguistic, ut ars poetica, left by Lessing in the Laocoon was never more 
relevant. 
The opening, overt, first phase of postmodernist architecture lasted from the nineteen 
seventies to the early nineteen nineties. Michael Graves's startling Disney Centre, 
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California, matched the innovative audacity of Moore's Piazza d'ltalia, New Orleans. 
Both the Piazza and the Disney Centre, completed in 1990, typify the theatrical rhetoric 
of Historicist self-announcement previously discussed here. Both of these buildings 
might be characterized as examples of what could be described as 'Romanism'. Another 
conspicuous example of what Charles Jencks calls 'Postmodern Classicism' (C. Jencks 
1991, 121) would be Philip Johnson's AT&T Tower with its vast Baroque broken 
pediment. Moore's Piazza contains an extraordinary melee of classical allusion from 
chrome Ionic to neon-lit Corinthian. His fascination with the aedicule (C. Jencks 1991, 
67) and impluvium as Historicist tropes create an architectural context of considered 
excess. The Doric metopes, which in the Piazza deliver water, Moore called 'wetopes' in 
the spirit of parodic subversion. Graves's Disney Centre has, extraordinarily, a 'classical' 
fayade with dwarfs from Snow White as caryatids supporting the pediment itself. It also 
contains a 'Roman' rotunda and barrel vaults. Both of these buildings, as exemplars, 
work referentially as similes. Both literally represent what they are branding, Italianate 
redevelopment and corporate logo. Both have wit. But neither would make any claim to 
metaphorical, or indeed, metaphysical, seriousness in the sense that metaphor has been 
discussed earlier here. What these edifices represent as the self-evident sensibility of bad 
taste is the rejection of what Robert Venturi called 'the puritanically moral language' of 
the seriousness and earnestness of Modernist architecture and its classical antecedents. 
They are the Nietzschean Dionysian overturning the Apollonian; the triumph of' Stylism' 
and the defeat of architectural reverence. In sharp distinction, Peter Eisenman, for 
example, has always disclaimed this kind of irreverent simile-based postmodern reference 
and looked instead for theoretical accounts of form which led in his case to 
deconstruction, but certainly in the case of other late-phase postmodernists such as 
Koolhaas, Hadid, Tschumi and Libeskind, for example, towards poststructuralist theory. 
In terms of Venturi's typology in Learning From Las Vegas, both the Piazza d'Italia 
and the Disney Centre are decorated sheds; building and space with external signage. In 
this sense, they are highly postmodern because they avoid Modernist expressive form as a 
decorated version of their function. However, in an intriguing juxtaposition, it is Frank 
Gehry at Bilbao who introduces the drama of the folded, gestural building becoming 
sculptural, and in that sense reiterates the modernist duck. The clip-on signage of 
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Venturi's decorated shed, semiotically liberating as it was in the past (C. Jencks 1991, 
159) has itself been superseded as merely collagist decor by buildings begun in the 
nineteen nineties and beyond which are philosophically existential (not, obviously, in the 
. sense of Sartre's Existentialism) and have something of Heidegger's 'Being' as well as 
'Dwelling'. The proximity of Moore's Piazza to a self-declaration of kitsch, not only puts 
it into a different universe of sensibility from Greenberg's Modernist epiphany, but also 
from the new sobriety of the Poststructuralists. It is almost as if the Puritanism that 
Venturi rejected in his Gentle Manifesto as the unacceptable face of Modernism, returns 
in poststructuralist form as a kind of restrained pluralism after the self-imposed stylistic 
excess of the previously emergent phase of postmodern architecture. 
The 'noise' of first-phase postmodernism as rhetorical historicism as a form of ironic 
posturing and parody which here is characterized as theatricality, bears comment in 
William Curtis's Modern Architecture Since 1900, now widely regarded as the standard 
reference text. 
Despite the noisy proclamations of 'postmodernists' in the early 1980s about the end of 
an era, their actual vocabularies involved little more than the sticking-together of pre-
existing pieces of modem architecture, with appliques here and there of skin-deep 
historicism. This scarcely amounted to a basic critique; it was rather a change of 
clothes. By contrast, the inventions of the masters, ofLe Corbusier and Wright in part-
icular, altered the very special anatomy of design and constituted a fundamental re-
organization ofthe deep structures .... ofthe medium itself. (W.J Curtis 1996,687) 
This commentary might well be a form of disapprobation, and is reminiscent of the 
position of David Harvey in The Condition of Postmodernity that Modernism retained an 
authentic centre (D. Harvey 1990, 359) or that of Jurgen Habermas in Modernity - An 
Incomplete Project (J. Habermas in Harrison and Wood, Eds 1995, 1000-1008) that 
modernity is not yet worked out. Similarly, Peter Eisenman initially held an important 
position between the remnants of Modernism and the emergent Postmodernism of the 
nineteen seventies and eighties. As a member of the New York Five, Eisenman's Houses 
I-XI played on a deconstructed Cubism in a similar way to Richard Meier's Neo-Purism 
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of Corbusian white form. Eisenman has argued that Modernism represented an Hegelian 
authenticity which created the dominant historical term from dialectical and binary 
opposition such as function and form or structure and decoration (P. Eisenman in C. 
Papadakis, Ed, 1988, 6). He suggests that since Modernism cannot address the 
complexity and pluralism of new postwar culture, then architecture, like film, music or 
literature must fmd its own post-Hegelian foundation. Instead, Postmodernism (that is of 
the nineteen eighties) has avoided the post-Hegelian challenge, the challenge of avoiding 
the dialectical either-or in favour of a search for historical authenticity. 'Each [literature, 
film, music and so on] has reconceptualized the world in its own way in what might be 
called post-Hegelian terms. What has been called Post-Modernism in architecture, a 
blatant nostalgia for the lost aura of the authentic, the true and original, has specifically 
avoided this most important task.'(C. Papadakis 1988, 7) Eisenman's prescription is to 
penetrate metaphor for a state of catachresis; that is to instantiate the trope of the 
condition of 'the between' of the similar but 'incorrect' term as a means of destabilizing 
the dialectical nature of Hegelianism. This is, of course, a form of 'deconstuction'. In fact 
his nineteen eighties signpost building, the Wexner Center, Ohio, (1983-9) contains 
strong elements of the Modernist grid, 
but deforms and defaces its modernism 
with the historicist castellated forms 
which refer to the historical context of 
the site [Fig 13]. In fact, in terms of 
praxis, Eisenman' s state of catachresis 
was only arrived at by being 
historically derivative. His 'atopia' or 
'placelessness' (W.J. Curtis 1996, 665) 
turns out to be temporal, as the Wexner Center demonstrates. Eisenman's critique of a 
postmodernist 'search for historical authenticity' and 'blatant nostalgia' results in 
affirming the inevitably temporal and recursive, and hence allegorical, nature of the 
postmodern palimpsest. And in fact, what has emerged as 'authentic' in later 
poststructuralist architecture is its acknowledgement of its Modernist origins as a kind of 
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ironic 'Truth To Materials' rather than the florid eclecticism of the earlier Moore and 
Graves period. 
E"isenman's 'between' invokes a condition of atopia or 'placelessness' on either 'side' 
as the particular result of refusing the validity of the Hegelian dialectical opposition of 
either-or. The erosion of 'place' as part of identity and meaning sounds appropriate for a 
postmodern Nietzschean or nihilist deferral of Enlightenment rationalism. Christian 
Norberg-Schulz characterizes Eisenman's 'between' as the Janus-like two faces of 
Postmodernism. One face inevitably contemplates the Modernism from which it is 
descended, whilst the other confronts the Nietzschean drama that' .... the Post-Modern 
condition is characterized by a general loss of intrinsic meaning and that all knowledge is 
'interpretation". (C. Norberg-Schulz in A. Papadakis, Ed 1988, 11-15) Norberg-Schulz 
suggests in a familiar way that the Cartesian dualism of mind versus body created a 
separation between ideas and feelings. The synthesis which will reintroduce meaning into 
form, Norberg-Schulz proposes, is art. 
Art can embody meaning phenomenologically as suggested here in Chapter Three. But 
it is through Heidegger's sense that art in conferring a particular meaning must withhold 
others. It is then through alethia or 'unconcealing' as 'revelation' that the visual image 
disgorges its latent language from which meaning becomes manifested. It has to be said 
that Norberg-Schulz's Heidegerran emphasis on alethia as a source of spiritual 
understanding rather than language can sound both mysterious and transcendental (C. 
Norberg-Schulz in A' Papadakis, Ed 1988, 13). Despite the enormously important 
contribution of Norberg-Schulz to the tradition of Heidegerran phenomenology, 
especially in Existence, Space and Architecture (1971), his oeuvre remains limited [29]. 
His position is one where 'significance' in architectural form does not necessarily 
implicate language. When he does speak of language, he does so in Jencks's terms as a 
language of architecture, a position irreconcilable with that proposed here (A. Papadakis 
1988, 14). 
The avoidance of the c1ip-on eclecticism of the nineteen seventies and eighties with its 
showy theatricality and thinness of meaning was achieved by a concerted theoretical 
concentration which can be broadly represented as poststructuralist. What characterizes 
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this most aptly is the development of a pluralism of non-gridded architectural design in 
the nineteen nineties and beyond involving free-flowing curved or deformed space. If 
'pluralism' and Poststructuralism broadly equate, then what poststructuralist theory 
involves varies from Deconstruction, Phenomenological Hermeneutics, the Monad of 
Liebnitz (the fold), the Allegorical Impulse, the Semiotics of the Metaphorical Sign, 
Language and Visual Form, Visual hermeneutics, Literary Theory, Linguistics and The 
Philosophy of Language and perhaps much else besides. Certainly what is taken to be 
distinctive here is that this proliferation of theory has at its centre a concern for the 
relation between the form of the art-work and language, and how that transmits 
significance and meaning. The plurality of positions which represent 'theory' are all 
subsumed by the allegorical in the sense that the temporal fold which opposes the very 
notion of avant-garde Modernism is essentially a postmodern imperative involving 
always the backward glance and the elegy of a lost past. The position of Terry Eagleton 
in After Theory that Theory has un-theorized itself into embodiment nevertheless still 
requires a Theory of No-Theory (T. Eagleton 2003, 23-41). The present concern here is 
with meaning in postmodern architecture where 'postmodern' equates with 'theory'. 
Whether it is possible to know from within the postmodern as actual members of its 
cultural agency if 'theory' is being superseded into a condition of the post-postmodern is 
a different intellectual inquiry. 
POSTSTRUCTURAL ARCHITECTURE AND THE NEO-THEATRICAL 
Theatricality, it will be recalled, is derived from Michael Fried's defence of optical and 
retinal instantaneity in art, a project parallel to Clement Greenberg's Kantian teleology 
leading to painterly abstraction which denied narrative and attempted to cut out the 
picture plane as in Jackson Pollock's Lavender Mist. Theatricality as the art of 
contrivance can be readily understood as a self-conscious form of rhetoric which is 
inseparable from the self-regarding concept of conspicuous display. The movement away 
from abstraction towards objecthood and the display of the installation we now recognize 
as part of the impetus towards the postmodern. In architecture, there could be no similar 
movement towards objecthood since the building is clearly already in its state an object. 
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Architecturally, display took the form of opposing the decorum of modernist building by 
dressing the early postmodern building in flagrant Historicist tropes. This first phase of 
postmodernist theatricality which initiated the possibility of architectural rhetoric is 
represented here by the exaggerated gestural characteristics of Corbusier's Ronchamp. 
However, the qualitative nature of later theatricality changed as architects became 
interested in the possibilities of Post structuralism and its supporting theory. The rhetoric 
of display became a form of revivified Modernism and was no longer wilfully Historicist 
in the sense that it ceased to be a kind of eclectic stylism. This difference is examined 
with an account of Bernard Tschumi's Villette, Paris. 
It will be readily understood that the meanings of the theoretical components of the 
postmodern such as the Hermeneutics of Visuality, Deconstruction and so on have 
already been extensively discussed in Part One and do not therefore require further 
rehearsal or exposition. 
An important part of theatricality is that experience of it takes place both in time and 
space, like the installation. And it is in the duration of beholding that the theatrical object 
announces its self-rhetoric. Emergent postmodern architecture (Venturi, Moore, Graves) 
took the notion of excess, in contrast to the quietism and decorum of Modernism, and 
made it a version of eclectic Historicism. Its rhetoric is essentially mimetic such as 
Moore's Piazza d'Italia and formed around the parodic copy. But what it conspicuously 
did not do was to acknowledge within its rhetorical display its debt to its parent, 
Modernism itself. Although it remained technologically modern, its 'stylism' was eclectic 
in source ranging from classicism to the Baroque and Rococo and to the typological 
excesses of nineteenth century Romanticism. In contrast, the poststructuralists 
(Libeskind, Koolhaas, Hadid, Eisenman, but Gehry needs placing in his own typological 
drawer) explicitly acknowledge Modernism, and their rhetoric lies in the impetus to 
explode and extend its form but not its ideology. The drama of the exploded Modernist 
form as rhetorically gestural and hence expressive, makes it, paradigmatically, what is 
here designated as neo-theatrical. The newness of this poststructuralist theatricality is 
identified in its play around the morphology of Modernist design; we expect in this 
respect, and indeed find, much steel glass and concrete reminiscent of the modem. 
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Charles Jencks et al have described the drama of later postrnodern architecture as 
'Ecstatic'(C. Jencks 1999, 8-20). The paradigm of the ecstatic according to Jencks is 
Gehfy's Bilbao Guggenheim Museum which is said to inaugurate 'Bilbaoism', a term 
initiated by Peter Eisenman. In a later configuration, Jencks further characterizes such 
architecture of the conspicuous as 'The Iconic Building' (2005) and which is discussed 
later in Chapter Seven. 
The ecstatic in architecture summons up of course Mannerist rule-breaking such as 
Michelangelo's Laurentian Library, Florence, or Palladio's giantism at San Giorgio 
Maggiore, Venice. Its historical apotheosis is perhaps Bernini's statue The Ecstacy of St 
Theresa (N. Coates in C. Jencks 1999, 66-77) amidst the Baroque swirls of Santa Maria 
della Victoria, Rome. It is the Baroque which both Paulo Portoghesi and Robert Venturi 
have identified as a postrnodern source (R. Venturi 1966, 38-9) and which prefigures the 
Deleuzian fold. The difficulty with 'architectural ecstacy', although it makes a good 
theme, is that it is of the essence transitory and palpitated. This does not appear to be the 
natural characteristic of, say, Gehry's Vitra Design Museum, and the unease which 
accompanies this designation of the ecstatic surely arises from the fact that pluralist 
iconic buildings which are Late Postmodernist are inflected by Modernism which 
obviously resists the very idea of architectural spasm and perturbation. It is proposed 
here, that offering an explanation rather than simply an account and one which is based 
on the theatricality of rhetoric is more likely to accommodate the gestural expressionism 
Two. 
181 
of the iconic poststructuralist 
building. However, as may 
become clearer in the next 
chapter, the ascription of the 
iconic to later postmodern 
buildings makes a useful link 
with the Peircean sign 
discussed here in Chapter 
In fact, the Guggenheim plan shows [Fig 14] Bilbao as the perfect example of the 
postmodern palimpsest where the Modernist white cube in a rectilinear block so redolent 
of the Bauhaus, is floriated by the titanium-clad 'petals' which emerge from the core, 
producing the central dramatic ascent of the atrium. This building as an 'event', literally 
overlays the postmodern on to its Modernist foundations as the curve and fold arising 
from the white right-angled Purism of the rectilinear lower galleries which seems to 
suggest that when it comes right down to function, Modernism still has a foundational 
role. Jencks draws an interesting distinction in relation to this building between the 'self-
sameness' of Modernism and the 'self-similarity' of the postmodern. A Modernist 
building such as Mies's Seagram Tower replicates its geometry in a self-repeating rule. 
Postmodernism will seek to deform this inherently grave classicism by replacing classical 
geometry with ' fractal geometry' (' .... fractals, irregular fractured forms that have a 
dynamic mixture of order and chaos known as self-similarity.' C. Jencks 1999, 170-1 and 
also 1997, 11-12). Self-similarity as rhetorical 'enonciation' is, like the postmodern novel 
(D Lodge 1977, 226), a text 
deliberating on its own textuality; 
writing which postulates its own 
conclusive inconclusiveness and 
architecture deferring end-point 
architecture. In other words, and 
in terms already established in 
Chapter Two, it IS meta-
architectural. The arrangements of 
Modernism incorporating the 
gridded right-angle and horizontal striation - think of Denys Lasdun' s National Theatre, 
London - defy the conventional aphorism that there are no right-angles in nature, only 
curves, undulation and fold. In this sense, Modernism has always been an episteme of the 
artificial. In contrast, Poststructuralist architecture in violating the Modernist grid, 
anticipates disorder and displacement in form, and in contrast to the artificial, looks to the 
natural in bends and curves, as Gehry does in spectacular fashion at Bilbao. But it is 
clearly not the case that all Poststructuralist buildings curve, as Zaha Hadid's Science 
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Centre, Wolfsbung, 
Germany 2004 shows 
In equally dramatic 
straight-line fashion. 
And yet in the same 
breath compare Hadid's 
Science Centre with her 
Ordrupgaard Museum, 
Copenhagen 2005 whose curved embodiment seems to engender the feminine and it 
becomes clear that 'pluralism' means precisely a synthetic inclusiveness [Figs 16 and 17] . 
This, then, is an architecture which retains the artificiality of modernist reinforced 
concrete, steel and glass, but which equally, and in one sense defiantly, opposes the 
artificial with the curve as the paradigm of the natural. The fact that Pluralism can enfold 
both the artificial and the natural in one form becomes a familiar, and 'double-coded' , 
anti-dialectical postmodern trope. 
The almost startling neo-theatricality of Gehry's Bilbao contrasts strongly with the 
earlier and more contained gestural expressionism of his Vitra Design Museum where the 
curved folded form in his oeuvre first substantially appears. The semantic significance at 
Bilbao however is confined to the simile rather than to the full metaphorical resonance at 
Vitra and the quite extraordinary references of the Nederlanden Building, Prague, both 
discussed in Chapter Six. As what has become the exemplar of postmodemist rhetorical 
self-inflection and theatrical drama, Bilbao has produced the reservation that it signifies 
itself rather than the whole point of the museum, the art that it contains (C. Jencks 1999, 
19); that its very self-annunciation of form disparages its avowed junctional intention to 
be a museum of art. The predisposition of postmodemist architecture to tendentiously 
express its rhetorical theatricality so overtly and so to exaggerate form over function does 
not require a value-judgement about its merits as architecture. There is no possible basis 
for saying that Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum, Berlin for example, is a 'better' 
building than Gehry's Bilbao, merely that it is a differently enriched form of cultural 
context and experience. The variety in the richness of that cultural experience in terms of 
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meaning and the semantic resonance of the two buildings is represented by the 
observation that the Jewish Museum engages profoundly with the allegorical as 
remembrance, whereas the dominance of the form at Bilbao makes the building 
allegorical only in the sense of being Historicist. That is, it represents the temporal 
palimpsest of the postmodern folded back over (literally) the modem. Its imagery and 
iconography is that of the simile such as 'flower', 'petals', 'ship' 'cathedral' and so on 
(C. Jenks 1999, 168). In the light of the earlier discussion here of the abyss apparently 
separating the visual from the semantic, image and word, it is tempting, if speculative, to 
characterize the Modernist inflection in poststructuralist architecture as visual silence and 
the postmodern element as the sound of the address to referential meaning. As if the 
right-angled white Cubism of Gehry's lower galleries at Bilbao signify as silent Vitruvian 
decorum whilst the 'ecstacy' of the flowering titanium above almost demands the 
language of the analogue. 
The Pluralism which associates with poststructuralist architecture does not seem to 
represent one coherent theoretical position, let alone any commonality of build. But 
although internationally important architects such as Foster and Rogers have abjured 
theory in favour of Late Modernist simile-based Hi-Tech, what at least links 
poststructuralist practice, with the important exception of Frank Gehry, is an 
underpinning reliance on theory itself as the point of inception. The demands of unit 
costs, materials and site will always be principle considerations. But the emergent form is 
no longer produced by the demands of function. Indeed, the resultant forms may be in an 
almost Dadaist fashion 'anti-architectural' in generating deformation and 'bad space', 
neither of which are functional, and both of which may be considered to be anti-humanist 
and anti-utilitarian in the sense that beholders of and participants in the building as an 
event are necessarily required to negotiate it rather than be conducted through it as in the 
Corbusian or Modernist grid (Anthony Vidler 1992, 140-3). In many ways, the influence 
of the Architectural Association, London, and the Institute For Architecture and Urban 
Studies, New York, has proved to be decisively important. Both Tschumi and Koolhaas 
(who in tum taught Zaha Hadid) taught at the A.A. and in New York, the lA.U.A. was 
directed initially by Eisenman who in tum was an influence on Libeskind (Aaron Betsky 
1990, 61-2). 
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The influences here are highly heterogeneous. Peter Eisenman has moved through 
Chomskyan syntactic structures, Deconstruction and Deleuzian fold-theory. Libeskind 
has' derived much from Heideggeran hermeneutics, and Zaha Hadid, like Bernard 
Tschumi, has been powerfully influenced by Russian Constructivism. Both Koolhaas in 
Delirious New York and Tschumi In The Manhattan Transcripts dealt 
phenomenologically with the experiential chaos and non-rational character of the city. 
Neither were practical building projects, both were expositional theory (A. Betsky 1990, 
64-8). The experience of dislocated and deformed space, particularly in the urban setting, 
becomes another version of the uncanny. It was previously noted that Baudelaire 
represented the ironic moment as a form of doubling in which an involuntary 
Schadenfreude uncannily asserts itself. Equally, Walter Benjamin's characterization of 
the ruin as quintessential embodiment of the allegorical always has the capacity to disturb 
(A. Vidler 1992, 4-5). Ruins represent not just memory, but dangerous memory. In an 
insistent memory of Modernist Cubism, the deformed poststructuralist architectural 
volume is apt not only to produce a sense of strangeness, but also displacement and 
Marxist alienation. Libeskind's large void at the Jewish Museum is disturbing and dark at 
the same time, both darkly disturbing and disturbingly dark. It would seem that the 
experience of the allegorical as the metaphorical ruin of time is also an encounter with the 
uncanny. Hal Foster's location in Compulsive Beauty (H. Foster 1993) of the uncanny in 
the frightening presence of 'something else' as Freudian Unheimliche or the un-homely, 
finds its ground in the tales of Hoffman or Grimm. 
When two historical imperatives become oppositional and co-present in the same 
context, the impact on the spectator of disturbance and the uncanny is inevitable. It is also 
a temporal disturbance, such as two historically different modes inhabiting the same 
space at the same time. Time, for a moment, is metaphorically ruined. In considering the 
trace of the postmodern architectural imperative, the opening assault on Modernist 
Purism, which in its Brutalist manifestation was becoming international by 1950, came 
from the author of the architecturally pure himself; no less than Corbusier. Ronchamp 
(1950-4) was suddenly the drama of a violation of origin and de-canonization. If anyone 
building may be said to announce the postmodern, it is Ronchamp. It is the doubling of 
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the familiar in Corbusier of the white stucco and typically Corbusian forms such as the 
vestigial campanile compared with the gestural reference of the roof and ground plan 
which both astonishes and unsettles. The conflation at Ronchamp of past and present is in 
a sense, the ruin of and nostalgia for earlier forms defaced by the sudden rhetorical 
gesture of the new shape. It is Ronchamp which first rhetorically synthesizes the old 
Modernist planar Cubism with new folded and curved forms. The ground plan which at 
one end is amoebic and at the other pointed and prow-like [30], defies the Modernist grid 
by being 'hollow' (W.J. Curtis 1996, 420) and containing an unsettling floor which 
slopes rhetorically towards the east end. Once the beholder has realised that the physical 
gap between wall and roof allowing the entry of light is a further parody of and play on 
Functionalism, then the building emerges ever more strongly as gestural sculpture. There 
may indeed be the residual silence of modernist restraint present, but there is also the 
unmistakeable presence of theatricality when the physical form becomes theatre-like not 
simply as an arena for Catholic liturgy, but as architectural drama. Once the tenuous 
relation between wall and roof has been appreciated as a play on a Modernist base 
supporting the roof simile, then Ronchamp becomes proleptic for the flowering of Frank 
Gehry's roof on its Modernist galleries below at Bilbao. Ronchamp also hints at 
Historicism. The pierced wall fenestration which exposes the thickness of the wall and 
doubles as niches at the expense of the typical Corbusian strip window, suggests the 
Romanesque, rather like the deliberate textural roughness of the concrete stucco. The 
amoeba-like form of the east end further prompts reference to the apse and ambulatory, 
while the side chapels which are a requirement of Catholic liturgy, might also pun on the 
side aisles of the Carolingian basilica-form. Although there may be other Historicist 
instances (Curtis 1996, 421-2) suggestive of an ancient place (the similarity to the 
approach to the Parthenon), Ronchamp is innovative of postmodern reference in a strictly 
simile-based way. It may represent the allegorical as a Christian building (see also 
Chapter Six) but it does not dissemble temporally between absent presence and present 
absence. Nevertheless it is part of the immense significance of Ronchamp that it 
abrogates Modernist straight-line, right-angled grid forms and announces the possibility 
of Baroque drama and theatre. It is also the case that Ronchamp so profoundly displaces 
Modernist ideology that the experience of it as a building by Corbusier creates both 
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cognitive and aesthetic confusion verging on the disquiet of the uncanny. Not for nothing 
did James Stirling, architect of the modernistic iconic Leicester Engineering Building but 
later himself a leader of British Postmodernism, question the 'mannerism' and 'conscious 
imperfection' of Ronchamp and wonder whether it 'should influence the course of 
modern architecture'. (Curtis 1996, 420) Extraordinarily, it is Ronchamp as Corbusian 
self-inversion, literally ascending from its Purist foundation, which ushers in the era of 
theatricality in architecture. 
Theatricality as the drama of the unexpected surprise is most obviously present in the 
rhetorical pose of earlier Postmodernism in architects such as Moore and Graves. This 
impetus towards posture and display would presumably to have led eventually to an 
architecture of both the preposterous and the Disneyfied. It was of course the rise of 
theory in what here is classified as Poststructuralist Architecture which nullified the more 
extreme populism of the nineteen eighties and before. The demise of the nakedly 
Historicist postmodern building has led some to suppose that this closure represented the 
end of the postmodern itself (W.J. Curtis 1996, 602). In fact, as Chapter Three here 
proposes, what took place was not death but transfiguration. The distinction is between 
what was earlier established as latent rather than manifest; between immanence rather 
than concupiscence, or even between the Nietzschean Apollonian rather than the 
Dionysian. 
It then becomes important to identify what it 
is about 'theory' that allows us to even consider 
representing later postmodernist architecture as 
Poststructuralist and to establish among the 
individual strands of 'Pluralism ', some 
commonality. At the Parc de la Villette, Paris, 
(1984-90) Bernard Tschumi effectively declared 
a manifesto. And the fact that Villette involved 
both Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman 
indicated what kind of theory might prevail and 
become superordinate. The superimposition of 
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Tschumi's points, lines and planes in a fonn of spatial palimpsest [Fig 15] creates what 
Anthony Vidler in The Architectural Uncanny (1992) calls the 'Villette-board'. The 
allusion here is to 'game' and 'play'. Part of the layering is a grid of red-painted steel 
constructions in the fonn of cubes which obviously refer to Russian Constructivism and 
which are therefore in a manner of speaking historical plagiarism and which are recursive 
in a familiar postmodernist way. But part of the 'play' here is that in direct contravention 
of Constructivist principles of praxis, they are self-consciously 'useless' and non-
functional. The grid of these 'follies' creates the template of the 'board' and 'game', but 
then ruins the rationality of the grid by rendering it purposeless and traversed by paths 
and walkways which go nowhere in particular and which are therefore 'aimless'. If 
Villette is a kind of bizarre architecturally conceptual board game, then among the follies 
(French folie 'mad') as 'pieces' are the empty spaces - les cases vide - required for 
'play'. The play here is on absence among presence; Constructivism as both absent and 
present temporally (A. Vidler 1992, 101). In tum this of course implicates the allegorical, 
but in a wider sense what is invoked here is Heidegger's 'unconcealing' as an aspect of 
Deconstruction. It is Deconstruction which has been an underlying common attitude 
which unites the Poststructuralist response in architecture and which has generated 
theoretical views about actual form rather than being simply a version of fashionable 
radical chic. The frozen fonnalist gesture of the Villette follies creates an almost eerie 
uncanniness. Time, in its Newtonian sense as flowing inexorably from a past and through 
a present to some future is suspended (A. Vidler 1992, 102) and becomes a personal 
experience of the uncanny as an aspect of Bergson's 'duration' in which the predilections 
of the follies to disturb becomes palpable. The psychological unease in the presence of 
impractical gestures in the 'absent presence' of Constructivism is a result of the forward 
temporal flow of Constructivist ideology violated by the 'blind' backward glance of the 
follies. There is a persistent deferral of definitive meaning. The follies are not beautiful 
by design, but pun on the engineering of the girders which, in an obvious Constructivist 
reference, constitute them. There is no parergon of embellishment and ornamentation, 
only an apparent functionality that is wholly non-functional; anything resembling Kantian 
beauty is bracketed by the sheer embodiment of the steel. 
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In citing Hassan's model of conceptual antinomy in Chapter Three, it becomes clear 
that Postmodernism does not simply establish dialectical opposition between modernist 
and postmodernist principles. There is as a procedure fundamental to the postmodern 
involving a different ordering of priorities and a reversal of established imperatives. Thus 
Modernist metonymy and contiguity is replaced by a postmodernist emphasis on 
metaphor, the allegorical replaces the simile and famously, Derrida reverses the polarity 
between the Saussurean tradition of the domination of speech, including historical 
rhetoric, and writing. In one conceptual sense, then, writing carries the characteristic of 
silence where speech is necessarily of the audible. However, it is of the greatest 
importance here to note that it is indeed through, as it were, the rhetoric and 'noise' of 
speaking that postmodern architecture means [31]. Nevertheless, it is clearly the case that 
Theory is a form of written discourse, and in that sense Tschumi's reversal of the 
functional nature of Constructivism into the empty presence of the non-functional follies 
at Villette is a form of inscription. The inscription is not a form of narrative, but 
Tschumi's historical Constructivist 'ruin' seems to be the site of the site of the uncanny 
as a kind of temporal 'haunting'. 
If Postmodernism necessarily contains Modernism, in the way, for example, the follies 
at Villette 'contain' Constructivism, then the epistemological imperative for the 
postmodernist 'text' must be for the audibility of rhetorical speech to be overlaid on to 
the silence of inscription. The reversal of emphasis in Deconstruction is not the 
ideological exclusion of one episteme to be totally replaced by that which supersedes it. 
This leads to the non sequitur of either/or which cannot be since Postmodernism both 
contains and is contained in tum by Modernism. 
Derrida addresses indirectly the problem of meaning in architecture in 'Force and 
Signification' in Writing And Difforence (1. Derrida 1978, 3-30). Derrida's position 
which reiterates that of Paul Ricoeur, is that philosophy, by which he means the 
metaphysics of the Analytical Tradition, cannot escape metaphor, especially architectural 
metaphor like 'structure' because its language is itself irredeemably metaphorical; that 
the terms philosophical discourse must use to defeat metaphor are patently metaphorical 
themselves, such as 'support', 'higher' and 'lower' and 'ground' and 'foundation', an 
embedded attribute explored extensively in Lakoff and Johnson's Metaphors We Live By 
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(G. Lakoff and M. Johnson 1980,26-30). Mark Wigley in Derrida's Haunts also makes 
this point [18]. 'Derrida's work would go on to repeatedly demonstrate that metaphysics 
constitutes itself with the very metaphors it claims to have abandoned as 'mere' 
metaphors .... Philosophy can only define a part of itself as non-metaphorical by 
employing the architectural metaphor'. (M. Wigley 1993, 18) The deconstructive 
architectural metaphor par excellence is the play between absence and presence which 
always inaugurates the trace of the temporal and the dissembling appearance of the 
allegorical. In speaking of meaning inherent in the follies at Villette, Derrida 
acknowledges that 'historicism' is a form of nostalgia but that the follies inevitably 
'dislocate' origin (J. Derrida in N. Leach, Ed, 1997,327). He speaks of a postulation: 
, ... . architecture must have a meaning, it must present it and, through it, signify. The 
signifying or symbolical value of this meaning must direct the structure and syntax, the 
form and function of architecture. It must direct itfrom outside, according to a prin-
ciple (arche), a fundamental or foundation, a transcendence or finality (telos) whose 
locations are not themselves architectural.' (Point De Folie - Maintenant L 'Architec-
ture in N. Leach 1997,326-7, original emphasis) 
It is noteworthy that Derrida in coupling 'syntax' with the 'function of architecture' 
subscribes to the view opposed here that function is somehow architecturally linguistic. 
However, in another and important sense, Derrida catches the 'theory' in poststructuralist 
architecture by insisting that the form and function of architecture is externally mediated 
by a foundational argument that is not of itself architectural. Derrida further proposes that 
what follows must embrace Heidegger's 'dwelling', with both nostalgia and architectural 
order, and what is more, 'Regardless of mode, period or dominant style, this order 
ultimately depends on the fine arts. The value of beauty, harmony and totality still 
reigns.' (N. Leach 1997, 327) Despite Derrida's sometimes gnomic expression, it is 
interesting that what emerges is not a wholesale deconstruction of the binary pairing of 
the beautiful versus the ugly; that the ugly, or at least the banal and non-beautiful, 
necessarily comes to subsume the beautiful as a reversed result of 'deconstruction'. It 
may do as an aesthetic procedure rather as Emin's Bed does, and thereby express 
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conceptual meaning as an installation rather than dwell on formal arrangement, but the 
possibility of beautiful form in architecture remains intact, and within the poststructuralist 
sensibility. Thus the widespread appreciation of Gehry's Bilbao Guggenheim does not 
only represent an almost sublime awe at the building's rather breathtaking meta-
architectural self-reference, but also an appreciation of the aesthetic, or beautiful, quality 
of its natural forms. Although it has become an event, it remains significant form. In 
speaking of beauty and harmony, Derrida is invoking the Vitruvian classical value of 
order, and specifically, architectural order. In this he opposes no less than Kant, who in 
The Critique Of Judgement relegates architecture to the inferior as art because of its 
dependence on utilitas and materiality which is aesthetically transcended by the 
inherently superior content of painting. Architecture then is understood by Kant to be 
utilitarian and dependent on embellishment and ornament rather than being intrinsically 
aesthetic (M. Wigley 1993, 12). 
So what is being suggested is that there is a loose and highly varied kind of 
deconstructive architectural theory which may well be approximate but which 
nevertheless is a unifying thread in poststructuralist practice. Just as it is impossible to 
detect an underlying architectural imperative which somehow bonded together all the 
competing revivals of the mid-nineteenth century, so it might seem equally tentative to 
accord to poststructuralist architecture a deep-structural organizing principle which is 
characteristically deconstructionist. Nevertheless, the nineteenth revivals were highly 
eclectic and essentially mimetic - simulations and copies of previous and admired styles 
such as classicism or gothic. Barry produced both the effusive gothic of the Houses of 
Parliament and the severe Greek-Revival classicism of the Reform Club. It might be 
possible to say that the period was eclectic precisely because it was revivalist and 
therefore non-innovatory and regressive. The broadly acknowledged 'pluralism' of 
poststructuralist architecture, rather like nineteenth century eclecticism, has a revivalist 
aspect. The revivalist element in Poststructuralism is the explicit acknowledgement of 
stylistic Modernism, ifnot always its spatial organization, such as Gehry's ordered lower 
Bilbao galleries rising in an increasingly deformed rationalism to the 'bad spaces' of the 
atrium. Arguably, the presence of the modem in architectural Poststructuralism brings 
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with it a Modernist decorum, and to complete the earlier point concerning Kant's 
relegation of architecture to utilitarian function rather than aesthetic form, it connects 
later postmodern buildings to what Derrida characterizes as the continuum of 
architectural order. The Moore-Graves period was conspicuously 'bad-mannered' with its 
self-conscious violation of good taste and it was this flagrant theatricality which mocked 
the quietism and ordered restraint of Modernism. 
The procedures of deconstruction - a deferral of the either/or, the possibility of 
inversion within antinomies and the temporal oscillation between presence and absence 
for example - become variants in a practice in which 'trace' and 'play' form an 
organizing practice. Thus Peter Eisenman deconstructively dislodges the familiar idea of 
'location' into the more dangerous territory of 'dislocation' as a working method 
(Andrew Benjamin in N. Leach, Ed, 1997, 294-5). This is emphatically not a destructive 
procedure in which previously dominant architecture is disinterred and shaken apart. 
Rather, it involves the interrogation of existing models of form in order to 'unconceal' 
their concealed assumptions and contradictions. It then becomes a process of revelation 
from disfigurement; a violation of the sanctity of the architectural norm, and whilst still 
according it respect, or even veneration, nonetheless profanes it. Part of the 
destabilization of architectural 'location' is the dislocation or dislodging of meaning. In 
the sense of the allegorical, commissions of the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries such as the Berlin Jewish commemorations by Libeskind and Eisenman and 
Libeskind's original design for the New York 'Freedom Tower' are overtly concerned 
with remembrance and memory. And of course, museums such as the Vitra, Frankfurt, 
and the Guggenheim, Bilbao, by Gehry are in themselves 'cabinets of curiosities' and as 
such repositories of memory and commemoration. Museum objects are semblances of an 
absent past which is beyond redemption but whose absence is constantly recalled by the 
presence of the artefacts of the museum, and like commemorative buildings, the site of 
mourning (Stephen Bann in L. Cooke and P. Wollen, Eds, 1995,28-9). Amongst the most 
powerful allegorical sites of remembrance and mourning in the built environment are 
Christian churches and cathedrals. The iconography of the church and the postmodern 
museum are discussed in the next chapter. The conceptual process of shaking and 
loosening architectural structures are aspects of 'trace' and not demolition. 
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Deconstruction as an underlying architectural paradigm, albeit complex in its individual 
variety, has been a dominant connective tendency within the 'Pluralism' of the 
Architectural Poststructuralists, a pluralism which has increasingly acknowledged the 
Deleuzian fold and its implications for curved architecture. 
'The unbuilding that is deconstruction is not a form of demolition. It establishes the 
conditions of possibility of the 'tradition of architecture' rather than staging its fall. To 
make a building tremble is precisely not to collapse it by subjecting it to some external 
force, but to explore it from within, even to consolidate the structure, imitating its 
every gesture, faithfully repeating its operations but in a way that exposes its limits, 
opening up its structures or, rather, finding the openings that are already there, the con-
cealed points of weakness .... this is an appropriation of structures that identifies struct-
ural flaws, cracks in the construction that have been systematically disguised, not to 
collapse those structures but, on the contrary, to demonstrate the extent to which the 
structures depend on both these flaws and the way they are disguised. That is, it identi-
fies the structural role of what traditional philosophy would identify as structural flaws 
and, in so doing, displaces rather than dismantles that philosophy.' 
(M. Wigley 1993, 42) 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE READING OF BUILDINGS 
This chapter attempts to read postmodern and poststructuralist architecture in the light 
of the theoretical chapters of Part One which establish the constitutive elements of the 
interpretative model. The themes which have spiralled forward are those enshrined in the 
set of principles enumerated in the Introduction. Thus, for example, the condition of 
gesture, metaphor, allegory and rhetoric, theatricality as a conspicuous aspect of rhetoric, 
the importance of Modernism for the recursive palimpsest of the postmodern as an 
instance of the. allegorical, the central importance of phenomenological embodiment for 
linguistic 'unconcealing', and above all, the insistently difficult relation between aesthetic 
form and language instituted by ut ars poetica form the basis of interpretation of actual 
buildings in this chapter. It is divided into five sections: Sculptural Gesture As Origin, 
Frank Gehry And Remembrance, The Architectural Curve, The Reinscription Of 
Modernism In The Fold and Daniel Libeskind And Building On The Past. What Fish's 
interpretative community might make of this interpretation of significant postmodern 
buildings would depend largely on the assonance and fit between the running theoretical 
themes and the way they are seen to reveal meaning in poststructuralist architectural 
form. 
SCULPTURAL GESTURE AS ORIGIN 
The shape of a building creates its attitude ('a theatrical pose created for effect, a 
position of the body indicating mood or emotion'). Substituting 'building' for 'body' in 
the dictionary definition would not substantially alter the meaning. Shape or pose then 
represents gesture. Gesture then indicates mood which is an important aspect of meaning. 
It was the theatricality of shape and seen with drama in the Baroque which was 
suppressed by Modernism but which re-emerged in Postmodernism. After the initial 
decorative and ornamental historicism of early postmodernist building in the form of its 
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typical clip-on stylism became largely marginal, postmodernist architecture became 
increasingly sculptural in form and therefore increasingly gestural. That meaning attaches 
to architectural gesture is first demonstrated by the emergence of the definitive shape and 
orientation of the Christian church with its powerful allegorical inflections and 
significance built into and embodied in its east-west alignment. This section looks at the 
huge importance of the church and its implications for the postmodern and further seeks 
to elaborate the significance of gesture as meaning by assessing Susan Langer's theory of 
gesture in Feeling And Form. There is also an important distinction drawn between 
commemorative buildings which instantiate the allegorical and the buildings of the 
'Bilbaoist' tendency which do not. 
Ronchamp is widely recognized as the precursive postmodemist building (C. Jencks 
2005, 56-63). It is highly significant that Corbusier, in introducing sculptural expression, 
did so by embodying that process in the form of a church. The church is the prequel for 
the postmodem building as a semantic signifier. It is the church which as a built form first 
establishes in its richness of reference and symbolism the possibility of a building 
embodying the allegorical. And 'embody' here has a literal connotation with the constant 
allusion to the presence and body of Christ. It is the church, as Corbusier acknowledges at 
Ronchamp, which prefigures and creates the possibility of a building as a form of 
meaning. The earlier basilica-form from which it emerged was classical and pre-Christian 
and acted as a public building from which justice was dispensed (W. Fleming 1995, 128-
9). Pre-Christian classical buildings of course might contain metaphorical elements such 
as Corinthian columns as mimetic of trees and other similes such as caryatids, but it is the 
church in which the whole building resonates semantically. The original entrance to the 
Roman basilica was the narthex, a kind of public vestibule for gathering, and later the 
main entrance to the Christian church prior to the establishment of the Romanesque 
tradition of a southern porch entrance (1. Curl 1999, 58-9). The apse of the Roman 
basilica was originally located on one of the long sides with a lateral transept at the end 
opposite to the narthex. It was from the apse that the Roman magistrate presided and 
dispensed justice. In an act of dramatic transformation, the church moved the apse to the 
centre of the transept, thus creating a 'head' looking west towards the darkness of the 
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setting sun (Son) and creating the church building as a representation of the body of 
Christ with the outstretched arms of the transept as mimetic of the crucifixion. Christ as 
Pantocrator, the universal ruler, emerged from the prior judicial magistracy of the Roman 
apse (E. Griffiths, The Guardian, 24.12.05). 
The allegories enshrined in the metaphorical themes of the building in its east/west 
orientation of light and darkness and death and rebirth, constantly met at each dusk and 
dawn, created the precedent for the building to mean and signify as built visual metaphor. 
It will be noted that the building as a 'body' with the apse as 'head' and transepts as 
'arms outstretched' is, in terms of visual metaphor, metonymic and simile-based in the 
sense that the old modified basilica-form physically resembled the prostrate Christ. It is 
the initial physical appearance, rather like Libeskind's fenestration in the Jewish 
Museum, which is metonymically contiguous and prompts the reading of death and 
resurrection, despair and hope as language emerging allegorically as a metaphorical 
overlay from the building-form. It is conspicuously not the case that this emergent 
language is an example of a Charles Jencks-like 'language of the church building'. In a 
further contiguous arrangement, the 'body' of the church, or nave, is the public aspect of 
the building. Beyond the transepts and crossing in the choir, or originally the sacristy, the 
public are excluded in the intensely private moment of consecration of the Host. In 
Anglo-Saxon churches such as Bradford-Upon-A von, the chancel arch is deliberately 
narrowed in order to exclude the laity from the central mystery the more effectively. The 
gesture of outstretched arms can of course signify embrace and welcome as well as 
crucifixion. There is therefore a perhaps unintended irony in that the arms of the transept 
also represent the crossing between choir and nave, public and private, and that the 
welcoming arms secondarily form the barrier between the two in a reversal of meaning 
which speaks of exclusion rather than welcome. And it was at the crossing, under the 
rood screen, that the sacrificial drama [33] of the Mass was confirmed by the present 
absence of bread and wine as 'body' and 'blood', finally made public in the act of 
communion. What is consecrated is sacrifice and remembrance, which makes the church 
oscillate temporally between absence and presence, and it is its commemorati ve function 
which makes it monumental. In this sense, an important distinction needs to be drawn 
between commemoratively monumental buildings in the postmodem such as the Jewish 
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Museum on the one hand and buildings of the 'Bilbaoist' tendency on the other such as 
Rem Koolhaas's CCTV Building, Beijing. Although both are examples of the 
postmodern imperative of the recursively allegorical, one contains the tendency to 
allegorize and 'preach', and the other, as an exemplar of the 'propaganda of branding' , 
not. The distinction between the commemorative in buildings and those that are iconic 
because visually they represent theatrical spectacle, is the basis for distinguishing 
buildings which allegorize and those which are stylistic members of the general 
postmodern imperative towards the allegorical. The foundation for this general tendency 
in postmodernism towards the allegorical remains Craig Owens's 'The Allegorical 
Imperative'. The one has intrinsic inner meaning, like the church, and the other, 
extrinsically, becomes representative and may be associated with a particular 
neighbourhood, city, region and even a nationality such as Utzon's Sydney Opera House. 
Although it might be expected that buildings which allegorize might be characterized by 
a formal modesty, this is far from the case as cathedrals demonstrate. An intrinsically 
allegorizing building such as Libeskind's Imperial War Museum of the North, 
Manchester, nonetheless, and in the same way, signals a particularly powerful iconic 
presence. The allegorizing building has to assume a dual existence, an oxymoron both of 
memory and matter, idea and substance. It metaphorically commemorates and 
transmogrifies absence into presence. 
Pre-Christian 'religious' buildings such as the pyramids or the Parthenon, for example, 
do not dissemble about an absent presence, but were literalist. The Parthenon contained 
an enormous statue of Athena in its naos, and the pyramid was essentially a mausoleum 
containing physical accoutrements to serve in the afterlife (V. Gibberd 1990, 12-16). 
Whether the source was the rectilinear cross-shape of the western church building or the 
central dome with four apses off in the eastern Byzantine tradition, the cross became the 
present symbol of the allegory of death and resurrection. The Byzantine tradition of the 
dome was of course conspicuously followed during the Renaissance with Brunelleschi's 
Duomo at Florence, during the Mannerist period with Bramante's St Peter's, Rome, and 
in the Baroque at St Paul's, London. The extraordinary achievement of the symmetrical 
cross, achieved with central dome with attached apses, is realized notably at Santa 
Sophia, Constantinople, by the use of pendentives (V. Gibberd 1990, 25). At any rate, 
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whatever the tradition, and whatever the synthesis between east and west, what remained 
essential throughout was the powerful iconography of the cross, expressed in the church 
building as commemoration and memory. And the Gothic achievement of greater height 
afforded by the buttress and the pointed arch not only facilitated the vertical symbolic 
thrust of 'uplifting', but allowed the creation of the glass wall fenestration of stained glass 
which visually depicted the narratives of faith and belief for an illiterate laity. 
Significantly, the cruciform disposition of the church emphasizes the importance of 
shape as gesture. We are reminded of Lessing's theory of gesture as a form of meaning in 
his insistence that Laocoon does not cry out, but expresses a stoic resignation and heroic 
suffering as qualities emerging from the statuary. And to reinforce an earlier point, 
Lessing's insistence on Laocoon's very silence indicates that there is no 'language of 
sculpture' as William Tucker proposed in The Language of Sculpture (William Tucker 
1974, 7) but only language that proceeds from the gestural suggestion of the form. In the 
same way, the shape of the building, particularly in its postmodern forms, and 
constitutive of its gesture, is an important part of its rhetorical meaning. 
In a neglected passage in Feeling and Form (1953), Susan Langer produces a complex 
theory of gesture as meaning, and in her case, particularly in relation to dance and 
movement. Buildings like dancers, then, may be said to pose. Any pose reveals an 
underlying attitude. Forward-leaning gesture may be understood as representative of 
assertion or even aggression, whereas reclining gesture suggests acquiescence or even 
submission, and so on. Gestural meaning may well be characterized by ambiguity, which 
then becomes in postmodemist architecture at least, what Charles Jencks calls 'the 
enigmatic signifier' of the familiar double-code (C. Jencks 2005, 21). Such enigmatic 
signification then becomes subject to readings by interpretative communities. 'Attitude', 
as suggested by gestural configuration, is recessive in Modernism as anti-referential and 
anti-metaphorical, and emergent and dominant in postmodern architecture. Fairly 
obviously, gesture suggests movement, or at least the end-point of movement, or a 
'frozen' moment in mid-gesture such as Laocoon's. Equally, Modernist sculptural 
assemblages such as Anthony Caro's or the content of Abstract Expressionist painting 
such as Jackson Pollock's flicks and drips are representative of such frozen moments. It is 
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worthy of note that Langer locates gestural meaning securely within dance which of 
course is highly theatrical; it therefore comes as no surprise that gesture correlates 
strongly with theatricality. Thus in architecture we should expect to find that highly 
gestural buildings tend to be versions of the theatrical in Michael Fried's specific sense 
[34]. It has been noted that the highly gestural content of the Abstract Expressionists' 
action painting initially drew on the 'autonomic gesture' of Surrealism but that later their 
expression became intensely personal and became characterized instead by 'autographic 
gesture', almost as personal signature (H. Foster, R. Krauss et ai, Eds 2004, 351). 
'Signature buildings' such as Gehry's 'Bilbaoism' may indeed appear to defy historical 
or genre tradition in favour of idiosyncratic form gesturally and are therefore sculpturally 
formed. In photography, the frozen moment is exemplified by Cartier Bresson's 
invocation of 'the decisive moment' as caught gesture. In architecture, Frank Gehry's 
Nederlanden Building, Prague, embodies dramatic reciprocal gesture in the interlocked 
'Ginger and Fred' forms. There is implied movement, but as in conventional pictorial 
painting, the figures and shapes must necessarily be 'caught' at one virtual moment in 
time. The 'attitude' in architectural gesture varies from the apparent sardonic air of 
Ginger and Fred to the potentially disconcerting lightning-form of Daniel Libeskind's 
Berlin Jewish Museum as redolent of Nazi insignia. Langer says: 
'Suffice it to say that as soon as a characteristic gesture is strikingly exhibited to 
someone who is not completely absorbed in its practical purpose .... it becomes a 
gestic/arm, and like all articulate forms it tends to assume symbolic functions. 
But a symbol-seeking mind (rather than a purposive, practical one) must seize upon 
it.' (S. Langer 1953, 179, original emphasis) 
She proposes to distinguish between actually apprehended gestures and gesture which 
is prior and virtual. Prior does not mean a priori and therefore transcendental. It means 
that what is expressed as gesture 'begins' as an aspect of the imagination which when 
expressed as gestural form becomes symbolic of the imaginative act from whence the 
gesture originates. Thus we necessarily have virtual and actual gesture, the one as 
originate and the other as successive, but symbolic. The 'attitude' of which the gesture is 
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symbolic is nothing less than feeling. 'Real gesture springs from feeling.' (S. Langer 
1953, 183) Form, then, as gesture, comes from feeling. However, gesture as symbolic 
feeling, is not simply a version of some personal or idiosyncratic expression. 'The 
conscious will that seems to motivate or animate him [the dancer, that is] may be 
imagined to lie beyond his person, which figures as a mere receptacle or even momentary 
concentration of it.. .. (1953, 183) The dancer no more spontaneously invents his 
expressive gesture as just private feeling than does the architect. Both are heir to a 
repertoire of significant form as 'history' which places their respective shape and gesture 
firmly in a public, rather than a private sphere in terms of its origins. Gehry's billowing 
curvilinear forms at the Disney Hall, Los Angeles, refer to the landscape, natural forms 
and 'nature' as much as to his own sculptural imagination. But as Gehry's own Vitra 
Design Museum shows, it is the church in its cruciform gesture which resonates across 
the passing of time and genres and haunts the new gestural and sculptural signification of 
the architecturally postmodern. 
FRANK GEHRY AND REMEMBRANCE 
In terms of trace, the theme of this chapter, it is Frank Gehry first and foremost who 
instigates architectural bending and folding, and so in a sense, anticipates the theoretical 
movement away from simplistic Deconstruction towards the Deleuzean fold and its 
Baroque implications. But Gehry has never been theoretically driven, and is certainly not 
to be considered as a poststructuralist, since this means in essence a kind of architectural 
practice in which the form of the building is influenced directly by theoretical 
consideration. His intuitive influence, however, has clearly been profound. Gehry's 
design practice can be broadly divided up into three phases. The first, given his current 
reputation as author of postmodernist 'Bilbaoism', seems in retrospect to be insistently 
and perhaps surprisingly Modernist. This opening period stretches from 1958 up to the 
work on his own Santa Monica House in 1977. The second phase, which largely 
represents an engagement with architectural Postmodernism, extends to 1987 and the 
Vitra Design Museum. From the Vitra Design Museum onwards, Gehry's development 
has been towards an ever closer approximation of architecture to sculptural expressionism 
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and is characteristic of his third and on-going phase. It is scarcely an exaggeration to 
suggest that it is Gehry' s Vitra Design Museum which extends the gestural qualities of 
Ronchamp and almost single-handed, establishes the sculptural as emblematic of 
architectural Poststructuralism. 
Fig 18 
His first commissions 
were not only perceptibly 
Modernist, but were clearly 
derivative. One of his 
opening commissions, the 
Steeves Residence, 
Brentwood, California [Fig 
18] of 1958 is obviously predicated on Frank Lloyd Wright's Prairie House style with its 
long, low flat laterals and Japanese inflections. Gehry has acknowledged that the model 
for his early house designs was Wright' s Robie House (F. Dal Co and K. Foster, 1998, 
66). The Robie House, 1914, is an internationally acknowledged source of the 
architectural modern and it is not only its functionally-driven laterality to minimize the 
effects of wind in the Illinois and Chicago districts which affected Gehry, but also its 
free-flowing interior space. Wright' s model of hearth and circulating space was an 
essentially American version, and one which subverted the grid-rationalism of the 
European International Style, and one which later mutated into the 'bad space' of 
Gehry's sculptural form. The exaggerated cantilever as a conspicuous Modernist sign, 
and which appears frequently in his early designs, not only derives from Wright but was a 
means by which Gehry could announce the American tradition to which he subscribed 
rather than the European influence of Loos's 'Ornament is crime' edict. Like the 
American Abstract Expressionists with whom he was contemporaneous, Gehry was 
looking to develop and evolve a characteristically American architectural repertoire, 
whilst the Expressionist painters such as Jackson Pollock produced what Clement 
Greenberg called 'American-Type Painting'. Later houses such as the well-known 
Danziger Studio, Hollywood, California of 1964, were severely Modernist and ironically, 
distinctly Loosian, with non-articulated rendered exteriors and in places minimal 
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fenestration and blank walls. Gehry's first large-scale success, Santa Monica Place, 
California, 1972 is extraordinarily idiosyncratic and eclectic. On one facade of this 
immense shopping mall is a vast glass curtain wall, hung and suspended in orthodox 
Miesian fashion rather like his Illinois Institute of Technology. The main fa~ade of the 
building however is rendered in pure white stucco, suggestive both of Meier's Late 
Modem Slick-Tech (C. Jencks 1980, 152) and Corbusier's Purism. The supportingpiloti-
like squared off columns make historicist reference to both Modernism and conventional 
classicism at the same time. But in a further sign, the fa~ade is skewed at an angle to the 
main axis of the building and so disrupting the rational grid; another conspicuous 
example of the skew as a postmodern signature can be found in the disjunction between 
the entrance and galleries within Robert Venturi's National Gallery extension, London. 
Santa Monica Place, then, is partly what Charles Jencks in Late-Modern Architecture, 
1980, describes as 'Late Modernist' in retaining Modernist referencing, but at the same 
time is also double-coded for what emerged as postmodern Historicism; it becomes an 
oxymoron, punning on style and dating (C. Jencks 1980, 50-54). 
Gehry's second phase runs from the transmogrification of his own Santa Monica 
House in 1977 up to, but not including, The Vitra Museum which opened in 1989. The 
Gehry Residence, Santa Monica, has now reached iconic status, but there were the 
precedents discussed earlier, especially Venturi's Vanna Venturi House and the Charles 
Moore House. The Vanna Venturi House plainly deals in ironic parody by the 
dedoublement of entailing both the Modernism from which it emerged and what amounts 
to a satire of it in the familiar palimpsest of absent presence. As a further decisive 
influence on Gehry's Santa Monica House, Moore's Orinda House, which was nearby, 
was already an established source for the disruption of Modernism and was already in the 
nineteen sixties becoming a postmodern paradigm. The Moore House puns vigorously on 
the inside/outside polarity by containing not one but two skewed aedicules. The important 
point here is that the aedicule as part of the Roman villa was an internal reserved space as 
a shrine or inner house within the villa. Moore's appropriation of it as a shower unit was 
candidly humorous and at the same time, frankly a form of affable mockery. The trace 
here is interesting because Moore hit upon the aedicule as inside the inside from Sir John 
Soane's House, London, which has become a postmodern shrine in itself (C. Jencks 1980, 
202 
152). What Moore was doing at Orinda, and what the architectural postmodern has 
continued to do since, was to make the relationship of parts to whole deeply problematic, 
in direct contrast to the logical and rational grid-form of Modernism, by what Venturi 
would have called 'contradiction'. 
Gehry's Santa Monica House has become both an icon and a definitive postmodern 
source because the difficult relation of the parts deny the possibility of a unified and 
coherent whole. Increasingly in Gehry's practice, the expressed importance of the part 
destabilizes the sense of the building as a discrete, singular and whole thing. The way, for 
example, 'roof seems to signify as the building at Bilbao and Disney Hall is a distinct 
break from the inherent Cubism of the earlier Danziger Studio. And 'roof, often with its 
atrium and inner galleries or functioning spaces, no longer means what 'roof 
traditionally did, which Libeskind's Spiral would also demonstrate should it be built. The 
difficulty in addressing the relational parts in the Santa Monica House lies in the fact that 
this is not one house at all; but then nor is it two, although it is certainly aedicular. Its 
aedicular form is of such fractured extremity that what counts as unity is a semblance of 
parts. It is a denial of the totality that dominates. Because the parts are so visually and 
conceptually powerful, each distorted and de-contextualized synecdochical part is a 
metaphor for the distorted whole. The violation of the old shingle house by the new might 
be understood to be deconstructive in some way. But Gehry does not do this. His basic 
position is aesthetic and not theoretical. Gehry does not do Theory. In his introduction to 
the 1992 Vienna Architecture Conference, 'The End Of Architecture?' he hopes the 
contributors such as Zaha Hadid ' ... will make beautiful buildings and will not have to sit 
around and worry about the end of architecture.' (P. Noever, Ed, 1992, 13) 
Deconstructive theory inverts conceptual polarities within the frames of reference of 
language. Gehry's 're-statement' of his House is less a deconstruction than a 
reconstruction; a physical process of imposition. However, whatever Gehry's intention, 
non-theoretical or otherwise, the imposition of one stylistic time-frame on another 
represents a temporal palimpsest and as such has intimations of the allegorical. 
His House was originally a shingle-type. This was the vernacular form that Vincent 
Scully argued represented an American simplicity and modesty of a Jeffersonian kind, 
derived from Jefferson's Palladian Monticello Residence, when vernacular and popular 
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forms were being dismissed as naiVe or kitsch by Modernism. Gehry enclosed and 
Fig 19 extended the shingle house so that 
the postmodern extensions created 
the aedicule. Essentially, the Gehry 
House is wrapped [Fig 19]. This is 
a significant act which contradicts 
the possibility of 'originality' in the 
shingle house which was itself a 
form derived from previous forms 
and which precipitates the trace into 
another poststructuralist-type infinite regress. But Gehry's wrapping, like that of the Land 
Artist, Christo, is an act of concealment (H. Foster, R. Krauss et al 2004, 434-5). What is 
concealed, and metaphorically denied as presence, is nostalgic remembrance, a suburban 
sentimental attachment to historical architectural forms which in Britain has led to the 
Tudorbethan suburban sensibility. Gehry's deployment of materials on the house also 
carries significance. Typically he used corrugated metal, chain-link, and plywood and 
cedar for raw wood-frame construction. These are the materials of the garden shed and 
the lot and by extension, found objects of a Duchampian and Dadaist inception, a 
possibility he picked up from Robert Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns. Gehry's later 
development of sculpturally embodied natural forms was certainly influenced by his 
contacts, not only with Rauschenberg and Johns, but also with sculptors such as Richard 
Serra and Claes Olden berg (0. Boissiere 1990, 29). The invocation of tropes like 
synechdoche and oxymoron and other metaphorical devices such as 'wrapping' or the 
Dadaist-signifying of commonplace materials indicate that Gehry's own expressionist 
tendency was acquiring a distinctly postmodernist referential rhetoric. Whatever Gehry's 
own intention may have been, his own procedures do not exhaust the semantic 
possibilities which may be legitimately overlaid on his own. 
'J wanted to preserve the iconic quality of the existing house and became obsessed 
with having it appear that the existing structure remained intact, captured inside the 
new structure and interacting with it. It was my idea that the old and the new could 
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read as distinct strong, self-conscious statements which could gain from each other 
without compromising themselves .... .1 decided to expose that idea further as I cut 
open the old house and built new sections.' (www.archinform.net/23.01.06) 
Once the original shingle house had been 'violated' and had become part of a 
transformation into something else, then in an important sense it became a metaphorical 
ruin. The original house which was 'cut open', then had its shingle-form quite literally 
ruined, but Gehry was clearly anxious to preserve the memory of the original house 
which as an 'aedicule' became in a certain manner a shrine. This is of course a restitutive 
process which is deeply curatorial, almost turning the original house into a museological 
site of display. (To amplify this point a little, Gehry has had to remodel the front in order 
to preserve some privacy from passing cultural tour busses; F. Dal Co and K. Forster 
1998, 153.) The apparent preservation of the original then becomes temporally a retrieval 
from the past. And the affection for the original and now irretrievable past is a kind of, or 
at least it can be represented as, a type of mourning; almost in fact a kind of expiation and 
atonement for the violated and cut open original, its innocent modesty still preserved 
inside the new form. The shingle house as an object of curiosity then becomes something 
like an object in a museum display case and conforms with Stephen Bann's formulation, 
discussed earlier. 
Gehry's formation of the aedicular structure, that is two doubled as one, by extending 
and wrapping the original house may be seen as a form of commentary. The doubling 
creates two texts; ancient and modem, past and present. The fresh postmodernist text 
inscribed on the older and previous one requires a constant oscillation between the two 
and across time. The new text values the old by keeping, not obliterating it, which is a 
palimpsest-like act of preservation. The old text (shingle house) becomes a 'curiosity' 
inside a metaphorical cabinet, or site of display which is the whole (new) house itself. 
The act of preservation is critical, because what is invoked by such an act is either 
nostalgia or mourning. Nostalgia involves an emotively intuited recovery of the past. The 
nostalgist is constantly veering beyond the frame of nostalgia itself into sentimentality. 
Proust's recreation of the past when, for example, he eats the madeleine is an example of 
recovered memory, the past as Bergson's 'duration'. However, his retrieval of the past, in 
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itself an impossibility of course, always has a tendency to move away from the affection 
for time regained towards the maudlin nature of time lost, which is effectively 
sentimental. Gehry's response to his shingle house indicates an element of nostalgia 
which remains only an aspect of his already marginalized 'intention'. But what is crucial 
is that the commentary by the new house on the old is parodic - that is, for example, that 
the extensive woodwork of the new mimics, not venerates, that of the original. The 
relational tenn between the two is ironic. And, as Baudelaire has amply demonstrated, 
irony is inimitable to kitsch or sentimentality. This oscillation between layers of meaning 
involving past and present with an attitudinising commentary by the latter on the former 
is the condition of the allegorical. Others, more theoretically inclined, such as Venturi 
and Moore, had already made the relationship of inside and out theoretically ambivalent, 
and the window and the wall were assuming the status of Kant's parergon. The 
postmodernist discourse was already 'out there', and the ambiguity and contradiction of 
the intrinsic and the extrinsic which it generated is clearly and obviously exploited by 
Gehry in his Santa Monica House. Despite his intentions, or perhaps rather his lack of 
them, the fonnal conditions of the allegorical are made available by the latent discourse 
which emerges from the structure. Despite his intentions, the fonnal conditions of 
allegory are made available by the structure's 'discourse'. The nature of that discourse 
centres on the notion of the ruin. 
By creating the temporal palimpsest, which Craig Owens has established as the basis 
of allegorical postmodemism, as the imposition of the new structure cut into the old, 
Gehry has literally ruined the original. The earlier discussion here of Walter Benjamin's 
Trauerspiel established that the ruin always creates the condition of allegory. In the sense 
of another paradox or oxymoron, the ruin maintains the illusion of the permanence of 
decay. What is conferred on to the Baroque drama or the landscape setting of the park is a 
kind of faux antiquity, another required suspension of disbelief in which the ruin signifies 
as a visual metaphor which inevitably embraces the tragiC. The ruin exemplifies a lost 
and irretrievable past. What Benjamin, in 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction' called 'aura' (W. Benjamin in C. Harrison and P. Wood Eds 1995, 512-
520) might attach to the ruin as nostalgic ambience. The ruin, or its more contrived 
analogue, the folly, obviously unites another past to some present and comments 
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morosely on the inevitability of decay whilst at the same time defeating it by making 
decay permanent in the contrivance of the folly. In this sense, Gehry's House, in a 
manner of speaking, is a folly. And like the folly, it inevitably commemorates 
remembrance, and equally, like the tomb, the pyramid, the ziggurat, and the memorial, it 
enshrines memory. The fact that Benjamin locates the ruin in seventeenth Baroque drama 
makes the dramatic aspect of the ruined antique folly seem inevitably another aspect of 
Fried's theatricality. In 'Letter To Peter Eisenman', Jacques Derrida comments on 
Benjamin's Trauerspiel: 
'Benjamin's concept of the ruin, which is also the concept ofa certain mourning 
in affirmation, indeed the salvation of the work of art .... if all architecture is finite, if 
it therefore carries within itself the traces of its future destruction, the future perfect 
of its ruin, according to modes that are original each time, if it is haunted, indeed 
signed by the spectral silhouette of this ruin, at work even in the pedestal of its stone, 
in its metal or glass, what would bring the architecture of 'this time' Gust yesterday, 
today, tomorrow; use whatever words you want, 'modem', 'postmodern', 'post-
postmodern' or 'amodern' etc) back to the ruin, to the experience of ' its own' ruin? 
(J. Derrida in D. Neuman et ai, Eds 1994, 26) 
Benjamin emphasizes the fact that the disparate elements of the ruin cannot constitute a 
whole by virtue of being a ruin, and in the Gehry House, such a unity or totality will be 
equally impossible, not only because of the fragmentation of the voids, but because in 
this case, the metaphor of the ruin is only called up by the presence of the new build. Part 
of the rhetoric of the Gehry House is that the presence of the shingle house - the implied 
ruin - must suggest the decay of the new postmodern element too. Much of Gehry's 
materials are persistently shiny, right down to the aluminised corrugated sheeting, chain-
link and the very nuts and bolts. The irony here of course is that shiny materials in 
modernist or postmodernist buildings signify; they are not merely functional, but indicate 
permanence and the defeat of decay, so that a building which shines declares the 
permanence of its newness. On sunny days in Bilbao and Los Angeles, the visitor is 
dazzled by the symphonic quality of the titanium which flows across the external forms 
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of the Guggenheim and Disney Hall. This 
paradox, the permanently new, exists as a 
trope and would seem to oppose its 
antithetical temporal trope, the 
permanence of decay. The allegorical 
punning and oscillating between past and 
present, the ruin and the new, destruction 
and permanence in the Gehry House, 
must mean that the allegorical 
commentary must be both past and 
present at the same time, and yet also 
between past and present in some 
unwritten frame of reference, the nature 
F' of which remains, perhaps, permanently Ig 
elusive. At both Bilbao and Los Angeles, the shining curvatures are comprised precisely 
of titanium or stainless steel shingles or tiles equally hand-applied and overlapping, 
suggestive of the fact that like the retrospection of the Gehry House, the newness of the 
Guggenheim must succumb to what Derrida calls 'the future perfect of its ruin'. 
Gehry's most radical phase began with the Vitra Museum, Weil am Rhein, which opened 
in 1989. There is a good deal of the personal, even biographical, present in the design. In 
front of the building is a large, brightly coloured sculpture by Gehry' s long-time 
collaborators, Claes Oldenburg and Coosje van Bruggen. It was Oldenburg who designed 
the enormous pair of binoculars which constitute the entrance to the ChiatJDay building, 
Venice, California built in 1985. The sculpture, which pre-dates Gehry's museum design 
for the site, originally fronted the pre-existing Nicholas Grimshaw factory complex. The 
factory makes furniture and the Design Museum exists to house the Fehlbaum family 
collection of chairs, and furniture production continues in the Grimshaw building. Gehry 
has been a furniture designer of course, the most famous of which is the 'Easy Edges' 
series of cardboard chairs, one of which is in the Vitra Museum. Gehry' s use of 
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compressed card for furniture manufacture is a typically iconoclastic insistence on using 
the familiar in unfamiliar contexts, and as at the Gehry House, incorporating and 
appropriating commonplace or found material in a crypto-Dadaist or Duchampian way. 
The reference of the Oldenburg sculpture [Fig 20] is clearly towards Russian 
Constructivism, and the piece then becomes an appropriate, if ironic, metaphor for 
construction work in the factory. But in a series of fascinating synechdochal and 
metonymic tropes, Gehry in tum sited the new design Museum directly in front of the 
'Balancing Tools' sculpture so that there is a contiguous relation between building and 
sculpture. By implication, Gehry's building becomes 'sculptural'. Metonymy, as used 
here, means that one term represents the attributes of another - as in 'bottle' representing 
'alcohol'. The physical contiguity of sculpture and building confers on the building the 
attribute of the object it relates to, and so for the first time, 'sculptural' enters Gehry's 
vocabulary. The series of gestures in the forms which constitute the building do not yet 
flow as they do at Bilbao and Los Angeles into a sculptural unity. Vitra comprises 
discrete parts which have the appearance of assemblage, and in this sense, it might be 
said that in terms of its construction, the building is Cubist. That Gehry had not yet 
evolved away from Cubism and its Modernist associations, is further suggested by the 
white stucco which seems to resonate with Corbusian Purism. 
The Vitra Design Museum is full of puns and double meanings. It declares itself 
rhetorically as both architecture and sculpture, both function and art (0. Boissiere 1990, 
25). Its outward references are to Eric Mendohlson's Einstein Tower, Potsdam 1917 and, 
almost inevitably, to Ronchamp (M. Tiller in o. Boissiere 1990, 19-21 and also K. 
Forster in F. Dal Co and K. Forster Eds, 1998, 15). Both of these are of course 
paradigmatic Modernist buildings, although Ronchamp, as the previous discussion 
demonstrated, was incipiently anthropormorphicaIIy referenced. But Ronchamp, like the 
Vitra Museum, is highly expressionist, which became an evolving Gehry trait. So Vitra 
hints at Modernism, but as an evolving postmodernist trope. At one point Gehry said, 'I 
am the last functionalist!' (Boissiere, 25) Its stark whiteness is not just of the Deco and 
Moderne of California or Florida, but is principally a vestigial touch of Corbusian 
Purism. Under Modernism, in the oppositional pairing of 'straight' and 'curved', the 
dominant term of the Modernist grid would be 'straight'. But here the weighting is 
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reversed, so that 'curved' supersedes right-angled straightness as the weighted tenn. 
Gehry may not be an overt Deconstructionist, but the reversing play of the Vitra between 
acknowledging the pristine Modem and the punning metaphors of Postmodernism begins 
to place his tenns of reference as 'poststructuralist' in a fairly loose sense. Certainly 
Gehry's practice as emerging from, but still indebted to Modernism, places his 
architectural context at some distance from the patent Historicism of earlier postmodern 
architecture. Gehry's postmodernist text is a commentary on Modernism which is 
simultaneously an acknowledgement and a deliberate act of subversion. The spiralling 
staircase is a case in point. It is powerfully sinuous and is a clear pun on the mediaeval 
spiral staircase. However, in a further play, it is also serpentine. The spiral staircase then 
becomes synechdochal and as such metaphorically signifies as part for the whole. The 
larger building can then be seen as spiralled and coiled. And in a startling and poetic way 
(the use of a literary tenn here is deliberate), the building spirals and coils up to a 
crucifonn atrium which instantly invokes the Christian iconography of the church. The 
associations thrown up here are inevitably linguistic. As synechdoche, the staircase 
connotes the serpentine 'snake' and a particular garden while the crucifonn atrium 
invokes the attributes of the church. The poetic nature of this visual metaphor (ut ars 
poetica) is a further example of language 'uncoiling' from visual fonn as metaphorical 
meaning, and is another defiance of the naIve simplicity of 'the language of architecture'. 
The snake and the fish assumed a considerable importance for Gehry since both 
demonstrated a natural flexibility in shape. The overlapping scales of both express 
curvature. Hence the shingles of The Gehry House later become scales, conspicuously at 
Bilbao and Los Angeles. Venturi's 'duck' is any building which expresses its function by 
its shape. 'Ducks' are of course similes; a doughnut-shaped building which sells 
doughnuts is a 'duck'. Gehry does not nonnally do ducks. But in order to test the 
practicality of shingling a contemporary building with scales in order to express 
curvature, Gehry built the The Fishdance Restaurant, Kobe Japan, 1987 as, and in the 
literal fonn of, a fish. As part of the restaurant complex, next to the seventy feet high Fish 
is a coiled copper-clad and upwardly spiralling building called The Snake (F. Dal Co and 
K. Forster, 1998, 327). There is an odd metaphorical collocation here because the fish 
and snake are obviously powerful western Christian symbols and equally both are deeply 
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mythical, whilst the fish is emblematic of Gehry's own Jewishness, and all this is situated 
in Japan in a seaside harbour restaurant. This deliberate 'appropriate inappropriateness' is 
a recurring aspect of Gehry's oeuvre and receives its fullest expression in Prague in the 
Nedelanden Building. Within this deliberate confection of Christian and mythical fish 
and snake in a Japanese setting is the conceit of the punning satire with shades of 
Baudelaire behind. 
The snake reappears centrally at Vitra and incidentally at the Bilbao Guggenheim in 
the form of Richard Serra's vast steel sculpture 'Snake'. At the Vitra, the snake 
association triggers the allegorical presence and absence of the remembrance of the 
church itself. 
, You could smile for a moment about the incongruous idea - that the serpentine coils 
of the Vitra writhe two paces away from a row of apple trees .... you will also make 
use of a mediaeval spiral staircase .... You will stop, as if struck by an invisible force 
and raise your eyes to the great cruciform expanse of stained glass .... You will make 
use of a mediaeval staircase. Then you will be in what the artist calls his 'crypt', a 
great white space with a vault with cruciform beams .... You will amuse yourself with 
the idea that this museum is designed like a church with nave, choir, crypt, and 
ambulatory, and if you have a facetious eye, even a sacristy and presbytery'. 
(0. Boissiere 1990, 31-33) 
Gehry's juxtaposition of the snake metaphor next to the nearby fields of apple trees 
conjures up images of the apple, the serpent and some implicitly mythic Eve. That this is 
set in the context of a building which invites itself to be read as 'church', makes 
deciphering it a puzzle, almost a rebus even. The constant oscillation between the 
commentary text and the historicist text, between past and present, and within parts such 
as the 'mediaeval' spiral, doubling as it does as snake and serpent, makes this an 
allegorical experience. Despite Gehry's propensity for punning satire, the allegorical 
inflection at Vitra cannot be 'amused' because it must 'mourn' a ruined past beyond 
recovery and which can only be touched contiguously by metonymic remembrance, like 
Proust's madeleine. It might be that in establishing the sculptural as a poststructuralist 
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episteme of the fold that Gehry has instituted the efficacy of the gesture as the 
embodiment of semantic visual metaphor, and perhaps nowhere more effectively than at 
the Vitra Museum. 
Both the fish as 'body' and the snake as spiralling atrium reappear, although perhaps 
in a formulaic way, at the Bilbao Guggenheim. The Guggenheim, 1991-8, has become a 
ravishing success and the source of local economic and cultural regeneration and now 
further signifies as an economic indicator precisely as an iconic building. In many ways it 
repeats the stylistic mannerism of the Vitra Museum and deploys similar rhetorical 
tropes. Thus we are not surprised by the central metaphor of a flower with its associated 
expanding petals rising and undulating around a central atrium. However, Gehry's 
previous sharp irony and reference may have become modified by the presence of 
metaphorical petals, although the rhetorical anthropormorphism of the dominant 'boat' is 
perhaps more successful given the Guggenheim's marine setting. In a Spanish context, 
the petaVflower form will naturally be read as a rose, the attribute of the Virgin Mary, 
and the building then mimics Vitra with its cruciform internal bracing (Coosje van 
Bruggen 1997, 113). The Guggenheim has a more clearly defined 'nave' than the Vitra, 
and its more linear layout leading to the transept-like structure of its 'east end' suggests 
once more the presence of church - but here as a pagan temple of the visual arts. 
However, there is an element of the populist and formulaic about the Guggenheim which 
is perhaps insistently disconcerting. If the building does contain properties of kitsch, then 
by definition, its populist attributes and mannerisms should be naively unforced. There is 
nonetheless something mimetic at Bilbao, that the spectator is in the presence of a unique 
copy, and the mimesis and second-handness issues from The Sydney Opera House and its 
branding as a national icon [35]. Despite the Modernism of its lower galleries which defer 
display and theatricality as Modernist form, the Guggenheim has abandoned some of the 
inherent modesty and decorum of the Vitra Museum. Be this as it may, the critical and 
popular success of the Guggenheim is beyond dispute, and its influence as 
paradigmatically sculptural makes it omnipresent and eponymous. Its sculptural 
properties insist that it was designed outside-in as much as inside-out, and so reversing 
the form follows function premise of Modernism, but still noticeably incorporating the 
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steel and glass Hi-Tech shine and reflectivity of Late Modernism. The distortion to the 
internal space that 'outside-in' imposes on inside articulation produces what Louis Khan 
called 'bad space' or voids. Daniel Libeskind has spoken of the intense metaphorical 
compression of voids at his Berlin Jewish Museum (see below) and voids and bad space 
have become congruous with Deconstructionist Architecture. Peter Eisenman has 
similarly produced distortions to inner space in his sequence House 1-10. There is a 
significant play on absence and presence. In terms of 'differance', Derrida has written of 
'the metaphysics of presence' in a familiar way here and in abolishing the conventional 
weighting in oppositional or Hegelian pairing, producing what he is apt to call 'present 
absences'. In the Guggenheim, Gehry's huge voids in the atrium and elsewhere clearly 
subvert the rational isotropic space of Modernism, and so the double code of absent but 
present previous forms makes the subversion of the modern a 'present absence'. 
Fig 21 The Nationale-Nederlanden Building, 
Prague 1992-6, known variously as 
'Ginger and Fred', 'The Dancing 
Building' and also as 'The Wave' in 
Gehry's practice office, is dramatically 
different from both Vitra and the 
Guggenheim [Fig 21]. The building is 
vertically expressed and its Corbusian 
pilotti are an Historicist Modernist 
reference. The entire structure IS 
designed around waves and curves. It 
undulates longitudinally but also curves 
differentially in its vertical plane. The 
waves of the cornice are echoed 
horizontally by the sweeping Art Deco striations of the fa~ade and by the wave-motion of 
the fenestration at each floor level. The windows are expressly pushed out from the 
fa~ade, and the shadows so caused identify the vertical ripple and rhythm of the building. 
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Along each wave of windows, each one has its glazing bars inverted alternately. 'Ginger' 
has an exaggerated concave curve which seems to make the structure lean both 
backwards and towards 'Fred'. The vertical perspective of 'Ginger' is broadly 
conventional whereas 'Fred' is also curved concavely but has reversed vertical 
perspective. As an office building, it seems precipitously non or even anti-functional. The 
colonnade and plaza created by Ginger's legs do so at the expense of the sidewalk and 
pedestrian traffic. Ginger has a transparent glass 'skirt' where Fred comprises reinforced 
concrete; in this way, gender is announced. Its restaurant is on the roof. In its context, it 
seems perverse. 
Fig 22 
A member of Fish's interpretative 
community at this point suspects 
double meaning. Allegory at its 
simplest level of defmition says one 
thing but means another. Irony also 
says one thing but instead means its 
opposite. But it is within the ironic 
play between part and whole, 
between synechdoche and metonym 
and text, that allegory is located. On 
the face of it, the doubling here 
between an apparently trite figural 
reference to two movie stars of 
yesteryear in two structural towers 
in an office building seems 
irredeemably trite and even conspicuously kitsch. But when the reader of this building 
reconsiders, then there is an incontrovertible reference on its roof [Fig 22] to the ruined 
dome of the Hiroshima Peace Building (Joseph Pesch, Kunst & Kultur 4.5, 1997). And 
immediately, the suspicion arises that what appeared to be a trite architectural gesture of 
self-conscious display in fact masks a much more serious intent. The fact that this 
building signifies one thing but means another within its 'double code' is the clue to the 
presence of the allegorical, and the suspicion grows that the deliberate presence of the 
214 
Peace Dome as an overt signature of remembrance and commemoration is an invocation 
of the tragic. Gehry's audacity here in using the Fred and Ginger trope to mask a more 
serious and deeper meaning might even trigger that involuntary intake of breath that 
announces the sublime. The temporal palimpsest instigating the dissembling allegorical 
commentary accompanies that other distinctively postmodem conceit, the oxymoron, in 
which in this case an apparently trivial appearance conceals a tragic reality. Allegory is 
available. It does not necessarily announce itself as part of its other-speaking. It inheres in 
a text as a result of a reciprocal part/whole relation which will be synechdochal or 
metonymic in character. Thus allegory may be read as a form of narrative by the 
unsuspecting reader, outside the 'interpretive community'. The allegory only comes into 
play the moment the reader realises that the parts and whole exist in places in time 
present but also past. The allegorical will 'inhabit' or 'exist' in both the past parts and the 
present whole, and in an extraordinary and perplexing way, in and between both. This act 
of understanding by interpreting the meaning of parts and whole is a feature of 
allegoresis discussed earlier. It cannot be said that the Nederlanden Building 'contains' 
allegory; an allegorical interpretation becomes available when parts and whole are 
related, and in the case of architecture, set in their socia-historical context. The intrusion 
of this building into the traditional architectural setting of the historical locale is the 
imposition of the infelicitous on the felicitous. It is architectural risk-taking that dares to 
chance the possibility that its appearance, which disguises a deeper reality, might 
nevertheless infringe taste and sensibility. 
The Nederlanden Building has received sustained criticism within Prague. Very little 
new building has been allowed within the inner historical core of the city. The only recent 
new building has been the large blocks of flats erected under the previous Communist 
regime around the city. The site of Fred and Ginger is within the conservation area and 
overlooking the river. It seems perverse to the local inhabitants because it breaks the rules 
of what is seen as a sensitive site bordering on a shrine in an historical city context. Any 
redevelopment which has been allowed by the planning authorities has had to 
acknowledge the eclectic Baroque of the surrounding buildings. The side fayade does 
actually mimic the local buildings in its fenestration. It does after all have glazing bars. 
The proportions of the windows are quite conventional. The striated articulation and 
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waveform fenestration is not. Part of the sharpest criticism has related to the fact that, 
taking the fa~ade for example, it is so heavily mannered in Deco and Moderne that it 
would' be far more appropriate in an American setting. But given that Gehry, unlike 
Venturi for example, does not normally do Historicist and especially Art Deco rhetoric, 
and given also that the Nederlanden Building is so different from his more famous 
predecessors such as the Guggenheim or Disney Hall, it becomes necessary to ask why 
this conspicuous change was necessary, and why in Prague where it has received such 
vociferous objection from its inception. 
If the side elevation is parodic and satirical, Fred and Ginger themselves are 
anthropomorphic in a heavily accented and mannerist way. They are incontrovertibly 
mimetic of the human body and manifestly gendered. Ginger is expressly female and 
seen from the side, the extruded balcony represents a coquettish hands on hip gesture. 
And Ginger of course has legs - dancing legs. And so, ineluctably, we come to Fred 
Astaire and Ginger Rogers and the nineteen thirties Hollywood musical. At one level this 
celebrated carefree escapism. At another level altogether, what these films escaped from 
was precisely the reality of that decade itself, of persistent mass unemployment and the 
rise of Fascism and the growing threat of war. Fred and Ginger date the historical 
referencing of the building explicitly to the thirties. In Prague, there was a systematic 
Nazi destruction of Jewish cultural life and later the enormities of the Holocaust. Gehry 
has become increasingly conscious of his own Jewish ethnicity and the Jewish inflections 
of the fish-form (0. Boissiere 1990, 30-1) so that this building in Prague suddenly 
becomes for him a poignant and an autobiographical memorial. Prior to the construction 
of the building, the site had been a bombsite since the end of world War Two, when a 
misplaced American bomb destroyed the pre-existing house. It had been carefully 
preserved for nearly fifty years as a ruin and a commemorative place as well as a ruined 
folly; 'folly' in a double sense of a ruined place commemorating the follies and losses of 
war itself, but also as an ideological aversion to, and signpost of, the American folly of 
'friendly fire'. Then, seen from a slightly different angle, Ginger's apparently coquettish 
gesture means very differently. Ginger becomes crushed like a discarded coke can, and 
what was merely a balcony expressing a flirtatious hip-movement becomes and doubles 
as an evisceration and becomes 'wound', an invocation of the tragic reminiscent of 
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Libeskind's at Berlin, and metonymic of the history of the site. And of course, what this 
carefully preserved bomb-site meant to the citizens of Prague was hallowed as recovered 
memory, a memorial displaced by an apparently insensitive modern building. The 
previous ruined site was an example of what Anthony Vidler called a case vide at 
Villette, an empty place with its own distinctive memory. In fact, the ruined Peace Dome 
at the top of the building represents the worst destruction the world has seen as it mimics 
the single remnant of mass extermination, both in Hiroshima, but also in the Holocaust. 
The Nederlanden Building cannot, and defies interpretation as if it were, some 
inconsequential example of postmodern architecture as a foible or folly. The building 
presents the unpresentable in an oxymoron of sinister gaiety. 
'Furthermore, Gehry reminds us that his building is a memorial which indicates 
via Ginger and Fred that we cannot do without dancing or poetry after the Shoah; 
that more than ever before we need the fictions of the good life that the makers 
of celluloid illusions gave us, that we need the harmonious dream of a dancing couple 
like Ginger and Fred, if we do not want to freeze or despair when we face those 
other film documents shot in Auschwitz and Buckenwald and Dachau and all the other 
places of organized mass-murder - or pictures of bombed out cities like Dresden, 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It may well be that such monuments always have to be 
doubly encoded so that we can bear them.' (J. Pesch, Kunst & Kultur 4.5 1997) 
Fred and Ginger evokes a demonic past with an innocent present. Compared with the 
dazzling crypto-modem white of the Vitra or the shining titanium and glass of the 
Guggenheim, the Nederlanden Building has a soft pink, symbolizing not only Ginger 
herself, but also her 'dancing years' apparently so innocent and yet so prescient, and that 
its achievement is in its allusive grace which can only be appreciated in the light of the 
'dark conceit' of its rhetoric. 
THE ARCHITECTURAL CURVE 
The theoretical justification of the curve in postmodem building has largely been 
derived from Gilles Deleuze, and especially his formulation of the fold or 'Ie pli'. If the 
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cUr:'ed form is taken to its logical extreme, then its resting place emerges as the 
'isomorphic polysurface' or BLOB, a structure which abolishes the walVroof interface 
and results in one total indivisible shape covered by one continuous 'skin'. Whether such 
'total' buildings are, in terms of metaphor, able to mutate beyond signifying as simile into 
more elaborated forms of meaning remains to be seen. 
Frank Gehry established bending and folding as an architecturally institutional process 
with the 'event' of the Vitra Museum. Curvature was of course not new as Saarinen and 
Otzon had already demonstrated among others. At both Vitra and Bilbao, Gehry 
developed curvature in the roof in discrete Cubist forms, but 'placed' the roof collage on 
to orthogonal, right-angular grid-constructions which formed the galleries. In both of 
these signature buildings, Gehry inevitably creates an 'event' at the junction of 
orthogonal wall and curved-form roof. In a sense, this is the poststructuralist fold sitting 
then in a slightly artificial way on the modernist grid. But at Disney Hall, Gehry comes 
close to abolishing the roof-wall distinction by enveloping the still grid-form galleries 
with a 'roof which cascades virtually down to ground level. The enveloping roof-form 
retains its Cubist differentiation into distinct elements, so that there is still the mutual 
separation and integration of parts within a whole which facilitates the metonymic and 
metaphorical transfer of symbolic meaning in form, and not instead simply by the 
intention implied in the internal content. Once the building is seen to completely abolish 
the roof/wall, part/whole differentiation however, it mutates into what has become known 
as an 'isomorphic polysurface' (J.K. Waters 2003, 8), an entirely folded building such as 
the Birmingham Selfridges 2003, by Future Systems which is constituted by one 
continuous exterior skin. Greg Lynn as a theorist of biomorphic design has characterized 
such a buildings as a 'Binary Large Object' or BLOB (J.K. Waters 2003, 59). These 
'bioforms' begin as virtual CGIs (Computer Generated Images) within computer 
programs in 3D modelling [36]. Once a building becomes biomorphically constituted by 
one continuous skin, it inevitably becomes holistic and signifies as a total unified entity. 
It is no longer constituted by the relation of part to whole and so resists metaphor and is 
therefore in Peirce's terms indexical rather than symbolic in that it can only signify as 
form as simile. Such biomorphic or blob-form buildings signify as meta-architecture; as 
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architecture about itself in which 'the building is the sign' (C. Jencks 2005, 15). The only 
references this kind of building can make are ones aimed at commercial or cultural 
branding associated and identified with an iconic form, and in this case, the symbolism is 
extrinsic and social and not derived from the building's inherent formal suggestions such 
as visual metaphor. It is likely, but not necessarily probable, that entirely folded BLOB 
isomorphic polysurfaced buildings will be appropriated into a repertoire of available and 
poststructurally eclectic architecture that Charles Jencks in The Architecture of the 
Jumping Universe, 1997, has characterized as 'Waveform' (C. Jencks 1997,49-52). The 
Herzog and de Meuron Olympic Stadium for Beijing begun in 2004, is such an example 
of BLOB-form architecture being incorporated into mainstream architectural practice (C. 
Jencks 2005, 112-3). If it is assumed that all buildings mean in some way and are always 
subject to interpretation, then the semantic paradox of Modernism enters the BLOB-form. 
How is it possible to interpret a building that has no meaning, but only form? 
Jencks suggests that architectural folding and bending is subsumed under 'Waveform', 
particularly where the fold is understood to be a twist in a linear form and thus a 
bifurcation, representing what Rene Thorn has called Catastrophe Theory (G. Lynn in A. 
Papadakis, Ed, 1993, 8-15). In a fundamentally important way, folding in architecture 
should be seen not only as the definitive defeat of what Corbusier called in Modernism 
The Poetry of the Right Angle, but also as an essentialist element of what might be called 
the neo-avant-garde of poststructuralist architecture. It is in the folded curve-form, 
initiated by Gehry principally at Vitra, that Poststructuralism establishes its 'differance'. 
This proposal requires very careful qualification when it is recalled that poststructuralists 
such as Hadid, Koolhaas and Eisenman and Libeskind although incorporating folding and 
bending in their design, also retain the sharp crease of the roof/wall event as a particularly 
acknowledged Modernist trace. Within the complex inversions of poststructuralist theory, 
Modernism is both defeated and celebrated. Although Gehry may have initiated the fold, 
he is not known as a reader of Gilles Deleuze but it is with his Le Pli that folding as an 
incorporated practice receives its theoretical justification. It was shown earlier that in 
what represents a previous incorporation and appropriation, that of Derridean 
Deconstruction and Difference, poststructuralist architecture refuses the binary opposition 
of old and new in the oxymoron that embraces both the 'post' and the 'ante-' at the same 
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synchronic moment. As a theoretical position, the fold now curves away from 
Deconstruction but is equally layered on it in another palimpsest (G. Lynn in A. 
Papadakis, Ed, 1993, 9-10). In the tradition of the Phenomenologists traced here earlier 
such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze rejects the straight-line optical 
geometrical formations of Descartes which implicate the fixed point and interstice. 
Instead, Deleuze rejects this kind of fixed-point space in favour of the metaphor of the 
rhizome. The rhizome has no obvious beginning or source and spreads indefinitely, 
constantly transforming itself, constantly subject to change, transmogrification and 
movement. The fold is similarly always a fold within folds. He derives the idea of the 
fold as a kind of explanation from Leibniz and the Baroque imperative towards curves 
and folds as part of the suggestion of movement. 
, .... a flexible or elastic body still has cohering parts that form a fold, such that they 
are not separated into parts of parts but are rather divided into infinity in smaller and 
smaller parts that always retain a certain cohesion. Thus a continuous labyrinth is not 
a line dissolving into independent points, as flowing sand might dissolve into grains, 
but resembles a sheet of paper divided into infinite folds or separated into bending 
movements, each one determined by the consistent or conspiring surrounding .... A fold 
is always folded within a fold, like a cavern in a cavern. The unit of matter, the small-
est element of the labyrinth, is the fold not the point which is never a part, but a simple 
extremity of the line. That is why parts of matter are masses or aggregates, as a correl-
ative to elastic compressive force. Unfolding is thus not the contrary of folding, but 
follows the fold up to the following fold.' (G. Deleuze in A. Papadakis, Ed, 1993, 18) 
THE REINSCRIPTION OF MODERNISM IN THE FOLD 
Dcleuze cites Leibniz and his invocation of the allegory of the upper room. Below is 
the common room of the senses and above the dark windowless room of the soul and the 
complex epistemological folds of knowledge like drapery (G. Deleuze, 1993, 19). 
Similarly, architecture which is folded inevitably contains folds within folds and 
therefore a built complexity. There have been objections to Deleuze and poststructuralist 
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theory (G. Doy 2002, 151-2 and P. King 2005, 10-16), but the fact remains that in a 
documentary sense the fold as a theoretical construction has been widely influential. Nor 
is it simply the case that the fold applies only to the form of a curved building. At 
Rebstock, Frankfurt, Peter Eisenman folded his scheme into the existing built landscape 
context whilst retaining the sharp edges of the Modernist inflection in his built forms. 
Eisenman makes it clear that the fold is temporal. Rebstock is seen as a 'singularity'. 
'Singularity is not something that emerges from a ground or a figure form. It is the 
quality of unfolding in time that allows the possibility of singularity.' (P. Eisenman in A. 
Papadakis, Ed, 1993, 25) Eisenman's scheme, which he calls 'Folding In Time' (1993, 
23), folds in time because it acknowledges the presence of the existing sied/ung. The 
siedlung was the Modernist linear housing which became inappropriate in postwar 
Germany but whose presence as an absence is folded into the site. This folding back in 
time and in a sense on the pre-war Modernist context, obviously implicates memory and 
remembrance and is, palimpsest-like, much in the way that Gehry's roof forms fold on to 
the orthogonal vestigial Modernist grid below. Eisenman's Rebstock plan destroys the 
presence of the old Modernist setting like an archaeological excavation, but allegorically 
commemorates its memory. Craig Owens's hugely influential 'allegorical imperative' as 
temporal palimpsest, is now supplemented by the idea of the temporal fold. That this is a 
case of folding back and not simply generating curvilinear architectural form is made 
clear by the consistent presence of Modernist reference in poststructuralist architecture. It 
is a generalization worth making that since Vitra, poststructuralist architecture involves 
bending and folding not just as aesthetic curved form, nor simply as nostalgia, but as a 
declaration that it is nothing less than a historical component of the modem. The overt 
'postmodemism' and New Historicism of Moore and Graves have simply been 
superseded. Eisenman's Rebstock folds the new into and on to the old and in so doing 
folds over the original site of the sied/ung, but collides with it in the process. Folding in 
this conceptual sense does not necessarily involve the smoothing normally associated 
with the fold, but instead may initiate conflict, perturbation and violation. 
Henry Cobb, who built the iconic I Ian cock Tower, Boston USA in 1973, distinguishes 
between part and whole. 'Bending is a manipulative strategy of objects. Folding is a 
manipulative property of surfaces.' (A. Papadakis 1993, 95) So structures bend and 
221 
surfaces fold. Eisenman as an incipient Modernist avoids conspicuous curvature with its 
imperative towards expressionism and the sculptural and retains the sharp crease between 
plane surfaces as 'event'. His large holistic structures such as his Japanese towers have 
parts that are broadly folded into the whole ('infolding') but which are then subject to 
deformation (,unfolding'). The Alteka Office Building, Tokyo, (P. Eisenman in A. 
Papadakis 1993, 28-29) is significantly bent, almost as an acknowledgement of Thorn's 
catastrophic event, and mimics falling and the eruption of its parts. In Japan this is of 
course a direct reference to the always impending real-life catastrophe of earthquakes, as 
in his Nunotani Headquarters, Tokyo, 1992 (C. Jencks 1997, 57). Eisenman's metaphor 
of collapse in a Japanese setting echoes Gehry's placing of Christian and Judaic symbols 
also in a Japanese setting at Kobe in his Fish Restaurant. (,Yes, a building has to stand 
up, but it does not have to look like it stands up.' P. Eisenman in P .Noever 1991, 38) This 
is not folding as smoothing; it is folding as the conscious violation of a cultural context. 
Eisenman's towers in a Japanese setting also inevitably commemorate previous disasters, 
and like Gehry's Fred and Ginger in Prague, dissemble and hover over the tragic. The 
Jewish Memorial, Berlin, 2005 comprises 2,751 concrete blocks. All the blocks are 
slightly different and resemble the minimalist objects of Donald Judd and Robert Morris, 
and in a deliberately ambivalent way, the Memorial oscillates between the sculptural and 
the architectural in another example of Eisenman's 'in-betweeness'. The blocks seem to 
acquire the properties of both sculptural plinths and coffins and are arranged and both 
disarranged in a distorted grid. This is not a maze but a labyrinth, but which defies, unlike 
the maze, entrance and exit. Seen from the side, the grid of blocks ripple and undulate. 
The sense of being lost in the middle of the labyrinth of course represents an entire lost 
generation in an act of German expiation, because this act of remembrance is called 
Memorial To The Murdered Jews Of Europe. The allegorical intensity of the Memorial as 
moral commentary on national guilt speaks for itself. It is typical of Eisenman's interest 
in rhetorical tropes such as catachresis in which the wrong use of a term sets up 'in-
betweeness' that it not only establishes the pleasure of ambiguity, but also defeats the 
bipolarity of the Ilegelian dialectic. Thus The Jewish Memorial as oxymoron summons 
the attention as either sculpture or architecture, or both at the same time. 
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· Zaha Hadid, like Eisenman, insists on acknowledging her debt to Modernism. Unlike 
Libeskind's conceptual shards at The Imperial War Of The North, Hadid's shards are 
derived from Russian Constructivism. 'We felt at the time that although it was very 
important to be able to invent new programs and to rewrite the program for architecture, 
and although the spirit of the early twentieth century was that of optimism, we were 
confronted, in the seventies, with this notion that there was no progress in architecture 
and that we could only go forward by looking to the past. We felt that we had to examine 
this culture of twentieth century Modernism very carefully - for example, by looking at 
the very early projects done by Leonidov.' (Z. Hadid in P. Noever 1991, 48) Architects of 
course draw and do not build which is the business of engineering and construction. In 
the case of Hadid, she not only produces architectural rendering, but also paints in 
advance of the architectural drawing which may well be in part at least, the product of 
digital CAD. At her Vienna Exhibition, 'Architectur' 2003, the paintings assumed an 
enormously important presence as preludes to form (P. Noever, Ed, 2003, 43-6). The 
shards, fractals and fragments which constitute the paintings as abstract forms are not so 
much instances of Deconstruction as sometimes assumed, but rather emerge as the design 
and 'significant form' of the Bauhaus tradition or from Malevich's Suprematist painting. 
Like Eisenman, the engendered forms converted to digital program renderings can be 
accepted as provocative accidents in CGI. Hadid's determined recourse to early 
Modernist procedure and practice and to Suprematist hard edge and line represents 
another poststructuralist temporal fold. And it is the paintings which help to generate the 
design interface between the hard-edged Modernist shard of her oeuvre and its folding 
into built form. The postmodem palimpsest is ever present. 'This idea of juxtaposition of 
the new and the old became very interesting to us. One could almost see it as a kind of 
contextual architecture but it had to do with a superimposition of the new on the old so 
that both could coexist.' (P. Noever 1991, 48) She is less interested in theorizing time 
than some others such as Eisenman and Libeskind, and rather seeks to embed Modernist-
inflected form into landscape. However, it is significant that in embodying Modernist 
form in her design and in seeking the 'new' from the old, she confronts in a neo-avant-
garde and adversarial way, architectural norms and assumptions in much the same spirit 
as the original Modernist avant-garde did. One consequence of a concern for an 
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architecture of heavily inflected Modernism is that like Modernist architecture itself, 
there is less ~mphasis on symbolism and reference, and more on the presentation of form 
in which' .... formal characteristics of landscape in general are brought into the ambit of 
architectural articulation.' (P. Schumacher in P. Noever 2003, 25). This is not so 
surprising when it is recalled that Corbusier's villas and the Marseilles Unite could not 
celebrate their being other than in landscape. 
Hadid's first major commission, The Peak 1982, Hong Kong, is not simply expressed 
laterally as a formal reference to Modernism, but is stretched longitudinally in an 
exaggerated and striated form that she describes as 'geological' (P. Noever 1991,49). As 
in many other of her buildings, there are large volumes of poured concrete which in this 
limited. metaphorical sense makes them consonant with rock formation and 
metonymically links them to the natural. In a monolithic and aggressive shard-form 
building like the Wolfsburg Science Center, the association of the building with natural 
rock strata is arguably a version of the sublime. The inside blatantly contradicts the 
outside. Instead of horizontal floor-levels that would echo the external striation, the 
interior is expressed vertically with large inverted 'cones' which create both voids and 
draw upwards traffic through the bUilding. In contrast, but still using poured concrete as a 
Modernist inflection, the Ordrupgaard Museum flows and undulates in folds and with its 
glass curtain wall approximates to BLOB-form architecture. The folds and curves here 
are almost gendered. The fact that within these internationally recognized buildings 
Hadid can modulate between hard monolithic cantilevered forms as a constant in her 
design, but can also mould and fold as an invocation of 'the feminine', demonstrates the 
eclectic but always retrospective aspect of architectural poststructuralism. 
Hadid's most celebrated building to date is both 'Corbusian' and' .... one of the few 
convincing iconic buildings after Bilbao.' (C. Jencks 2005, 158) The Rosenthal Center 
For Contemporary Art, Cincinnati 2003 has conspicuous, even startling, Modernist 
references. The ground floor lobby brings the street into the building like the portico at 
Mies's Seagram Building and being comprised all round by glass curtain walling, appears 
to float just like the Seagram or the Villa Savoye. There are squared ofT structural 
concrete pi/otis announcing 'frame'. The building's external concrete is not stuccoed, but 
is laid in light grey blocking that has the effect of establishing its lateral as well as its 
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vertical emphasis and which contrasts dramatically with the black glass and extruded 
forms above. Occupying a constricted corner site, the building is a straight-edged cuboid 
of interlocking geometrical forms apparently rationally obeying the Form Follows 
Function edict. [Fig 23] The building is elegantly referenced towards Corbusian 
Modernism, including the internal ramps lifted from The Villa Savoye. But actually, the 
form does not follow the function. The internal volumes do not correspond with the 
external interlocking forms and the back-wall is a continuation of the street through and 
up in a sudden curve and fold that Hadid calls an 'urban carpet'. The internal ramps 
mimic those at The Villa Savoye and which Rem Koolhaas deploys within the Dutch 
Embassy, Berlin. There is an intense irony that is produced by the Modernist Cubism of 
interlocking forms. Picasso extended his Analytical Cubism by developing the three-
dimensional texture of the collage with objects pasted on to the surface. Collage is an 
aspect of Cubism. The external texture of the Rosenthal Center is both Cubist in its 
interlocking forms and collagist in its textured exterior surface [37]. 
The notion of urban architectural collage is best known in Colin Rowe's Collage City 
of 1978 (W. J. Curtis 1999, 609). It belongs to the tradition of Jane Jacobs and Kenneth 
Frampton's 'Critical Regionalism' (K. Frampton 1982, 288-9) in resisting Modernist 
assumptions about clearance and zoning and the need for historical architectural forms in 
the city. The idea of collage arises from 'pasting on' new build within the traditional 
nuances of the urban fabric without resorting to zoning or erasure. The irony in lIadid's 
building arises from its Cubist collage. What is 'pasted on' here is defiant Modernist form 
but which is poststructurally inflected. Instead of the postmodern pastiche which emerges 
from Rowe, Frampton and the Kriers, for example, I Iadid subverts faux Historicism with 
an insistent double-code of ironic retro-modernity. This hortatory instance of the 
allegorical commentary would seem to be in a cryptic way a criticism of the anti~ 
Modernism that emanated from Venturi's plea for complexity in architecture. The 
poststructural architectural impulse subsumes Venturi's complexity, but not at the 
expense of its origins. 
Like Eisenman, Zaha Hadid [Fig 23] has been uncompromising in her attachment to 
the foundational nature of Modernism. 'We, the authors of architecture, have to take on 
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the task of reinvestigating Modernity. An 
atmosphere of total hostility, where looking 
forward has been, and still is, seen almost as 
criminal makes one more adamant that there 
is only one way and that is to go forward 
along the path paved by the experiments of 
the early Modernists.' (C. Jencks and K. 
Propf, Eds, 1997, 280) Eisenman is clear that 
time is an indispensable element of 
architectural practice. 'Current post-
structuralist thought questions both VISIon 
and structure, and thus the diagram also 
questions the sedimented anteriority of vision 
at the same time that it invokes it.' The architectural diagram or drawing as essentially 
historical not only implicates time and makes past moments singular, but is also the 
present and critical invocation of past practice in what Eisenman calls 'Diagrams of 
Anteriority' (p. Eisenman 1999, 40) The drawings he cites are Modernist; Corbusier's 
Maison Domino and The Villa Savoye. Poststructuralist architecture is reinvented 
Modernism and has to be clearly separated from earlier New Historicist versions of 
Postmodernism which denigrated Modernism in architecture. Zaha Hadid worked for 
Rem Koolhaas at OMA for several years which reinforced her belief in the foundational 
nature of Modernism at a time when castigating it was distinctly de rigueur. A pattern of 
poststructuralist architecture then becomes discernabJe in which Modernism plays a key 
and recurring part in the design of Eisenman, Koolhaas, Hadid Tschumi and Libeskind 
with Gehry as sui generis, the unique initiator of folding and the author of Bilbao ism and 
the Iconic Building but whose practice is deeply embedded in the modern. 
Rem Koolhaas's painting and multi-media disseminations are well known, as is his 
interest in the Russian Constructivists such as Leonidov. The influence of such 
Revivalism and its hostility towards early decorative postmodernism was an important 
source ofZaha Hadid's own repertoire of fragmented fonn which she developed at OMA 
(Office of Municipal Architecture). Koolhaas also taught Hadid at the Architectural 
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Association. There was further interest in Russian Constructivism from Tschumi , 
particularly his play on Chernikhov at Villette. The large wedge of black glass in his 
National Dance Theatre, The Hague 1981 seems to pun on the Suprematist sign of the 
Red Wedge, making the building play on the possibility of ideology. Koolhaas's primary 
concern has been with the urban context and the need to layer or superimpose new build 
on or around the old. Such layering was a central theme of Delirious New York. When 
Koolhaas wrote, 'Since the urban is now pervasive, urbanism will never again be about 
the 'new', only about 'the more' and the 'modified'.' (C Jencks and K. Propf, Eds 1997, 
306), he anticipated the way such collage would work in practice in Berlin in the shape of 
the city's 'Critical Reconstruction' and the manner in which his signpost Dutch Embassy 
Building would layer in as retrospective Modernism. Part of what he calls 'urbanism' is 
characterized by 'Bigness' and Bigness involves both complexity in itself and between its 
constituent parts. He suggests that Delirious New York implied a 'Theory of Bigness' 
based on the parts as discrete architectural gestures: 
'Beyond a certain critical mass, a building becomes a Big Building. Such a mass 
can no longer be controlled by a single architectural gesture, or even by any com-
bination of architectural gestures. This impossibility triggers the autonomy of its parts, 
but that is not the same as fragmentation: the parts remain committed to the whole. 
(C. Jencks and K. Propf, Eds 1997,308) 
The parts remain autonomous and the building does not become holistic since it enshrines 
both deconstructive and poststructural imperatives. So the punning 'black wedge' at the 
National Dance Theatre connotes Constructivism as a discrete form that is nonetheless 
incorporated into the larger building. This consistent denial of the classical unity of form 
and an insistence on the collision and contiguous contact of autonomous elements 
implying a potential chaos, not only 'deconstructs' the conventional notion of a building, 
but also the unity of Modernist function and form itself, the very trope it puns on. Given 
that Hadid's and Koolhaas's references tend to be Modernist, then the reference is 
inevitably towards stylistic rather than metaphorical devices. The acts of subversion here 
are located in the interlocking and collage of fractured elements rather than latcnt 
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semantic meanings that emerge from visual metaphor. That a Big Building becomes 
sufficiently complex to require separate parts that function autonomously whilst retainjng 
linked coherence of services within each part is demonstrated by Koolhaas' s Lille 
Congrexpo 1994. As a vast ovoid, it contains three disparate parts containing auditoria 
and exposition space, and externally is dressed in cheap-looking but modern materials 
such as corrugated metal and in places, plastic. Such self-contained but contiguous parts 
not only defy the Modernist unity of function and form, despite being Modernist in 
inflection at least, but also deny the possibility of holistic design, and in particular, BLOB 
architecture. By definition, BLOB-form is holistic and without parts and its references are 
restricted to simile, so that Roger's Millennjum Dome, for example, seems to signal 
'circus tent' or something similar. Whatever Koolhaas' s different buildings may signify, 
as in the Modernist references to Mies's National Gallery, Berlin and Rietveld 's 
Schroeder House in his Kunsthal, Rotterdam (W.l. Curtis 1999, 667), like Hadid, the 
ontology of his buildings depends on the play between the independence and self-
cooperation of their parts. 
Much of the deformed Modernism of hi s method, certainly in the later buildings, is 
expressed as a kind of almost 
deliberately reckless or 
' delirious' misappropriation 
of planar geometric volumes 
in a difficult relation of part 
[Fig 24]. As a deformed cube 
Koolhaas's eattle Public 
Library 2004, is con tructed 
around massive and exposed 
concrete cro -bracing 
remini cent of oster 
Fig 24 hanghai Bank and covered in 
a continuou lattice and skin of darkened gla s. he building is patently cubist, and the 
deformed planar surface are multiple view of the central cube. This collocation of 
Picasso and eonidov, ubism and on tructivism, might suggest in a public library, the 
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collective power of knowledge and the presence of leftist ideology suggestive of the fact 
that in the West, knowledge is inevitably fractured; a hint of old time avant-garde 
progressivism concealed by the poststructuralist cynicism of the Neo-Avant-Garde. 
However, this building constitutes one of Charles Jencks's Iconic Buildings - structures 
that since Bilbao are attention-seeking and which brand whole institutions or locales (C. 
Jencks 2005, 102). In the present terms here, it may be that the intense theatricality of this 
building is revealed in the drama and rhetoric of its deformation. Koolhaas's previous 
building, The Dutch Embassy, Berlin 2003 is also centred on a cube and the sharp creases 
and bends of the linked diplomatic residence building retain his Neo-Modernist 
inflections as does the 'trajectory' of the ramps which like Hadid's in the Rosenthal 
Center invoke the Corbusian promenade architecturale. Compared with the formal 
extravagance of Seattle, the Dutch Embassy is seen from the street-view as an 
unassuming glass cube (OMAIR. Koolhaas 2004, 30). The roofline accommodates nearby 
vernacular building, and although indisputably a modern building on completion, its 
impact consists in an essential modesty compared with the 'statement' of Seattle. The 
dominant reason for the comparative understatement of the building is that its situation in 
the old East German sector made its site one of some sensitivity, and its imposition or 
layering into the existing fabric was a requirement of Berlin's Critical Reconstruction 
programme. Here Rowe's collage of urban development with the new layering over the 
existent built strata of time seems to synchronize with Koolhaas's own deliberations on 
urbanism It is an ac;pcct of this building's Modernist plainness that it has an aura of 
decorum. The space between the Embassy and the residence assumes the character of 'a 
court' and a 'park' according to OMA, and the whole is meant to constitute the 
characteristics of 'a villa', and the embrace of the residence around two sides of the cube 
is 'a theatrical backdrop' (www.oma.nl). 
But there is an impossible conflict of interest on the one hand between urban collage, 
layering and superimposition in which The Dutch Embassy succeeds and on the other 
Koolhaas's predilection for the Big Building which does not accommodate as a form of 
remembrance the archaeological strata of the built environment but imposes upon it. 
Hence Koolhaas's CCTV Building, Beijing which in 2008 will be an immense 
international monolith not far short of The EifTeI Tower in height and likely to be the 
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largest non-tower structure built. An essential component of Modernist zoning and 
erasure was the imposition of the new on the old not as a temporal palimpsest but as the 
eradication of memory and the familiar that seemed to associate with ideas about slum 
conditions, particularly for working people. It was therefore with the best of intentions 
that mass clearance and rebuilding and the central planning lessons from World War Two 
aimed to guarantee that hygiene and health replaced poverty and ill-health in the great 
modern stride forward. The old and its memories, like a hovering allegory, far from being 
preserved and restored, became an enemy to be erased. So what Modernist building 
'meant', because it avoided metaphor, was sociological in that it represented utopian 
progress. It embodied the opposite of collage in the imposition of the shining new. 
Retrospectively of course, that meaning has significantly changed, just as Gadamer 
suggested that meaning must, and the large modern perimeter block and towers of 
welfare housing are now widely felt to represent a failed experiment rather than social 
progress. Part of the rejection of the Modernist housing ideology, and perhaps Modernist 
architecture in general, has been its insistence upon imposition rather than collage and its 
violation of the locus genii as an architectural texture. There has also been a popular 
rejection of Bigness as an authoritarian failure of scale as David Harvey among others 
has shown and which was discussed earlier. 
Koolhaas's Big Building is meant to dominate its context and signify in a local, 
national, international and globalist way as a form of branding within the ideology of 
advertising. The Iconic Big Building now associates with economic regeneration and 
power. But it has to be acknowledged that if the Iconic Monolith, like the ascent of 
Everest because it is there, (R. Koolhaas in C. Jencks and K. Propf, Eds, 1997, 307) 
erases and dominates its context as Modernism did before it, then the previous unease at 
Modernist Bigness may indeed accompany it. In The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 
Frederick Jameson characterizes the Bonaventure Hotel, Los Angeles, as a vast shining 
simulacrum of international capital and with the advent of Bigness, that analysis seems 
prescient. Meaning is both synchronic, the symptom of a particular moment, but also 
diachronic and subject to change across time. If, as suggested earlier here, that 
Wittgenstein was right in attaching meaning in language to use, then a shift in the social 
use of a building over time, like a redundant church, may change its meaning. Of course, 
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it is not possible to know how Koolhaas's Chinese CCTV Building may signify when it 
is used, but in a Derrida-like play that Koolhaas might well enjoy, as a vast act of 
deformation, it might well contain that gene of the sublime, the monstrous. Certainly, 
despite its infelicity, the CCTV Building is Modernist in its ambience, rather like a 
colossal skyscraper bent into a Mobius strip and perhaps in its gesture reminiscent of 
Tatlin's forward-leaning and aggressively revolutionary Constructivist Tower (Jay 
Merrick, The Independent On Sunday, 6.08.06). [Fig 25] 
DANIEL LmESKIND AND BUILDING ON 
THE PAST 
One of the recurrent and conspicuous features 
of Postmodemism has been its mistrust of 
traditional epistemological boundaries which 
separated different discourses. In many ways, the 
Deleuzian 'rhizome effect' of the 
poststructuralists has invaded neighbouring 
epistemologies so that instead of remaining 
autonomous, disciplines have become 
'connected' by cultural studies. Peter Eisenman, 
for example, expropriates 'deep structure' from 
psycholinguistics in much the same breath as he invokes concepts from classical rhetoric 
as an explanation rather than an account of his procedures. And it has been consistently 
argued here that theoretical models derived from philosophical, linguistic and literary 
theory form an essential component of architectural meaning. It is only by the application 
of such theory that a model of interpretation can emerge because meaning has to 
implicate language, and language itself must be derived from architectural form, and in 
the case of architecture, as visual metaphor. This section looks at the theoretical 
complexities of Daniel Libeskind's early pre-architectural thinking as well as the 
architecture itself, and in particular, the Jewish Museum, Berlin as an exemplar of the 
allegory of absence and linguistic meaning immanent in built architectural form. 
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One example in architecture of the dissolution of autonomies and boundaries has been 
the decisive poststructuralist engagement with sculptural expressionism that has 
developed from the deconstruction of the classical grid into folding. There is a powerful 
chiasmic movement between art and architecture where art has become increasingly 
architectural as installation, and architecture has become art-like in the development of 
sculptural form. As architecture has folded into sculptural form, it has necessarily placed 
a new premium on the efficacy of drawing. Of course, architects have always produced 
drawings, but typically in elevations of the final empirical dimensions of the building. 
More recently it is noticeable that Rem Koolhaas, Zaha Hadid, Will Alsop and Daniel 
Libeskind for example all paint as a preliminary exploration of form and idea. Equally, 
Frank Gehry's exploration of configuration for important buildings like the Vitra or 
Guggenheim Museums began as intuitive, and indeed almost autonomic, frottage. 
However, as buildings have become increasingly sculptural, the architectural drawing 
that underpins the structure has assumed an overwhelming complexity in order to enable 
structural engineers to verify the structural integrity. And that complexity of the 
architectural drawing has become resolved by the use of CAD programs such as Calia 
which Gehry's practice used for Bilbao or even more complex systems such as 
Alias/Wavefront's Maya (J.K. Waters 2003, 58-9). What drawing and painting do is to 
retain touch and texture that is embodied in experience and which might be broadly 
described as phenomenological. The earlier discussion of ocularcentrism, opposed as 
retinal and Cartesian by Merleau-Ponty, established that the singular visual paradigm 
reinforces the hegemony of vision at the expense of meaning and marginalizes the 
interaction of sensory perception. In fact, the growth of sculptural forms in 
poststructuralist architecture is always analogous to gesture and therefore to human 
embodiment. This is not simply retinal, but instead in a multi-sensory way is haptic. 
But the influence of computer modelling in BLOB architecture, and which could 
conceivably represent a new architectural paradigm of holistic retinal Minimalism, and 
which defers meaning rather like Donald Judd's 'specific object', clearly emphasizes the 
visual over embodiment. In a little book which remains influential, The Eyes of the Skin, 
Juhani Pallasmaa says: 
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'Computer imaging tends to flatten our magnificent, multi-sensory, simultaneous and 
synchronic capacities of imagination by turning the design process into a passive visual 
manipulation, a retinal journey. The computer creates a distance between the maker 
and the object, whereas drawing by hand as well as model-making put the designer into 
a haptic contact with the object or space. In our imagination, the object is simultan-
eously held in the hand and inside the head, and the imagined and projected physical 
image is modelled by our bodies. We are inside and outside of the object at the same 
time.' (J. Pallasmaa 2005, 12-13) 
Greg Lynn, the acknowledged doyen of biomorphic three-dimensional modelling, accepts 
that the computer program is capable of, and is used to innovate, design from within its 
own design repertoire independently of the architect who is traditionally the deus ex 
machina in the design (J.K. Waters 2003, 70-71). 
Daniel Libeskind on the other hand remains firmly inside the phenomenological and 
heuristic imperative of design and form from art and drawing. And experience and 
embodiment as an aspect of spectatorship is lodged in the form. At the Jewish Museum, 
Berlin, the void and the Holocaust Tower command an intuitive hush - 'the sound of 
silence' as it were, and at the Imperial War Museum North, Manchester, the floor of the 
earth shard physically curves in a metaphor of disorientation and disintegration. 
Libeskind's concept of an 'architectural drawing' can never be assumed to be an 
orthodox rendering of orthogonal elevations, although clearly these have to appear at 
some point in the design presentation. Nor are his 'drawings' simply sketches or 
paintings. After leaving professional music, his early work is highly conceptual and 
gnomic - 'When the once-potent truth of architecture is reduced to a sign of its absence, 
one experiences a parching, suffocating dryness: 'The psyche lusts to be wet." 
(Chamberworks: Architectural Meditations on the Themes from Heraclitus 28 Drawings. 
J 983 [Unoriginal Signs].) Although it might be improper to quote out of context, much of 
the early work, including 'Chamberworks', seems to have an inflection of Futurism or 
Surrealism: 'Poetics for Millionaires: Synonymous with rehabilitation, stenography will 
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be only for aristocrats. Amputated hands cannot recover stolen treasures, yet can be 
dipped into the circulatory system, which is, on average, 60,000 to 100,000 miles long.' 
(D. Libeskind 2000, 50) Or alternatively, Libeskind's presentation for the Berlin Jewish 
Museum Extension was produced as text between the spaces of the staves on music 
parchment. And the City Edge Competition, Berlin 1987, contained mixed media, 
including an architectural book containing a photograph of Mies bolted and screwed 
down on to a base. It is interesting that the slash fenestration of Libeskind's signature 
building, The Jewish Museum, appears first in the earlier 'City Edge' as an isolated 
surface or wall-like object which is completely penetrated by the incision and which 
hence is made into a signifying event within the mixed media installation. The sense that 
the early conceptual work represents a rehearsal for the built forms to come is reinforced 
by his drawings, particularly 'Micromegas: The Architecture of Endspace', 1979. The 
combination of 'micro' and 'mega' has a suggestion of an oxymoron of the large within 
the small. The drawings although computer-rendered, are not computer-generated. [Fig 
26] Libeskind says: 
'There is a historical tradition in architecture, whereby drawings (as well as other 
forms of communication) signify more than can be embodied in stabilized frameworks 
of objectifiable data. If we can go beyond the material carrier (sign) into the internal 
reality of a drawing, the reduction of representation to a formal system - seeming at 
first as void and useless - begins to appear as an extension of reality, which is quite 
natural. The system ceases to be perceived as a process whose coherence is supported 
by empty symbols, and reveals a structure whose manifestation is only mediated by 
symbolism. An architectural drawing is as much a prospective unfolding of future 
possibilities as it is a recovery of a particular history to whose intentions it testifies and 
whose limits it always challenges.' (D. Libeskind 2000,84) 
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The phenomenological influence IS 
confirmed by the impact of Husserl's 
Origin of Geometry (2000, 87) on the 
geometrical nature of the drawings which 
Libeskind regards as 'researches'. The 
apparent randomness and implicit chaos of 
the Micromegas series is not an empty 
violation of order but an attempt at the 
resolution of conflicting impulses rather 
than presenting a particular meaning. 
'These drawings seek to reflect on a deeper 
level of consciousness the inner life of geometrical order whose nucleus is the conflict 
between the voluntary and the involuntary.' (2000, 87) Like Gehry's 'frottage' drawing, 
it seems that geometrical form generates further geometrical form, not all of which is 
' intended'. Libeskind's 'drawings' which range from conventional imagery to computer-
assisted shapings to mixed media installation, do not privilege vision in a Cartesian or 
retinal sense, but instead emphasize cross-sensory perception in both the designer's 
concept of form and the spectator's experience of it. In Part Two of The Eyes of the Skin, 
Pallasmaa suggests that not only is the reading of a building a profoundly sensory as well 
as a conceptual process, but that in reality, the spectator's conceptual reading and 
response to architectural meaning and significance depends on a prior and initial sensory 
response; ultimately this latent process manifests itself as language. The totality of the 
experience engages all the senses ('acoustic intimacy', 'silence, time and solitude', ' the 
shape of touch' , 'mimesis of the body' and so on; J. Pallasmaa 2005, 5). Libeskind's 
buildings actively subvert 'the hegemony of vision'. The raw concrete of the voids at the 
Jewish Museum or the dislocated forms at the Imperial War Museum or the equally 
exposed concrete in the long two-metre wide form at the Felix Nussbaum Haus, 
Osnabruck 1998 (also known as 'Museum Without Exit') in which space and experience 
is powerfully compressed, all demand nuances of touch and texture as well as vision. 
Merleau-Ponty's version of the glance as a kind of extenuated touch as a contiguous 
contact between directed vision and the surface seen is an ever-present feature of the 
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Fig 29 
Fig 30 
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ambiguity and contradiction of Libeskind's buildings. The multiplicity in his drawings 
represents not only a rehearsal and research into future built form, but establishes the 
phenomenologies of embodiment as a prerequisite of the central theme of his 
architecture: meaning. 
But if buildings mean and signify in some way, that is not necessarily directly a result 
of authorial intention, and in Breaking Ground 2004, Libeskind insists that it will result 
in an expression of some kind. 
'Since the modernist era began, buildings have been designed to turn a neutral face to 
the world, to be immune to expression. The goal has been to produce objective, not 
subjective, architecture. But here is the truth of the matter: No building, no matter how 
neutral it is supposed to be, is actually neutral. Le Corbusier may have insisted that 
'a house is a machine for living in\ but.. .. it is still an expression of your personality, 
and hence not a neutral space.' (D. Libeskind 2004, 121 original emphasis) 
Libeskind proposes that even a version of Venturi's 'dumb box' like Mies's New 
National Gallery, Berlin signifies precisely in its defacement of form which suggests a 
kind of violence and aggression which strips decoration and articulation down to a state 
of nakedness and which in turn is a kind of 'assault'. If all buildings mean or express 
some kind of feeling, then the architect is not restricted to one form of that expression, 
but may vary the building form in order to avoid 'the Gehry' or 'the Libeskind' formulaic 
design (D. Libeskind 2004, 109). Which is exactly what he does. Hence a comparison of 
the Jewish Museum, the Imperial war Museum Manchester, the Denver Art Gallery 
Extension and the proposed Boiler House Spiral at the Victoria and Albert Museum, 
London for example [Figs 27, 28, 29, 30] produces fractured shards and fractals, 
curvilinear sweeps, dramatic folding, incisive creasing and angles and everywhere the 
violation of the grid (D. Libeskind 2004, 125). There is a wide spectrum of 
poststructuralist eclecticism here which reflects Libeskind's admiration for the kind of 
radical Victorian eclectic he found at the V&A. ('When the Victorians built the Museum 
150 years ago, they didn't erect what had been in fashion 150 years before that, in the 
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Georgian era. The Victorians were brave and radical, shocking even. They built a 
contemporary building.' 2004, 194) But despite the disparity of built forms, the 
underlying imperative is always towards an expression of feeling in form. It becomes 
necessary to distinguish between 'universal' and 'particularistic' or contextual meaning. 
In architectural terms, a particularistic meaning will associate with the context of a 
specific site. A universal meaning on the other hand invariably involves an abstract noun 
at the point that the meaning becomes linguistic. Thus the universal sense or state 
inherent in the Jewish Museum is widely recognized as relating to 'the tragic' (R. 
Patterson, Ed, 2000, 66-75). The particularistic sense at the V &A on the other hand 
emerges from the fact that the proposed building unites two earlier existing buildings and 
therefore suggests a unity of culture and learning across time; the building would be 
physically contiguous, linked. The fact that Libeskind's Extension is so radically a 
modem building (although not Modernist other than by inflection) creates a temporal 
flow between the new and the old, replete with its sense of remembrance of things past. 
The connecting flow of time between the old and the new is derived from the physical, 
contiguous link between the new building and the pre-existing older ones. The Boiler 
House Extension puns and plays on its own past with its apparent chaotic deconstruction 
of Cubism, as does the Denver Extension in a similar context. But the dominant note 
which the V &A sounds relates to the fact that this is a fractured Cubism which spirals. 
The particular meaning in the context of the museum is that there is almost a gothic-like 
rise of optimism which is spiralled upwards and which is celebratory of learning and 
culture and its continuity. As architectural form, the spiral achieves its rising emphasis 
without any curves, but through 'layers' of deformed cubes which concatenate vertically. 
Libeskind's themes or 'dimensions' at the V &A are 'the spiral movement of art and 
history', 'the interlocking of inside and outside' and 'the labyrinth of discovery' (D. 
Libeskind 2000, 156). Such 'dimensions' reinforce Libeskind's devotion to concept as 
well as built form, and the reciprocal relation between the two and the ever-present 
seeking and demand for meaning. Even a building which is so conspicuously deformed 
contains its own parlante and would speak in a commentary of cultural continuity 
through and because of time. It is in fact, its own temporal allegory. 
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Large public buildings are of course not new, but since Bilbao there is now a powerful 
globalist imperative to deploy iconic buildings as a definition and a sign of urban or 
national identity. Such buildings are inevitably monumental, and monumental buildings 
apart from being publicly large and conspicuous, are always commemorative. 
Commemorating something is always an act of remembrance, always implicating 
memory and always instigating absent presence. So the monumental building is a fonn of 
reminder, a temporal prompt and a kind of advice. ('Monument' from Latin 
monumentum, to remind, advise.) The monumental building in other words is always 
didactically tendentious and however disguised, hortatory. These have already been 
established here as the conditions of allegory. A Victorian Museum, for example, might 
well deliberately and overtly signal its didactic function through the ideology of 
'improvement', but the museum in a poststructuralist age shuns 'improvement', but 
nevertheless contrives to say one thing but mean another. It does so by studiously 
avoiding being seen as museum-like or institutional but yet providing uplifting 
experience. Zaha Hadid's acclaimed Wolfsburg Science Center looks more like what 
Charles Jencks calls 'large-scale horizontal sculpture' (C. Jencks 2005, 160) than a centre 
for the dissemination of knowledge. Where the Victorian museum was a showcase of 
improvement, its poststructuralist counterpart represents what Stephen Bann has called 'a 
cabinet of curiosities' commemorating past as well as current achievement. Because the 
museum commemorates and remembers, it always provides, like the church, sadness as 
well as celebration and is another allegorical oxymoron. 
The sadness and veneration which attaches to relics such as reliquaries in the church 
and cabinets of curiosities in the museum has been theorized in Deconstruction and 
Poststructuralism as absence, and since deconstructive procedures are now an 
incorporated sine qua non of poststructuralist theoretical construction, the relative 
solemnity which surrounds poststructuralist architecture is accounted for by the critical 
seriousness of its underlying and foundational theory. There is inevitably a marked 
contrast with the rhetorical theatricality of the New Historicism which so characterized 
early postmodem architecture of the Graves and Moore variety. Nevertheless, the later 
iconic building continues to be rhetorical by definition of being iconic and also theatrical 
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in the contrivance and expressionist drama of its sculptural declaration. The essential 
difference would seem to be in the openly acknowledged Modernism of the 
poststructuralists conferred by theory, compared with the earlier architectural 'noise' of 
the postmodernists expressed in the parodic and ironic laughter of historicist quotation. 
Certainly the on-going and completed commissions of Daniel Libeskind, rather like Peter 
Eisenman, show a moral seriousness and gravitas, as demonstrated by several buildings 
in different countries commemorating the Holocaust. It is perhaps surprising to speak so 
naturally of architecture as exemplifying 'moral seriousness', but Libeskind has shown 
consistently in his first building, the Berlin Jewish Museum, a capacity to engage tragic 
and elegiac meaning into architectural built form. 
'In effect, Libeskind evolved a complex political metaphor in space, light, matter and 
dematerialization to evoke the universality of Jewish civilization, and the void left in 
Western culture by the destruction of the Jews in the Second World War. Far from 
being an exercise in neo-modernist formalism, this was a work of chilling authenticity 
drawing together in its lines of thought both grave, apocalyptic themes, and radical 
reassessments of the meaning of human destiny.' (W.J. Curtis 1999,667-8) 
Libeskind has called the vast and still on-going project at the former S.S. Barracks at 
Sachsenhausen, Berlin 'Mo[u]rning'. In Libeskind's submission for the project, the lettcr 
'u' is crossed out in a move clearly derived from Derrida and Ilusseri. Bracketing out the 
letter 'u', of course leaves 'morning'; light and rebirth from darkness and death. The 
original project involved the actual rebuilding of the ruined Nazi buildings which 
Libcskind objected to along with the mass housing which was proposed for the site. 
Although there is to be no housing, some of the buildings have been restored as part of 
the commemorative nature of the site, and others have been razed and flooded and 
preserved as ruins. Allegorically, the floodcd buildings have received what Libeskind 
calls 'a new baptism'. (D. Libeskind 2000, 91) The submerged buildings as trace and 
memory are seen from viewing platforms and constitute as ruins what could be described 
as the prescrvation of decay. Libeskind's own distinctive buildings for the site contain 
spaces for social use such as unemployment training as well as a library and museum and 
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continue the metaphors of hope and rebirth of the larger site. 'Its aim is to bring people to 
this place, to reveal, disclose, and remember. At the same time it must be a place for 
hope, a place where those who are trying to rebuild Germany can find a workplace, an 
employment future, the growth of new nature, the quietude of contemplation, the 
rehabilitation of the physical and mental spirit: the dawn of a new Mourning .... ' (2000, 
91) 
It may be no exaggeration to suggest that Libeskind's Jewish Museum has already 
become recognized as an experience of the sublime, and that it has joined Ronchamp and 
Gehry's Vitra as a signpost building of the architectural postmodem from the second half 
of the twentieth century onwards. ('In fact, the Jewish Museum has already been called 
the last architectural masterwork in twentieth century Berlin, and its foremost building for 
the twenty first.' B. Schneider 1999, 58) Indeed, it may be seen as one of the great 
accomplishments of modem architecture and the Modernism it embraces. What makes it 
utterly distinctive in the terms discussed here is its unrivalled power to condense and 
focus meaning. 
'And equally, Libcskind certainly pays formal homage to modernism. The echoes and 
traces of Le Corbusier are evident everywhere in the work, not least in the transform-
ation of the spiral museum ... .into the zigzag museum, as well as in the deeper epistem-
ological attitude to the city and its inhabitants registered in the spatial movements of 
the urban projects. The powerful imagery of the avant-gardes is ever-present, trans-
formed and displaced, re-formed and replaced .... Beyond this, however, when con-
fronted by the withdrawn exteriors and disturbing interiors of the Jewish Museum, we 
find ourselves in a phenomenological world in which both Heidegger and Sartre would 
find themselves, ifnot exactly 'at home' (for that was not their preferred place), 
certainly in bodily and mental crisis, with any trite classical homologies between the 
body upset by unstable axes; walls and skin tom, ripped, and dangerously slashed, 
rooms empty of contcnt and with uncertain or no exits and entrances. What Heidcgger 
liked to call 'falling into' the uncanny, and what for Sartre was the dangerous instrum-
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entality of objects in the world as they threatened the body and its extensions, is for 
Libeskind the stuff of the architectural experience.' (A. Vidler in D. Libeskind 2000, 
(222-3) Anthony Vidler's 'Afterword' to Libeskind's book, The Space of Encounter, calls 
the Jewish Museum a 'Museum of the Voice'. That is, the building speaks its meanings 
and demands to be heard in the phenomenological tradition. Libeskind himself in 
Breaking Ground, 2004, explains that his initial conceptual procedure involved three 
processes. The first was the collection and gathering of names, including Schleiermacher, 
the founder of the Hermeneutical Method (A. Kenny, Ed, 1994, 230-1) much admired by 
Libeskind (D. Libeskind 2004, 92) and discussed here earlier. The second involved 
reading Walter Benjamin, and the third was the influence of Arnold Schoenberg's 
unfinished opera, Moses and Aaron. 
The collection of names and the lines and connections between notable Berliners gave 
Libeskind both the zigzag shape which had to accommodate its site, but also the 
configuration of windows. As discussed earlier, the fenestration is metaphorically 
symbolic and each point of each window is numbered and accords to one of the names in 
the Holocaust Memorial Book from which Libeskind began. It might be tempting to read 
the window slashes as a biblical 'writing on the wall'; in fact, Libeskind describes it 
otherwise. 'The windows are the 'writing of the addresses by the walls of the Museum 
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itself." But the biblical is 
persuasively inscribed 
into the text of the 
building. (' I had always 
imagined the building as 
a sort of text, meant to be 
read ... .' D. Libeskind 
2004, 94.) Just a Moses 
led the Jews in the fli ght 
from Egypt both in the Bible in choenberg's opera, so did many attempt to escape from 
the hoah. And the idea of flight and expulsion is commemorated in the Museum's 
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Garden Of Exile [38], perhaps as the ultimate ejection from Eden and the loss of 
innocence itself paralleled in the building's invocation of the Holocaust. And although 
Libeskind does not appear to say so, the building's zigzag plan can be interpreted not 
only as a deformed Star of David or as Nazi insignia, but also as a coiled serpent [Fig 31]. 
The spatial metaphor of the entrance is particularly important because having entered 
via the original Baroque building, Libeskind's extension is confronted only by going 
down; the experience of meeting the Jewish Museum is subte"anean. Compared with the 
experience of the garden above, there is something chilling and unnerving, hellish even, 
about entering the museum and its labyrinthine confusions of voids, corridors and the 
'streets' leading to the garden, the rising staircase and ominously, to the Holocaust Void. 
The physical presence of the vertical void which runs the entire length of the building 
instantiates the metaphorical presence of absence and seems to summon up a disturbing 
nihilism in its bare concrete. But the brilliance of this device is that to fully experience 
the enormous physicality of the void, the beholder must look up, and looking up is 
looking towards the light, because the fenestration becomes larger and more expressed at 
the top of the building and as it rises. Absence and presence, darkness and light, realised 
in spatial and visual metaphor, is a powerful and compelling embodiment of allegory. 
The void is crossed at sixty places by sixty bridges and these correspond to Libeskind's 
reading of Walter Benjamin's One-Way Street which Libeskind describes as 'urban 
apocalypse' (D. Libeskind 2000, 27). The dislocation, alienation and disorientation of the 
steel and glass architecture of Berlin that Benjamin addressed in both One-Way Street and 
the Arcades project, is reproduced in the Jewish Museum in its fractured fenestration 
which violates floors and confuses inside and out and in the complexity of its 'streets' 
and their rising and falling levels. Libeskind's adoption of the term 'streets' is a direct 
reference to Benjamin's vision of pre-war Berlin as dystopian. 
From Barthes we might expect that any interpretation of a writer's intention by a 
reader will be a form of reinscription. Benjamin, in 'The Task of the Translator' (1923) 
suggested that any interpretation is in fact a form of translation O. Lechte 1994,205). It is 
the original which has to remain in a state of permanence and stasis as form in order to 
continue to 'exist'. But it is the translation of the meaning which becomes subject to 
change because as translation it becomes another kind of reproduction, but never as a 
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literal process. (Benjamin of course also wrote the influential 'The Work of Art in an Age 
of Mechanical Reproduction'.) A literal interpretation and translation 'demolishes the 
theory of the reproduction of meaning and is a direct threat to comprehensibility.' The 
richness of Libeskind's visual metaphor will always defeat literalism, but at the same 
time always itself become subject to over-interpretation. This is an inevitable and 
acceptable condition. There is no 'remedy' to interpretation, and over-interpretation is 
both inevitable and necessary as the test to destruction of allegorically concealed 
meaning. Only the default position of falsification within Stanley Fish's 'interpretive 
community' remains as the restraining order of the discourse. Libeskind's intentions at 
the Jewish Museum are of course an essential component of its potential significance, but 
like the redundant church, its allegories and symbolisms may change according to social 
use or indeed, disappear. Just like Witlgenstein's 'meaning from use', architectural 
meaning is dependent on the way any building functions in its social, economic and 
cultural context. A change of context inaugurates a change of meaning. Is it possible to 
imagine some point in the future when the immediacy of the Holocaust has receded that 
the stylistic infelicities of the Jewish Museum could become transformed into say, 
perhaps, a museum of German Expressionism and Noir in film? When the gouges and 
slits of its skin represent not the atrocities of suffering, but the excesses of the slasher 
movie? 
The Jewish Museum has become paradigmatic of embedded meaning not only in 
poststructuralist architecture and has become iconic not as representative of some 
particular form of 'branding', but as a built structure which encodes a difficult common 
experience of the tragic and its possible redemption. In this sense it moves from the 
particular to the universal. For many, the experience of it ushers in an unexpected 
solemnity that is comparable to the symbolism of the church or cathedral which also 
invokes the mourning of darkness and its meaning, and the redeeming aspect of light. 
Libeskind's early Neo-Dadaist influences are subsumed by his rejection of Enlightenment 
Reason discussed in Chapter Two here. 'Thus to speak about architecture ... .is to speak 
about the paradigm of the irrational. In my view, the best works of the contemporary 
spirit come from the irrational, while what prevails in the world, what dominates and 
often kills, does so always in the name of Reason.' (D. Libeskind in P. Noever, Ed, 1991, 
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63) The rhetorical 'absence' of the Holocaust Tower dramatically signifies the horror of a 
particular event and is an insistently chastening experience. In the voids running the 
length ofthe building, the distraught angles of the structural members continually play on 
a connotation of ruin, that what at times seems to be the suggestion of imminent physical 
collapse also represents the ruin of taste and sensibility as an insane end-point of the 
ideology of Enlightenment Reason. It is perhaps here in these great ruined and empty 
spaces that Libeskind has most powerfully embodied the tragic. He has called his 
thoughts on the Jewish Museum 'Between The Lines'. 
'These are the two lines of contemporary dichotomy, the lines which create the rift 
between faith and action, between political belief and architectural response. These 
lines develop themselves, because they have a logic. They also fall apart: you can't 
keep them together, because they become completely disengaged, there's no way to 
keep them mutually intertwined. Therefore, the lines show themselves as separated 
so that the void, which has been centrally running through what is continuous, mater-
ializes itself outside as what has been ruined, or rather as the remnant or residue of 
independent structure. I call this the 'voided void', a void which has itself been voided, 
a deconstruction which has itself been deconstructed. Fragmentation and displacement 
mark the coherence of the ensemble in this type of operation, because the thing has 
come undone in order to become accessible, both functionally and intellectually.' 
(P. Noever, Ed 1991,69-70) 
Of course, reading 'Between The Lines' is an act of literary interpretation, (R. Patterson 
Ed, 2000, 73) and Libcskind has said that he considers the depth of metaphorical meaning 
in the Jewish Museum as representative of a text. The gap between denotation and 
connotation is reader inference. It is the building's physical form which hints and 
prompts the spectator to suspect a subtext where something as mundane as bare concrete 
of the voided space might connote the raw experience of suffering when compared to the 
pure white walls of the rest of the museum. And it is the architectural skill expressed as 
aesthetic form which allows the building'S gestures to become language and which allow 
Libeskind to speak of ruin and fragmentation, deconstruction and displacement and 
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o$ers to speak of the tragic as presence. And reading the external fenestration as 
'wounding' is amplified from the inside when the windows can be seen as significant 
incisions into the very structure of the building and not simply as a rhetorical device 
patterned on to the exterior [Fig 32]. 
Whether or not it is part of Libeskind ' s intentions, 
'wounding' becomes an integral part of the 
experience of the spectator at the Jewish Museum as 
an essential element of its phenomenological 
substance; the texture of its surfaces and the 
arrangement of its spaces. This act of spectatorship is 
distinctly that of distanced observation, what T.S. 
Eliot called 'the objective correlative', and is quite 
Fig 32 separate from the experience of the exhibits which 
inevitably transform the role of the visitor from spectator to participant. When confronted 
by ' wounding' so consistently, the spectator role, in an act of readership, seeks out its 
associations. And what wounding connotes with is the classical idea of trauma. Aristotle 
makes clear that contained within the Greek notion of the tragic plot is the resolution of 
the fatal flaw in the heroic fall, understood to evoke suffering, pity and fear in an 
audience but which confers the redemption of catharsis. In the eyes of the spectator, the 
physical suffering and mental agitation of the fallen hero is the confrontation of what 
Kant and the Romantics later called the sublime. Although it may not be an over-
interpretation to characterize the experience of the Jewish Museum as a version of the 
sublime, it does need careful limiting. For someone like Burke, for example, the sublime 
was so overpoweringly phenomenological that the experience of awe marginalized both 
cognition and language as a form of resignation to the drama of fate CR. Patterson, Ed 
2000, 38-9). At the Jewish Museum, the constant cascade of visual metaphor, on the 
contrary, is the precisely the mechanism which transmogrifies significant form into 
language. It becomes difficult to resist the idea that the transformation of visual metaphor 
into linguistic discourse represents a second-hand version of the building-form, as when a 
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window summons up notions of wounding and the tragic implications of Greek trauma, 
and that then the 'discourse' doubles and becomes a disquieting kind of reproduction. 
Aristotle's depiction of tragic plot naturally consists of certain requirements of 
narrative as the unfolding movement towards tragedy. And of course, a building, unlike a 
narrative, is an entity which is abstract and does not contain narratives or representations 
but has to have its meanings coded in form. It was suggested earlier that buildings 
ultimately mean by virtue of the social and cultural use to which they are put. Since the 
museum must always embody the process of commemoration, it must equally enshrine 
memory. It is only in memory that history itself is remembered and revived. There may 
be no narratives in architecture, but there is the collective memory, ut ars poetica, of the 
past which is the semantic analogue of Aristotle's plot. It is the contact of the 
spectatorship of the Jewish Museum with the enshrined memory of a terrible historic 
moment which approaches the sublime. But it has to be said that this touch of the sublime 
does not confer Aristotle's catharsis as a form of cleansing or emotional evisceration 
(Greek katharsis, to purge or purify). Although the sense of the tragic is palpable, the 
central and dominating void is almost nihilist in that it represents absence of a 
particularly agonising kind, and is a monument to mourning rather than the redemption of 
catharsis. 
As well as oscillating between a present reflecting in some way on some past, a present 
absence, allegory says one thing but means another. The Jewish Museum is not, as 
Libeskind has insisted, a Iiolocaust Museum, but instead is the history of Jewish culture 
in Berlin and in Germany. This is what it says. But once its signs have been read, and its 
parts holistically reconciled, what it means has more to do with the tragic recollection of 
suffering. Allegory is not only a temporal palimpsest which folds a present back on to a 
previous history, but is also a rhetorical trope which is both hortatory and didactic. It is 
not only a present which mourns the ruin of the past, but it also uses the past to moralize 
about the present. The figural symbol of allegory can be thought of as the pointing finger, 
sometimes in Christian iconography as God, but equally as Ilistory itself (R. Wittkover 
1977, 173-188). 
Rachel Whiteread's Iiolocaust Monument, 2000 at the Judenplatz, Vienna is called a 
'Nameless Library'. It is a room-sized cast made in dental plaster with walls made up of 
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rows of opened books. Although the cast is Whiteread's principal sculptural procedure, 
the fact that the Nameless Library is cast in dental plaster recalls a deeply disturbing 
association with the concentration camps and insists on reviving memories which have 
lain dormant. The open books recall the symbolic burning of Jewish culture when books 
by Jewish authors were publicly burned by the Nazis on May lOth 1933. In other words, 
the Vienna monument allegorically points a finger implying guilt and complicity. 
Allegorically it prompts an underlying moral response of atonement. For the same reason, 
the Jewish Museum is an uncomfortable experience, not simply a cabinet of curiosities, 
more expiation than redemption. It is part of Daniel Libeskind's extraordinary 
achievement that the singular visual and aesthetic quality of the Jewish Museum converts 
so powerfully into language and meaning. The underlying components of architectural 
meaning which have been established here in terms of the relationship between visual 
form and language and expressed as rhetoric and allegorical metaphor are represented 
most completely in the Jewish Museum. In one obvious sense, the building stands as a 
test of the application of the theoretical model of Part One here to the reading of 
poststructuralist buildings as embedded and coded meaning as well as iconic form. The 
linguistic, philosophical, textual, metaphorical and theatrically rhetorical aspects of the 
post modern form an essential interpretative backdrop. This is not an attempt to cram such 
meanings into the Jewish Museum as some kind of repository of theory, but rather the 
proposition that the experience of this building exemplifies most fully and 
paradigmatically the imperative of postmodern architecture to mean and to mean as 
language. 
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CONCLUSION 
FORMALISM AND CULTURAL CONTEXT 
Charles Jencks effectively began the discussion of architectural significance as an 
aspect of the postmodem with his book, Meaning In Architecture (1969). That book, and 
particularly The Language of Postmodern Architecture which followed it, established the 
now familiar position that the semantics of architectural Postmodemism would involve 
the decoding of meaning within the semiotic configurations of building form. This aspect 
of semiotic interpretation implying the presence of language, or the postmodem building 
as 'discourse', was never fully worked out - a lacuna the present work attempts to 
address. Nevertheless, Jencks's formulation seemed to imply that architectural meaning 
would be located within architecture as an interior sense generated by the puns and 
parodies of the double form. This might be understood to represent, albeit in a loose 
sense, the proposal that meaning inheres inside particular genres in an almost autonomous 
way, much as F.R. Leavis and I.A. Richards had suggested and discussed here in Chapter 
Four. There is no doubt that primarily postmodem buildings mean by virtue of being 
architecture. The rhetorical tropes indicated here, however 'architecturally intertextual' 
they might be, work as meaning precisely because of their architectural historicism. It 
will be noticed immediately that this apparently reverses the equally familiar 'base and 
superstructure' model that assumes that it is the cultural context which determines the 
meaning of the art-object. The opposition between these two positions, often 
characterized as intrinsic versus extrinsic, or formalist versus contextual, is antithetical 
and dialectic, and one which Peter Eisenman has attempted to dissolve with his 'in 
betweeness'. It surely seems almost a truism now that the work of art, and particularly so 
in the case of architccture, means by virtue of both its intrinsic and extrinsic properties 
and by both its formal and cultural significance. Thus the deconsecrated church ceases to 
allegorise because of its change of use and because it functions differently. And it is at 
the Nederlanden Building or the Jewish Museum for example that concealed meanings 
emerge because of both the spectator's extrinsic knowledge of the tragedies of the Second 
World War as well as the construing of the architectural tropes in the buildings' form. 
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THE LITERARY THEORY OF POSTMODERNIST ARCHITECTURE 
The focus here has been consistently one of documenting the conditions of meaning. 
And clearly statements of meaning are non-evaluative and abjure judgements of value. 
What meaning must have of course is interpretation, although not as a process of 
revealing a fixed authorial intention favoured by Leavis or the absolute authority of the 
text insisted on by New Criticism. The sign is, as Chapter Two proposed, irrevocably 
metaphorical in Peirce's triadic formulation. Understanding metaphor implicates the 
relationship of part to whole, often the metonymic generating the metaphorical. The 
mechanism of yoking part to whole as one thing representing something else or some 
other state is characteristically synechdochal; one part contiguously touching and 
prompting the larger metaphorical meaning which in the building assumes the 
proportions of visual metaphor. And it is only through visual metaphor that the trope of 
saying one thing but meaning another can be instantiated as an example of Craig Owens's 
fundamentally important condition of the allegorical imperative which underlies the 
postmodern. The source of interpretation, architectural or otherwise, is inevitably literary. 
And in the case of poststructuralist architecture, where, it is proposed, that built form 
becomes language, it is particularly important to establish a semiotic and linguistic model 
of interpretation of the kind produced in Chapter Five. The literary interpretation of 
architecture may initially sound rather odd, but in fact emerges as an essential 
requirement. What follows in terms of rhetoric and metaphor, allegory and metonymy or 
synechdoche and chiasmus is the metaphorical nature of poststructuralism which only 
becomes revealed through this kind of tropic scrutiny. Equally, terms such as 
'unconcealing' or 'revealing' may give an impression of obscure or even biblical 
exegesis. But if the proposition here holds that the fundamental nature of the postmodern 
is allegorical, then the poststructuralist building must say one thing but mean another; it 
must in other words be construed by acts of empathic reading. What those potential 
meanings could become will always be subject to the process of public discourse in the 
shape of Stanley Fish's interpretative community. 
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THE RHETORIC OF POSTMODERN THEATRICALITY 
One constantly re-emerging theme has been that of theatricality as a form of rhetorical 
display that separates the minimalist decorum of Modernism from the historicist 
contrivance of the postmodern. In the Graves-Moore edition, early Postmodernism 
flagrantly subverted Modernism precisely by being conspicuous. In its later 
poststructuralist manifestation, theatricality becomes embodied in Bigness whilst the 
Modernism which is part of its salient features is re-emphasized. The disputes between 
Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried and the Minimalists during the nineteen sixties 
continue to be understood now not merely as a disagreement between the art movements 
of Abstract Expressionism and Minimalism, but also as the epistemological divide 
between Modernism and Postmodernism itself. Fried's argument in Art and Objecthood 
that the transmogrification of painting into installed objects which become increasingly 
sculptural/architectural and so create the condition of theatre between genres, is ironically 
and parodically celebrated by the postmodern sensibility that delights in the presence of 
the oxymoron, rather like Peter Eisenman's 'in-betweeness'. In poststructuralist 
architecture, the persistence of contrivance and display becomes the rhetoric of meta-
architecture; the self-referential iconic building seen at Bilbao, Berlin and Beijing and at 
the site of Yamasaki's Twin Trade Towers in New York. Part of later theatricality has 
been the violation of the Modernist rational grid in favour of architectural folding and the 
emergence of the sculptural building which allows not only a new expressionism, but also 
stylistic autobiography in architecture. Thus, it is assumed here, that as long as buildings 
continue to display the features of rhetorical theatricality, then we may assume within the 
almost impossible debate about Post-Postmodernism, that we remain within a postmodern 
sensibility. Deleuze's 'rhizome' with its self-imposed uncertainties continues to generate 
the infinite regression of the interpretation of interpretations. This contextualized 
situation arises from the condition of the art object or text implying a meaning which can 
never be exhausted by authorial intention alone as Gadamer, JIeidegger and Merleau-
Ponty have argued. Meaning will inevitably be diachronic as well as synchronic, 
historical as well as contemporaneously authorial, and is subject to change over time 
through acts of readership. But whatever is made of it in some future, it is the astonishing 
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theatricality of that gap between wall and the event of the roof at Ronchamp that initiates 
the metaphorical into architecture. 
THE MODERNISM OF POST MODERNISM 
Part of the layered structure of architectural Poststructuralism that has included 
deconstruction, and the Deleuzian Pli, folded and curved into sculptural expression, has 
been the essential component of Modernism itself. The kind of retraction of early 
postmodernist architecture from Modernism represented a difficult disengagement that 
evolved into a process of separation. Wilful stick-on Historicism subverted Modernism 
with the collage of eclecticism almost as a denial or camouflage of modem steel and glass 
that amounted to the recriminatory gesture of the retort. (Venturi's derisory 'Less is a 
bore' in response to Mies's eponymous 'Less is more.') But the founding elements of 
modern design of concrete, steel and the glass curtain wall which allowed industrial 
mass-production rather than hand-crafted materials, could only literally be concealed 
behind the rhetoric of inauthentic periodization. Now, nobody does what is often 
considered to be 'Postmodernism' and faux-inauthentic periodization except perhaps the 
supermarket superstore in its barn-like invocation of the vernacular encasing the dumb 
box within. In contrast, the Poststructuralists use the constructional elements of 
Modernism to facilitate sculptural form and expressionism rendered virtually in CGI. The 
kind of Modernist inflection seen, for example, in Zaha Hadid's Cincinatti Contemporary 
Arts Center is neither parodic nor recriminatory, but is contrariwise, a form of veneration. 
The temporal palimpsest created by this, as it were, re-inscription within Modernism and 
its materials is almost a kind of 'truth to materials', albeit Modernist, both an open 
acknowledgement and 'play' on Modernism as a source and origin but one indefinitely 
deferred. Craig Owen's postmodemistic 'allegorical imperative' initiated the concept of 
Postmodemism as instituting a Duchampian appropriation of extrinsic and historicist 
'found objects' in the form of earlier artistic style. In the case of architecture, this 
appropriation, or indeed, expropriation of earlier historical elements, including the 
Modernism from which it emerged, created the architectural definition of the trope of the 
oxymoron which is so powerfully characteristic of the postmodem building. Frank 
Gehry's Santa Monica House becomes paradigmatic of apparently diametrically opposed 
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elements constituting one form as a conspicuous example of 'double coding' into an 
architectural oxymoron. Despite the flagrantly rhetorical Historicism of emergent 
architectural postmodernism in the nineteen seventies and eighties, it is to the incipient 
Purism of Modernism that the poststructuralists consistently return. 
BUILT FORM AS VISUAL METAPHOR 
Buildings can only mean as metaphorical form because they have no language. 
Although the beholder is not in any sense part of what might be called the ontology of the 
building, the spectator must be prepared to partake of the building's 'parlante' which 
emerges from the rhetorical style of architectural detail. In this sense, the role of the 
reader is both one of spectatorship and participation, both of visual discrimination and the 
act of construal. The spectator as reader rather than merely an observer in an architectural 
context inevitably confronts something that can only be addressed as 'visual meaning'. 
The metaphorical nature of this kind of sign, like Libeskind's 'suturing' in the 
fenestration of the Jewish Museum mentioned earlier, represents what H.P. Grice called 
'implicature', or the condition of 'as if; as if, that is, a rivet signifies a stitch. The 
contiguous juxtaposition of 'stitch' and window slit as 'wound' as visual double-coding 
later participates in the linguistic process of generating abstract nouns such as 'tragic' in 
instances of holistic meaning. The implicature of 'as if immediately suggests something 
other than something said. And this doubling of meaning, once it is realised that it has a 
temporal context of a present form implicating a context from the past, becomes part of 
the allegorical. The cognitive processes underlying interpretative readings of 
architectural visual form are clearly complex. There is a metaphorical transfer from the 
visual to the linguistic. At least there has to be an initial association between visual tropes 
such as simile and synechdoche which 'touch' metonymically and which prompt the 
realization of larger and holistic metaphorical meaning which is produced as language 
from form. Reading the poststructuralist building becomes ever more complex when it is 
recalled that as form and meaning it both subverts and venerates its modernist influences. 
The palimpsest of the postmodernist reinscription on to Modernism is in another sense a 
violation, and the violated remnant of the modem both discarded and retained represents 
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an act of architectural performative infelicity. The associative elements of figural 
contiguity and 'touch' reinforce the view that the experience of the building is, in a full 
sense, embodied and that even the retinal or Cartesian 'look' is a form of contact or 
'touch', much as Merleau-Ponty proposed. And the fact that the interpretation of the 
building as form is nonetheless experiential and historical rather than a search for the 
transcendentally ideal places an emphasis on the phenomenological tradition and 
'unconcealing' of Heidegger rather than the Kantian formulation of the beautiful 
favoured, say, by Roger Scruton. At all events, without visual metaphor in architecture, 
there could only be a severely marginalized presence of meaning, or indeed in terms of 
built form rather than societal or economic significance, an entire absence of meaning as 
the semiotic emptiness of Mies's Seagram Tower demonstrates as part of its Modernist 
episteme. 
LANGUAGE AND MEANING FROM FORM 
Donald Davidson and other philosophers of language argue that since metaphor does 
not and cannot produce logical propositions, it is incapable of discursive meaning. 
Metaphorical meaning at best is connotative rather than denotative. Metaphorical 
meaning, equally, is essentially comparative, and expresses one thing in terms of another 
different but in some way similar thing. Since architectural meaning is the result of 
metaphor locked in form, philosophers of language are incapable of response to 
architectural metaphor because they can detect no propositions. This of course is not very 
helpful because it dispenses with the very idea of response itself. Response in its full 
sense is embodied and multi-sensory, perhaps even synaesthetic. The later sensation of an 
echo, for example, may recall an earlier experience of resonant footsteps in a church 
building which then associates strongly with a sense of colour, derived possibly from the 
earlier sight of stained glass. Without such a cognitive response to figural associations 
and connections, the metonymic and metaphorical linkages in Libeskind's slash windows 
discussed earlier in terms of visual metaphor might be missed completely. And it is the 
linkage and association between metonymy and metaphor, 'suture' to 'gash', part to 
whole, that generates the linguistic sense of 'wounding' and which in tum leads to the 
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elaborated language of the allegorical, generating in tum, the larger sense of the presence 
of the tragic. This is insistently language from architecture. The composite theoretical 
model of Part One with semiotic (Saussure, Peirce and Barthes), theatrical (Fried), 
philosophical (Heideggeran phenomenology), literary (Gadamer) and interpretational 
(Fish) elements, amongst others such as the fundamental importance of sculptural 
expression and gesture, is the basis of architectural meaning as construed by the beholder 
as reader. The model permits the embedded discussion of such meaning in the context of 
buildings in Part Two because such constituent meanings have already been established 
by the model itself. In many ways this is the opposite of 'The Language of Architecture' 
formulation based on the naive assumption that buildings inherently contain a meaning 
by virtue of architecture having a language. They and it do not. The language that 
associates with architectural meaning is nothing less than the language of the spectator 
responding to the 'langue' to be derived from architectural visual metaphor. However 
naive 'The Language of Architecture' might appear in the light of the model of meaning 
proposed here, it remains powerfully ubiquitous and creates a lacuna of elaborated 
meaning which the present proposal has attempted to address. It is important to realize 
that the theoretical model upon which interpretation can be based, as argued in the 
Introduction here, represents neither a hierarchy nor a structural system, but instead is a 
matrix of relatively independent elements all of which are considered to be essential 
aspects of the holistic problem of postmodem architectural meaning. No one element is 
prior. Although the metaphorical nature of the signifier is fundamental, there is no reason 
to suppose that it is 'prior' to hermeneutics and phenomenology or the nature of 
interpretation. What unites the composite elements of the model is the demands of 
response. And it has to be equally insisted upon that there is nothing distinctively 
architectural about such elements of response. The literary theory of meaning is not at all 
architectural, but is an absolute requirement of architectural interpretation. Each 
component of response, in the sense of being genre-like, has a propensity to dissociate 
from other genres. But in another much more important sense, in the model proposed 
here, the disparate elements of genre such as 'the philosophical' or 'the allegorical' do 
actually combine or synthesize in the form of the familiar Venn Diagram. Here, 
distinctive and essentialist considerations of genre overlap subject boundaries and 
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produce an exchange of meaning. The closing sense, then, is of an appropriation of 
Gadamer's 'conversation' in which a conversation between beholder and building 
presupposes a conversation between the genres of response. 
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NOTES 
1 A modem painter like Francis Bacon occupies a position wholly opposite to that of 
Lessing. Winckelmann and Lessing both agree that Laocoon's mouth gesture is not a 
scream; ' ... this pain expresses itself without any sign of rage either in his face or posture. 
He does not raise his voice in a terrible scream, which Virgil describes his Laocoon as 
doing; the way in which his mouth is open does not permit it.' Although Lessing thus 
quotes Winckelmann in his opening chapter in order to show the absurdity of speculating 
about the volume-level emitted by a marble sculpture, he does agree fundamental1y that 
Laocoon's capacity to move and exalt the beholder arises from what Lessing describes as 
Winckelmann's recognition of 'noble simplicity and quiet grandeur'. Arguably, there is 
nothing of 'quiet grandeur' about Francis Bacon's 'Screaming Popes' sequence for 
example. Bacon began the sequence from an earlier fascination with clinical mouth 
disease. (See 'Three Figures For The Base Of A Crucifixion', 1947, and Velasquez's 
'Portrait Of Pope Innocent X'.) [Fig 2] The Screaming Popes series is typically 
understood to connote with anxiety, alienation and existential terror, and the fracturing of 
discourse. Bacon's practice often depicted figures in extremis almost as part of his 
painting practice. Yet Bacon's painting is frequently described critically as having its 
own sense of beauty, although overall his oeuvre may not be understood to be concerned 
with traditional notions of the beautifu1. Lessing's ascription to art of a restrained ideal 
and transcendental beauty through expression is in fact modified and made contingent by 
such familiar oxymorons as 'deformed beauty' which attaches to Bacon's work. Bacon's 
acknowledged status as an artist coupled with his frequent depiction of extremis 
compromises Lessing's assertion that imagination and sensibility are deferred by such 
depiction of extremis. The fact that Lessing's aesthetic was produced in an eighteenth 
century Enlightenment context which elevated the transcendentally ideal against the 
natural and real does not alter the fact that transcendental beauty should be context-free, 
universal and literally outside time, or in some sense, timeless, a position contradicted by 
Laocoon's expression of terror. For the visceral in Bacon, see N. Mi11er, the Fugitive 
Body: Bacon's Fistula in 'The Body', Journal Of Philosophy And The Visual Arts, 
Andrew Benjamin Ed, 1993. 
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2 Leonardo's iconic image of the ideal man circumscribed within the circle conforms to 
Vitruvius's rule. 'For if a man be placed flat on his back, with his hands and feet 
extended, and a pair of compasses centred at his navel, the fingers and toes will touch the 
circumference of a circle describes therefrom ... Therefore, since nature has designed the 
human body so that its members are duly proportioned to the frame as a whole, it appears 
that the ancients had good reason for their rule, that in perfect buildings the different 
members must be in exact symmetrical relations to the whole general scheme.' (Book 
Three, Chapter One) 
3 Prior to the Reformation, and beginning in the Eastern Church in the eighth century, 
iconoclasm began under Emperor Leo III and was ended in 843 AD by the Empress 
Theodora when image-breaking was proscribed. 
4 The conflict of interpretations surrounding the origins of the English Civil War such as 
R.H. Tawney's Religion And The Rise O/Capitalism, need not be of direct concern here. 
But what remains important about the emergence of 'modem times' or 'modernity' is its 
intimate association with capitalism, causal or not. Relationships between 'Base and 
Superstructure' are discussed here in the section 'Cultural and Socio-Economic 
Transition' in Chapter Four. 
5 The importance here of Clement Greenberg's treatment of the picture plane and its 
essential flatness in Modernist art cannot be exaggerated. 
Constable, but primarily Turner, had already roughed up their painted surfaces with 
scumbles and in Turner's case, impasto. The French impressionists were then heirs to this 
fascination with the very qualities of the physical, painted surface. In France, the official 
procedures of the Salon declared the surface to be essentially smooth, precisely in order 
to 'enter' the depicted subject in History Painting and other genres. The presence of the 
surface was then perceived as a failure of technique and sensibility. In this art, the picture 
plane, in an act of suspended disbelief, was deep and led the eye of the beholder into the 
picture's narrative. The Impressionists reversed this and celebrated the physical presence 
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of the surface paint. The effect was to bring the picture plane 'closer' to the surface of the 
picture. 
Greenberg argued that the end-point of this historical process would be an art which had 
no subject, would be abstract, avoided narrative and the literary and would be 
fundamentally optical. Such art, which ignored the picture plane (but never figure and 
ground of course) in favour of all-over flatness was perceived to be realised by the 
American Abstract Expressionists, with Jackson PoIlock as its apotheosis. 
6 Perspective was the discovery (or re-discovery) of the depiction of deep space 
'underneath' the picture plane. The depiction of such deep space was primarily achieved 
by the introduction of the vanishing point, and the sensory realisation that empirical 
objects appear to be smaller when viewed from a distance. Hence lines drawn towards the 
vanishing point went 'in' diagonally towards that point and in effect determined the 
'height' of any object depicted so as to suggest distance 'inside' and 'within' the picture 
and not on the surface. 
Once established, perspective became the dominant mode of western art during and after 
the Renaissance and Reformation, a convention which remained wholly hegemonic 
literally up to Picasso's cubism and the advent of Modernism in the 20th century. 
It was nothing less than this a11-powerful dominance of deep space which Greenberg 
contested in the 20th century. 
7 The modern novel is largely thought to begin with Proust's In Search of Lost Time 
which was begun before the First World War. Proust's recall of past time is Bergsonian 
in its quality of compressed and arbitrary narrative passages interrupted by various kinds 
of intellectual speculation separate from the narrative and which declared the book(s) 
non-realist. 
The 19th century novel of social realism stretches in Britain from Dickens, through 
George Eliot and into Henry James and Joseph Conrad in the early 20th century. The 
break with realism is most obvious in Joyce, and Ulysses deploys Greek Myth as the 
structure of the book and so denies narrative realism. Ulysses, more than any other early 
20th century novel opens the, modern novel. 
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8 Peter King The Room to Panic: An Example of Film Criticism and Housing Theory 
2004. For hostile responses to Bachelard as cited see Morley, D. 2000 Home Territories: 
Media, Mobility and Identity. 
9 The structure of Spiral Jetty itself, which embodies allegory and myth, has become 
recognized as the primary emblem of ruined time in Conceptual Art of the postmodern 
(H. Foster et al 2004, 506). 
10 The realist instantaneity and therefore Modernism of Cartier-Bresson's 'decisive 
moment' is in sharp contrast to the contrived photographic procedures of postmodern 
photographers such as Cindy Sherman. Such photographical contrivance no doubt 
conforms to Fried's account of theatricality. Sherman's 'impersonation' of historical 
characters by adopting their persona such as Marilyn Monroe takes a feminist position, 
(R. Krauss in D. Hooker, 1989, 439) but is still nostalgic retrieval and therefore part of 
the postmodern allegorical imperative as Craig Owens's treatment of Sherman makes 
clear. 
11 The Russian Formalists such as Bahktin distinguished between 'fabula' and 'syuzhet' 
as approximating to Aristotle's account of the representation as 'story' and the story's 
representation as 'plot'. For example, see David Bordwell, Narration In The Fiction 
Film, 1985, Chapter Four, 'Principles Of Narration'. 
12 There has perhaps been a certain suspicion, perhaps even hostility to 'Theory' from 
Feminism as a version of hegemonic male identity; ifso, this is quite different from Anti-
or After Theory which is at base, culturally informed. 
13 Speaker/author intention as negotiable by the recipient/reader is a position taken up by 
critical Reception Theory and is dealt with in Chapter Five here under 'Literary Theory'. 
14 Heidegger's account of the sign as implicitly concealed and hidden and unavailable to 
scopic interrogation and which only 'unconceals' as language from object to text should 
be aligned with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's metaphorical treatment of the sign. 
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15 The capacity of both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to suggest that the physical senses 
impinge on objects such as 'hearing' the building or vision as an aspect of indexical 
'touch' can be disconcerting and might seem obfuscatory or mysterious. In fact, these 
perspectives emerge from a thorough-going phenomenological approach which demands 
sensory input constantly in the moment of the beholder's response. The resulting insights 
might then be construed as epiphanies arising from the radical change of viewing-point. 
Such insights, or 'qualia', may indeed be revelatory, but are emphatically not so in any 
religious sense. 
16 Alethic or aletheic (from Greek aletheia: truth). The word, used adjectively, suggests 
possibility (or the grammatically subjunctive) and contingency. That is, Gadamer 
suggests, that in any exchange in a conversation, the emergent meanings from the impact 
of contrary positions generates a new synthesized meaning from both, but which is 
wholly dependent on the context from which the newly available meaning emerges and is 
not a priori. 
17 Chiasmus 'crossing'; under Commutatio (change/interchange) in rhetoric. The logical 
pattern of this rhetorical figure is ABBA. There is a sense of a scissor-movement and the 
transitive 'crossing over', and reversing on the other 'side'. In one sense that may be 
extrapolated from chiasmus, the state of entropy is implied in that the first term is 
'ruined' by the reversal. As a figure, it is typically associated with punning wit. 
Francis bacon, the 20th century painter, (referred to in note I), in a well-known chiasmus 
said: 'Champagne to all my friends and pain to all my sham friends'. 
18 Barthes's 'enonciation' is distinguished from 'enonce' in that it is considered with the 
act of utterance rather than what is actually depicted. Semiologically, practically all the 
examples in Mythologies and Camera Lucida announce or 'utter' potential connotative 
meanIng. 
19 Austin's use of 'force' seems to hinge on the felicity of the 'hereby'. The difference 
between 'I support the proposal' and 'I hereby support the proposal' is its force in the 
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sense of the appropriateness of its felicity. In the present architectural context, a building 
such as Libeskind's Berlin Jewish Museum which is self-consciously infelicitous in the 
fenestrated slashings of its 'skin' would lack (deliberately so) force in its felicitous sense. 
20 The Picturesque was, of course, a rhetorical context. It was concerned with how the 
disposition (Dispositio) of external landscape 'affected' the inner reception by the 
beholder (C. van Eck in J. Birksted, 2000, 246). The inner, private response to the 
external landscape was the Romantic response to the sublime which supplanted the 
Picturesque at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
'But given the rhetorical context for the Picturesque argued here, its location of the 
meaning of architecture outside itself [that is on the beholder], and the various uses of 
painting in architecture and language design, may both be also understood as expressions 
of the rhetorical concern to situate all works of art firmly within human life and 
passions .... works of art that do not in some way refer to the life and history of the 
community for which they are made do not possess any meaning.' (Added parenthesis, C. 
van Eck 2000, 256) 
21 The distinction between 'showing' and telling' as connotation and denotation 
respectively is found in The Rhetoric of the Image in Barthes 1977,36-37. 
22 The nine distinctive features of visual metaphor under 'Salient Features of Visual 
Metaphor' are of foundational importance here. From the 'profanity' of Charles Moore's 
shower in his House doubling as an aedicule to the 'sacred' in Frank Gehry's instigation 
of the Vitra Museum as a metaphor for the church, postmodern architecture signs as 
metaphor, and since the building'S 'text' is imminent or 'invisible' in Merleau-Ponty's 
terms, it is visual metaphor which indicates potential meaning. The proposal of number 
five of these salient features that visual metaphor subsumes a shift from the metonymic 
to the metaphorical, producing the instance of contiguity is of itself fundamental and 
further, relies heavily on Jakobson's studies of aphasia and the mutual interdependence of 
these two figures. 
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23 'Sir, knowing how doubtfully all Allegories may be construed, and this book of mine 
which I have entitled The Fairie Queene, being a continued Allegory, or darke 
conceite ... ' 
24 There is an intriguing historical reversal here. In the early 19th century with the 
opening of Romanticism the allegorical figure, which had been a dominant rhetorical 
trope from the Graeco-Roman period right up to the 18th century, becomes marginalized 
in favour of the symbol. Symbolist poetry (Mallarme, Rimbaud, Verlaine et at) then 
persists into the 20th century and into the opening of Modernism. 
During the opening of the postmodern in the mid-20th century, allegory once more 
assumes an imperative, albeit radically transmogrified, in the manner discussed here of 
the allegorical postmodern, and completes this historical volte-face. 
25 'In the course of our reflections we have come to see that understanding always 
involves something like applying the text to be understood to the interpreter's present 
situation.' (Gadamer 1993, 308) 
'All understanding is interpretation, and all interpretation takes place in the medium of a 
language that allows the object to come into words and yet is at the same time the 
interpreter's own language ... The linguisticality of understanding is the concretion of 
historically effected consciousness.' (389, original emphasis) 
'To think historically means, in fact, to perform the transposition that the concepts of the 
past undergo when we try to think in them. To think historically always involves 
mediating bctwcen those ideas and one's own thinking. To try to escape from one's own 
concepts in interpretation is not only impossible but manifestly absurd. To interpret 
means precisely to bring one's preconceptions into play so that the text's meaning can 
really be made to speak to us.' (397, original emphasis) 
Gadamer's points here are obviously fundamental to the model of interpretation which 
this dissertation proposes. 
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26 Frank Lloyd-Wright's iconic house is often assumed to be Falling Water because of 
the drama of its setting, but in fact the earlier Robie House, Chicago, has been a much 
greater influence on earlier Modernist architecture. 
Its extended and exaggerated cantilever created the long, low building favoured by early 
Modernism, and in conjunction with Wright's low Prairie Houses heavily influenced 
early Gehry. 
27 Although outside the present scope, the landscape setting of architecture is itself 
'coded' between the commonplace 'scenic' and a complex previous history which 
actually produced it. Thus an attractive arrangement of trees and water may be the 
remnant of the Picturesque in what was an eighteenth century park. Or an arrangement of 
fields apparently constituting 'the scenery' may be what is left of a mediaeval open field 
system. Such a list could indeed be comprehensive and represent another 'doubling' in 
which a lost landscape, hidden under a modernizing present, becomes the site of the 
allegorical in a way which invokes the temporal palimpsest. 
Chapters like 'The Landscape Today' in Hoskin's groundbreaking The Making Of The 
English Landscape (W.G. Hoskins 1955, 298-303) or 'What Does It All Mean?' in 
Michael Aston's Interpreting The Landscape (M. Aston 1985, 149-154) although not 
addressed to allegorical interpretation, nevertheless implicate nostalgia for a lost past 
which still signifies in a present characterized by intense change. 
28 Benjamin Lee Whorf proposed that it is language which is the shaper of ideas. In 
terms of language and thinking, cognitive processes do not become tangible in language, 
but are causally produced by language use. Thinking is determined by language; this 
usually known as The Whorfian Hypothesis (Max Black 1972, 96-100). 
29 Christian Norberg-Schulz, although only writing marginal comments on the relation 
between architectural form and language, nevertheless denies the autonomy of 
architectural meaning. His method is then to introduce phenomenologically different 
viewpoints from different genres. Hence we are surprised to meet both poetry and 
references to painting and sculpture. It might be suggested that Norberg-Schulz's cross-
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genre referencing as critical theory is a precursor to Gilles Deleuze's later formulation of 
the rhizome. 
30 It is not clear, in terms of similes, why Ronchamp should be considered as boat-like. 
Nevertheless, nave originally signified 'ship' (Latin navis, ship). W. J. Curtis asserts that 
the roof-form was derived from a crab shell (W.J. Curtis 1990, 657), so that the nautical 
similes apparently persist. 
31 The concept of architectural 'parlante' which is associated with Ledoux and the 
Revolutionary Period involved the idea of 'architectural speaking' as simile. That is, the 
shape and form of the building indicated its function. Architectural parI ante then becomes 
in Robert Venturi's typology in Complexity And Contradiction another version of 'the 
duck'. (http://en. wikipedia. orglwiki/Architecture...,pariante 17. 12.05) 
32 Objectively, 'philosophy' would reply that the 'part of itself which is non-
metaphorical is the logical proposition itself, even though its terms may well be 
metaphorically inflected. 
33 The consecration of the bread and wine in the Roman Catholic tradition is as 'real 
presence' (transubstantiation) and in the Anglican tradition as a shared meaning 
(consubstantiation). That these rituals are vestigial pagan remnants is a speculation 
outside the present remit. 
34 The link between gestural expression in Abstract Expressionism and theatricality has 
been made specific by one of its principal practitioners, Mark Rothko. 'I think of my 
pictures as dramas; the shapes in the pictures are performers ... Neither the action nor the 
actors can be anticipated, or described in advance.' Quoted in Foster, Krauss et al 2004, 
350. 
35 The statement here that Gehry's Bilbao Guggenheim is mimetic is not qualitatively 
normative and jUdgemental. It simply documents the fact that the building is a pretty 
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spectacular exemplar of Fried's theory of contrivance and theatricality. It is most 
important to re-emphasize that a model of interpretation is uninterested in comparative 
judgements, but is able to comment on significance, which represents an altogether 
different category. 
Despite the earlier sculptural curvi-Iinearity of the Vitra Museum, it is the phenomenal 
branding power at Bilbao that gets bending and folding and the curve into an 
international context and becomes hegemonic. 
However, the concealed and hidden references In Ginger and Fred in Prague are 
aesthetically more daring and risk-taking and amplify powerfully the elegiac and parodic 
irony which is such an insistent theme in poststructuralist architecture. 
36 Virtual computer-generated buildings are created by software such as Photoshop and 
other CAD programs such as '3-D Synthesizer' or 'Alias/Wavefront'. See J.K. Waters 
2003, 'Waveform Architecture and Digital Design', 50-85. 
37 Zaha Hadid's practice is multi-form. For example on the one hand is the geometrical 
wedge of the Wolfsburg building and on the other, the extruded bending and folding to be 
seen in the Olympic Pool, Stratford, London. As a celebration of 'difference' both 
buildings might be seen to pun on gender where the Wolfburg's assertive 'masculinity' 
compares with the more 'female' flowing forms at the Olympic Pool which could also be 
seen as commensurate with the flow of water. 
38 The obvious reference in the Garden of Exile at the Jewish Museum is not only to the 
Jewish biblical exile in Egypt, but equally of course to the garden of Eden and the loss of 
innocence. Here the serpent as Corruptor inflicts not only the loss of innocence but also 
the incalculable horrors ofthe holocaust and where 'loss of innocence' assumes an almost 
mythic poignancy. 
Another example of the form of the building generating allegorical meaning is the Bejing 
Olympic Stadium. Its vast lattice roof represents not just a simple popular simile such as 
'bird nest' according to its Chinese architect in collaboration with Herzog and Meuron, 
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but is emblematic of the emerging openness of Chinese society itself and as such 
therefore casts a commentary and a kind of allegorical exegesis. 
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Fig 27: Daniel Libeskind Jewish Museum, Berlin 1988-99. B. Sneider 1999, Jewish 
Museum Berlin 
Fig 28: Daniel Libeskind Imperial War Museum of the North 1997-2001. D. Libeskind 
2000, The Space of Encounter 
Fig 29: Daniel Libeskind Derrver Art Museum Extension 2000. D. Libeskind 2000, The 
Space of Encounter 
Fig 30: Daniel Libeskind: Victoria & Albert Museum Spiral 1996; non-built. D. 
Libeskind 2000, The Space of Encounter 
Fig 31: Daniel Libeskind Berlin Museum Plan. D. Libeskind 2000, The Space of 
Encounter 
Fig 32: Daniel Libeskind Jewish Museum Berlin; fenestration. Kenchiku Bunka Vol 50, 
1995 
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